

**HURRICANE KATRINA: THE ROLES OF U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AGENCY LEADERSHIP**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 10, 2006

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs



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HURRICANE KATRINA: THE ROLES OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY LEADERSHIP

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2006

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Collins, Stevens, Coleman, Bennett, Warner, Lieberman, Akaka, Dayton, Lautenberg, and Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order.

Good morning. Today, in our 18th hearing on Hurricane Katrina, the Committee will examine how the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA coordinated and led the Federal preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

Our first panel this morning consists of Michael Brown and Patrick Rhode, who were FEMA's Director and Acting Deputy Director in the days leading up to and following the storm.

As Katrina neared the Gulf Coast, Mr. Brown dispatched to Louisiana, leaving Mr. Rhode as the top ranking official at FEMA headquarters. Today we will discuss their leadership at the agency during this enormously challenging period.

Our second panel consists of two senior officials at the Department of Homeland Security headquarters. Robert Stephan is the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection and one of the chief architects of the National Response Plan.

Matthew Broderick runs the Department's Homeland Security Operations Center, which serves as the eyes and ears of top DHS officials, particularly during times of crisis.

Secretary Chertoff relied heavily on Mr. Stephan and Mr. Broderick during Katrina's aftermath. We will discuss their roles and their views of FEMA from the top of the organizational chart.

Our panels today separate witnesses from a Federal agency, FEMA, from those of its parent organization, DHS. The separation is deliberate. It reflects, in part, the differing perspectives on Katrina that we have heard consistently from officials of the two entities. It also reflects tensions between the two that predate the

storm—tensions over resources, roles, and responsibilities within the Department.

This tension is clear in Mr. Brown's response when Committee investigators asked him why FEMA was not better prepared for Katrina. Mr. Brown responded "its mission had been marginalized. Its response capability had been diminished. There's the whole clash of cultures between DHS's mission to prevent terrorism and FEMA's mission to respond to and to prepare for responding to disasters of whatever nature."

By almost any measure, FEMA's response to Katrina has to be judged a failure. I must say that I have come to this conclusion with a sense of remorse because I've been struck throughout this investigation by the extraordinary efforts of many FEMA professionals in the field as well as some FEMA and DHS officials at headquarters who literally worked around the clock to try to help bring relief to the people in the Gulf States.

But the response was riddled with missed opportunities, poor decision making, and failed leadership.

The responsibility for FEMA's and, for that matter, the Department's failed response is shared. While DHS's playbook appears designed to distance the Department's leaders and headquarters as much as possible from FEMA, the Department's leaders must answer for decisions that they made or failed to make that contributed to the problems.

One problem that manifested itself in a variety of ways was the Department's lack of preparedness for the Katrina catastrophe. Instead of springing into action or, better yet, acting before the storm made landfall, the Department appears to have moved haltingly. And as a result, key decisions were either delayed or made based on questionable and, in some cases, erroneous assumptions.

The day after the storm, for example, Secretary Chertoff named Michael Brown as the lead Federal official for the response effort. At the same time, the Secretary declared Hurricane Katrina an incident of national significance, which is the designation that triggers the National Response Plan. The National Response Plan, in turn, is the comprehensive national roadmap that guides the Federal response to catastrophes.

The Secretary's action led many to question why the incident of national significance declaration had not been made earlier. But in reality, the declaration itself was meaningless because by the plain terms of the National Response Plan Hurricane Katrina had become an incident of national significance 3 days earlier when the President declared an emergency in Louisiana.

The lack of awareness of this fundamental tenet of the National Response Plan raises questions about whether DHS leadership was truly ready for a catastrophe of this magnitude, and I think it helps explain the Department's slow, sometimes hesitant, response to the storm.

Similarly, we will learn today that FEMA's leaders failed to take steps that they knew could improve FEMA's ability to respond more effectively and quickly to a catastrophe. In the year or so preceding Katrina, Mr. Brown was presented with two important and highly critical assessments of FEMA's structure and capabilities. Both included recommendations for improvement.

The first was a memorandum produced by a cadre of FEMA's top professional operatives known as the Federal Coordinating Officers. Among other things, the memo warns of unprepared emergency response teams that had no funding, zero funding, for training, exercises, or equipment.

The other was a study conducted by the Mitre Corporation of FEMA's capabilities. The study, commissioned by Mr. Brown, was designed to answer such questions as what's preventing FEMA from responding and recovering as quickly as possible. The Mitre study is eerily predictive of the major problems that would plague the response to Hurricane Katrina. The study points out a "lack of adequate and consistent situational awareness across the enterprise," a prediction that became reality when you look at all of the missed opportunities to respond to the levee breaks; an "inadequate ability to control inventory and track assets," which we saw that over and over again with essential commodities not reaching the destination in time; and undefined and misunderstood "standard operating procedures."

Despite this study, key problems were simply not resolved and, as a result, opportunities to strengthen FEMA prior to Katrina were missed.

As this Committee winds down its lengthy series of hearings and more than 5 months of investigations into the preparedness for and response to Hurricane Katrina, we increasingly reflect upon what can be learned from the thousands of facts we have gathered. One thing that I have found is a strong correlation between effective leadership and effective response. Unfortunately, I have also found the converse to be true.

Senator Lieberman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, very much, Madam Chairman.

Thanks not only for your excellent opening statement, but thanks also for the leadership that you have given this investigation over 5 months and now almost 20 public hearings. In this now my 18th year privileged to be a Member of the U.S. Senate, I've not been in a more thorough nonpartisan and I'd say important investigation. I thank you for setting the tone and showing exactly the leadership that you just described in another sense.

And I thank our joint staff for the extraordinary work that they have done interviewing more than 200 witnesses, compiling and obtaining hundreds of thousands of documents.

Today and Tuesday, we're going to hear directly from the top leadership of both the Federal Emergency Management Agency and its parent, the Department of Homeland Security. Our hearings are now reaching the concluding phase. To date I think these hearings have set—the previous hearings have set the stage for the panels we're going to hear today and Tuesday. We've broken much new ground, and today and Tuesday we have some tough and important questions to ask.

In my opinion, our investigation has shown a gross lack of planning and preparation by both the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA. And that guaranteed that the response to Hurricane Katrina, or for that matter any other catastrophe that might

have happened, was doomed to be uncoordinated, inadequate, and therefore more damaging than it should have been.

We have heard from a large number of witnesses who have spoken of the full range of failures during Katrina. We have learned of one failure after another in evacuation, search and rescue, law and order, emergency medical treatment, and deployment of assets.

And we have learned that the Federal Government was simply not prepared to overcome these predictable challenges in this predictable and predicted hurricane. Even those responsible acknowledge that they did not meet the desperate needs of the people of the Gulf Coast.

FEMA and DHS officials have told us that in interviews and testimony and in evidence gathered by our staff. I want to read just a few of those statements that are on that chart.

From Michael Lowder, FEMA's Deputy Director of Response, who in an August 27, 2005, e-mail 2 days before Katrina hit landfall said, "If this is the New Orleans scenario"—which was the way they described the big hurricane arriving—"we are already way behind."

From Scott Wells, a FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer, "This was a catastrophic disaster. We don't have the structure. We don't have the people for catastrophic disaster. It's that simple."

From FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer Bill Lokey, the top man for FEMA in Louisiana, "Communications and coordination was lacking. Pre-planning was lacking. We were not prepared for this."

From former FEMA Director Michael Brown, who we'll be hearing from today, when asked the question, "Before Katrina, was FEMA ready for this kind of catastrophe?" Mr. Brown said simply and directly, "I don't think so."

And finally from Secretary Chertoff, who we will hear from Tuesday, "But I also think Katrina tested our planning and our planning fell short."

The fact is that when DHS, the Department of Homeland Security, was created in 2002 in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, I said, and I know that I spoke for most Members of Congress, that I hoped to see a coordinated, consolidated, and accountable Department of Homeland Security. In this investigation, unfortunately, we have seen so little effective coordination and consolidation that we must hold the Department of Homeland Security accountable and ask urgently that it do a lot better.

We hoped that the Department would quickly evolve into a world-class agency that had the planning, personnel, and materials in place to respond swiftly and effectively in a disaster, natural or terrorist. Katrina showed us that the Department of Homeland Security has a lot of work to do on itself.

Despite ample warnings that New Orleans is a bowl covered by inadequate levees that would be overtopped or breached in a big hurricane, despite the specific warnings of the mock Hurricane Pam exercise done a year before Katrina hit that government at all levels was unprepared to protect New Orleans from the expected big hurricane, and despite the specific mentions of emergency preparedness and rescue responsibilities in the National Response

Plan of January 19, 2005, the fact is when Katrina hit America's Government was largely unprepared to protect the people of the Gulf Coast.

Nature hit New Orleans hard but also gave its people a break by hitting hardest 15 miles to the east. Because of the failure to effectively evacuate the poor and infirm who could not evacuate themselves, if Katrina had hit New Orleans head on the death toll probably would have been in the tens of thousands, as the Hurricane Pam exercise had predicted.

Here are a few things that came to pass. In the days before the storm, FEMA failed to pre-stage personnel in New Orleans, other than a single public affairs employee, or move adequate amounts of crucial supplies of food, water, and medical supplies to the scene.

The Department of Homeland Security failed to implement the catastrophic incident annex to the National Response Plan early enough, which would have triggered a more aggressive timely Federal response.

The Department of Homeland Security failed to develop an effective plan to maintain accurate situation assessments at the Homeland Security Operations Center, which was set up to be the Nation's nerve center during a disaster. That failure led to the ignoring of reports that the levees were being breached and overtopped and that the city had flooded with people already trapped in attics and on rooftops.

FEMA was late in bringing in search and rescue teams and then pulled them out for security reasons, even though other agencies continued to stay and do search and rescue.

DHS failed to stand up until the day after landfall the Inter-agency Incident Management Group, that senior level interagency group charged with helping to coordinate the Federal response to a catastrophe that was required once the President declared an emergency on Saturday morning.

Yesterday we heard from General Bennett C. Landreneau of the Louisiana National Guard who told us that the buses promised by FEMA before the storm for post-landfall evacuation and then at different points again on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday after the storm did not arrive until Thursday, and that delay unfortunately contributed to the human suffering that the world saw at the Superdome and the convention center. All those mistakes meant time was lost and lives were threatened or lost.

Time is, obviously, everything in a crisis like Katrina or in, God forbid, a terrorist attack. New Orleans Police Department Superintendent Riley told us that earlier this week, and he's right. People were drowning in flooded streets and yards, breaking onto their rooftops with axes to await rescue, starving in attics, and feeling that they had been abandoned and losing all hope as their ventilators and medical support systems failed for lack of power. Those lucky enough to escape made it to the Superdome or Convention Center, and we all saw the grim pictures of human neglect there.

Because timing and situational awareness is so central to the response to every catastrophe, today's hearing is going to look at what the most senior officials in the Federal Government knew about the flooding of New Orleans and the breaking of the levees and when they knew it. A little less than a week after Katrina

made landfall Secretary Chertoff said, "It was on Tuesday that the levee, it may have been overnight Monday to Tuesday, that the levee started to break. And it was midday Tuesday that I became aware of the fact that there was no possibility of plugging the gap and that essentially the lake was going to start to drain into the city. I think that second catastrophe really caught everybody by surprise."

We're going to talk to Secretary Chertoff about that next Tuesday. Today we will ask some of his senior staff how the news media, including a New Orleans radio station early Monday morning, numerous Federal agencies, and the American Red Cross could be aware of growing and catastrophic floods in New Orleans all day Monday, August 29, the day of landfall, while the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security responsible for disaster response somehow didn't know about it.

In our exhibit book we have Exhibit Q¹ that details more than 25 reports of flooding, levee breaches, and desperate citizens seeking refuge from rising floodwaters that began coming in as early as 8:30 a.m. on Monday, August 29. A selection of them are shown on the boards here to my left. They include, at 9:14 a.m., the National Weather Service issues a flash flood warning reporting "that a levee breach occurred along the Industrial Canal at Tennessee Street. Three to eight feet of water is expected due to the breach."

Then 2 hours later at 11:13, the White House Homeland Security Council issues a report that says in part, "Flooding is significant throughout the region and a levee in New Orleans has reportedly been breached, sending six to eight feet of water throughout the Ninth Ward area of the city."

The Homeland Security's operations center reports that "Due to rising water in the Ninth Ward, residents are in their attics and on their roofs." That's a quote from White House Homeland Security Council at 11:13.

Then at 8:34 in the evening, Monday, the Army Corps of Engineers issued a situation report that "there is flooding in St. Bernard Parish with reports of water up to the roofs of the homes." And that "all Jefferson and Orleans Parish pumping stations are inoperable as of 29 August."

Finally, Marty Bahamonde, I believe our first witness, certainly one of the first witnesses last fall before the Committee, the FEMA employee who Director Brown, I believe, had dispatched to New Orleans, was there early, testified that he had taken a flight on a Coast Guard helicopter over New Orleans at approximately 6:30 p.m. Eastern time. A report from 10:30 p.m. Monday night that "there is a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to flow into the city, an estimated two-thirds to 75 percent of the city is underwater. Hundreds of people were observed on the balconies and roofs of a major apartment complex in the city. A few bodies were seen floating in the water and the Coast Guard pilots also reported seeing bodies but there are no details on locations." That's the end of the report from Marty Bahamonde.

¹ Exhibit Q appears in the Appendix on page 205.

He took this picture that afternoon, and it shows a great American city underwater, and still somehow the highest officials at the Department of Homeland Security and perhaps at the White House were under the impression as Monday, August 29, ended that the city had dodged a bullet.

Madam Chairman, we've got to ask some tough questions today because we've got to have answers if we're to make the changes that we all want to make at DHS. In the early aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina debacle, former FEMA Director Michael Brown was singularly blamed for the inadequate Federal Government response. Our investigation confirms, in my opinion, in fact that Mr. Brown did not do a lot of what he should have done. But he was not alone. In fact, there was a massive failure by government at all levels and by those who lead it to prepare and respond as they had a responsibility to do.

In the case of the Federal Government response to Katrina, with the exceptions, proud exceptions, of the National Weather Service and the U.S. Coast Guard, there was a shocking, consequential and pervasive lack of preparation, response, and leadership.

Mr. Brown, I understand that you are prepared this morning to answer our questions fully and truthfully. I appreciate that very much. I thank you for it. In doing so, I believe you will be serving the public interest and this Committee's nonpartisan interest in finding out exactly why the Federal Government failed so badly in its preparations and response to Hurricane Katrina so that together we can make sure it never happens again.

Katrina has passed, but the clock is reset and ticking again. We know that we will have to respond to another disaster, natural or terrorist. We cannot and will not let the clock run out on us again.

Thank you very much.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you Senator. Thank you for your generous comments.

Our first witness panel this morning includes the top two FEMA leaders at the time of Hurricane Katrina's landfall. Michael Brown was the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, known as FEMA, from March 2003 until he resigned from that position in September 2005.

Patrick Rhode was Chief of Staff at FEMA from April 2003 until recently. At the time of Hurricane Katrina Mr. Rhode was also serving as the Acting Deputy Director of FEMA. Soon after that he returned to his former position as Chief of Staff.

I would ask that the witnesses rise so I can administer the oath.

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. BROWN. I do.

Mr. RHODE. I do.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

Mr. Brown, I understand that you have some brief remarks that you would like to make.

**TESTIMONY OF THE HON. MICHAEL D. BROWN, FORMER
UNDER SECRETARY FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE AND DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGE-
MENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

Mr. BROWN. I do, Chairman Collins. Thank you.

In 1989, a congressman wrote a letter to the *Washington Times*. That letter said that there is a fatal flaw if we separate preparedness from response. That Congressman's name was Tom Ridge. We reached that fatal flaw in 2003 when FEMA was folded into the Department of Homeland Security. I would encourage the Committee to look at a 1978 study done by the National Governors Association in which—I'll quote very briefly—"as the task of the projects were pursued, it became evident that the major finding of this study is that many State emergency operations are fragmented. This is not only because uncoordinated Federal programs encourage State fragmentation, but because a strong relationship of long-term recovery and mitigation of future disasters must be tied to preparedness and response for more immediate disasters and that is not always adequately understood."

Madam Chairman, I tell you that what occurred after FEMA was folded into the Department of Homeland Security, there was a cultural clash which didn't recognize the absolute inherent science of preparing for disaster, responding to it, mitigating against future disasters, and recovering from disasters. And any time that you break that cycle of preparing, responding, recovering, and mitigating, you're doomed to failure. And the policies and the decisions that were implemented by DHS put FEMA on a path of failure. And I think the evidence that we'll have before you today will show the actions that were taken that caused that failure, and I beg this Committee to take corrective action to fix that so these disasters don't occur in the future. Thank you.

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Rhode.

**TESTIMONY OF PATRICK J. RHODE,¹ FORMER ACTING DEPUTY
DIRECTOR AND CHIEF OF STAFF, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY**

Mr. RHODE. Good morning, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, Senators. I would like to make a very brief opening statement, if I could.

My name is Patrick Rhode. I served as Chief of Staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, part of the Department of Homeland Security, from April 2003 until January 2006. I served under both former Director Brown and the current Acting Director David Paulison. I'm happy to be appearing before you today voluntarily as you continue your important work in reviewing the collective governmental response to Hurricane Katrina and assessing possible changes in emergency management.

At the outset, I would like to observe, if I could, that Hurricane Katrina was a truly catastrophic event. It was an American tragedy on numerous levels. The magnitude of the disaster was unlike anything we had previously faced as a Nation. The storm com-

¹ The prepared statement of Mr. Rhode appears in the Appendix on page 82.

promised 90,000 square miles of the U.S. Gulf Coast, an area almost the size of Great Britain.

On the professional level of emergency management, it was unprecedented. On the personal level, my heart went out to those who were suffering, and indeed, my heart still goes out to those who continue to deal with the aftermath of Katrina.

Many people in the emergency management community, including myself, tried to do the very best they could under very difficult circumstances. The dedicated public servants working on this issue at the Federal, State, and local level were doing their very best to help as many people as they could under the existing framework for emergency management.

As in all things, there are lessons to be learned from this experience. I hope that these hearings will produce just such learning and lead to the creation of new legislation that can improve on the current system of disaster management. If we can apply those lessons so as to make things better for the next emergency situation, I want to do all that I can to contribute appropriately to that effort.

As you know, in addition to appearing here today voluntarily, I have fully cooperated with your staffs by participating willingly in several interviews with them. In addition, I would like respectfully to note that any statements I offer today in response to questions about how to improve the emergency management system are the opinions of one private citizen. As I sit before you today, I am no longer a government employee but have returned to private life with my wife and 6-month-old daughter. I do not and cannot speak for FEMA. Anything I have to offer is my own personal opinion for whatever the Committee may deem it to be worth. And I want to take care to be clear that it does not reflect the official views of the agency or the Federal Government.

In short, I applaud the Committee for taking on the challenges of assessing what kind of support is needed for and what changes should be made to the country's emergency management system. I am hopeful that together we can contribute to enhancements and improvements that best assist disaster victims in the future.

With that, I welcome any questions or comments you may have.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Rhode.

Mr. Brown, in my opening statement I mentioned a study that you commissioned from the Mitre Corporation. It's under Exhibit 2 in the exhibit book.¹ Mitre Corporation gave you its findings on March 2005, and I'd like to read just some of the key findings of this consultant:

"Unclear lines of responsibility lead to inconsistent accountability. There is no deputy to you with operational experience and there are too many political appointees. Not enough senior management emergency experts. Lack of adequate and consistent situational awareness across the enterprise."

I also mention that earlier in 2004 that a group of senior FEMA operational professionals, the Federal Coordinating Officers cadre, wrote a memo to you outlining their grave concerns. The memo cautions of unprepared teams and zero funding for training, exercises, and team equipment. It is suggested reestablishing a single

¹ Exhibit 2 appears in the Appendix on page 303.

response and recovery division at FEMA to facilitate the refocusing that is necessary to regain some of the efficiency that has been lost at FEMA.

We've received testimony that in response to both of these warnings, which were very explicit in identifying serious problems within FEMA, that you did not take any action.

My first question for you is, what action did you take in response to the warnings from these senior career people and the outside consultant?

Mr. BROWN. Madam Chairman, the first thing I think the Committee needs to understand is that I indeed did commission those studies. In fact, I asked for both of those documents from the FCOs and from the Mitre Corporation. We had to literally go scrape together the money just to get the initial work done by Mitre. But I had come to this conclusion: After 3 years of fighting, the articles you see in the *Washington Post* about my attempts to try to get the FEMA mission put back on track and how that was rebuffed consistently by the Department of Homeland Security, I'd reached this conclusion: That in order for FEMA to work effectively, I had to have something that would give a roadmap to either future FEMA directors, because I was intending to leave, and/or to the Department of Homeland Security other than me saying it, that would point out these problems.

As I said, we had to fight to get the money just to do the Mitre study. Once we received the Mitre study, we were in the process of trying to figure how to complete that, get that into a document that would say, here's what we need to do, A, B, C, so I could present that to Secretary Ridge and then Secretary Chertoff to implement those. We were never given the money. We were never given the resources. We were never given the opportunity to implement any of those recommendations.

Chairman COLLINS. So you're testifying that you were rebuffed in your efforts to remedy these problems by the Department of Homeland Security. Did you ever discuss these concerns about budget authority, organization, personnel with individuals at the White House?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, ma'am, I did.

Chairman COLLINS. With whom did you discuss those concerns?

Mr. BROWN. I discussed those concerns with several members of the President's senior staff.

Chairman COLLINS. Would you identify with whom you discussed those concerns?

Mr. BROWN. Before I do, Madam Chairman, may I just make a few comments and ask for the Committee's recommendation?

Chairman COLLINS. Certainly.

Mr. BROWN. On February 6, 2006, my counsel Andy Lester of Lester, Loving and Davies sent to Harriet Miers, Counsel to the President, a letter requesting direction for what I should do when or if this kind of question is posed to me by the Committee. Like Patrick, I'm a private citizen. The President has the right to invoke Executive privilege in which confidential communications between his senior advisers are not subject to public scrutiny or discussion.¹

¹ The letter from Mr. Lester (Exhibit 1) appears in the Appendix on page 298.

It's my belief, Madam Chairman, that I don't have the right of Executive privilege, that I cannot invoke that. Yet I understand that the President, the White House, the Executive is a co-equal branch of government and that right of Executive privilege resides with the President.

I also recognize that as a private citizen I am here to truthfully and honestly answer any questions that you may ask. So in response to the letter, which did not—and I want to make sure that we understand, the letter did not request that I be granted Executive privilege. The letter requested guidance on what the other equal branch of government wanted me to say or not say when these kinds of questions were posed. So despite reports in the press to the contrary, the letter speaks for itself. It did not request Executive privilege but guidance.

I received that guidance by letter again to counsel, to Mr. Lester, from White House Counsel Harriet Miers in a letter dated February 9, 2006. And I'll just read you the last paragraph:

"The President's views regarding these Executive Branch interests have not changed. I appreciate that your client is sensitive to the interests implicated by potential disclosure of confidential communications to which he was a party as a senior official in the Administration as reflected in his recent responses to Congressional committees and their staffs, and request that he observe his past practices with respect to those communications."

In my opinion, Chairman Collins, the letter does not answer our request for direction on what is to be done. So I am here as a private citizen stuck between two equal branches of government, one which is requesting that they're not going to invoke Executive privilege but that I respect the confidentiality of the concept of Executive privilege. And on the other hand, appearing before you, again as a co-equal branch of government, under oath, sworn to tell the truth, without guidance from either one. So Madam Chairman, I would ask you for guidance on what you would like Michael Brown, private citizen of the United States, to do in this regard.

Chairman COLLINS. Does the letter that you have from the White House Counsel direct you to assert Executive privilege with respect to your conversations with senior Administration officials?

Mr. BROWN. It does not, and nor do I believe that I have the right to assert that privilege on behalf of the President. I am a private citizen.

Chairman COLLINS. Has the White House Counsel orally directed you to assert Executive privilege with respect to those conversations you've had with senior Administration officials?

Mr. BROWN. They have not to me, and to the best of my knowledge, they have not directed that to my counsel either. That's correct.

Chairman COLLINS. These conversations clearly could be subject to an assertion of Executive privilege. In fact, if such a privilege were to be asserted by the White House, I would, in all likelihood, rule that the privilege applied to those conversations and I would instruct you not to answer the questions so that we could further explore the privilege issue with the White House.

However, in the case of conversations between the presidential advisers, the privilege is for the Executive branch to assert, not the

legislative branch. And because you have testified that the White House Counsel's Office has chosen not to assert this privilege, there is no basis for you to decline to answer the question about your conversations with presidential advisers. So I would direct you to respond to the question.

Senator STEVENS. Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Stevens.

Senator STEVENS. Has anyone contacted the staff or yourself from the White House requesting that Executive privilege be recognized in this hearing?

Chairman COLLINS. Yes, I had a lengthy discussion last night with the White House Counsel in which I advised her to either send Mr. Brown a clear letter asserting Executive privilege or to send it to this Committee or to have a member of the White House Counsel's Office present today to object to questions, and Ms. Miers declined to do either.

Senator STEVENS. I just want to say for the record, as a former general counsel of an Executive department, I believe Executive privilege is in the best interest of the country, and in a situation like this, if this witness testifies and there's a difference of opinion, then we're faced with a question of whether the White House wants to send someone down to challenge the statements that have been made. I think it's a very difficult ground we're on. I don't know where Mr. Brown is going, but it does worry me that there is a legitimate basis for Executive privilege. If they've not asserted it to you, then that's their problem.

Chairman COLLINS. The Senator is correct, and I invited the White House to provide me with that assertion last night. They declined to do so. I invited the White House to have an attorney present to make the assertion. I have reviewed the letter, and we will put both the letter from Mr. Brown's lawyer and Ms. Miers' response into the record. And the letter does not assert the Executive privilege.¹

Senator STEVENS. Is there White House counsel present?

Chairman COLLINS. There is not a White House counsel present that I am aware of. I suspect there are White House staffers here however.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Madam Chairman, if I may, first I wanted to tell you I both appreciate and support your ruling in the context of—even if Executive privilege had been asserted, we are a co-equal branch of government, and in this case, we are doing an investigation on a totally non-partisan basis that goes to the heart of the public safety of the American people. So we have an interest in obtaining the truth. We're not out to get anybody. We're out to get the truth.

That would be my opinion even if Executive privilege had been asserted, but Executive privilege has not been asserted, and therefore I think the privilege and responsibility, let alone the right, of Congress as representatives of the American people to get the whole truth about Katrina really is the priority value that we have

¹ The letter from Ms. Miers appears in the Appendix on page 334.

to honor. I thank you, Madam Chairman, for doing exactly that in your ruling.

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Brown, I would direct you to answer the question, and I am going to reclaim the time that I had before we had to resolve this issue.

Mr. BROWN. Chairman Collins, I'm happy to answer those questions. Could you restate the question? [Laughter.]

Chairman COLLINS. I asked you with whom you talked at the White House about the budget authority and personnel problems that you perceived were hindering your ability to carry out your mission.

Mr. BROWN. At various times I had conversations with the Deputy White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten before he moved over to OMB. And I had numerous conversations with Deputy White House Chief of Staff Joe Hagin and occasionally conversations with Chief of Staff Andy Card.

I've also had conversations with both former White House Homeland Security Adviser General John Gordon and with the current Homeland Security Adviser Fran Townsend.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Brown, Exhibit 6 is a series of e-mails about conditions in New Orleans on Monday morning.¹ We know from testimony before this Committee that Marty Bahamonde of FEMA first received a report of the levees breaching on Monday morning at about 11 o'clock. He later in the day overflew the area and saw it firsthand.

The e-mails also talk about all of the other problems in the city. By 10 o'clock on that Monday morning, August 29, you had received a report from Mr. Bahamonde that there was already severe flooding in the area, that the water level was "up to the second floor of the two-story houses, that people were trapped in attics, and that the pumps for the levees were starting to fail."

What action did you take in response to that information and to pass that information along to the Secretary of Homeland Security?

Mr. BROWN. Two things, Chairman Collins. First and foremost, I alerted headquarters as to those reports and asked them to get in contact with Marty to confirm those reports.

And I also put a call in and spoke to, I believe it was, Deputy Chief of Staff Hagin on at least two occasions on that day to inform him of what was going on.

Chairman COLLINS. Was there anyone else that you called at the White House to inform them of these developments?

Mr. BROWN. It would have been either Andy Card or Joe Hagin.

Chairman COLLINS. DHS officials tell us that they did not know of the severity of the situation in New Orleans until Tuesday morning. That's almost 24 hours after you received the information that I referred to about the severe flooding in New Orleans. They also assert that they believe you failed to make sure that they were getting this very critical information.

I'd like you to respond to that criticism.

Mr. BROWN. First and foremost, I find it a little disingenuous that DHS would claim that they were not getting that information because FEMA held continuous video telephone conferences—I'll

¹ Exhibit 6 appears in the Appendix on page 331.

refer to them as VTCs—in which at least once a day if not several times a day we would be on conference calls and video calls to make certain that everyone had situational awareness. Now I'm sitting in Baton Rouge, so I'm not sure at all times who is on the video conference, on the VTC, but the record indicates that on numerous occasions at least Deputy Secretary Jackson and at least Matthew Broderick or Bob Stephan, someone from the HSOC, the Homeland Security Operations Center, is in on those conversations, on those VTCs. So for them to now claim that they didn't have awareness of it I think is just baloney. They should have had awareness of it because they were receiving the same information that we were.

It's also my understanding that Mr. Rhode or someone else on his behalf sent an e-mail either directly to the DHS Chief of Staff or perhaps to the HSOC about that information.

But in terms of my responsibility, much like I had operated successfully in Florida, my obligation was to the White House and to make certain that the President understood what was going on and what the situation was, and I did that. And the VTCs were the operational construct by which DHS would get that situational awareness. They would get that through those VTCs.

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Rhode, were you aware of when the levees had broken on Monday morning? And what did you do with the information? First, when were you aware of the problems with the flooding as a result of the levees breaching?

Mr. RHODE. Madam Chairman, I believe that I first heard about the issues with the levee, at least partial information, during the early hours of Monday morning or mid-morning, I want to say, somewhere between 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock or so. I believe that I came across an e-mail that was sent to me that suggested that perhaps there was a levee breach. I don't think there was a whole lot more information than that. And I endeavored to, as was always my practice whenever someone was sending me operational information, I tried to make sure that information made it directly to the operators.

Our protocol within FEMA was to make sure that the operations team had any sort of situational information. Again, my role was in Washington, DC. I was not in Louisiana. But as that information became available and as I became aware of it, I wanted to make sure that the operations team had it within Washington so that it could then be transmitted to the Homeland Security Operations Center as there were many situational reports, obviously, throughout the day.

Chairman COLLINS. But that's exactly why I'm asking you. You were in Washington.

Mr. RHODE. Yes, ma'am.

Chairman COLLINS. You were now the top FEMA official. Did you take any steps to ensure that Secretary Chertoff was aware of this information?

Mr. RHODE. As the information became more and more apparent, Marty Bahamonde later that day helped orchestrate a conference call, that I participated in, and at the conclusion of that conference call I sent a letter to the department, or sent an e-mail to the Department of Homeland Security, in addition to what I thought was

operational people that were also on that call that were making sure the Homeland Security Operation Center had that information.

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Brown, it isn't only DHS officials who say that they were unaware until Tuesday that the levees had collapsed. I've also been told that exact same thing by Admiral Timothy Keating, the head of Northern Command, who is responsible for homeland defense for DOD. He, in an interview, told me that he was not aware until Tuesday morning that the levees had breached and that the city had flooded.

Was there any communication from you or did you take any steps to ensure that Northern Command was informed of this catastrophic development?

Mr. BROWN. I would not, at that point, have called Admiral Keating directly but would, through the FEMA operations center, there is a military liaison there. So they would have had that same operational situational awareness to pass back up their chain of command so that Admiral Keating or Secretary Rumsfeld or any of those could have had that same situational awareness.

Chairman COLLINS. What is so troubling is we have heard over and over again from top DHS officials, from top DOD officials, from the leadership throughout the Administration that they were simply unaware of how catastrophic the hurricane's impact had been because of the breaching of the levee. Can you help us understand this enormous disconnect between what was happening on the ground, a city 80 percent flooded, uncontrolled levees, people dying, thousands of people waiting to be rescued, and the official reaction among many of the key leaders in Washington and in Northern Command that somehow New Orleans had dodged the bullet.

Mr. BROWN. Chairman Collins, let me frame an answer a little different way. It's my belief that had there been a report coming out from Marty Bahamonde that said, yes, we've confirmed that a terrorist has blown up the 17th Street Canal levee, then everybody would have jumped all over that and been trying to do everything they could. But because this was a natural disaster, that has become the stepchild within the Department of Homeland Security.

And so you now have these two systems operating, one which cares about terrorism, and FEMA and our State and local partners who are trying to approach everything from all hazards. And so there's this disconnect that exists within the system that we've created because of DHS.

All they had to do was to listen to those VTCs and pay attention to those VTCs, and they would have known what was going on. And in fact I e-mailed a White House official that evening about how bad it was, making sure that they knew again how bad that it was, identifying that we were going to have environmental problems and housing problems and all of those kinds of problems.

So it doesn't surprise me that DHS officials would say, well, we weren't aware, they're off doing other things, it's a natural disaster, so we're just going to allow FEMA to do all of that. That had become the mentality within the Department.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman.

Thanks for your cooperation. Mr. Brown, we are going to get back to those comments. Obviously, our hope was that the Department would be ready to deal with natural disasters and terrorist attacks and that the impact of a terrorist bomb on the levees would have been exactly the same as the hurricane was to flooding the city.

Let me go back to that day because this is very important, and your comments just now highlight it, and this is about Marty Bahamonde. He takes the two helicopter flights, 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. Central Time. He sees the devastation, and he told us that immediately after those helicopter rides, he called you and reported his findings to you.

Is it correct that Mr. Bahamonde told you that during the helicopter rides on that Monday evening, he could see New Orleans flooding?

Mr. BROWN. That's correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Now, is it also correct that Mr. Bahamonde told you that during the helicopter ride he could see that the levees had broken? Is that right?

Mr. BROWN. That's correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Bahamonde told us that after he finished giving you that devastating information, you said you were going to call the White House. In your staff interview, you said that you did have a conversation with a White House official on Monday evening, August 29th, regarding Bahamonde's flyover. Who was that White House official?

Mr. BROWN. There is an e-mail—and I don't remember who the e-mail was to, but it's in response to the information that Marty has given me. And my e-mail—because I recall this quite vividly—I am calling the White House now.

Senator LIEBERMAN. In other words, you were e-mailing somebody at the White House—

Mr. BROWN. No, I was actually e-mailing somebody in response to Marty's information.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Got it. OK.

Mr. BROWN. Back to FEMA, in which I said, yes, I'm calling the White House now. And I don't recall specifically who I called, but because of the pattern of how I usually interacted with the White House, my assumption is that I was probably calling and talking to Joe Hagin.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Joe Hagin, who is the Deputy Chief of Staff—

Mr. BROWN. The Deputy Chief of Staff who was at Crawford with the President on that day.

Senator LIEBERMAN. He was at Crawford, and you called him. It is surprising you wouldn't remember exactly, but to the best of your recollection, you called Joe Hagin. And is it right that you called him because he had some special responsibility for oversight of emergency management?

Mr. BROWN. No. It was because I had a personal relationship with Joe, and Joe understands emergency management, and he's at Crawford with the President.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Got it. And you, quite appropriately and admirably, wanted to get the word to the President.

Mr. BROWN. That's correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. As quickly as you could. Did you tell Mr. Hagin in that phone call that New Orleans was flooding?

Mr. BROWN. I think I told him that we were realizing our worst nightmare, that everything that we had planned about, worried about, that FEMA, frankly, had worried about for 10 years was coming true.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you remember if you told him that the levees had broken?

Mr. BROWN. Being on a witness stand, I feel obligated to say that I don't recall specifically saying those words, but it was that "New Orleans is flooding, it's the worst-case scenario."

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right, and maybe that's the bottom line, that you said this was the worst-case scenario, the City of New Orleans is flooding. Did you ask Mr. Hagin for any particular action by the White House, the President, the Administration, in that phone call?

Mr. BROWN. They always asked me, What do you need? Joe was very good about that. The difference is in 2004—the best way to describe it, Senator, if you'll bear with me for a minute, is in 2004 during the hurricanes that struck Florida, I was asked that same question, What do you need? And I specifically asked both Secretary Card and Joe Hagin that on my way from Andrews down to Punta Gorda, Florida, that the best thing they could do for me was to keep DHS out of my hair. So—if I could just finish.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. So what had changed between 2004 and 2005—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Katrina, right.

Mr. BROWN. Between the hurricanes of 2004 and now Katrina, was that there was now this mentality or this thinking that, no, now this time we were going to follow the chain of command.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Which was?

Mr. BROWN. Which was in essence—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Put you in charge.

Mr. BROWN. Was put me in charge, but now I have to feed everything up through Chertoff or somehow through DHS, which just bogged things down.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So you don't have any recollection of specifically asking Mr. Hagin for the White House to take any action at that time?

Mr. BROWN. Nothing specific. I just thought they needed to be aware of the situation.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood. Mr. Brown, on the evening of landfall, you appeared on the 9 p.m. edition, that is, that same evening, of MSNBC's "Rita Cosby Live and Direct." You said then very explicitly that you were deeply concerned about what was happening in New Orleans, and I quote, "It could be weeks and months before people are able to get back into some of these neighborhoods" because of the flooding. You also said that you had "already told the President tonight that we can anticipate a housing need here of at least in the tens of thousands." You were correct.

Did you, in fact, speak to President Bush that night, August 29?

Mr. BROWN. I really don't recall if the President got—normally during my conversations with Deputy Chief of Staff Hagin, some-

times the President would get on the phone for a few minutes, sometimes he wouldn't, and I don't recall specifically that night whether he did or not. But I never worried about whether I talked directly to the President because I knew that in speaking to Joe, I was talking directly to the President.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, it is surprising, again, to me that you wouldn't remember whether the President was on your call to Joe Hagin.

Mr. BROWN. I don't want to appear arrogant, but I talked to the President a lot, and so sometimes when he is on the phone or not on the phone, I just wouldn't recall.

Senator LIEBERMAN. All right. So that maybe you were inflating a little bit or being loose with your language when you told MSNBC that you had already told the President that night about—

Mr. BROWN. No, because when I say that I've told the President, if I've told Joe Hagin—

Senator LIEBERMAN. I got it.

Mr. BROWN [continuing]. Or told Andy Card, I've told the President.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I have this problem here in the Capitol, too, when somebody says, "Senator Warner told me to tell you"—and then I found out it was a staff member, or I told Senator Warner—OK. [Laughter.]

Mr. BROWN. Well, you need to get staffers as good as Hagin and Card because, trust me, they tell the President.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Let me now go to Secretary Chertoff because you talked about the chain of command that you were asked to follow. Did you speak to Secretary Chertoff after your call with Marty Bahamonde and tell him about the severity of the situation in New Orleans on Monday evening?

Mr. BROWN. I don't recall specifically if I talked to Chertoff on that day or not.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Why would you not have if that was the chain of command?

Mr. BROWN. Because I'm still operating that I need to get things done, and the way I get things done is I request them from the White House and they happen.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, then, did you tell anyone else at the Department of Homeland Security in a high position—Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, for instance?

Mr. BROWN. I think that Michael and I may have had a conversation.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Monday evening?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Which would have been along the same lines.

Mr. BROWN. Exactly.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Am I right that at some point on Monday evening there was either a phone conference call or a video conference call that you were on reporting on the situation from New Orleans?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And do you know whether anybody from the Department of Homeland Security was on that call?

Mr. BROWN. They were on all the calls.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Was Secretary Chertoff on that call? Do you remember?

Mr. BROWN. I don't recall.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you know where he was that evening?

Mr. BROWN. As I went back through my e-mails, I discovered that he was either gone or going to Atlanta to visit the FEMA Region IV offices and to visit CDC.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, and we are going to ask him about that because obviously the No. 1 man in terms of the responsibility for the Federal Government response to this disaster for some reason did not appreciate that it was such a disaster that he got on a plane and went to Atlanta for a conference on avian flu.

I want to go back to Sunday, the day before. Am I right that there was a video teleconference on that Sunday in which President Bush and Secretary Chertoff were on the conference?

Mr. BROWN. I specifically recall the President being on the conference because he was in the SCIF at Crawford.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. BROWN. But I don't specifically recall seeing Secretary Chertoff on the screen.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. And on that Sunday video conference call, am I right, you were still in Washington then?

Mr. BROWN. That's correct. I left that afternoon.

Senator LIEBERMAN. But you described the catastrophic implications of the kind of hurricane that Dr. Max Mayfield and all the other forecasters were predicting that day.

Mr. BROWN. I told the staff—and if you don't have the transcripts of that VTC, then we need to get them for you.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I want to give you a phrase. You described it as "a catastrophe within a catastrophe."

Mr. BROWN. That's correct. This was why I was screaming and hollering about getting money to do catastrophic disaster planning. This is why I specifically wanted to do New Orleans as the first place to do that. This is why I was so furious that once we were able to do Hurricane Pam that I was rebuffed on getting the money to do the follow-up, the follow-on. This is why I told the staff during that video conference call——

Senator LIEBERMAN. The day before the hurricane?

Mr. BROWN. The day before the hurricane struck—that I expected them to cut every piece of red tape, do everything they could, that it was balls to the wall, that I didn't want to hear anybody say that we couldn't do anything, to do everything they humanly could to respond to this because I knew in my gut, Senator, this was the bad one.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Brown. Time is up for me.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and, again, like all my other colleagues, my thanks to you for your leadership. This has been extraordinary.

I have to make a couple of observations as I listened to the testimony, Madam Chairman. We hear a lot and we have seen in this

Committee a lot of discussion about structural problems. We have had hearings where local folks and Federal folks and State folks all pointed at each other saying, well, they were in charge, they were in charge. Anytime you get a disaster like this—a disaster not just of Katrina but the disaster of the response—you get an analysis that we are getting here of literally hundreds of thousands of pages of review of information.

But I am going to be very blunt here. What we had—and having been a mayor and involved in situations that could have been terrible, that weren't so terrible, in the end when things go bad we do the analysis and we see all the structural inadequacies. But when you have good leadership, oftentimes even with structural inadequacies, things don't go bad. And my sense as I listened to this is we had almost the perfect storm of poor leadership. We had a governor who was indecisive, met with the President, met with the mayor, and did not make a decision, wanted more time. We had a mayor who, though well intentioned, is holed up in a hotel room without communications. Again, good intentions, wants to know what is going on on the ground, but nobody is in charge.

And, Mr. Brown, the concern that I have is from your perspective I am hearing "balls to the wall," but I am looking at e-mails and lack of responsiveness. Marty Bahamonde sending an e-mail about "situation past critical"—this is on Wednesday at this time—"hotels kicking people out, dying patients," and your response is, "Thanks for the update. Anything I need to do to tweak?"

Mr. BROWN. Senator, with all due respect, you take that out of context because you do that on the fly saying, yes, is there anything else I need to tweak, and what you ignore is what's done beyond that, which is calling the White House, talking to the operations people, and making certain that things are getting done. And I'm frankly getting sick and tired of these e-mails being taken out of context with words like, "What do I need to tweak?" Because I need to know is there something else that I need to tweak, and that doesn't even include all of the other stuff that's going on, Senator.

So, with all due respect, don't draw conclusions from an e-mail.

Senator COLEMAN. And, Mr. Brown, I would maintain that, in fact, the context of the e-mails are very clear, that they show a lack of responsiveness, that they show a disconnect. That's the context. In fact, I am not going to take individual ones, but if you look at the entire context of the e-mail discussion, you are getting information on Monday, 11:57, a message saying New Orleans reported 20-foot-wide breach. It is 11:57. An e-mail, not out of context, coming back saying, "I am told water not over the bridge." At that point obviously it hasn't hit the fan for you. And so I don't think it is out of context. I think the context of the e-mails—and not just the e-mails, by the way, but the things that we as Americans saw, to me it is absolutely still stunning that on Thursday, you have people at a Convention Center that are suffering. All of America knows that. All you have to do is watch TV. It doesn't matter what channel you watch. And what we have you saying at that time is, "We have just learned that"—this is a CNN interview, September 1, not out of context. "And so this is catastrophic as it continues to grow. I will tell you this, though, every person at that Convention Center,

we just learned that today, and so I have directed we have all available resources." I knew a couple of days ago. So did America—

Mr. BROWN. Senator—

Senator COLEMAN. And so let me finish the comment. What I hear is you saying, well, the structural problem falls with the Mitre report, in which it was laid out very clearly the structural inadequacies. And your testimony today is that you had conversations, you pushed that forward.

Can you show me where either in the e-mails or in the record your very clear directives to go "balls to the wall" to clean this situation, to fix it? Do you have anything that I can look at as a former prosecutor in writing that gives substance to what you have testified to today?

Mr. BROWN. Absolutely. I've testified in front of the House that I misspoke on that day regarding that e-mail. We learned about the Convention Center on Wednesday, and we started demanding—because the Convention Center was not planned for. It was not in anyone's plans, including the city and the State. And when we learned about it on Wednesday night, we immediately started demanding the Army and resources to take care of that. And there are e-mails in the packages that you have where I am screaming, "Where is the Army? I need the Army now. Why hasn't it shown up?" And because I misspoke about when I learned about the Convention Center after being up for 24 hours, you want to take that out of context, and, Senator, I'm not going to allow you to do that.

Senator COLEMAN. Let me ask you about a conversation that—Mayor Nagin came before us, this Committee, and he talked about going over to Zephyr Stadium. And Mayor Nagin's comment to this Committee is, and I quote, "I was so flabbergasted. I mean, we're in New Orleans. We're struggling. The city was touch and go as it relates to security. And when I flew out to Zephyr Stadium to the Saints' facility, I got off the helicopter and just started walking around, and I was awestruck. We had been requesting portable lights for the Superdome because we were standing at night and all over. To make a long story short, there were rows of portable lights. We all knew sanitary conditions were so poor, we wanted portable toilets. They had them all over the place."

Were you with Mayor Nagin at that time?

Mr. BROWN. I don't know whether I was with him on that particular date or not, but I know the area he is talking about.

Senator COLEMAN. And can you explain to this Committee why if there had been obvious deep concerns about sanitary facilities, about lighting, why those facilities, those concerns had not been met?

Mr. BROWN. Because they were having—the U.S. Army, the National Guard, were having difficulty getting those supplies into the Superdome. You need to understand that there are media reports of shooting, there are media reports of looting and everything else going on. And if the Army moves in there, the Army kills people. And so they had to be very careful about moving those things in there.

By the same token, you have civilians who began to move things in there and couldn't get them there. So, yes, there were things

stockpiled, and as that supply chain continued to fill up, Zephyr Field was full of a lot of stuff. And those things were continuing to go on the other end to get into the city.

And so for you to take a snapshot of Mayor Nagin going there and being there for a few minutes and seeing all of that and him screaming in his typical way about, "I want all this stuff in the city," again is taking it out of context, Senator.

Senator COLEMAN. When did you order that food and water be delivered into the Convention Center?

Mr. BROWN. The day that we learned about it, that Wednesday. We immediately ordered that stuff to be moved. Whether it was or not, whether it was actually done or not is the question you should be asking. And if it wasn't, you need to be asking why because we didn't have the capacity within FEMA ourselves to do that, and we needed the Fifth Army or the First Army to move that stuff in there.

Plus, I will also remind you that there's no—

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Brown, just on that point alone, my notes indicate—and I just wanted to check the records. Records that have been produced to the Committee by DHS indicate that FEMA did not order food and water for the Convention Center until 8 a.m. on Friday, September 2.

Mr. BROWN. I can tell you unequivocally, Senator, under oath, that the minute that I learned that there were people in the Convention Center, I turned to Bill Lokey, my Federal Coordinating Officer, my operations person on the ground, and said, "Get MREs, get stuff moving in there."

Senator COLEMAN. Did you ever do any follow-up to find out whether that happened?

Mr. BROWN. Senator, I continued to do operations as best I could all along throughout that time, and I would continually ask questions: Are things happening? Are things happening? Are things happening?

Senator COLEMAN. The record is very clear as to when the order was given. It was given on Friday.

My concern is this, Mr. Brown: Again, I understand there are structural problems. I understand some of the concerns that have been raised about the function of DHS and the integration of FEMA. But as I listen to your testimony, you are not prepared to kind of put a mirror in front of your face and recognize your own inadequacies and say, "You know something? I made some big mistakes. I wasn't focused. I didn't get things done." And instead what you have is, "The problems are structural. I knew it up front. I really tried to change it."

The record, the entirety of the record, doesn't reflect that. And perhaps you may get a more sympathetic hearing if you had a willingness to kind of confess your own sins in this. You know, your testimony here is that you are going to communicate to the President as to what he understood. I am not sure what you understood. I am not sure you got it. And I have to tell you the record, not the e-mails but the record, reflects that you didn't get it or you didn't in writing or in some way make commands that would move people to do what has to be done until way after it should have been done.

Mr. BROWN. Senator, with all due respect, what do you want me to say? I have admitted to mistakes publicly. I have admitted to mistakes in hearings. What more, Senator Coleman, do you want from me?

Senator COLEMAN. Well, I think——

Mr. BROWN. What do you want from me? I am asking you. What do you want from me?

Senator COLEMAN. Well, what I am hearing today and what I heard from your testimony is coming in and talking about all these structural problems—that the die was cast. That was your testimony today, about the integration—and, by the way, I have my own questions about the integration of FEMA and DHS. But what I heard today from you that the die was cast——

Mr. BROWN. It was.

Senator COLEMAN. And what I am saying, Mr. Brown, I am saying that, in fact, leadership makes a difference, you didn't provide the leadership. Even with structural infirmities, strong leadership can overcome that, and clearly that was not the case here.

Mr. BROWN. Well, Senator, that is very easy for you to say sitting behind that dais and not being there in the middle of that disaster watching that human suffering and watching those people dying and trying to deal with the structural dysfunctionalities, even within the Federal Government. And I absolutely resent you sitting here saying that I lacked the leadership to do that because I was down there pushing everything that I could. I've admitted to those mistakes, and if you want something else from me, put it on the table and you tell me what you want me to admit to.

Senator COLEMAN. A little more candor would suffice.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. BROWN. How much more candid—ask me the question, Senator. Ask me the question.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, but I think my time is up. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I want you to know that I admire your leadership and commend you and our Ranking Member for your leadership in pursuing these hearings for the sake of the security and safety of our country.

I agree with you, Madam Chairman, and with the Ranking Member that it is unfair to lay blame of the gross mismanagement of the disaster on one or two people. And I do not believe that Mr. Brown should be the scapegoat for all that went wrong.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator AKAKA. However, you and Mr. Rhode were in charge of FEMA, and I can recall Harry Truman's statement that "The buck stops here." And so you are it, and the hearing is on you.

What happened to the people in Louisiana and throughout the Gulf Coast reinforces the need for qualified, experienced leaders in senior positions throughout the Department of Homeland Security. That is why I introduced legislation last fall to require minimum professional qualifications for most Senate-confirmed positions at DHS.

Nor should we forget that until 2003 FEMA was an independent Cabinet-level agency. One of my reasons for voting against creating

DHS was that FEMA would no longer operate independently. FEMA's activities and budget are controlled by the Secretary of the Department. We cannot forget that the problems of FEMA are the problems of DHS and the ultimate responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. Brown, my question relates to a statement you made during your interview with the Committee. When asked about whether you were keeping Secretary Chertoff apprised of the situation in New Orleans on Monday, the day the storm hit, you stated that you, and I quote, "did not believe that the Department had any operational mandate at that point and that if the Secretary wants information about something, he can either call me directly or reach out to HSOC to get that information."

Wasn't it your responsibility as Under Secretary to keep Secretary Chertoff informed on the developments of an ongoing crisis that involved multiple components of his agency?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, Senator, it is my responsibility to keep him informed, and we have structures in place by which to do that. The HSOC and his representatives are involved in the VTCs, and he and I exchanged phone calls and talked at times to do that. But when you are running operations, the primary responsibility has to be to run operations, and then you feed information, as you should, through the channels—through the VTCs, through the e-mails, through the situation reports that get to him. And then if he has questions about any of those SIT reports that come to him, he can call me, or if there is something in the SIT reports that I think is of particular interest to him, then I would call and tell him.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Brown, in your interview, you referred to the so-called tax that FEMA was forced to pay when the Department was first stood up and you were the Deputy Director of FEMA. You said that the tax funded the shared components of DHS, such as the Secretary's office and the IT system. You told Committee investigators that FEMA's mitigation funding suffered a disproportionate reduction because you were trying to avoid taking money out of other areas, such as the National Flood Insurance Fund.

You may recall that the Administration tried to reduce FEMA's mitigation funding prior to the creation of DHS. The President's fiscal year 2002 budget proposed eliminating the Pre-Disaster Mitigation program, which later was saved by Congress. The Administration responded by seeking to eliminate all post-disaster mitigation funding in fiscal year 2003.

Is it possible that the reason mitigation funding took such a hard hit when DHS collected its tax is that mitigation programs were not valued by the Administration?

Mr. BROWN. It is nice to appear before a Committee as a private citizen and not be constrained by talking points or SAPs that say what you can and cannot say, but, yes, I think that is part of the problem, that there is a belief within OMB that mitigation programs don't have a good enough cost/benefit ratio so, therefore, we need to eliminate them, when indeed I do believe that there is a good side to it, that the Administration believes that pre-disaster mitigation funds could be used. So there is a balance to be struck to try to do both pre- and post-disaster.

But I do think that mitigation, to a certain extent, was given a back seat.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Brown, in response to prehearing questions for your confirmation hearing before this Committee in June 2002 to be Deputy Director of FEMA, you stated, "Mitigation will continue to be a primary focus for the Agency."

As Under Secretary, did you consider informing Congress that mitigation programs are not being prioritized and were, in fact, receiving less funding than you thought they should have under DHS?

Mr. BROWN. I think the American public needs to know how it works in DC, that an agency administrator can have his priorities and OMB can have their priorities and never shall the 'twain—shall the two meet. And despite my personal belief that mitigation is good and we need more mitigation funding in this country, OMB takes a different tack, that mitigation doesn't have a great cost/benefit analysis, which you could argue all day long. I believe that it does. And so consequently mitigation gets cut. I don't believe that it should.

But by the same token, Senator, I think you would not respect me if I came to you in your office and sat down and said, I know the President has proposed this, but here's my personal belief.

Now, yes, sometimes I would try to make certain that people understood what my real belief was in hopes that they could maybe do something about it. But I would not want to be that disloyal.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Brown, Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA public affairs officer that has been mentioned by other Senators today, was sent to New Orleans prior to the storm to be your eyes and ears on the ground because you personally trusted him, according to his testimony before the Committee in October 2005. His description of why he was sent to New Orleans, is it correct?

Mr. BROWN. I actually tried to send two people to New Orleans. I sent Marty to New Orleans and tried to send Phil Parr, one of our FCOs, to New Orleans, too. Marty was able to make it in. Phil couldn't. I think Phil got stuck in Beaumont or Houston or somewhere and couldn't actually get there. But I trusted both of those men, and I wanted both of them there because I did trust their capabilities.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Brown, in your interview with the Committee, you stated that you didn't completely rely on Mr. Bahamonde's Monday morning report that the levees had broken because, "He tends at times toward hyperbole."

Why did you send Mr. Bahamonde to be your eyes and ears if you did not implicitly trust his ability to relay information back to you accurately?

Mr. BROWN. Look, I trust Marty, and I think Marty has good judgment. But Marty does tend to hyperbole. I mean, that doesn't mean you don't trust him.

The real problem that was going on while Marty was down there is that I'm sitting in Baton Rouge, Marty's giving us these reports, and yet the governor's staff is getting conflicting reports. And I'm trying to balance those two reports. Marty's down there, a guy that I know. The governor's telling me she has people down there that

she trusts, and there are two conflicting reports. So I'm trying to synthesize those two reports.

But I trusted him, and I still trust him. That's why based on what he told me I made my calls.

Senator AKAKA. Madam Chairman, my time is expired, but I will make concluding remarks by saying that I tend to agree with you, Mr. Brown, that if a terrorist had blown up the levee, as you had stated, there would have been a reaction. We need an all-hazards approach to defending our homeland, not a call 911 only if it is a terrorist attack. And as I mentioned in my opening remarks, what we are doing in these hearings is to try to find solutions that can help the security and safety of our country, and this Committee is doing that very well under your leadership.

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Bennett.

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Brown, you may recall during your confirmation hearing I made a comment—I don't have it in front of me, but I remember it well enough because I made it a number of times. I think I am the only Member of this Committee who served in the Executive Branch, and I served at the Department of Transportation 18 months after it was put together. And so the comment that I made repeatedly was, "A, we needed to create the Department of Homeland Security and, B, we needed to be under no illusion that it would work for at least 5 years."

The Department of Transportation was put together much like the Department of Homeland Security, taking highways from Commerce, taking FAA as an independent agency, as FEMA was, taking the Coast Guard from Treasury, etc., mass transit from HUD, putting them together in a Department that looked wonderful on paper. It was created—it looked as if it was created by the geniuses at the Harvard Business School. It had magnificent lines, well drawn. And as I got there 18 months after it had been created when the Nixon Administration took over from the Johnson Administration, it was obvious I was walking into chaos, cultural clashes, turf battles, and all of the kind of things you are describing here.

So I am not surprised, and I am not prepared to be pejorative in attacking who was responsible. The creation of such a Department in the world in which we live made great academic sense. The President was attacked by his political enemies for not doing it sooner. And yet there is great concern now that all of the problems connected with the creation of such a Department surfaced. So I am sympathetic to what you are saying.

At the same time, having been in that kind of a situation and having seen a Department struggling with those kind of problems, I know that there are some things that can be done. I am struck by your testimony this morning where you say, "I don't remember who I called at the White House. I think it was Joe, but I don't remember." And then you are quite specific in what was said. There is a little bit of a disconnect that if you have a conversation and you can't remember who it is with but you are very specific that, "Yes, I said this, and I said that," and so on——

Mr. BROWN. Can I tell you why?

Senator BENNETT. Yes, I would appreciate your clarifying that.

Mr. BROWN. Because generally I say the same things to everybody. If I have a message that I need X, I am saying it to everybody I can get on the phone.

Senator BENNETT. All right. But going back to the context of a Department that has problems by virtue of its structural difficulties, problems that I am not prepared to say specifically it is this person's or that person's, the way you deal with that, at least from my point of view, in an emergency, is you ignore the departmental lines. And it is easy for me to say after the fact, I recognize that. But trying to put myself in your position, I think I would have gotten on the phone and said, "I have to talk to Secretary Chertoff directly. I don't want to talk to his staff. I don't want to send an e-mail. And I don't care where he is." And I would think even in a Department that is heavily bureaucratic, that kind of statement from you saying, "I am in the midst of the greatest natural catastrophe that we have seen. I have got a governor that is giving me information that is different. I have got a mayor that seems to be paralyzed. I have got to talk to the Secretary, and I want to talk to him right now."

Did it ever occur to you to say that within the Department? Or was the Department culture so stultifying that you felt you couldn't do that?

Mr. BROWN. The culture was such that I didn't think that would have been effective and would have exacerbated the problem, quite frankly, Senator.

That's why my conversations were predominantly with the White House because through the White House I could cut through any interagency bureaucracy to get what I needed done.

Senator BENNETT. You are telling us that a face—well, not face-to-face but wire-to-wire conversation directly with Secretary Chertoff would not have produced any kind of worthwhile results?

Mr. BROWN. No, it would have wasted my time, not because—and I say that not because of any disparagement of Secretary Chertoff, but because if I needed the Army to do something, rather than waste the time to call Secretary Chertoff and then have him call somebody else and then have—maybe he calls Rumsfeld, and then Rumsfeld calls somebody, I'd rather just call Andy Card or Joe Hagin and say, "This is what I need," and it gets done. That's exactly what we did in Florida.

Senator BENNETT. That is a staggering statement. It demonstrates a dysfunctional Department to a degree far greater than any we have seen.

Mr. BROWN. Senator, you have copies of documents¹ that I have brought today that I pray for the country that you will read, where I have, since 2003, been pointing out this dysfunctionality and these clashes within the Department, and that if they are not fixed, this Department is doomed to fail, and that will fail the country.

Senator BENNETT. I appreciate your opinion. If I may express an opinion, if I were Secretary Chertoff and I had a Deputy Secretary who would prefer to call the White House rather than talk to me, I would find that very disturbing. Have you ever sat down with Secretary Chertoff, particularly a fresh start, a new Secretary com-

¹ Documents from Mr. Brown appear in the Appendix on page 132.

ing in, available now, and said to him, "Mr. Secretary, there is an issue I have got to discuss with you here, and I know you have plenty on your plate, but can I have 15 minutes, can I have half an hour to discuss this with you?"

When Secretary Chertoff came here for his confirmation appointment—admittedly he was probably the most available at that point because we controlled whether or not he got appointed—he was open to all kinds of suggestions about how the Department should be structured based on the information we had developed in our hearings, and I do not find him a man who would refuse to talk to you or refuse to hear your point of view.

Did you ever make any attempt to discuss this with him when he first came on board before he got overwhelmed by all the bureaucracy?

Mr. BROWN. Two attempts. The first one occurred very shortly after he arrived, and in March 2005, I drafted a memo, which is in your materials, dated March 2005, from me to the Secretary entitled—the subject matter is "Component Head Meeting." Secretary Chertoff had announced that he wanted the Under Secretaries to prepare for him a briefing, a very honest briefing about where we were in terms of our budget, personnel issues, and, most importantly, he wanted to know what our most serious challenges were so that he could address those challenges.

So I drafted it—you can read it at your leisure—where I discussed preparedness, the National Response Plan, what needed to be done with it; the organizational structure, the turf battles, the cultural clash between, say, ODP and FEMA and how that needed to be done. And he was to have those component head meetings with everybody. He never had one with me.

The second time was when the whole issue—when they began to do their 2SR review of where things are at. The issue then became whether or not to pull preparedness out of FEMA, and, again, I requested a meeting and Deputy Secretary Jackson was able to get that meeting for me, and I went in and made my case about why preparedness belonged in FEMA and why the way the statute was created had not been implemented the way the statute read but it should be, and made that case to him, the same case I made to Secretary Ridge on September 15, 2003, which is, again, in your materials. And on that day when I made that case to the Secretary, the people at FEMA will tell you that in the car on the way back to headquarters, I was ecstatic because I thought I had won, that I had found someone who understood that issue, had agreed with me, and indeed, he had agreed that we needed to do what I had outlined in the memo.

Forty-eight hours later, that decision is reversed, and we are going in a different direction.

Senator BENNETT. Well, my time is up. I think I now understand why Secretary Chertoff says he didn't know because you didn't feel it necessary—"necessary" is the wrong term. You didn't feel it was efficient or proper—that is the wrong term. Let me phrase it as correctly as I can. He didn't know because you didn't think it would do any good for you to tell him.

Mr. BROWN. I succeeded in Florida in 2004. I succeeded in the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster, the fires in California, the fires

in the mountainous West. I succeeded in the tornado outbreak. And when I didn't succeed, one of the reasons why I didn't succeed, other than the mistakes I have said that I have made, is that DHS was an additional bureaucracy that was going to slow me down even more. And the way I got around that was dealing directly with the White House.

Senator BENNETT. Regardless of where you may or may not have succeeded, once again, you did not—the reason he did not know is because you did not think it important to tell him.

Thank you.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lautenberg, my apologies for not calling on you prior to Senator Akaka. The information I had was wrong.

Senator LAUTENBERG. We have a new time clock here. We are going to straighten it all out. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for your zeal and your consistency on trying to get to the bottom of this.

I want to set my view as clear and as straight as possible. I am not here, Mr. Brown, to defend you. I am not here to defend anybody who has made mistakes, and now we can distribute the mistake array and see who really made some of the worst ones.

The fact is that if I have a fire in my house, I don't insist on talking to the fire chief before I satisfy that I have sounded the alarm. And if you want to convey something to the President and you cannot trust his Deputy Secretary or the other people who the President appointed to do things, then we are in bad shape. And the fact that we are parsing words here and trying to figure out whether you should have spoken A, B, or C or retroactively trying to fit this puzzle all together, does it surprise anybody that perhaps there was some panic as people were drowning and carrying not only their luggage on their heads but their children on their heads, trying to escape the ravages of this incredible inferno—I will use that term—that was enveloping us?

So whether or not you called A, B, or C, B or C had to get to A, and you had to believe that there was a mechanism. I would tell you this: That when the terrorists struck the World Trade Center, people didn't wait to get to the President to send the alarm to him that something terrible had happened and was happening.

You have been selected as the designated scapegoat. That is what I see because I think that we are clear on President Bush's message to you on Friday after the storm struck on Monday. And while I do not have—well, yes, I do have the precise words: "Brownie, you're doing a heckuva job."

Now, I cannot imagine the President would trivialize this situation just to be a good guy with you. Somebody must have said to him you were doing things right and you were doing your best. Whether it was good enough or not, it may have not been good enough.

I served in World War II. I know sometimes no matter how hard we tried, we couldn't protect everybody that we wanted. So keep your chin up and fight back, as you did. You are not here to be, as I said, the designated scapegoat, designated target. Call it whatever you want.

Mr. BROWN. Senator, thank you.

Senator LAUTENBERG. I did it for my conscience, not to be a good guy. I mean, I see this all in front of me, and I have been in situations where panic struck and people react in different ways. You try to do your best. But we are, after all, human beings, and human beings make mistakes.

What I see here are mistakes on a current basis that infuriate me. In the *New York Times* yesterday or today, the piece about the fact there are—I have so much paper here to try to get it all organized because, as you can see, I am in a state of anxiety here. “Storm Victims,” reporting February 9 in the *New York Times*; on February 10, this day, in the *Los Angeles Times*: “Nearly 6 months after two hurricanes ripped apart communities across the Gulf Coast, tens of thousands of residents remain without trailers promised by the Federal Government for use as temporary shelters while they rebuild. Of 135,000 requests for trailers that the Federal Emergency Management Agency had received from families, slightly more than half have been filled.”

Yesterday, we were greeted by hundreds of people who worked their way up here from New Orleans, pleading for help. I spoke to the people, and what I got was, “Please, give us a place to cover our heads with, a place that we can lie down and go to sleep.” They are not looking for jewels or trappings. They are looking for an ability to exist.

So Mr. Brown is not on the payroll. Mr. Rhode is not on the payroll now. Who is responsible for not catching up with our responsibilities? And the fingers, no matter which way they try to point them, to me they point at the White House. That is where the responsibility belongs. Get those trailers there. Get those homes built. We sent down lots of money that was not efficiently used, and that was after your departure, need I remind you.

And so when we look at this, I think the blame game is an easy one to play, but it is a hard game to win. And I find that the response now indicates where we were before.

I listened to you carefully. I ran a fairly big company before I came to the U.S. Senate, and I know that there was a lot of buck-passing and people would make mistakes. But, on the other hand, if people earnestly tried to do the right thing, then that is what we can ask. And if the system breaks down because it is poorly designed, that is too bad, and I hope we learn from this. But it is hard to understand why when wires were going at 9:30 in the morning—“wires” are e-mails. That shows my dating, “wires,” right? That they are saying the pumps are starting to fail. You suggested, Mr. Brown, that Marty Bahamonde might be a little hyperbolic, but the fact of the matter is this is as he gave it to us, and when he gave it to us, he was under oath like you are. And he said, “Severe flooding on St. Bernard-Orleans Parish line. Police report water level up to second floor of two-story houses. People are trapped in attics. Pumps starting to fail, city has now confirmed.” This is a report from Michael Heath. Do you know who Michael Heath is?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator LAUTENBERG. He was your assistant, right?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator LAUTENBERG. So he is reporting to you that he had gotten a report from Marty Bahamonde that these things were happening, and this was at 10:12 in the morning when the most severe point of the storm's attack was at about 8 o'clock. So information was flowing. And for the White House to deny that they had clear reports is, I think, disingenuous at best. White House officials confirm—this is now February 10—that the report of the levee break arrived there at midnight, and Trent Duffy—Marty Bahamonde sent his report out at 9 o'clock in the morning—arrived there at midnight. And Trent Duffy, the White House spokesman, acknowledged as much in an interview this week saying it was surrounded with conflicting reports.

When did you have an awareness that it was sent to the White House?

Mr. BROWN. Senator, I am going to give you two answers, if I may, to what you just said. May I first address your question about the White House notification? And then you touched on housing, and I really want to give you some information about housing, if I could do that, because I think it is pertinent to your concern.

On Monday, August 29, at 10 o'clock, I had written Andy Card and told Andy Card that this is the bad one and that housing, transportation, and environment were going to be long-term issues and that if he wanted any additional details, to be sure and call me or continue to BlackBerry because he had written me earlier that indeed Joe Hagin had been keeping him informed of what I had been telling him. So I had been telling them about that situation throughout the day, so they knew about it.

Senator LAUTENBERG. So at midnight they are saying conflicting reports.

Mr. BROWN. Well, all I can tell you is that during the day on Monday, they were being told. They were aware of that.

Senator LAUTENBERG. OK.

Mr. BROWN. But you also mentioned something about housing and the concern about housing. I think it is important for this Committee to know that for the 2005 budget, I specifically requested \$10 million to redesign our recovery from catastrophic events, including catastrophic housing; I requested \$80 million for the Emergency Response Teams to do things such as catastrophic planning, and the e-mail says, for example, like New Orleans. And this whole e-mail chain, which is dated December 30, 2003, which I want the Committee to have in the record, is that we were asking for all of those things to address housing issues, to address those response teams, and every one of those was never even presented to OMB because DHS took them out of our over-target request.

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Madam Chairman and Senator Lieberman, I congratulate you once again on helping to prepare a record which I really am confident is going to be complete with regard to this tragic episode. And I think we owe no less to the many victims who suffered and are still suffering and also to prepare our great Nation for the future.

Mr. Brown, despite what my good friend of the left is saying about the Executive Branch, I did spend 5 years in the Pentagon as Secretary of the Navy during the—— [Laughter.]

Vietnam War, and my friend over here, Mr. Stevens, had he heard that comment, he would have come out of his chair because he spent a couple of years in the Department of the Interior as their counsel. But, anyway, all of us have a little humor here on a Friday morning.

But I come to this responsibility with no prejudice and no fixed views. I simply think that I want to support my Chairman and Ranking Member in getting the best record possible.

Now, I have been informed—and I would appreciate it if you would verify the accuracy of this statement—that in the course of interrogation by very able Committee staff—and they have done a commendable job——

Mr. BROWN. They are very good.

Senator WARNER [continuing]. That you felt that you had to rely on counsel of FEMA and decline to give a full response to perhaps as many as 12 questions. Is that correct?

Mr. BROWN. That's correct. Counsel for FEMA was present, and when the types of questions about who and what was said to certain White House officials, they would—I think counsel for FEMA is quality counsel, but they never wanted to use the word "executive privilege." It was "high-level communications," and so there was this legal dance going on. And I just felt caught in the middle because, look, Senator Warner, I respect this President and I respect the Presidency. I respect this branch of government, too, and now as a private citizen, I am caught between these two in terms of executive privilege.

Senator WARNER. Right. I listened very carefully, but I believe now given the very clear guidance by the Chairman, these impediments are now removed. Would I be correct in that assumption?

Chairman COLLINS. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. Well, then, Madam Chairman, I would think we would ask this witness to go back over each of those questions and provide for the Committee and the staff the full answer that he is capable of giving. May I make that in the form of a request?

Chairman COLLINS. You may.

Senator WARNER. And you will be quite willing to do that.

Mr. BROWN. I would be happy to do that.

Senator WARNER. Well, that is extremely——

Mr. BROWN. As long as we can work out schedules properly, Mr. Bopp.

Senator WARNER. I think it is very important that we have a full and complete record, and your willingness to do that, I think, is very helpful.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Warner, if I could just clarify, it is possible that the White House might decide to assert the privilege, which it has a right to do, at some future time.

Senator WARNER. Well, I understand that.

Chairman COLLINS. I just wanted to clarify.

Senator WARNER. I am trying to move through this to be of some assistance to the Chairman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Madam Chairman, if I can say, I want to thank Senator Warner. I think you make a very important point. Now that Mr. Brown has taken a different position, for all the reasons we talked about at the beginning, just to complete the record, if those questions are not all asked today, which they probably won't be, I think it is a very important idea to schedule a time to come back and talk to our joint staff again.

Mr. BROWN. If I could just say, Senator, though, I am not really taking a different position. I always wanted to answer the questions.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood. I accept your amendment.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. I think that is important.

Now, my responsibilities around here—and, coincidentally, my two distinguished leaders here—are on the military committee, and I am quite interested in your assessment of the performance of the uniformed individuals, both Guard and Reserve and the active forces that were brought to bear. I think we have to keep going over this because a lot of people following do not understand the Guard and Reserve are under a certain framework of Federal statutes, as you well know, and the regular force is under others.

My understanding is that one of the series of questions in which you felt that you couldn't give a full answer related to the following issues. You spoke to a number of White House personnel while on an airplane, probably on Friday, September 2, about the proposal to establish a dual-hatted commander of the National Guard and Title X forces in Louisiana.

Can you now tell us about what your views were? And the situation in your judgment dictated, I think quite appropriately, a clarity of the chain of command to military personnel, be they Guard or Reserve or active?

Mr. BROWN. Correct. General Honoré had decided to deploy and come to Baton Rouge, and I had a conversation with him on his way down there that said—because we had not federalized anything yet. I think General Honoré has testified before this Committee.

Senator WARNER. Yesterday.

Mr. BROWN. And if you watched television, you know he is a very commanding presence.

Senator WARNER. Yes. I have gotten to know him, and I have known many officers in my years here. He is very impressive.

Mr. BROWN. Very impressive. And so when General Honoré and I first got on the telephone together, he already had a litany of things he wanted to do, and I had to back him down and say, "I may want all of those things done, but until we get federalized, or however we work this out, I am still in control and you need to let me know what you want to do, and we can play this game. I may want you to do all those ten things on your list, but come and tell me before you do them." And he understood that and respected that.

Senator WARNER. Well, also, if I may say, it was not a game. He is a serious-minded—

Mr. BROWN. He is very serious.

Senator WARNER [continuing]. And he has handled in his capacity as a military commander a number of situations. He recounted some half-dozen disasters in which he actively participated——

Mr. BROWN. That's correct.

Senator WARNER [continuing]. On behalf of the——

Mr. BROWN. And so I was ecstatic to have him there because I could now use my military aides that were there with me at the Command Center to interface with them and whatever troops might show up. There is an e-mail—again, I assume that this e-mail has been produced—where I am, I believe it is on Friday, September 2, screaming in the e-mails about where is the Army. I have been asking for the Army, where are they? I need the Army now.

Senator WARNER. Now, let's be more explicit. Part of the Army is the National Guard.

Mr. BROWN. Right, but I was——

Senator WARNER. You wanted active——

Mr. BROWN. I wanted active-duty forces.

Senator WARNER [continuing]. Duty forces.

Mr. BROWN. Right, because what I needed was I needed the active-duty military to take over logistics. I needed them to handle logistics because the civilian side had fallen and completely failed, and I needed logistical support from the Army.

We were still also having the problems about control of the areas, and we had a lot of discussions, both General Honoré and I did, about the whole law enforcement issue. We both, I think, and I think Secretary Rumsfeld—and I am not going to try to put words in any of their mouths, but we all had concern about once you federalize and bring in those active-duty forces, if they are doing law enforcement, I mean, these guys are trained to kill, and if some punk decided he wants to take a potshot, that punk is going to probably end up being dead, and that raises a whole plethora of issues.

But I was pushing for federalization of National Guard troops—let's go to National Guard.

Senator WARNER. That would be the National Guard of the States of Louisiana, Mississippi——

Mr. BROWN. Mississippi, particularly—I have to parse that a little bit, particularly Louisiana, because I really felt that we needed to federalize those Guard troops, but understood that if we did it in Louisiana, we probably needed to do it in Mississippi also.

And I really began advocating for that about midweek, and there is some——

Senator WARNER. Well, I think at this point you had better clearly state to whom did you advocate that because you have made the case that you were—and I am not faulting you—circumventing DHS and going directly to the White House.

Mr. BROWN. Right.

Senator WARNER. So were those requests placed directly to the White House?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, those were being discussed, again, with Mr. Hagin and Mr. Card.

Senator WARNER. Right.

Mr. BROWN. And then the discussions on Air Force One centered around how could we do this, was there a way to do this—by “doing this,” I mean federalizing. Was there a way to federalize without invoking the Insurrection Act? Is there some way that we could figure out a way to somehow have a dual-hatted command system? That was really beyond—I mean, generals needed to decide if they thought they could have a dual-command system. I have been in dual-command systems, and they don’t work very well. But if General Honoré thought that he could do that or General Blum thought he could somehow make that work—

Senator WARNER. Now, let’s identify, General Blum is the head of the National Guard.

Mr. BROWN. National Guard, correct. So if they could figure out a way to make that work, a dual-hatted command, without actually invoking the Insurrection Act, that was fine with me because the end that I was trying to get to was I just wanted active duty in there to start doing things that I needed to get done.

Senator WARNER. Would that include law enforcement? Because it is a doctrine of Posse Comitatus, as you know.

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator WARNER. Which explicitly prohibits that.

Mr. BROWN. And that is why we were trying to do this dual hat so that perhaps we could have the National Guard doing law enforcement while active duty was doing something else.

Senator WARNER. All right.

Mr. BROWN. That is a messy situation because when you are—for example, if the National Guard is doing law enforcement on behalf of the Army, who is doing logistics, the Army is not going to put down their weapons just because they are handing out MREs. And so if they are doing that while the National Guard is doing law enforcement and a fire starts, the Army is going to defend themselves, as rightfully they should.

So it presented all sorts of legal and just practical considerations.

Senator WARNER. And I might add that they are all wearing basically the same uniforms, so those observing or participating in crime cannot distinguish between the two.

Mr. BROWN. That’s correct.

So it was my opinion that, however politically they needed to work it out with the Governor, we needed to federalize this operation.

Senator WARNER. And now, in the course of the questioning on that issue by the staff, at what juncture did you feel you had to withhold certain information on the advice of FEMA counsel?

Mr. BROWN. Discussions about what the President said in the conference room, conversations that I had with National Security Adviser Hadley.

Senator WARNER. Are you now prepared to inform this Committee what those conversations were?

Mr. BROWN. I believe, if I can get a clarification on the instructions, the instructions go to discussions with, say, Hadley, Hagin, and Card, but they don’t yet go to the President. Is that correct?

Chairman COLLINS. That is correct.

Mr. BROWN. OK. Secretary Chertoff, myself, National Security Adviser Hadley, General Blum, and occasionally Karl Rove was in

and out of that particular room, and I think on the telephone—I don't want to speculate who was on the telephone. We were on a conference call, and I think it was—I believe it was back to maybe Fran Townsend and perhaps Andy Card because Andy wasn't on that particular trip. We were discussing how we could make a proposal to Governor Blanco to do this joint command without actually federalizing, and we were having discussions about, let's just federalize, let's not federalize, the pros and cons of, how is it going to look if we invoke the Posse Comitatus Act—I mean the Insurrection Act? How is Posse Comitatus going to fit into all of this? We were having some very heavy discussions about how we could do that. And National Security Adviser Steve Hadley was taking notes and trying to formulate a construct by which we could have federalization without invoking the Insurrect Act.

Senator WARNER. And what was the result of all of those conversations?

Mr. BROWN. The result was a draft that was sent to Governor Blanco that evening, I think sometime late at night, about how we could do that, which is the proposal that she ultimately rejected.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator, we will have a second round. I know that some of the Senators have planes to catch.

Senator WARNER. Fine. I think I went only one minute over. I was allowing him to finish his answer.

Chairman COLLINS. You were. Only two. Senator Dayton.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank you and also the Ranking Member, Senator Lieberman, for your extensive inquiries into this catastrophe, for the CODEL that you led, which I was proud to accompany you to Mississippi and Louisiana.

I appreciate both of you appearing as private citizens before this Committee.

Mr. Brown, you stated in your testimony previously to the House committee that you had communications with the White House "30 times" during the weekend before Katrina made landfall on Monday, August 29, and that included several calls to President Bush regarding that matter. Could you, since you are not under executive privilege, comment on with whom you had those conversations in the White House and what the substance of those conversations was, please?

Mr. BROWN. Yes. The conversations prior to me leaving Washington DC and going to Baton Rouge—there were at least one or two conversations directly with the President—I will just say, generally, about the situation and what was going on.

Senator DAYTON. I am sorry. Prior to the actual landfall?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator DAYTON. And what was the general nature of those conversations? You were apprising him of the——

Mr. BROWN. Apprising him of the situation. The one that has been reported in the news that I guess falls outside the privilege at this point is that I literally called the President and asked him to call Governor Blanco and to call the mayor and do everything he could within his persuasive powers to convince them to do a mandatory evacuation.

Senator DAYTON. And the other 30 calls then were to whom, please?

Mr. BROWN. Generally to either Andy Card or Joe Hagin, just here's what's going on, here's what we've mobilized, we're moving supplies into Texas, into Tennessee, moving supplies into Atlanta and other places so we can move in once we know where it makes landfall.

Senator DAYTON. I need to respectfully disagree with my colleague Senator Bennett—I am sorry he has departed—because at least according to this report in the *New York Times*, at 11:05 p.m. on Monday, August 29, it states here there was an e-mail message from FEMA's Deputy Director to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, which says we have just spoken with our first representative on the ground in New Orleans who did a helicopter tour and describes the 200-yard collapse of the levee on the south side of the lake.

Wouldn't you reasonably be able to expect then, if your Deputy is communicating directly with the Deputy of Homeland Security, that the Secretary would be informed, if necessary, of that communication?

Mr. BROWN. Oh, absolutely, and that is my point about those systems are in place—the VTCs, the communications from headquarters—because I am running around in Baton Rouge trying to run operations. So absolutely, Senator.

Senator DAYTON. So, again, going to the *New York Times* article today, can you explain this apparent discrepancy? It says, "But the alert"—referring to the prior alerts—"did not seem to register. Even the next morning"—which would be Tuesday—"President Bush, on vacation in Texas, was feeling relieved that New Orleans had 'dodged the bullet,' he later recalled. Mr. Chertoff, similarly confident, flew Tuesday to Atlanta for a briefing on avian flu."

It would seem that both of these individuals had been informed, at least in your judgment, directly about the situation, which contradicts what they have stated here.

Mr. BROWN. Correct.

Senator DAYTON. OK. You stated in your testimony earlier today, sir, that—I believe I am paraphrasing, but trying to quote—"I ask the White House and they happen" as a way of getting things to occur.

Mr. BROWN. Right.

Senator DAYTON. Can you state what in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane landfall, what did you request of the White House, and did they, in fact, happen?

Mr. BROWN. Great question because I am coming from the perspective of all the other disasters that I have described, particularly Florida in 2004, where that direct chain of command interface took place, and for the first time in this disaster, Andy Card replied to me at one point—and I don't remember what the specific request was, but I told Andy on the telephone I needed something, whatever it was. And his reply back to me was, "Well, Mike, you need to feed that back up through the chain of command." And that became—

Senator DAYTON. What is the chain of command, sir, at this point?

Mr. BROWN. Well, at that point, that said to me, the way we had been doing business is not how I am always—I am going to have

to kind of do this on the fly now, was I needed to go get Chertoff to agree to do that, which bothered—

Senator DAYTON. Did you do so, sir?

Mr. BROWN. Yes because Chertoff and I had—again, in the record there is a record of my phone calls back and forth to DHS constantly.

Senator DAYTON. So you went through the chain of command and then presumably he went to the White House, whatever. Did what was necessary to happen happen?

Mr. BROWN. Well, not always because we would—I was frustrated because the Army wasn't getting there quickly enough and things weren't—I mean, I was as frustrated as you were, I was as frustrated as the American public was, I am sure as frustrated as everybody in this room about the slowness of the response. People will tell you that I am a fairly calm individual, and I was certainly screaming and cussing at people while I was down in Baton Rouge.

Senator DAYTON. What specifically, sir, were you requesting and when did you request it that did not occur as expeditiously as you would have expected?

Mr. BROWN. I think the best way to answer that in the hearings is to refer you in particular to the e-mails between my military aides, General or Colonel Jordan, and I forget the name of the other Colonel—I apologize to him—that I would tell them what my priorities of the day were, and they would come back and say, "Well, we haven't been able to get this moving, we haven't been able to get that moving." That will show you what I was frustrated about.

Senator DAYTON. OK. Thank you.

In your testimony before the House Committee previously, you were asked by Congressman Thornberry, "And so how many total FEMA people were prepositioned, approximately, at the Superdome?" Prepositioned meaning before the hurricane's landfall.

Mr. BROWN. Correct.

Senator DAYTON. And you stated here, "Counting the team which I will count as FEMA people, you know, a dozen." Subsequently, before this Committee, Mr. Bahamonde testified that, "I was the only FEMA employee deployed to New Orleans prior to the storm."

Can you reconcile that apparent discrepancy?

Mr. BROWN. Yes. In fact, I have learned he's right because I had—we had deployed a National Disaster Medical Team—or I had specifically authorized an NDMS Team, Marty Bahamonde, and Phil Parr to go directly to the Superdome. And Marty was the only one who made it prior to landfall, and the others made it after landfall.

Senator DAYTON. How is it that you were misinformed, even months later when you made this testimony, as to the number of FEMA people who were actually in New Orleans prior to landfall?

Mr. BROWN. All I can tell you, Senator, is I tried to review every document I could get my hand on. At the time of that hearing, I just didn't recall.

Senator DAYTON. You stated, again, in an article today, sir, that the real story is the change in the structure, FEMA being put in as part of the Department of Homeland Security, which you say is a factor in this difficulty in response. And you elaborated on some

of those points today. I guess I must respectfully disagree from my perspective in Minnesota, where in 1997 there was a serious flood, a major fire in Grand Forks adjacent to Minnesota, East Grand Forks was flooded. The response there in my recollection—and I was there just 2 weeks after. The testimony of the mayor of Grand Forks and others was that the FEMA response was quite exceptional. Subsequently, in June 2002, Roseau, Minnesota, in the northern part of the State, flooded. I was there as well, and this was prior to your becoming the Director, but the response of those who witnessed and participated in both situations was very definitely that FEMA's response in 2002, which is prior to this reorganization, was not nearly as effective as the one in 1997.

So, I guess I would question whether the real problem here was this restructuring or whether it was whatever breakdowns that occurred in the executive agency.

Mr. BROWN. Right, and I think it's important for the Committee to realize that it is not just the folding of FEMA into DHS, but it has been the—and we should probably go back through some of my own testimony as Deputy Director and General Counsel, that FEMA always was really good at making do with what they had, and FEMA always suffered from this brain drain of people continuing to leave, an aging workforce, people who were retiring all the time. It was reaching—I mean, it was having its problems before it went into DHS, no question about it.

Senator DAYTON. Why was there a brain drain?

Mr. BROWN. It was just a function of the aging of the workforce, and they can make more money—I mean, some of the most skilled people that I found when I first came to FEMA's General Counsel had all gone within a couple of years because they can make so much more money after they put in their 20 years or so by moving into the private sector. It was awful.

Senator DAYTON. Mr. Rhode, you had been at FEMA until just 2 weeks previous to today?

Mr. RHODE. Let me say it will be about almost 3 weeks today or tomorrow.

Senator DAYTON. Having been in New Orleans recently, again, reading recent reports about the situation there, the fact that, according to one report yesterday, of the 50 million metric tons of debris, only 6 billion had been removed, the fact that utilities have not been replaced, and an article today in the *Washington Post* states that FEMA will not make the decisions until August about what can be rehabilitated and what cannot, that it is holding up, at least according to this article, the people's ability to rebuild their houses and the like. Can you explain what has happened during this period of time over the last couple of months and help us, illuminate us, as to what the barriers are that prevent an effective response by FEMA?

Mr. RHODE. Well, I can certainly talk to some of my experiences over the last couple of months. I am not certain that I am familiar with the August deadline. I am not sure if—that happened after my departure from FEMA. I am not sure I can speak to that very well. But certainly the recovery of a 90,000-square-mile area, you know, we often concentrate on Louisiana and New Orleans, but clearly in Mississippi and even some parts of Alabama, has been

incredibly challenging. The debris alone is something that was on an absolute historic scale that we have never seen before.

I cannot really speak to all of the challenges, although I can say that a lot of it has to do with local ordinances and local desires. I know FEMA tries to work very closely with the State and the locals as it relates to where they would like debris to be deposited, some of the local ordinances as to whether or not you go on private property or you do not. There are certainly an awful lot of challenges that collectively we have to overcome together on the table, and that is what the current recovery is all about in those States.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Pryor.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Let me start, if I may, with you, Mr. Brown. It sounds like you have taken responsibility for the things that went wrong under your watch.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, sir.

Senator PRYOR. Do you feel like the designated scapegoat? That was Senator Lautenberg's term.

Mr. BROWN. Why don't you issue a subpoena to my wife and have her come and answer that question, sir. [Laughter.]

Senator PRYOR. I can relate to that. But do you feel that way? Do you feel like you have been sort of set up to be the scapegoat?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator PRYOR. To be the fall guy?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. I can't lie to you, but, yes, I feel that way.

Senator PRYOR. You feel like the Administration has done that to you?

Mr. BROWN. I certainly feel somewhat abandoned.

Senator PRYOR. OK. Let me ask this question about FEMA given your role there, your experience there. In your opinion—just your opinion as a private citizen—should FEMA be in DHS?

Mr. BROWN. I don't want this to sound like a lawyer answer. How's that for a caveat? There was a time when I was still idealistic and was really fighting internally to make it work the way the statute intended, for Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) to be EP&R. I have since come to the conclusion that the cultural differences are so wide and so great that it cannot function within DHS, and the things that have been done to it now—the stripping of preparedness out into a separate directorate, whatever is going to be announced next week, response going somewhere else—is going to drive the final stake in the heart of FEMA. The country, particularly governors, particularly mayors, will then be faced with a situation in a disaster looking around and saying, "Who do I go to?"

FEMA suffers from this lack of direct accountability to the President. All disasters are local, and you know if something happens in Arkansas or something happens in Minnesota or wherever it happens, you want to know that the FEMA guy and the President are on top of it and they are in charge.

Senator PRYOR. I appreciate your answer there, and I know that the previous administration had FEMA, as I understand it, as an independent Cabinet-level agency. Do you think it should be restored to that?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator PRYOR. And it sounds like from your previous answer it is the direct accountability that FEMA would have with the President that makes that important.

Mr. BROWN. What has happened, I've described it this way to both James Lee Witt and Joe Allbaugh, both friends of mine, that the job they had no longer exists. When they were the FEMA Directors, they were in charge of their budget; they made their argument directly to the President and to OMB. Now I make my case to another Under Secretary and hope to work through that bureaucracy or directly to the Secretary before it even gets to OMB. And so without that kind of direct accountability and that direct way to get things done, I think you marginalize FEMA to where it becomes ineffective.

Senator PRYOR. I appreciate your candor on that.

Let me also ask, you mentioned in previous testimony today that you had a number of phone calls throughout your time at FEMA with President Bush, and that was in the context of you couldn't remember exactly when you talked to him and exactly what was said. I am trying to get a sense of how involved President Bush was with FEMA when you were there. Was this a frequent occurrence where you talked to the President? Are we talking about once a month or just every time a disaster happened? Or tell me, how involved was President Bush?

Mr. BROWN. I would say he was involved. We developed, I think, a very good relationship. Unfortunately, he called me "Brownie" at the wrong time. Thanks a lot, sir. But we had a very good relationship where I could—whether we were on Air Force One or we were in the car together alone, that I could explain to him or express concerns or issues that I thought were important. And I always felt like I had a very good relationship particularly with Andy Card because Andy had gone through Hurricane Andrew; with Joe Hagin, who used to be a first responder and understands those issues. I had a very good relationship with those people. General Gordon, the White House Homeland Security Adviser, all of those people I had great relationships with.

But there came a point where I recognized that I could no longer complain and argue about what needed to be done without starting to appear to be a whiner, and so I needed to pull back. There was a new Secretary there, and I think the White House had the attitude of we have a new Secretary now, Mike, go deal with the new Secretary.

Senator PRYOR. That was actually my next question, and that is, you served there under two different Secretaries, Secretary Ridge and Secretary Chertoff.

Mr. BROWN. Right.

Senator PRYOR. And not to put words in your mouth, but basically, as I understand your previous testimony today, there were critical times when, instead of talking to Secretary Chertoff, you in effect went around him and went to other people in the Administration to try to get things done. Is that a fair assessment?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, and, in fact, you are going to hear from witnesses today that I think are going to say Brown didn't think he worked for Chertoff and Brown didn't think he was part of the

team. And the reason they say that is because I had a mission, and my mission was to help disaster victims. And I wasn't going to—I mean, I was going to do everything I could to prevent bureaucracy or to prevent new layers of bureaucracy or people who did not understand the relationship between State and local governments and FEMA to get in the way of doing what we needed to get done. So, yes, I was an infighter.

Senator PRYOR. This may be a little bit of an unfair question, but had Secretary Ridge been in control during Katrina, would you have gone through Secretary Ridge, or would you still have gone around the Secretary?

Mr. BROWN. I don't know how to answer that because my experience with Secretary Ridge was in Florida, he left me totally alone.

Senator PRYOR. Meaning left you alone to do your job or he abandoned you?

Mr. BROWN. Exactly. He left me alone to do my job. Secretary Ridge during Florida and the entire Department of Homeland Security apparatus stayed out of my way.

Senator PRYOR. And that changed with Secretary Chertoff?

Mr. BROWN. What happened was, I think with Secretary Chertoff the DHS apparatus now saw an opportunity to insert itself, as they had always tried to do, into FEMA operations, which necessarily slows things down. The HSOC, for example, does not exercise command and control. They don't have the ESF structure. They can't do those things. Yet during Katrina, they were trying to do that.

There is, again, in the packet of materials that I have supplied the Committee today, a January 26, 2004, concept paper, "The DHS Headquarters Integrated Operations Staff Capability," again, in which they are trying to now move those kinds of operational controls out of FEMA into DHS. And attached to that are a couple of e-mails and talking points about why we think that is a bad deal and is going to cause us even further problems. I would encourage you to look at that, Senator.

Senator PRYOR. OK. Thank you. I also have a question—there is a document that I have. I don't think it is in the record. I will be glad to submit it, if the Chairman would like me to, but it apparently is in connection with Hurricane Pam, that scenario there. The document is entitled "Combined Catastrophic Plan for Southeast Louisiana and the New Madrid Seismic Zone: Scope of Work, fiscal year 2004."¹ And it is interesting because I assume—it says "fiscal year 2004." I assume it was drafted in 2003 or 2004. But if I can quote from it, it says, "The most dangerous hurricane would be a slow-moving Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane that makes landfall at the mouth of the Mississippi River, moves northwest of and parallel to the river, and then crosses New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain."

I will skip down a little bit. "The Federal Emergency Management Agency and Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness believe that the gravity of the situation calls for an extraordinary level of advanced planning to improve government readiness to respond effectively to such an event."

¹ Document submitted by Sen. Pryor appears in the Appendix on page 110.

And I will skip down a little bit more. "The geographic situation of southern Louisiana and the densely populated New Orleans area would complicate response problems and quickly overwhelm State resources."

So, in my view, here is a FEMA document that is screaming out that we have got to be prepared for this, and it sounds like FEMA just could not get anyone's attention, I guess, at DHS to do the proper level of preparedness. Is that fair?

Mr. BROWN. Senator, yes, yes, yes. I go back to the \$80 million that is being cut, and I specifically—FEMA had never done catastrophic planning. I wanted to do catastrophic planning. We got the \$80 million to do that. New Orleans was the first place I wanted to go. The scenario that played out in Katrina was exactly the scenario we wanted to plan against. And I was rebuffed in getting the money to do that planning.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you.

Mr. Rhode, I just have a few seconds left, and since you are from Hot Springs, Arkansas, I need to ask you at least one question.

Mr. RHODE. Well, thank you very much, Senator.

Senator PRYOR. And this is an impression I have that I would just like to get your thoughts on because I know you have just recently left the Agency. But it appears to me—and I went down on the CODEL with almost all of us that are here right now, and it appears to me that there is a difference in how FEMA has dealt with Mississippi as opposed to Louisiana and specifically New Orleans. And it appears to me that it may be because FEMA—and maybe the Federal Government—just does not have a trust level with the City of New Orleans government and also the State of Louisiana's government. Is that fair?

Mr. RHODE. Senator, I'm not sure that I've heard it explained that way at all. I am aware that there have been some challenges, certainly, perhaps unique in some regards, and historic challenges particularly within Louisiana and Mississippi. I know that there is a very aggressive recovery effort that is going on there, and it can get somewhat complicated because you are often dealing with many different opinions, many different voices from the public. You are talking about a housing situation which you are trying to determine where best to repopulate areas, where best to provide housing. It is a very difficult situation.

I would like to believe that the FEMA approach is very consistent across all States that we deal with. Throughout the course of any one year, FEMA will administer some 50 to 60 presidential disaster declarations or emergency declarations, and I would hate to think that the approach globally is different from one State to another. But I'm certain there are unique challenges within Louisiana.

Senator PRYOR. Well, Madam Chairman, I know that in the last few days on the front page of our statewide newspaper, there have been several stories about 8,000 or 9,000 trailers that are FEMA trailers that are sitting at the Hope, Arkansas, airport; that apparently Mississippi has received many trailers, many more than Louisiana has. And I think that is one reason I have that perception, is because it seems there is unequal treatment.

And let me say this—I know I am over my time, Madam Chairman, but I think this Committee has heard—or at least, speaking for myself, I have heard enough about the problems at FEMA, and I am ready to fix it, and I hope that this Committee will get very serious over the next few weeks and few months to fix it.

So thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Brown, over the course of our investigation, numerous officials have expressed concern that you were selected as the Principal Federal Officer for Hurricane Katrina. And, indeed, your own e-mails also expressed displeasure at your selection for this duty.

A Department of Homeland Security official told us that you do not agree with much of the National Response Plan and, in particular, that you oppose the concept of a Principal Federal Official, a PFO. A key author of that plan, who will be testifying before us next, Assistant Secretary Robert Stephan, told our investigators that you opposed the concept of a Principal Federal Official and that you did not agree with the concept, thought it was unnecessary, and didn't fully understand a lot of the responsibilities in the National Response Plan—and this is a quote—“as evidenced by what Mr. Brown failed to set up.” In your own interview with the Committee staff, you called the concept of a PFO “silly.”

Now, this is an important issue because that is a major concept in the National Response Plan. DHS officials have told us that you were replaced as the PFO on September 9 after it became clear that you were not carrying out your responsibilities satisfactorily, and since some of these same officials will be testifying very shortly before us, what is your answer to those criticisms of how you performed as PFO?

Mr. BROWN. The PFO function, we have done a great job as Republicans of establishing more and more bureaucracy. It absolutely flabbergasts me that as Republicans we have come in and established on top of the Federal Response Plan, a plan that worked, that States understood, that we have taken that plan and we have created it in a vacuum. We put it together—I mean, EP&R was supposed to put the NRP together, and instead it was given to TSA. Now, explain that one to me, Senator. And then it shifted over from TSA to some military guys that have never worked in a consensus way with State and local governments, who have prime responsibility in a disaster.

I would refer you to a memo dated April 6, 2004, regarding—it's a legal memo in which they are discussing the legal issues surrounding the proposed regional structure for DHS. And it very accurately reflects the conflicts that are created by the creation of the PFO cell versus the FCO under the Stafford Act and the FEMA Director and what their roles are supposed to be.

I can tell you from experience that the PFOs who have been appointed to date—and since we are not in a courtroom, no one can object about hearsay, so I am just going to tell you generally what they have told me. They believe that the PFOs, that their role is simply to give the Secretary information about what is going on. Yet in the document itself, it gives the PFO operational responsibilities to actually do things in a disaster.

That conflicts directly with the role of the FCO and directly with the role of the Director of FEMA or the Under Secretary for EP&R. And those are outlined in that memo.

So what happens is I get designated as the PFO, which means that I am instructed by Secretary Chertoff to plop my rear end down in Baton Rouge and to not leave Baton Rouge. You can't run a disaster that way. You can't run a disaster unless—as I did at all of the other disasters, going into the field, going out and seeing what's going on, getting into New Orleans, getting into Jackson. I was told to not go back to Mississippi. Well, how can the FEMA Director, because he is now the PFO, how can I know what's going on in Mississippi if I can't go there and sit down with Haley Barbour and find out what's going on?

Chairman COLLINS. But you see no value to having a single person designated as the Principal Federal Official, as Admiral Allen was after you were replaced? And he is generally credited with improving the coordination and response.

Mr. BROWN. Because Admiral Allen was then given the where-withal to leave, to go do things, if he needed to be in New Orleans, to go to New Orleans, to be able to go to Jackson, Mississippi, to be able to go wherever he needed to go. I was literally constrained by Secretary Chertoff and told to stay in Baton Rouge after my first trip to Jackson, Mississippi. My hands were tied by him.

Chairman COLLINS. One final question in my remaining time. You stated earlier that, in retrospect, you should have called in the Department of Defense earlier to take over the logistics because you knew that FEMA would be overwhelmed by Hurricane Katrina. If you knew that FEMA's logistics system would be overwhelmed, why didn't you recommend to Secretary Chertoff that he exercise his authority to call in DOD sooner?

Mr. BROWN. I take blame for this. But on August 30, we issued a mission assignment to DOD for airlift and for other capabilities. I don't know whether that mission assignment was ever implemented or ever done. But as early as August 30, I made that request back to headquarters for that to be done.

I still stand by my earlier testimony that what I wish I had done was even prior to landfall, which then—and I'm not trying to be flippant here, Senator, but had I requested active-duty military to move in there, and Katrina had made a slight move to the left or to the right and gone somewhere else and we didn't have this—and I mean this in all due respect—you would have been having me up here testifying about why I wasted money having the military come in and preposition itself.

So I'm trying to balance those two things off. Do I really step out on a limb prior to landfall and demand active-duty military for something I may not need, or do I do it after it has made landfall? And that is just a judgment I made, and in hindsight, I wish I had just rolled the dice and said do it now.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Thanks again, Mr. Brown.

I want to come back to Monday night after the day of the hurricane hitting, Marty Bahamonde calls you, you call Joe Hagin, who is with the President at Crawford. You are not sure if the Presi-

dent was on the conversation. You inform them that New Orleans is underwater. Does Joe Hagin at that point ask you, "Do you have everything you need?" Do you ask for anything from them?

Mr. BROWN. I don't recall on that particular conversation asking for anything in particular. I know he asked me. He always asked me do I have everything I need.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. BROWN. But I don't recall specifically saying that night I need X, Y, Z because literally the storm had just made landfall, the levees were just breaking, and we were trying to get a handle on what we needed.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK.

Mr. BROWN. And as I testified in front of the House, I was still, naively so, thinking that I could get this unified command structure established within Louisiana and that we could get things done.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. BROWN. I was still in that mind-set at that point.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And that Monday night, again, after you spoke to Bahamonde and then Hagin, did you have any other conversations with the White House?

Mr. BROWN. Oh, every single day.

Senator LIEBERMAN. No, but I mean Monday night, on August 29, the day of landfall, after you called Hagin, when the President may or may not have been on the phone, did you—

Mr. BROWN. Yes. I had a late evening phone call I think with Hagin, and I had an e-mail exchange with Andy Card.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And can you describe the tenor of those exchanges?

Mr. BROWN. I can tell you the e-mail to Andy Card basically says this is what we expected and we're going to have—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, actually I have seen that one. This is the big one, you said.

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. And pretty much the same exchange with Hagin.

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I want to go back because a part of what we are looking at here is whether the Federal Government could have done—obviously we reached some conclusions that it should have done more in preparation. Senator Dayton referenced a comment you made to the House Select Committee in the fall that you thought you might have talked to the White House before landfall on Monday, maybe as many as 30 times. By your recollection, when did those calls start? Was it Thursday? Friday?

Mr. BROWN. Probably speculating—if the records prove me wrong, they'll prove me wrong, but probably on Thursday because we had literally started doing—FEMA had already started ramping up Monday or Tuesday of that week.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Based on weather forecasting, obviously.

Mr. BROWN. Right.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And do you recall—there is, in the transcript of the video teleconference that occurred on Sunday—incidentally, you begin it, for the record, by welcoming Deputy Sec-

retary of Homeland Security Michael Jackson to the conference call, so at least there was a direct call—and one would hope, and we will ask, that the Deputy Secretary told the Secretary in that call Dr. Mayfield was very alarmed, and you said this is a catastrophe within a catastrophe.

But when the President is on the call from Crawford, he thanks you, and he says to you, “I appreciate your briefing that you gave me early this morning about what the Federal Government is prepared to do to help the State and local folks deal with this really serious storm.” That was a private call or a personal call, I assume, that you had Sunday morning with the President of the United States.

Mr. BROWN. Correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And, again, in that call you were telling him how serious the situation was based on the weather forecasting and reporting, as he says in the transcript we have, that you think you are ready to handle it.

Mr. BROWN. Senator, the best that I can explain to this Committee—I don’t know how to put it into words. I sat in those VTCs on Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and I think I was there for the one Sunday before I left—

Senator LIEBERMAN. And these are all—and this is very important. These video teleconferences are happening Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday before the Monday on which the hurricane hit.

Mr. BROWN. That’s correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And on those video teleconferences, you probably got the Homeland Security Department, the Weather Service, the White House—

Mr. BROWN. They are all tied in. You don’t always necessarily see them on the screen, but they are all tied in.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. And they all have the opportunity to tie in.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me go on and just ask you, do you remember any other personal calls with the President that weekend, except for the one on Sunday morning?

Mr. BROWN. I don’t think I talked to him personally once I landed in Baton Rouge. I was only talking to Hagin.

Senator LIEBERMAN. How about before, during that weekend?

Mr. BROWN. Oh, yes, on Sunday—I left on Sunday, as I recall.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, I know about the call you had with the President on Sunday. Was there anything on Friday and Saturday?

Mr. BROWN. I don’t think so Friday, but I do believe there was on Saturday.

Senator LIEBERMAN. One direct with the President? And to the best of your recollection, what did you say?

Mr. BROWN. Just I was expressing my concern, as I was in the VTCs all along, that this is a big storm, this is the one we have all worried about, and depending on where it goes, it could be catastrophic.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And, again, were you asked by the President or Mr. Card or Mr. Hagin, “Do you have everything you need?”

Mr. BROWN. I'll say it again. I can't ever think of a conversation where—I never ended a phone call, with particularly Joe or Andy, where they didn't say, "Do you have everything you need."

Senator LIEBERMAN. I want to ask you one more question, but I will ask rhetorically whether, looking back at it, you may have mislead them because as it happened, FEMA, DHS, not to mention the State and local governments, didn't have everything they needed to respond to Hurricane Katrina.

Mr. BROWN. And that gets back to Senator Collins' point about me asking for the Army earlier. In hindsight, which, of course, is perfect, knowing my fears and the planning we have done for New Orleans, I do wish that I had called for and talked to either Rumsfeld or England prior to it even making landfall and requesting those DOD assets at that time.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Madam Chairman, since Senator Lautenberg has left, I am going to ask one more quick question. It is my last.

One of the more perplexing allegations made about FEMA's failure to deliver in the aftermath of Katrina came from General Bennett Landreneau, the head of the Louisiana National Guard, and it also came from Governor Blanco last week, but very strongly yesterday from General Landreneau, that seeing what was happening on Monday, the day of landfall, during the day, they said, "We desperately need a means to get people out of New Orleans who have not been able to evacuate on their own." And you told them, "I'm going to get you 500 buses." And General Landreneau said, "Monday night they didn't come. We spoke again Tuesday. FEMA said they're on their way. Wednesday, they're still not there." And we find in our investigation that it wasn't until 1:47 a.m. on Wednesday that FEMA actually asked the Department of Transportation to provide the buses, which last week the DOT person told us they were ready to do.

So they begin to arrive late Wednesday night, mostly on Thursday morning. Meantime, as I said before, we are seeing these horrific human conditions, embarrassing to our country, not what we are all about, in the Superdome and the Convention Center. So why didn't FEMA deliver those buses on Monday when you said you were going to do it?

Mr. BROWN. I wish I knew the answer to that, Senator. I think it goes back to what we saw in the Mitre study, again, that I asked for, because I knew that the logistics system in FEMA was broken and that we couldn't do some of those things. I knew that and was desperately trying to fix it. All I can tell you and all I can tell the country is that those nights I would sit in my room crying sometimes, screaming, arguing, because I was as frustrated as the country.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So let me just——

Mr. BROWN. Because I'm asking for this stuff, and I can't make it happen.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I got you, and I hear you, and that is what you are saying, that, in fact, when you told General Landreneau, "I am going to get you 500 buses"——

Mr. BROWN. I was going to get him 500 buses.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You, in fact, asked somebody.

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. On Monday, to the best of your recollection?

Mr. BROWN. That's right.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, later on, when you come back to the staff, we're going to ask you why you think it took until Wednesday morning for that e-mail to go to DOT. Thanks, Mr. Brown.

Thanks, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

What is your overall assessment of the professionalism that the military was able to bring to bear on this situation? And if you wish to separate Guard from active, but generally speaking.

Mr. BROWN. Senator Warner, I'm so doggone jealous of their planning capabilities I could scream. Their ability to—one of the fallacies in FEMA pre-DHS, and I believe one of the fallacies currently within DHS, is a robust planning cell that can do the kind of planning that I've been screaming about for 3 years, and they can do it. And by having two military aides, just two planners, two colonels come in and sit down with me so I can turn to them and say I need X, Y, Z, they can start planning how to make that happen. And we didn't have that.

My interfacing with Honoré was absolutely the most professional at all times. I consider the man to be a friend now. He was a lifesaver to me. My relationship with Secretary Rumsfeld, to a certain extent, but even more so with Deputy Secretary England, a personal relationship there, I admire those guys. They have got the kind of things that we need.

Having said that, I am one of these that I don't think the military needs to be involved in disasters, like maybe some do. But we need to replicate and duplicate and perhaps adopt some of their methods of doing things within Homeland Security.

Senator WARNER. Well, let's talk specifically about what occurred in this instance. You say you don't think they should be involved, yet you are requesting them and you have recognized they have assets, from helicopters to trucks and heavy lift capacity. And they have got a turnaround time—often within hours they can produce. So I think you want to go back and revisit they should not be involved in these things.

Mr. BROWN. We have to be very careful because they have a mission, and if I were Rumsfeld or England, I would be very concerned about diluting that mission by giving them these additional responsibilities.

Senator WARNER. Well, I would have to differ a little bit with you there. When we consider the amount of suffering and destruction here and the military has a very vital role in homeland defense—Admiral Keating was before this Committee the other day. I work with Rumsfeld and England on a daily basis, and Keating.

Mr. BROWN. Right.

Senator WARNER. And they are there and trained, and the President of the United States and the people want them involved.

Mr. BROWN. In a catastrophic event, no question.

Senator WARNER. Right.

Mr. BROWN. But there is a slippery slope that we go down where suddenly State and locals will become more and more dependent upon active-duty military to respond.

Senator WARNER. All right. Let's go back to this particular incident. What grades do you wish to give them?

Mr. BROWN. Oh, I give them an A.

Senator WARNER. An A, all right. Well, that is consistent with what others have stated here. Did you from time to time make the decision to bypass Chertoff and go directly to the White House on requests for the military?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator WARNER. And do you feel that those requests were responded to, to your satisfaction?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator WARNER. So that chain of communication was effective and results were delivered.

Mr. BROWN. Right. And I think the other thing that—again, as in almost any disaster, which is why you need to train as you fight and fight as you train and you need to have preparedness tied to response, which is my mantra. It is because you need to know those people when you actually get into the battle. You need to know who you are dealing with. And that is one of the fatal flaws within DHS right now, is separating this preparedness from response. Go back to 1978—I don't think you were in the room when I mentioned it, but there is a 1978 NGA report which talks about that very issue. Tom Ridge wrote a letter to the *Washington Times* in 1989 saying if you separate response from preparedness, it is a fatal flaw. We need to keep those together, and I think if we can learn from the military and tie those together, we can make it work.

Senator WARNER. I was listening to the hearings elsewhere, and I did follow that colloquy that you had.

Do you feel that the inability of the President, as I understand, trying to work with the Governor of Louisiana to do a certain degree of maybe bifurcated federalism, i.e., the dual hat, as a consequence of that not occurring, did that contribute to some of the problems?

Mr. BROWN. Absolutely, no question. I think it contributed to two things: The continued delay in response and my demise.

Senator WARNER. I understand the delay in response, and now your demise, you mean in terms—

Mr. BROWN. Because as long as I was not able to get that done, I still couldn't get a unified command structure established within New Orleans because I didn't have the capability to do that. James Lee Witt comes down and actually says to the President—once he is hired by Governor Blanco, James Lee stands behind me and says, "Mr. President, now that I'm here, Mike and I are going to establish a unified command." But by that time, it was too late.

Senator WARNER. It was too late.

Mr. BROWN. Too late.

Senator WARNER. And had it been done, you feel that much of the suffering could have been spared, and the devastation—

Mr. BROWN. The suffering could have been alleviated. I may or may not still be the Under Secretary, but—

Senator WARNER. Well, facts are facts.

Mr. BROWN. Right.

Senator WARNER. General Honoré, working with you and the TAG from Louisiana, more or less worked this out even though there was not a formalization of a dual hat. They did it by sheer force of their own personality and their understanding of what a military person must do when they face extreme situations. Whether they have orders or not, they are trained to act.

Mr. BROWN. That is the best description I have heard of how it came about. We did it without—I mean, they just did it.

Senator WARNER. But it would have been better if it had been formalized and earlier on.

Mr. BROWN. Clearly.

Senator WARNER. That is clear. Now, again, I return to the record. The Chairman has indicated that you will be given an opportunity to go back over several questions. But this is a unique moment. You are here, and the eyes of many are upon it. Do you wish to at this time go back and reflect on some of those dozen different questions where you followed the advice of FEMA counsel and did not give a full response and give your responses at this time?

Mr. BROWN. If we have questions that they would like to pose, I'd be willing to do that, sir.

Senator WARNER. All right. But I do not have the full litany of questions before me. I understand you will have the opportunity. But at this time, there is nothing further in the context of what you withheld that you would like to proffer at this time?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

Senator WARNER. Good. To you, Mr. Rhode—you have been very quiet here, but I would like to direct just sort of a general question to you. You have followed very carefully the responses given by Mr. Brown to the series of questions propounded by the Senators here. Do you feel that there is any additional information on any of those colloquies that you would like to provide?

Mr. RHODE. It's hard for me to say, Senator. I appreciate the question very much.

Senator WARNER. We are trying to build a record, and it is important that we get in as much as we can.

Mr. RHODE. Absolutely, sir. I appreciate that, and I have appreciated the opportunity to work with staff over the last couple of months, too, when I was employed with FEMA. I do believe that this was an absolutely incredible challenge that faced our country, one perhaps unprecedented, it goes without saying.

I would like to see in addition to potential FEMA efficiencies that need to be improved—and I think we all agree that there are certainly some that need to be improved—it was true before I arrived and is certainly true after I left—in the way of logistical tracking, in the way of improving situational awareness, some of these items that I know have been talked about before this Committee.

I would also like to see greater accountability as well, too, within the National Emergency Management System, and in my opinion, that means perhaps greater protocols, greater understandings of roles and responsibilities between the local, the State, the Federal system, greater accountability within all levels of government and

government agencies. I think we need to take a hard look at the Emergency Support Functions, as they currently exist, when FEMA calls them together, and how they perform and what they are expected to do, and perhaps build in greater metrics and goals and deliverables together with that.

I think that the system is one that has worked very well and served the country very well, but I think it's one we need to take a very serious look at as it relates, obviously, to a catastrophic event.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. My time has expired, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Rhode, when Mr. Brown was named the PFO the day after Katrina made landfall, he relinquished his role as Director of FEMA, according to the National Response Plan, NRP, which made you temporary FEMA Director. Were you aware of this provision in the NRP when Mr. Brown was named PFO? And if not, when were you made aware of your new role?

Mr. RHODE. Senator, I'm not certain as I sit here that I was made aware that Mr. Brown's title as Director had been removed, even temporarily. I honestly can't say that I remember hearing that.

Senator AKAKA. Was there ever a time when you knew that it was your responsibility?

Mr. RHODE. Senator, I'm not certain that I've heard that, to be completely honest and candid. My role was one as the chief of staff from the time that I joined FEMA until the time that I left FEMA. I joined FEMA in April 2003, and I left just recently in January 2006, with the exception of roughly an 8-week period where I was also given the title as well, too, as Acting Deputy Director. I'm not aware during the time of the early days of Katrina, as Mr. Brown was initially named Principal Federal Officer, I'm not aware of any additional impacts to me or how I was conducting myself in the office.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Brown may have chosen to ignore the NRP, but according to that plan, he was no longer the FEMA Director for that disaster, and this may be contributing to the problems that we are talking about.

Mr. Rhode, when you were asked during your interview with the Committee about the resources FEMA could have made available to New Orleans once the city began to flood, you discussed search and rescue capability. Is it your understanding that search and rescue is the only resource FEMA could have provided to New Orleans once the city flooded?

Mr. RHODE. Senator, my understanding is that there were many resources that were applied to the City of New Orleans and the entire 90,000-square-mile area that FEMA had within its command, whether they were assets that FEMA perhaps could federalize or assets that other agencies were contributing through the FEMA Federal system.

Senator AKAKA. Now, when you discussed the rescue and search capabilities, you were aware that you were acting as the Director, were you not?

Mr. RHODE. I was not aware that I was acting as the Director of FEMA, no, sir, but I was aware that while Mr. Brown was away that I was acting, as best I could, to lead FEMA, yes, in Washington, DC.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Brown, I noticed an e-mail in the documents you released only this morning dated September 1. The e-mail was from Brooks Altshuler. Who is he?

Mr. BROWN. Brooks was my Policy Director at FEMA, and I think he may have held a dual title of Deputy Chief of Staff also.

Senator AKAKA. In the letter, you are told to, "Please talk up to the Secretary" in your press conferences. You were also told to say that there was a "solid team with solid support from the Secretary."

What was the reason for this e-mail?

Mr. BROWN. I don't know. In fact, I asked Brooks about that. I wanted to know what was going on. I was getting very frustrated. There is also an e-mail in there where I tell them that I have told Mr. Chertoff that the number of phone calls and—I called them "pings"—the pings that we were getting for things was literally driving us nuts, that we had operations to run, and that there were channels by which you could get information, but we needed to be doing things.

I was particularly upset one time when there had been a request for a briefing of the Secretary one morning. He had called me late in the evening for numerous things to be briefed about the next day. I pulled the team together. They spent the night getting their briefings together, and then they twiddled their thumbs for about 2 hours that morning, waiting for him to get off some phone calls or something. And I finally dismissed the briefers and just told them to go back to work because you can't have two people in control. Either somebody's going to run the disaster or somebody's not going to run the disaster. And I think that just stemmed from the inability to understand that there was a catastrophic disaster going on, people had things to do that they needed to be doing.

Again, drawing the difference between, say, Florida and Katrina, I never had a decision second-guessed in Florida. Yet in Katrina, there were times when I would make a decision and find out that the decision hadn't been carried out because somebody above me, either on the Secretary's staff or the Secretary himself, had made a contrary decision or that there had been conferences, conversations with people in the field, that would contradict either FEMA policy or what we should be doing. And it became an absolutely unmanageable situation.

I'm not very good at hiding my feelings. I don't play poker for that very purpose. And so I imagine at one point Brooks was frustrated that maybe it appeared that I was a little ticked off about some stuff.

Senator AKAKA. I want to thank you so much for being as responsive as you have been, both of you.

Mr. BROWN. Senator, I am here to get the truth out.

Senator AKAKA. I really appreciate that. Did you perceive that this e-mail—do you interpret that e-mail as being more perception than substance?

Mr. BROWN. Clearly. But perception is reality sometimes, too.

Senator AKAKA. Well, again, I want to thank you. As I mentioned earlier in my first statement, you should not be held a scapegoat and we cannot look only at you and Mr. Rhode, but at the whole system.

Mr. BROWN. May I say something, Senator?

Senator COLLINS. We are getting very late on time.

Mr. BROWN. I just appreciate the fact that this has been bipartisan, and to have that come from you, Senator, I greatly appreciate that.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Dayton.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Brown, just to try to make sure that this chronology as described today in the *New York Times* is accurate, Monday, August 29, it states here, 9:27 p.m., an e-mail message from—with the subject FYI from FEMA was sent to the Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff's Chief of Staff. It says, "The first reports they are getting from aerial surveys in New Orleans are far more serious than media reports are currently reflecting."

10 p.m., in a conference call, Mr. Bahamonde describes the levee breach and flooding to FEMA operational staff.

10:30 p.m., a Homeland Security Situation Report states, "There is a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal." The report reaches the White House later that night.

11:05 p.m., an e-mail message from FEMA's Deputy Director to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, it says that the breach has occurred.

Do you know when it says here the report reaches the White House later that night to whom that report reached?

Mr. BROWN. Only based on what I've read in the papers, and I would disagree with you, based on my personal experience, just because it's in the *New York Times* doesn't mean I believe it.

Senator DAYTON. That is why I am asking you. Do you know whether the White House or anyone in the White House was informed on that Monday night by any communication—

Mr. BROWN. What I understand that report is about, it is about, it is about a SIT report, a situation report that went to the White House situation room. I can tell you and in my testimony is, from my conversations directly with Hagin and Card and others, that they were aware of what was going on.

Senator DAYTON. They were aware as of when?

Mr. BROWN. I have to go back and look at my cell phone—

Senator DAYTON. When were they aware of the breach, to your knowledge?

Mr. BROWN. Sometime that day.

Senator DAYTON. Monday?

Mr. BROWN. Monday.

Senator DAYTON. Monday sometime. Afternoon? Evening?

Mr. BROWN. My guess is afternoon because I was still—we were still debating at the EOC between the State and the Fed's is it a breach or is it a top. And not until later that afternoon would I have expressed that it was actually a breach to Hagin or Card.

Senator DAYTON. But Monday afternoon.

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator DAYTON. According to this chronology in the *New York Times*, which is not always perfect or correct, the Homeland Security Chief of Staff was informed Monday evening as well as the Deputy Secretary Monday evening about the reality of this breach of the levee. Again, this same article quotes Russ Knocke, if that is the right pronunciation, a Homeland Security spokesman, said that although Mr. Chertoff had been "intensively involved in monitoring the storm, he had not actually been told about the report of the levee breach until Tuesday after he arrived in Atlanta."

Was he intensively involved in monitoring the storm?

Mr. BROWN. I don't know because I wasn't with him. I was in Baton Rouge.

Senator DAYTON. OK. And he was where?

Mr. BROWN. I don't know where he was.

Senator DAYTON. OK. Is this typical that in this kind of serious emergency that the Deputy Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Department would not inform the Secretary immediately or very soon thereafter of receiving that kind of information?

Mr. BROWN. They would have had the same information because they would have been on the VTCs, and they would have had the same SIT reports. So they would have or should have been just as informed.

Senator DAYTON. And then subsequently, you stated in your testimony previously that the Secretary, "tied your hands by not allowing you to go back to Mississippi or New Orleans." When did that occur? And how were you prevented from—

Mr. BROWN. I want to say it was Wednesday when I made a quick trip to Jackson. But I'm not certain of the particular day. And on the flight back, he reached me on Mil Air, and we had a discussion, and he was quite irate that I had been in Mississippi. And I was explicitly told to go to Baton Rouge and not leave Baton Rouge.

Senator DAYTON. And why did he—what reason was given for that?

Mr. BROWN. Apparently because cell phones were down and he had a hard time making contact sometime. I don't know what the rationale was.

Senator DAYTON. OK. And, similarly, you can't reconcile the fact that you informed the President's Chief of Staff Monday afternoon about the breach in the levee and the President then subsequently stated that he was not aware on Tuesday morning?

Mr. BROWN. I don't know.

Senator DAYTON. OK. Yesterday, in our hearing, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Paul McHale, stated that it was on Thursday, September 1, that FEMA made a request for DOD to accept the responsibility to provide "full logistic support" throughout the entire area affected by Hurricane Katrina. Again, according to published reports, you toured by helicopter the New Orleans area on Tuesday. Who would have provided that full logistic support, if not DOD, prior to that request? And then why was it 48 hours later before that request was made?

Mr. BROWN. It would have been the Louisiana National Guard who would have done it, plus FEMA's team, such as Urban Search and Rescue Teams or any other rapid needs assessment teams that

we might have had on site would have been doing it. And that fits in pretty well—I had not heard that comment from Paul McHale, but that fits in pretty well with my recollection that on August 30, indeed, there is a mission assignment, and my understanding, by August 30, I was requesting active-duty military.

Senator DAYTON. August 30, which is 2 days prior to when he is testifying here that the request is——

Mr. BROWN. Right, and based on what I've seen so far, the timeline of these things, that wouldn't surprise me.

Senator DAYTON. It wouldn't surprise you that it takes 2 days for a request from FEMA to reach the DOD?

Mr. BROWN. I guess.

Senator DAYTON. Well, I would suggest, Madam Chairman, that is something we should inquire—I would ask—my time is almost up here. For the record, I appreciate, again, both your appearances. If you could help us—the critical thing here is we need to look ahead. We need to understand why FEMA was unable to respond, and I just want to put in the record here this quote again today of the papers to clarify. It says, “Everybody is waiting”—this is as of today—“for the FEMA maps like they were the oracles at Delphi. The maps will tell residents and businesses where and how they can rebuild. Those maps will tell people whether or not they can get flood insurance. And if they can't get flood insurance, they may want to sell. But there may not be a market for the house, so the government may swoop in, raze the house, and build a park. Preliminary FEMA maps are scheduled to come out in the spring, but final Federal guidelines for rebuilding may not be released until August,” etc.

I mean, these—not just the immediate aftermath—but these alleged bureaucratic delays seem to be at the crux of why more progress has not been made in clearing away and rebuilding New Orleans. And to the extent that if there is anything that we can do legislatively, or whatever, that empowers FEMA to be more efficient in its response, I would appreciate it if you would direct us to that in writing.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I want to thank the two witnesses for their testimony. We will have additional questions for the record. We appreciate your voluntarily being here today, and I would now like to call the second panel to come forward.

We will now proceed with our second panel. Robert Stephan is the Department of Homeland Security's Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, a post which he assumed in April 2005. Matthew Broderick is Director for Operations Coordination at the Department of Homeland Security. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, he was the head of the Homeland Security Operations Center.

I would ask that you both stand so I can administer the oath. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Colonel STEPHAN. I do.

General BRODERICK. I do.

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Stephan, we are going to start with you.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ROBERT B. STEPHAN,¹ (USAF, RETIRED), ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Colonel STEPHAN. Good morning, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and other distinguished Members of this Committee. Thank you very much for the opportunity to address you today and also for your ongoing support to the Department of Homeland Security's very important mission. I am pleased to come before you to discuss the activities of the Department in relation to preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

Currently, I am the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection at DHS. By way of background, I retired from the U.S. Air Force, after 24 years of experience, at the rank of Colonel. I have extensive experience in contingency operations from a joint special operations community perspective. In my 24-year military career, I organized, trained, and equipped Air Force special operations forces for contingency operations in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Croatia, Liberia, Colombia, and Kosovo. My duties also included during this period extensive responsibilities for the planning and execution of complex combat search and rescue, air traffic management, terminal attack control, medical evacuation, and noncombatant evacuation operations.

Following my Air Force career, I joined DHS at its inception on Secretary Ridge's staff in March 2003 and served as a Special Assistant to Secretary Ridge and later as Director of the Department Integration Staff. In August 2004, then-Secretary Ridge commissioned me to lead or integrate the Department efforts to coordinate the development of the National Incident Management System document as well as the National Response Plan. In this capacity, was responsible for leading an interagency writing team comprised of more than a dozen principal representatives across the Department and other key Federal agencies and for coordinating the development of the NRP document, in fact, with hundreds of State and local government, private sector, and other Federal agency and Department partners. I also had lead responsibility for developing an initial program of education, training, and awareness regarding the NIMS document and the NRP in partnership with FEMA's Emergency Management Institute at Emmitsburg, Maryland. Following issuance of the NIMS in March 2004 and the NRP in December 2004, at Secretary Ridge's direction, I transitioned responsibility for the ongoing management, maintenance, and training of both the NIMS and the NRP to FEMA headquarters, specifically the NIMS Integration Center under Director Brown.

The National Response Plan is the core operational plan for national incident management. It adopts an all-hazards approach integrating natural disasters, terrorism, and industrial accidents, for the most part, and provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational coordination for a cross-spectrum of domestic incident management concerns. It is actually signed by the heads of 32 Federal departments, to include Cabinet Secretaries and agency heads and national-level presidents of private volunteer organizations. Prior to final implementation, the NRP

¹ The prepared statement of Colonel Stephan appears in the Appendix on page 85.

was tested during the Top Officials Exercise 3, conducted during the period of April 4–8, 2005, and involving complex mass casualty scenarios in two State venues—New Jersey and Connecticut.

The NRP is implemented—and this is important to understand this for our discussion—in a cascading fashion according to the situation at hand. It is not a document or a system that is turned on and off in a binary fashion like a light switch; in fact, certain core coordinating structures of the NRP and information sharing mechanisms, such as the Homeland Security Operations Center, are indeed active 24 hours a day every day of the year. Other elements of the NRP can be fully or partially implemented in the context of a specific threat, the anticipation of a significant event, or in response to a specific incident. Selective implementation of core elements of the system allows flexibility in meeting the operational and information-sharing requirements, again, of the situation at hand, as well as ensuring and enabling interaction between Federal, State, local, and private sector partners.

With the onset of Hurricane Katrina, I focused my attention and responsibilities as Director of the Interagency Incident Management Group, as specified and assigned in the NRP.

By way of background, this group, the IIMG, is a multi-agency Federal coordination unit which reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security to facilitate strategic response to a domestic incident as opposed to tactical response that is facilitated at the local level by Federal, State, local, and private sector partners. Its membership is flexible and can be tailored to provide appropriate subject matter expertise depending on the nature of the threat or situation or incident at hand. The IIMG works in concert with other NRP coordinating structures such as the HSOC and FEMA headquarters National Response Coordination Center, as it did during Hurricane Katrina. In terms of division of labor, this Interagency Incident Management Group at DHS headquarters is intended to focus on strategic-level issues and medium-term courses of action—that is, the medium-term/long-term fight—while the HSOC and the NRCC at FEMA headquarters work in partnership to maintain situational awareness and solve operational and tactical level issues—that is, the near-term/near-horizon fight.

As IIMG Director, I asked my staff in the early evening of Thursday, August 25, to alert all IIMG members regarding the approach of Hurricane Katrina and to request them to maintain readiness for possible activation within a 90-minute time window as directed by the Secretary in accordance with our standard headquarters protocols. I also directed my staff to send regular HSOC situation and spot reports regarding Katrina to all IIMG members to help promote situational awareness and prepare them to assume their duties if recalled.

During the weekend period, Saturday and Sunday, I stayed in close contact with HSOC Director Broderick; I received regular verbal and electronic updates on the situation, information as it became available on the hurricane. Based upon the available information regarding the storm, it was decided not to activate the IIMG during the weekend period and that the fully activated and robust HSOC and National Response Coordination Center activities at FEMA were up and running at 100 percent or greater in order to

handle the emergent incident management pre-deployment considerations and initial incident management responsibilities. The IIMG membership remained on a 90-minute recall posture throughout the weekend to afford the Secretary an additive layer to these initial coordinating structures that were very robust and already stood up at our headquarters and at FEMA headquarters, along with the regional FEMA headquarters elements that had been in place as well as the FEMA headquarters elements that had now been in place in Baton Rouge at least since Saturday and Sunday.

As Hurricane Katrina approached, FEMA and other Federal agencies tactically prepositioned significant assets, to include essential equipment, supplies, and specialty teams, in critical locations throughout the projected hurricane footprint and established initial NRP-related coordinating structures at the national, regional, and State levels. Through these actions, the Department was leaning forward to prepare for a significant hurricane, informed by lessons learned from the previous hurricane season, the Hurricane Pam planning, and emergent analysis from the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, as well as, of course, by specific requests and requirements that were pushed to us from the States of Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Additional Federal assets were deployed into the region following the issuance of the Presidential Emergency Declaration on Saturday evening. The type and quantity of prepositioned Federal assets were based upon previous hurricane experience as well as specific State and local government requirements. It should be noted that the NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex was not implemented at this time because it was designed and constructed to be a no-notice—or to support a no-notice incident scenario that would not allow time for a more tailored approach. Subsequent FEMA analysis has indicated to us that as a minimum, 100 percent or greater of assets called for in the Catastrophic Incident Supplement were, in fact, deployed to the region some time during the course of the weekend prior to landfall.

Through the mechanism of the Presidential Emergency Declaration, the Federal Government had sufficient authority and time to take action to determine and deploy a full measure of appropriate assets prior to landfall pursuant to the Stafford Act and associated State and local requests.

On Monday morning, August 29, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security directed me to convene a meeting of IIMG members for the purpose of conducting a situational awareness update and pulsing the IIMG members regarding individual agency capabilities and operational activities in the hurricane impact area. At this point in the unfolding scenario, much of the information being reported from the field was understandably preliminary, incomplete, and unconfirmed. Throughout this day, there were many inconsistent and uncertain reports regarding the extent of hurricane damage in New Orleans and the status of the levee system there. This is fully consistent with the Day 1 pattern established during previous hurricane episodes that we had gone through since the Department's inception.

On the following day, Tuesday, August 30, at about 11:30 a.m., I was first advised by my staff of confirmed reports of irreparable breaches to the levees in New Orleans and that there was now considerable flooding confirmed to be occurring in various parts of the city. As a result, the IIMG membership was recalled to DHS headquarters, and the IIMG was officially activated at approximately 2 p.m. on that day. This decision was based on the fact that the potential long-term flooding of New Orleans represented a “catastrophic crisis within a crisis” and that the Secretary would now require the additional layer or additive layer of incident management capability provided by the IIMG. Secretary Chertoff shortly thereafter also issued a formal memorandum designating Michael Brown, the FEMA Director—already on the ground in Baton Rouge—as the Principal Federal Official under the NRP.

As the events of that first week unfolded, I believe honestly three factors combined to negatively impact the speed and efficiency of the Federal response.

The first was the sheer amount of unbelievable physical destruction, devastation, and disruption caused by Katrina regarding both wind damage and subsequent flooding. Response teams had to cope with the very severely restricted geographic access issue to core parts of the New Orleans downtown area due to the extent of the flooding. This significantly hampered response activities.

Second, the tenuous initial security and law enforcement environment in New Orleans during the first several days of the response significantly impacted and impeded rescue and response efforts until a level of stability was achieved later during the first week.

Finally, as the week progressed after landfall, failure of various Federal officials to fully implement key aspects of the NIMS and the NRP impeded the Federal response. Specifically, the designated PFO, FEMA Director Brown, and core staff deployed with him did not after landfall establish a robust Joint Field Office and Emergency Support Function structure as called for in the National Response Plan. According to the NRP, the Joint Field Office serves as a key hub of Federal incident management coordination at the local level and enables integrated interaction with key State and local officials, as well as, very importantly, other Federal departments and agencies with considerable resources to assist in the response. Although the NRP envisions this operation normally to become fully activated in a 48- to 96-hour period after the initial occurrence of an event, the completely functional JFO in Baton Rouge, in fact, was not activated until much later, in fact, until some time during the middle of the second week of the response.

Moreover, the Principal Federal Official failed to establish a robust Federal unified command structure in Baton Rouge or in New Orleans as called for in the National Incident Management System. The concept of unified command is absolutely paramount as it provides for the coming together of senior representatives from each agency involved in incident response to enable informed, collective decision-making, resource allocation, and coordinated multi-agency operations. While many support agencies had liaisons co-located at the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Emergency Operations Centers, full unified command was not accomplished in the first

week. And, again, I will give Mr. Brown credit in that the sheer amount of devastation and destruction that he had to cope with to establish this certainly impeded his ability to do so. But that should not have gone on and dragged out into the middle and end of the first week of the response.

The lack of eyes and ears on the ground in New Orleans significantly hindered the ability of NRP entities at DHS headquarters to put together a common situational awareness and common operating picture for the Secretary and other DHS headquarters leadership. This situation was dramatically turned around following the arrival of Vice Admiral Thad Allen in theater and his assumption of overall Principal Federal Official responsibilities.

Madam Chairman, as we move forward, the Department is aggressively looking at identifying additional shortcomings associated with the Federal response and to design and begin to implement appropriate solutions. A key focus area—and I believe my colleague will discuss this in a little bit more detail—is improving tactical-level situational awareness and command and control connectivity within the Department headquarters for catastrophic incidents. The Department leadership has also been working very closely with FEMA headquarters and field components to restructure FEMA logistics and mission assignment processes for catastrophic events. More details will follow from the Secretary regarding this effort in the coming weeks.

The Department is committed to taking also a close look at the NRP and its associated education and training processes and programs and making the adjustments necessary to make sure we have a full and robust response capability prior to the advent of this year's hurricane season. We look forward to continuing to work with you, this Committee, and our other partners, to look back retrospectively in order to operate more efficiently and effectively during future situations.

If I can just have one more second, I would like to really close by recognizing the extraordinary efforts of the men and women of FEMA who worked diligently and continue to work diligently to provide a wide variety of assistance to those whose lives were impacted by the hurricanes of 2005. The situation they faced at all levels was extremely complex and, in some cases, heretofore unprecedented. I hold these folks in absolutely the utmost regard. They deserve our continued respect and support in the road ahead.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you today. I will now defer to my colleague.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Broderick.

**TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MATTHEW BRODERICK,¹
DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS COORDINATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

General BRODERICK. Good afternoon, Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, distinguished Members of this Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to address you today and for your ongoing support of the Department of Homeland Security and its operations. I am honored and pleased to be before you to discuss the activities

¹ The prepared statement of General Broderick appears in the Appendix on page 94.

of the Department of Homeland Security relating to the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

Currently, I am the Director of Operations for the Department of Homeland Security, but to be clear, at the time of Hurricane Katrina, I held the position of Director of the Homeland Security Operations Center, HSOC. By way of background, I am a retired Brigadier General in the U.S. Marine Corps after serving for 30 years. During that time, when not in command, I was in charge of operations centers at all levels of the Marine Corps, including battalion, regiment, brigade, division, and then later, as Director of Operations for the Marine Corps, I commanded the Marine Corps National Command Center.

Following my career with the Marine Corps, I served for 3½ years as a regional vice president of operations for an international corporation and then as an adjunct consultant for the Institute of Defense Analysis working on command and control and situational awareness systems and on projects aiming to standardize and modernize joint deployable operations centers for the Department of Defense.

In May 2003, I was asked by the Department of Homeland Security to help improve the then-fledgling Homeland Security Operations Center. At that time, the Operations Center consisted of five or six DHS headquarters employees and approximately 100-plus detailees working in austere conditions with limited capabilities. Since that time, the center has grown into one of the largest 24/7 operations centers in the United States, with about 45 Federal, State, and local agencies represented and approximately 300 personnel. Last October, the Secretary, following his Second Stage Review of the Department and in consultation with Congress, established the Office of Operations Coordination, of which the HSOC is a core part of that organization.

The Office of Operations Coordination is responsible for coordinating operations across all DHS organizational components, for coordinating activities related to incident management, for collection and dissemination of terrorist-related threat information, and for providing domestic situational awareness on a daily basis. Its major components are the HSOC, future operations, current operations, and incident management operations. This was an important step within the Department because it consolidated the operational efforts of what were previously shared by other DHS components. It is also important to point out that the headquarters focus of the Office of Operations Coordination, both during Hurricane Katrina and now, is at the strategic level and, therefore, acts in a supporting role to assist with additional national assets, as required.

The HSOC is the primary national-level nerve center and conduit for information flowing in and out of these events. However, it does not become decisively engaged with any single event or incident so that it might monitor several different events at any one time. In the case of an incident like Hurricane Katrina, the HSOC continues to provide situational awareness to the Interagency Incident Management Group, while the Incident Management Division, a component of the IIMG, assumes responsibility for coordinating the Federal response specific to that incident.

The HSOC began its involvement with Hurricane Katrina prior to the first landfall in Florida, on or about August 24, 2005. About that time, the HSOC started issuing daily situation reports, and we were closely monitoring the latest developments relating to the storm, especially the meteorological reports from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Over the course of Friday, August 26, the hurricane shifted its directional path and its intensity. There was a level of uncertainty as to where the storm's eye would make landfall, as well as its intensity, magnitude, and impact.

The Department knew that a significant hurricane could cause potentially grave damage to the Gulf Coast. Various reports forewarned of an impending disaster and suggested the possibility of a storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain and the overtopping of the levees.

As a result, we began to take appropriate actions. The Secretary dispatched the FEMA Director to the area on Sunday, August 28. The President made emergency declarations for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and the IIMG was advised to maintain readiness over the ensuing weekend. The HSOC was on high alert as well and was carefully monitoring the approaching storm. The IMD was also focused intently on the storm's development, in the event the IIMG needed to be activated. The IMD's function is to coordinate the Federal response to a specific event when an incident reaches national significance, and in that case, the IMD helps guide the efforts of the IIMG. In addition, DHS/FEMA had tactically prepositioned significant assets in critical locations outside but near the intended area of impact, and it had initiated their National Response Coordination Center.

As the eye of the storm made landfall on Monday, August 29, information from that area was understandably sparse. At that time, it was difficult to ascertain accurate ground truth as to the extent of the damage. Our standard operating procedure is not to disturb the operations of field commanders in the middle of a crisis. Instead, we relied, in large part, on the good judgment of the information providers in the field and the NRCC to push relevant, pertinent information to the HSOC as information became clear.

As the day wore on, the HSOC began to receive information from a number of sources and began to gather, sort, and verify information and reports. There were many inconsistent and uncertain reports about the extent of flooding in New Orleans and the status of the levee system. We knew a certain amount of flooding could be expected in almost any hurricane. Nevertheless, the HSOC alerted others to those possibilities and potential occurrences, while we were making our best efforts to verify the accuracy. We were desperately pursuing all avenues in an effort to obtain confirmed reports from knowledgeable, objective sources. It is our job at the HSOC to distill and confirm reports. Based on my years of experience, we should not help spread rumors or innuendo, nor should we rely on speculation or hype, and we should not react to initial or unconfirmed reports, which are almost invariably lacking or incomplete.

Prior experience had shown that as the storm cleared over the next day or two, the ground truth would begin to crystallize and

a common operational picture and more frequent and accurate reporting would emerge. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

At about this time, it became clear that the Department needed to call upon significant additional Federal resources to respond to this event. As a result, the Department began to consider a greater role for the Department of Defense. Lieutenant General Russel Honoré was already leaning forward proactively and moving assets and personnel into the region. The HSOC began receiving regular situation reports from the U.S. Northern Command regarding DOD's specific deployment activities responding to Hurricane Katrina.

While the military was providing this ongoing support, the two departments were working to ascertain the precise language of what additional support could be requested and what could be provided. DOD needed to consider and balance these priority missions in light of their other military responsibilities and also needed a clearer understanding of exactly what was being requested. This effort was an example of excellent interagency coordination between two large agencies working collectively under significant pressure.

In addition, the Secretary deployed U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen as the Deputy Principal Federal Official in New Orleans. The situational awareness and reporting vastly improved, and the response efforts began to stabilize.

The Secretary has stated on several occasions that one of his primary goals is to improve situational awareness for such incident response efforts, and the Office of Operations Coordination, established under the 2SR, is one way to foster and promote this worthy goal. Since the early days following Hurricane Katrina, the Department continues to review the things that went well and the things that warrant improvement. I am proud to report that DHS has made great strides toward improving the information flow and situational awareness for incident management.

In particular, as the Secretary noted previously, DHS has established a six-person national reconnaissance team that can deploy in the immediate aftermath of an incident. In this way, the Department can receive real-time reporting of the facts on the ground, and the team can help us understand the priority concerns and allocate resources accordingly. A prototype of this concept was tested during the past Super Bowl with excellent results.

In addition, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has provided 26 two-person teams from offices throughout the country which can be deployed immediately to an incident anywhere within their region and use assets to report situational awareness directly back to the HSOC. They will begin their initial training next month.

Another step is the Secretary's designation of "Principal Federal Officials in waiting." The idea is that these Principal Federal Officials will have the opportunity to work cooperatively with State and local officials on an ongoing basis to plan and train together. In this way, we can develop and build the kinds of relationships that one needs to rely on when an emergency strikes.

These are just some of the initial changes to begin to address some of the lessons we learned from Hurricane Katrina. We continue to develop our comprehensive recommendations for the Sec-

retary, and the Department looks forward to continuing its cooperative relationship with this Committee and other stakeholders.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I would be happy to answer any of your questions. Thank you.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your testimony.

Mr. Stephan, you led the development of the National Response Plan, and Katrina was its first major test. Did key governmental officials responsible for executing the plan believe in it, understand it, and correctly use it as the basis for the Federal response?

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, ma'am. It is widely known throughout the U.S. Government that this plan was issued during the month of December 2004. The plan officially went into effect, I believe, on April 14, 2005. Secretary Chertoff sent a memo out at that time to his Cabinet colleagues, actually to all NRP signatories, that the plan was in effect, and, in fact, we had just used the plan to kind of measure government performance or kind of test-run it during the TOP-OFF 3 exercise April 4–8, as I described in my testimony.

There was a clear understanding on the part of all signatories to that plan, our State and local government partners, that the National Response Plan was the governing document that would govern the Federal response and how the Federal Government would support State and local and private sector response, recovery, and restoration activities.

It is my belief, based upon a series of interactions that I had personally with Mr. Brown over the course of the past couple years, that he personally did not believe in key coordinating structures associated with the National Response Plan, specifically those associated with the Department of Homeland Security headquarters, and that he, in fact, either did not or chose not to accept his responsibilities in full measure as the designated Principal Federal Official for the event and continued to perform duties as if he were the FEMA Director as opposed to rising up to a much higher level of responsibility that involved integrating all mission aspects that were ongoing during the response and recovery ops in the tri-state area, as was prescribed by the Secretary.

Chairman COLLINS. I want you to be specific on that point. In what ways did Mr. Brown fail to execute his responsibilities as the Principal Federal Official under the plan?

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, ma'am, I believe the plan itself calls out about a dozen very specific responsibilities that he had to follow. I will highlight two of those. The rest are available. One is providing real-time incident information to the Secretary of Homeland Security—who designated him to perform that responsibility through the Homeland Security Operations Center and the Inter-agency Incident Management Group, No. 1.

No. 2, ensuring that adequate connectivity is maintained between the Joint Field Office, which failed to be established in an appropriate amount of time, and the HSOC, local, county, State, and regional Emergency Operating Centers, nongovernmental Emergency Operating Centers, and relevant elements of the private sector. Those are two key pieces that left us more or less at various times during this response at DHS headquarters virtually blind to certain key events that were happening as the response unfolded throughout the first week.

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Broderick, that is a good segue into the first question I have for you. A key concept, as we have just heard, within the National Response Plan is the concept of sharing important information with decisionmakers. Yet in the case of Katrina, absolutely critical information was not shared promptly with key decisionmakers.

Now, in the case of Mr. Brown and what we have just heard from Mr. Stephan, I can only conclude that he let his poor personal relationship with Secretary Chertoff interfere with his clear responsibility to communicate to the Secretary. But the best example of this failure to communicate is the breach of the New Orleans levees. Secretary Chertoff stated that he did not learn of the collapse of the levees until Tuesday, arguably 24 hours after it happened. Deputy Secretary Jackson has told us in an interview that he did not learn of the collapse of the levees until Tuesday. Admiral Keating told me personally that he did not learn of the breach of the levees until Tuesday. Mr. Stephan has just testified that he did not learn of the collapse of the levees until 11:30 a.m, approximately, on Tuesday.

Whose responsibility was it to inform these key officials that the levees had collapsed and, thus, the city of New Orleans was in tremendous danger?

General BRODERICK. Madam Chairman, it was my responsibility at that time as the Director of the Homeland Security Operations Center to inform these key people, these key personnel. If they did not receive that information, it was my responsibility and my fault.

I would like to point out, though, that getting that situational awareness and getting the correct information was very difficult. Monday, we knew that we had a lot of conflicting reports. We expect flooding during hurricanes, and we know that. There were no urgent calls or flash messages coming up from anyone during the day of Monday that gave us any indication. We did get reports that there was breaching and overtopping. It's my job to make sure that these individuals all get the correct information, and that's what we were trying to do, is get ground truth.

There is a big difference between breaching, which means water's going to be streaming in at a rapid rate, and overspilling.

Chairman COLLINS. Absolutely.

General BRODERICK. There was also a question if there was a breach, could the Corps of Engineers quickly plug that breach? And we didn't know that, and we were having trouble finding that out.

There's also a question, if there's overtopping, can the pumps—and I believe there were 33 major large pumps within the city of New Orleans that could evacuate that water, and we didn't know to what extent. If water was overtopping, it could have been exiting as fast as it was coming in. The reports we were getting were very confusing. Some parts were flooding. We got word that some parts were up to 10 feet and some parts were up to rooftops.

We had other conflicting reports that said there were no breaches and that only certain parts of the city were taking water. Ascertaining to what degree was what we were trying to do and get ground truth.

We finally got a report that I remember at—I think it was the last SITREP of that evening that said there were no breaches to the levee systems in New Orleans, and that's what came up to us.

Chairman COLLINS. But from whom? And who was responsible on the ground in New Orleans to communicate the information to you? You are not down in Louisiana or Mississippi. You are up in headquarters at the Operations Center and deploying the information from there. But who is the person who is responsible for communicating accurate, timely, vital information to you?

General BRODERICK. At that time, it was Mr. Brown, Secretary Brown, Under Secretary Brown. There's an obligation, from my experience in the military—I've been doing this a long time, from Vietnam, to evacuating Saigon, to evacuating Phnom Penh. I ran southern Somalia for a while. I went back and evacuated Mogadishu. I've been in a lot of this stuff a lot of times. Juniors or subordinates have a responsibility to keep their seniors informed. There was a prevailing attitude from Mr. Brown that he did not want Homeland Security to interfere with any of his operations or what he was doing, and that came through loud and clear. So we trusted, based on their past record, that they would do the proper thing, take the proper actions, and keep us informed. We were not getting that information.

Chairman COLLINS. And it is completely unacceptable that Mr. Brown did not communicate to you. But I want to really focus on this issue because it was the flooding of New Orleans that made the difference between this being a bad hurricane and a catastrophic disaster for the city of New Orleans.

General BRODERICK. Yes, ma'am.

Chairman COLLINS. We know that Marty Bahamonde was so alarmed when he heard the reports of the breach in the levee that he called Mr. Brown on Monday morning. We know that he e-mailed a number of FEMA officials. And then later that day, he had a firsthand, eyewitness account to verify what he saw.

Did any of those reports get conveyed by Mr. Brown to you at the Operations Center?

General BRODERICK. Not by Mr. Brown, and Mr. Brown should have picked up the phone and called the Secretary right away if that happened.

Now, there were reports coming in from other agencies, and that's what we were trying to confirm. I remember leaving Monday evening, though, knowing that Mr. Brown had said that he could handle situations down there and asked us to stand back. And in the French Quarter, on television, they were dancing and drinking beer and seemed to be having a party in the French Quarter of New Orleans that evening. So it led us to believe that the flooding may have been just an isolated incidence, it was being handled, and it was being properly addressed because we were not seeing it.

Now, later on that evening, we had significant reports that came in later that then led us to the conclusion we had a serious problem. And by the time I came in Tuesday morning and read those reports, I knew we had a catastrophic event and we had to get moving, and I needed a few hours to get some ground truth to this very quickly, whatever means I could, so that I could get hold of Mr. Stephan and tell him we need the IIMG and the IMD in here.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Thanks to both of you.

General Broderick, let me begin with some questions for you. As you have indicated, at the time of Hurricane Katrina, you were the head of the Homeland Security Operations Center, HSOC, which describes itself, appropriately, as “the primary conduit to the White House and the Secretary of Homeland Security for domestic situational awareness during a catastrophic event.” It houses a number of agencies, a large number. And this was one of the gems that we wanted so much to create after September 11 within the new Department of Homeland Security, the place where the dots could be connected. And that is why what happened leading up to Katrina and on the day of landfall is so perplexing to us. And I presume—because I know you have served your country, you are a patriot, you are capable, I presume they are also of great concern to you.

I assume that, like everyone else in the Department of Homeland Security, you were generally aware of the so-called New Orleans scenario, that it was a bowl and if the levees broke, it would flood. Is that correct?

General BRODERICK. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And were you involved at all in the Hurricane Pam exercise, or anybody for you?

General BRODERICK. No, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You were not. But during the weekend before Hurricane Katrina hit landfall, I presume you were involved in briefings such as those that Mr. Brown or others have described, including the very public warnings by Dr. Mayfield on the TV that this could be a Category 4 or 5 storm and that would be the big one that New Orleans had been worried about. Is that right?

General BRODERICK. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. So we go into the weekend with that in mind, and in the interview with our Committee staff, you said, quite correctly, that one of the responsibilities of the HSOC, the Operations Center, is to develop plans for monitoring events, big events like the Super Bowl and the national political conventions, and in that sense maintaining all important situational awareness, what is going on and how can we, therefore, be prepared to respond.

Yet when you were asked what type of plan the HSOC developed for maintaining situational awareness during Katrina, your answer was, “There was no plan developed.”

So in light of your office’s, the center’s, and DHS’s primary responsibility with regard to catastrophes, how do you explain why there was no plan going into that weekend for trying to maintain situational awareness?

General BRODERICK. The usual reliance, sir, on a major contingency is when the Principal Federal Official is appointed, the Homeland Security Operations Center and other departments at the headquarters send the communications and the people with that Principal Federal Official to go to that incident. Because Secretary Brown owned significant assets down range and he could draw upon them, he would actually—we actually did not end up sending people from the headquarters with them because he had

the resources to draw down there. So right there that severed what would normally be my own people down at that site with my own communications.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Normally, you would have sent in your own team to try to the best of their ability to maintain situational awareness, and because you thought that Director Brown was doing that, you made a judgment that you didn't need to, that in some sense he was occupying the field.

General BRODERICK. Yes, sir. He had the assets. We will take a Principal Federal Official from across the country and ask him to be the Principal Federal Official. He needs to be supported, so we will take communications and people from the headquarters, and those people will pass that back.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Here is the painful reality that we have discovered, and if you have been following this, you probably have, too, which is that Michael Brown didn't have the assets. He had Marty Bahamonde and a few other people down there. And he himself had a hard time maintaining situational awareness.

Let me take you through some of the other steps which are so troubling to all of us. I appreciate that you took some responsibility in your answer to Chairman Collins' question because generally people don't do that. Here is part of the problem, and I want us to look at this together self-critically, constructively, because the next time, very different, it is going to be a terrorist attack or another disaster. And on that blue chart—you don't have to look at it. It is Exhibit Q.¹ But I referred to it earlier. Beginning at 8:30 a.m., there are public statements, local, State, and a lot of Federal agencies are saying basically the levees have broken, New Orleans is flooding. 9:08 a.m., the National Weather Service has reported that a levee broke—I am reading from this—and Transportation Security Administration—which I presume is part of HSOC, am I right?

General BRODERICK. TSA, yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. They put out a bulletin at 9:08 saying that a levee has broken in the uptown area of New Orleans on the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain, flood waters have already intruded on the first stories of houses, and some roads are impassable, heavy street flooding throughout Orleans, St. Bernard, and Jefferson parishes. And it goes on from the National Weather Service again, from HSOC Spot Report, continuing very agitated reports from the National Weather Service, one from FEMA. 12:40 p.m. on that day, Monday, the National Weather Service puts out a flash flood warning: Widespread flooding will continue across the parishes along the south shore of the lake. This continues to be an extremely life-threatening situation, so much so that they add—you wouldn't think it was the Weather Service's responsibility, but, of course, it is—those seeking refuge in attics and rooftops are strongly urged to take the necessary tools for survival. And they go on to tell them to take an axe or a hatchet with them. And, of course, National Weather Service is part of NOAA—which I also believe is part of the Operations Center, correct?

¹ Exhibit Q appears in the Appendix on page 205.

General BRODERICK. I have a NOAA representative at the Operations Center.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. So it doesn't necessarily mean that the representative got this, but he certainly should have.

General BRODERICK. I would assume that he did get it, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So here is the really troubling situation, and having some sense of who you are, I imagine today you have to be really furious about it. All this is happening and coming into component agencies of your Operations Center, and yet you go home Monday night, and you have seen on the television that in the French Quarter in New Orleans they are drinking beer, and you conclude that there is maybe some minor flooding, when, in fact, all these reports coming in are telling you that it is quite the contrary. It turns out the French Quarter, as we know, is a little higher elevated, so it was one of the few places that did not get badly flooded.

How do you explain that to yourself? And is that part of the reason why Secretary Chertoff and the President said that they didn't know about this—Mr. Stephan, too—didn't know about the flooding until Tuesday morning?

General BRODERICK. Yes, sir. They wouldn't know until I passed it on.

Senator LIEBERMAN. What did you—I am sorry. Go ahead.

General BRODERICK. I was extremely frustrated. I had been there a thousand times in situations like this. I honestly do not remember the official I called, but I called a senior official at FEMA and said we have a President, we have a Secretary that are seeing things on television, we are getting reports, what is going on down there?

Senator LIEBERMAN. You did that on Monday, the day of land-fall?

General BRODERICK. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And what was the answer you got?

General BRODERICK. The answer that I received, sir, was that FEMA SOP says, "We tell you early in the morning and we tell you early in the evening on a situation report, and that's what you're going to get." And I said, "That's unacceptable." This looks significant, it looks serious, and that was repeated again: "We give you a report in the morning, and we give you a report in the evening."

It was extremely frustrating, and we were trying to go—now, I asked a senior official, Mike Lowder, later on—

Senator LIEBERMAN. A FEMA official.

General BRODERICK. Yes, sir. I asked him several weeks ago why that happened and what broke down. He told me that he had called Secretary Brown on numerous occasions and recommended that he needed to call Secretary Chertoff and that they needed to push that information up, and he was told that they work for the White House and not for DHS.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And as we heard, he was telling the White House—Mr. Brown was—although Mr. Jackson was on some of the calls that he was making from New Orleans. I have been to the Operations Center. It is an impressive place. They are essentially sitting around getting information in the same general area, and it is coming in from a lot of the people at the table there. Why didn't

any of them go up to you and say, "General Broderick, this is a catastrophe. We have got to mobilize our forces quickly and respond to this?"

General BRODERICK. I can't answer that, sir, but I can tell you that some of that information—and I don't remember specifically—was coming toward me. That was my frustration with trying to find out were these significant breaches, was this overtopping, was it just a small section of the city that was flooding, were the pumps handling it. We could not get ground truth. We were getting nothing out of Louisiana.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Have you taken steps now as Director of Operations to make sure that the next time something like this or a terrorist attack happens that this doesn't happen again?

General BRODERICK. Significant steps, sir, including a National Reconnaissance Team that's ready to go with satellite communications and streaming video that we can insert within 8 hours and people within 4 hours from 26 different ICE locations.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

I raised the issue of the NRP and the Principal Federal Officer with the first panel, and I want to follow through with you on this topic.

Colonel Stephan, you were one of the principal authors of the NRP, National Response Plan—

Colonel STEPHAN. Correct, sir.

Senator AKAKA [continuing]. Which established the position of Principal Federal Officer, PFO.

Colonel STEPHAN. Correct, sir.

Senator AKAKA. The NRP states that once an individual is named PFO, he or she must "relinquish the conduct of all normal duties and functions."

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Do you think it is problematic for the Director of FEMA to relinquish his or her normal duties during a disaster?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, let me answer that question by saying recall Mr. Brown, by the time the Principal Federal Official designation was made by the Secretary, was already on the ground and, for all intents and purposes, performing Principal Federal Official duties as the senior person from the Department headquarters. However, without the formal designation, he, Mike Brown, was only able to direct FEMA resources.

A FEMA official, through the Presidential Declaration of Emergency on Saturday evening, was designated as the Federal Coordinating Officer for resource coordination purposes. Mr. Brown and his FCO, who actually is also a FEMA employee, worked together as FEMA Director, FCO, to push the initial—or get pulls of the initial resource requests and requirements coming in, push them up to their headquarters and to other places throughout the food chain.

When now Mr. Brown—all the Secretary really did by designating him PFO is say, look, Mr. Brown, you are already deployed, you are here, you are on location, you have no more responsibilities back in terms of your day-to-day administrative control of FEMA

headquarters, you're exclusively focused on the Federal Government's principal representative designated by me to do what needs to be done to bring this situation under control, determine State and local government and private sector requirements, get them resourced, and identify any shortfalls in that process as a result.

Senator AKAKA. Who was this FCO that was designated?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, that would be William Lokey, part of the Federal Coordinating Officer cadre that was in place on Saturday, I believe, concurrently with the Presidential Emergency Declaration, with full authority to bring in and have financed any Federal resource that was supported by a State and local request through the State-level validation process.

Senator AKAKA. Just to get the facts straight, was Mr. Rhode ever designated as Director?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I don't have clarity on that, but it would be incumbent upon Mr. Brown to designate an individual of his choice to perform in the FEMA headquarters director administrative duty as long as he was, in fact, designated to perform the Principal Federal Official duty, focusing exclusively on the Katrina response.

Senator AKAKA. Are there any changes to the PFO concept that you would like to recommend now that all of this has happened?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I think the concept is a good one. It is a necessary one. I would not throw the baby out with the bath water, so to speak. If one individual did not perform up to that level, that does not mean the concept is bad. I think the concept is good. I think the country, not the Department of Homeland Security that help put this National Response Plan together, thought highly of the concept enough to put it in this document and all support it, it ought to stay in there. But we ought to examine it to make sure that the PFO does have all the authorities that he or she would require during a similar incident or one of greater magnitude.

Senator AKAKA. Yes, it appears that the confusion regarding the shift of responsibilities probably played a part in what happened there.

General Broderick, as you know, geospatial technologies such as satellite imagery and aerial photography provide first responders with timely situational information during a disaster. I understand that there were multiple and uncoordinated efforts by the HSOC and FEMA to obtain aerial images of New Orleans from the Geospatial-Intelligence Agency immediately after Hurricane Katrina hit land. I am especially interested in this because I authored legislation that created the DHS Office of Geospatial Management specifically to coordinate such information requests.

How was geospatial information obtained during the response to Hurricane Katrina, and was the Office of Geospatial Management ever involved?

General BRODERICK. Yes, sir. The following day, Tuesday, when we realized that we had a catastrophic incident, the first thing we did was ask NGA, the National Geospatial Agency, to start overflying that and giving us whatever picture they could. There was also a request from one of the parishes that had significant pipelines underground and aboveground if they could fly those routes and see if there were any significant breaks or leaks that they

could detect, both subterranean and on the surface. We also wanted to get as much photography as we could of the actual site itself, and eventually, we were able to get that, sir.

One of the problems that I think in the future you run into with NGA—and we're trying to work that out now because I am a big believer in geospatial technology—is that usually when NGA, our primary source, does something like that, all the photography comes out as stamped “Secret,” and you can't pass it on. So we're trying to work through that on how we can get a level below the secret level.

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you for that. From the reports I received, I wondered what role the GMO had during that period of time.

Is it your understanding that FEMA was making requests of NGA at the same time the HSOC was?

General BRODERICK. I actually asked someone to help coordinate the efforts. There is no sense in duplicity and running the same missions. And we were trying to work that out with them, sir, as best we could. There were requirements coming up from the field. There were requirements from FEMA headquarters. There were requirements from us. Because of that and one of the lessons learned in that is we need, as the military does, to have one belly button that can coordinate all those efforts so that there is not a waste of assets and time.

Senator AKAKA. General, in your interview with Committee staff, you stated that on Wednesday, August 31, you tried to obtain buses to evacuate the remaining residents of New Orleans at Secretary Chertoff's request. I realize that Secretary Chertoff tasked you with this responsibility even though locating buses clearly was not your job.

Was your ability to oversee the HSOC hindered by your involvement in operations?

General BRODERICK. Sir, I'm sorry if I confused the record. That may have been a misquote. Secretary Chertoff asked me to find out the status of the buses and what was taking place and what Mr. Brown was doing to get more buses in there and, if they were having trouble, for us to step in and check with the Department of Transportation TSA to help support that.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for that response, General.

General BRODERICK. Yes, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Colonel Stephan, in your interview with the Committee staff, you described the Department of Homeland Security as a place where everyone wore multiple hats, fulfilling many roles. Do you believe this multi-tasking caused confusion and made it more difficult to accomplish tasks during Hurricane Katrina?

Colonel STEPHAN. No, sir, I do not. Once we had a verifiable confirmation of a levee breach—and, actually, the weekend leading up to that, there was no dual-hatting or triple-hatting that in my estimation across the Department leadership caused anyone to not be able to focus. We identified pieces of the response in a cascading fashion. We rolled in FEMA teams down into the area. We activated the FEMA response structure at their national-level headquarters, brought interagency players into their headquarters to facilitate the response to the Emergency Support Function cadre. We

had done outreach with the State and local government officials at all levels. We had done outreach with the private sector at all levels in the projected impacted zone. Secretary Chertoff made numerous personal phone calls to governors and other key officials in the potentially impacted zone to figure out whether or not there were any resource requirements that were not being met.

I wore multiple hats, but I knew which hat was most important during this response, and it was focusing on Katrina. And I may have been performing parallel duties, for example, as the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, while serving simultaneously as the Interagency Incident Management Group Director. But I only did those activities such as reaching out and making sure the private sector, for example, had the National Infrastructure Simulation Analysis Center analysis of the potential infrastructure cascading impacts inside the projected hurricane footprint, getting those things out, for example.

So I don't think triple- and dual-hatting of any individual leader within the Department caused any slowness or lack of a response.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your clarification, and I want to thank both of you for your responses.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I am going to turn over the gavel to my colleague, Senator Lieberman. Don't do anything that I wouldn't do. [Laughter.]

Senator LIEBERMAN. I can't promise. I will try not to.

Chairman COLLINS. I apologize for having to leave. I want to thank our witnesses for your very candid testimony. It has been helpful to us, and we will be submitting some additional questions for the record, but thank you for your cooperation.

Senator DAYTON.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Both of you have military backgrounds. What is the chain of command between Mr. Brown and the Secretary or whomever? Is that a direct connection?

Colonel STEPHAN. Yes, sir.

General BRODERICK. Yes, sir.

Senator DAYTON. Where do the two of you then fit into that chain?

General BRODERICK. We are staff officers, sir.

Senator DAYTON. Meaning you are parallel or you are——

General BRODERICK. I am a direct report to the Secretary. At that time, I was not. I worked for an Under Secretary of IAIP, but I had a very close relationship with the Secretary.

Senator DAYTON. Does Mr. Brown have a direct report to either of you—did he at that time?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, may I answer that in two ways? Neither one of us had a direct reporting day-to-day administrative chain of command that in any way, shape, or form involved Mr. Brown. However, with the designation of Principal Federal Official, Mr. Brown now has an operational chain of command that, in terms of sharing information, the responsibility is clear and direct in the National Response Plan to inform the HSOC and the IIMG about everything that is going on of major import in his area of responsibility and also directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

So although day-to-day administrative chain of command was not a factor, in the operational sequence of this, I would say the answer is yes.

Senator DAYTON. OK. Understanding that—and, again, I am going by a published report here from the *New York Times*, and it may be that, understandably, neither of you are in a position to corroborate or dispute these accounts. But it says here that on that Monday evening, 9:27 p.m., an e-mail message with the subject FYI from FEMA sent to Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff's Chief of Staff says, "The first reports they are getting from aerial surveys in New Orleans are far more serious than the media reports are currently reflecting." And then at 11:05 p.m., an e-mail message from FEMA's Deputy Director to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, says, "We just spoke with our first rep on the ground in New Orleans, who did a helo tour and describes a 200-yard collapse of the levee on the south side of the lake."

Now, we have two communications that this is accurate, one to the Chief of Staff of the Secretary, the other to the Deputy Secretary of the Department. You are saying that Mr. Brown didn't communicate with the Secretary or with you or whatever. What else should have been done? Could he reasonably expect that if the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Secretary are both informed, that the necessary subordinates in the agency are going to also be informed?

General BRODERICK. Sir, those were e-mails sent in the middle of the night—

Senator DAYTON. No, not in the middle of the night. 9:27 and 11:05 p.m.

General BRODERICK. Yes, sir, in the late evening. I don't disagree, but all I'm saying is if they were urgent messages that needed to be conveyed, I would have thought they would have called and not sent an e-mail. That person may not, for whatever reason, have been near their computer. I had 500 to 600 e-mails on my computer after the—

Senator DAYTON. There is an emergency going on. People went home and just left their computers—

General BRODERICK. No, sir. What I'm saying is they may have been engaged in other activities and not reading their e-mail. I think if the urgency of the call—

Senator DAYTON. I understand that neither of you can corroborate. I would like to find out from those two principals, Mr. Chairman, whether they received those, and if not, when they received them, and your point is well taken, although I don't know what the communications capabilities were at that point in time.

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Senator Dayton, you are right on. I was going to say that. They probably had difficulty with the phone service, but a lot of the BlackBerrys were still working so that the e-mail really mattered in that moment.

Senator DAYTON. I would think in the middle of this kind of emergency—and, again, you both have been in military combat situations where, if somebody departs, somebody else is monitoring the situation.

General Broderick, you then returned, you said, Tuesday morning and became whatever it was at that time when you returned.

Mr. Secretary, you testified that you didn't become aware of the situation of the breaches there until 11:30 a.m. Tuesday morning. What was transpiring from the time you arrived until the time you were informed?

General BRODERICK. Again, I say that's a failure on my part not to have informed Mr. Stephan earlier. It's my job to make sure that everyone knows what's going on. I was trying to—when I came in that morning about 6 o'clock, I realized the gravity of the situation, or what I perceived to be the gravity of the situation, and I was trying to get some quick ground truth before we activated the IIMG and brought all those people in.

Senator DAYTON. Well, the quick ground truth was apparent if you turned on the television, with all due respect. It was 5½ hours later before—I am trying to understand because we have set the structure up, and the structure has been criticized. I don't fault either of you individually, but if the structure is such that you can't get an e-mail at 9:27 p.m. or 11:05 p.m. communicated to the Secretary until after he arrives in Atlanta midday the next morning or next day, and if you don't find out until 11:30 a.m. what is transparently clear just by anybody looking—you don't need to send satellites, just turn on CNN.

I don't understand where all this disconnect occurred, and I don't think it is appropriate or fair to criticize Mr. Brown for that failure. I think he is being made the scapegoat, and I think that is very inappropriate. He communicated—somebody communicated to the Chief of Staff, to the Deputy Secretary. And if that wasn't communicated to you, if somebody didn't read their e-mail until whenever, and you came in at 6 a.m., and you became aware of this information, and Colonel Stephan wasn't informed until 11:30 a.m., that is not Mr. Brown's responsibility, in my judgment.

General BRODERICK. I wasn't aware of the information that you mentioned, sir. I was aware that there was a serious situation, and it was my job to get some clarity. And, yes, sir, in hindsight, I probably should have notified Mr. Stephan earlier.

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I'd like to add on to that. The first time I saw that particular message was actually in the newspaper this morning, so this is the first time I'm being informed about that particular correspondence. If you've ever been inside one of these Operations Centers, there's just a lot of information coming in. On Monday, the first day—I'm sorry, the day of landfall, in all of the other 3 years of experience I've had at DHS headquarters in terms of storms hitting, there is a very real lack of clarity, a very real lack of accurate assessments coming in from the field. They range in status from there is nothing going on here that's out of the normal to the sky is falling. And it's a question of trying to figure out what is the truth in all of that.

And, sir, I would like to just say one more thing. I'm a professional guy here. I've got a 24-year military background. I'm not putting anybody on the stand as a scapegoat. But in that training, I've learned that I'm accountable and responsible for certain things in my area. And if I knew something as a squadron commander and I didn't immediately notify my wing commander personally, that guy should fire me. I mean, that's just unbelievable.

Senator DAYTON. Well, we are Monday morning quarterbacking here. As I said yesterday to the Secretary of Defense, I paraphrased President Eisenhower—any eighth-grade student of history can make better decisions with perfect hindsight than any President or General can at the time in the middle of the battle. So I acknowledge that. But it seems to me very different to say that you have conflicting reports or different information, and you are trying to sort through that, from saying that, as you said here in your testimony, there is lack of situational awareness on the ground. Mr. Bahamonde was on the ground. Mr. Brown, according to published reports, is in a helicopter on Tuesday flying over the situation. I mean, you may have been getting different information, and I can understand if that is information paralysis. But that is very different from saying that there weren't people on the ground.

I am trying to figure out what is it about this that we can apply to the future. I am not trying to blame anybody as much as I am trying to understand—but we had the same thing happen on September 11. I mean, both of these were catastrophic events, but that is what the Department is set up to do. And you had people on September 11 who didn't turn on the television and see that the World Trade towers were down. They were with FAA, not related to you.

So here we have a situation where people are not—either they think they are communicating and other people are not getting the communications. We have a President of the United States—and I take him at his word—who didn't know until Tuesday, midday, what people in his—according to testimony, his top aides were told Monday night. We have a Secretary who went to Atlanta, evidently didn't know what was being communicated, reportedly, to his Chief of Staff and Deputy Secretary.

So, you can set up any structure you want in the world, but if people don't communicate to one another, don't act, as you know, in a military situation immediately and don't communicate that instantly, then they don't have an effective response.

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, according to Mr. Brown's own testimony that I watched in another room here this morning, he admitted that he was running a parallel information system that had nothing to do with the National Response Plan.

Senator DAYTON. Well, he was communicating directly with the White House, with the top aides there, he said himself with the President. But, again, I am going by this report here that they're also e-mailing. I mean, at some point somewhere along the line, somebody gets these. Maybe he should have picked up—you are saying he should have picked up the phone and called you out of bed in the middle of the night, General. I am just trying to understand. What did he fail to do?

Colonel STEPHAN. Sir, I am going to say if he had a critical information piece that's the whole nugget that we're all waiting for, confirmed, catastrophic flooding of the entire New Orleans downtown area, that to me is something that you just casually don't post to an e-mail and send to administrative headquarters somewhere light years away. You pick up the phone and say, "Boss, Secretary Chertoff, this is going down right here. It's serious. This is the one we've all been waiting for." Why did he not do that?

Senator DAYTON. Fair enough.

General BRODERICK. And, sir, just to clarify that, too, put a little more clarity on that, when we came in Tuesday, we realized it was serious. And we are taking a lot of steps now to fix that. But the problem was we knew there was flooding, but we didn't know what steps were being done to take care of that flooding and to what degree, and that was a major problem we were trying to find out. Is the Corps out there? We found out later that the Corps couldn't fly immediately with their helos to drop the 15,000-pound sandbags because of the flight restrictions of the weather. There were a lot of things that we found out later, and we were trying to find out—we know it's bad, but who's doing something about it and what's being done?

Senator DAYTON. I know, Mr. Chairman, when September 11 occurred, all of us Members of the Senate, except for a couple who were whisked away to various locations, were totally out of communication. This BlackBerry doesn't tell me half the time when we have a vote, and I certainly don't expect it is going to tell me if anything else occurs what is really going on. We had at that time agencies like the FAA and NORTHCOM and others who weren't able to communicate. Somebody called one line and the line was busy.

I mean, one of the critical questions I would have here, again, trying to apply this to the future, is, Do you have a secure means of communication, a reliable means of communication with whoever is there, with somebody else? Because, again, if people don't communicate effectively with one another, then it doesn't matter what the structure is.

General BRODERICK. I agree, sir, and that's my job. And believe me, we've made some significant push since then.

One little footnote. The e-mail to John Wood never mentions a breach in the levee.

Senator DAYTON. I am sorry. John Wood is who, sir?

General BRODERICK. The Chief of Staff.

Senator DAYTON. OK. Thank you. Thank you both.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Senator Dayton, thank you for an excellent line of questioning and for some statements that express certainly my feelings about what happened here. And I appreciate hearing that you are working on making it better because the totality of our investigation, including the testimony today, is unsettling because it shows us that the systems that we set up after September 11 failed us on that day.

These are two pictures that Marty Bahamonde¹—talk about ground truth. You can see the levees are broken. This is as clear as day. He is up in a helicopter. This was taken about 5:30 on the day of landfall, and then, of course, the second picture is the ground-truth reality, which is New Orleans, 5:30 Monday afternoon, is flooded. And for the reasons that we have all gone over today, the system didn't adequately tell the two of you or apparently the President or apparently the Secretary of Homeland Secu-

¹Photographs taken by Marty Bahamonde, Exhibit S, appear in the Appendix on page 335.

rity that this was happening, so that on that day you would have had more situational awareness to respond.

So I simply thank you for your testimony today and your willingness to accept some accountability, and I hope you have the same urgent sense that we do that we better get this right. Part of the problem, ironically, is the extraordinary flow of information coming in. But we have to figure out how to see the warning lights when they go off and share those warning lights so we can protect the safety and in this case the lives of the American people.

Anyway, I thank you. The hearing record will remain open for 15 days.

I now have the unusual pleasure as Acting Chairman of declaring this hearing adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:54 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

Today the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs holds its 18th hearing on the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina, the costliest natural disaster in our Nation's history.

The impact and wake of the storm devastated New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. For example, it was noted at yesterday's hearing that Hurricane Katrina's high winds and subsequent flooding caused what the FCC called "extraordinary" destruction of communications facilities. Almost three million telephone lines were knocked down, 38 emergency call centers were put out of action, and more than 1,000 cell towers were left useless. This is but one illustration of the damage caused to the region's critical infrastructure.

In the days immediately following the hurricane, I urged people to refrain from allocation of blame. Finger pointing and political attacks are not constructive. Instead, we must objectively identify our weaknesses and learn from our mistakes to better prepare for the certain event of another disaster.

Madam Chairman, I commend the thoroughness of the full Committee investigation. I am confident that these hearings will provide us with the information necessary to better guide preparation and mitigation efforts in the future.

I am most interested in learning from today's witnesses what happened to FEMA during the last several years. Specifically, did the agency's merger into the Department of Homeland Security damage its institutional capabilities to respond to disasters? Did FEMA have the necessary resources in terms of budget and experienced personnel to get the job done? I believe that these questions are just as important as examining FEMA's leadership role and response in the days leading up to and following the land-fall of Hurricane Katrina.

It is likely the senior career leadership at FEMA will need to be replenished and rebuilt. I understand that following FEMA's integration with DHS, several individuals in leadership positions within FEMA left the agency. The number of full time permanent senior executive service employees decreased from 50 in FY2002 to 31 today. It is unclear what effect this may have had on FEMA's response in the Gulf Coast.

Madam Chairman, it is clear that rebuilding the workforce and institutional ability of FEMA to swiftly and comprehensively respond to disasters of all types is one of the challenges before us. I look forward to working with you to accomplish this goal.

**Opening Remarks of Patrick J. Rhode, former FEMA Chief of Staff,
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
February 10, 2006**

Good morning, Senators. I would like to make a very brief opening statement.

My name is Patrick Rhode. I served as Chief of Staff at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, part of the Department of Homeland Security, from April of 2003 until January of 2006. I served under both former Director Brown and the current Acting Director David Paulison.

I am happy to be appearing before you today voluntarily as you continue your important work in reviewing the collective governmental response to Hurricane Katrina and assessing possible changes in emergency management.

At the outset, I would like to observe, if I could, that Hurricane Katrina was a truly catastrophic event. It was an American tragedy, on numerous levels. The magnitude of the disaster was unlike anything we had previously faced as a nation. The storm compromised 90,000 square miles of the United States gulf coast, an area almost the size of Great Britain. On the professional level of emergency management, it was unprecedented. On the personal level, my heart went out to those

who were suffering and in need, and my heart still goes out to those who continue to deal with the aftermath of Katrina.

Many people in the emergency management community, including myself, tried to do the best they could under difficult circumstances. The dedicated public servants working on this issue, at the federal, state, and local level, were doing their level best to help as many people as they could under the existing framework for emergency management.

As in all things, there are lessons to be learned from this experience. I hope that these hearings will produce just such learning, and lead to the creation of new legislation that can improve on the current system of disaster management. If we can apply those lessons so as to make things better for the next emergency situation, I want to do all that I can to contribute appropriately to that effort. As you know, in addition to appearing here today voluntarily, I have fully cooperated with your staffs by participating willingly in several interviews with them.

In addition, I would like respectfully to note that any statements I offer today in response to questions about how to improve the emergency management system are the opinions of one private citizen. As I sit

before you today, I am no longer a government employee but have returned to private life, with my wife and six-month old daughter. I do not, and cannot, speak for FEMA. Anything I have to offer is my own personal opinion -- for whatever the Committee may deem it to be worth -- and I want to take care to be clear that it does not reflect the official views of the agency or the federal government.

In short, I applaud the Committee for taking on the challenges of assessing what kind of support is needed for, and what changes should be made to, the country's emergency management system. I am hopeful that together we can contribute to enhancements and improvements that best assist disaster victims in the future.

With that, I welcome any questions or comments you might have.

**STATEMENT OF
COLONEL ROBERT B. STEPHAN (USAF, Retired)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

**Before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee**

February 10, 2006

Good morning, Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, and other distinguished members of this Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to address you today, and for your ongoing support to the Department of Homeland Security and its important mission. I am pleased to come before you to discuss the activities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) relating to the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

Currently, I am the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection at the Department of Homeland Security. By way of background, I am retired from the United States Air Force at the rank of colonel with extensive experience in contingency planning and operations from the joint special operations perspective. In my 24-year military career, I organized, trained, and equipped Air Force special operations forces for contingency operations in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Croatia, Liberia, Colombia, and Kosovo. My duties also included extensive responsibilities for the planning and execution of complex combat search and rescue, air traffic management, terminal attack control, medical evacuation and noncombatant evacuation operations.

Following my Air Force career, I joined the Department at its inception in March, 2003, and served as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Homeland Security and Director of the Headquarters Integration Staff. In these roles, I was responsible for a wide range of issues, including mission integration, contingency planning, and incident

management at the strategic and operational levels. In August 2004, then Secretary Ridge asked me to lead the Department effort to coordinate the development of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP), as required under Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5. In this capacity, I bore responsibility for leading an interagency writing team comprised of more than a dozen principal representatives across the Department and other key Federal agencies and for coordinating the development of the NRP document with a wide array of Federal, State and local government and private sector partners. I also had lead responsibility for developing an initial program of education, training and awareness regarding the NIMS and the NRP, in partnership with FEMA's Emergency Management Institute. Following issuance of the NIMS in March 2004 and the NRP in December of 2004, at Secretary Ridge's direction, I transitioned responsibility for the ongoing management and maintenance of both the NIMS and the NRP to FEMA headquarters.

The National Response Plan is the core operational plan for national incident management. It adopts an all-hazards approach that provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational coordination for domestic incident management. The NRP was issued in December 2004, and became fully effective on April 14, 2005, following a 120-day implementation period starting in mid-December 2004. It is signed by the heads of 32 federal departments and agencies and national-level private volunteer organizations. Prior to final implementation, the NRP was tested during the Top Officials Exercise 3, conducted during the period of April 4-8, 2005 and involving complex mass casualty scenarios in two State venues.

The NRP is a plan; as such, it does not provide legal authority; rather it provides a comprehensive set of processes and protocols to bring together departments and agencies at all levels of government and across disciplines in a common approach to incident management. The NRP is implemented in a cascading fashion according to the situation at hand. It is not turned on and off in a binary fashion like a light switch; in fact, certain core coordinating structures of the NRP, such as the Homeland Security Operations Center, are active 24 hours a day, every day of the year. Other elements of the NRP can be fully or partially implemented in the context of a threat, anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident. Selective implementation of core elements of the system allows significant flexibility in meeting the operational and information-sharing requirements of the situation at hand, as well as enabling effective interaction among Federal, State, local, and private-sector partners.

In August 2005, around the time of Hurricane Katrina, I held several senior positions at the Department. I was the Acting Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), the Manager of the National Communications System (NCS), the leader of the transition team for the new Under Secretary for Preparedness, and the Director of the Headquarters Integration Staff.

My core responsibilities as Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection focused me on policy coordination, planning, and risk-management strategies for the 17 critical infrastructure and key resource sectors, defined in HSPD-7. With the onset of Hurricane Katrina, I focused my attention on contingency responsibilities as the Director of the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) as specified in the NRP.

By way of background, the Interagency Incident Management Group is a multi-agency Federal coordination entity which reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security to facilitate the strategic response to a domestic incident. It is comprised of senior representatives from nearly 40 different agencies, to include DHS components, other Federal departments and agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Its membership is flexible and can be tailored to provide appropriate subject-matter expertise depending upon the nature of the threat or incident at hand. The IIMG works in concert with other NRP coordinating structures such as the HSOC and the FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC). In terms of division of labor, the IIMG is intended to focus on strategic-level issues and medium-term courses of action for Secretary-level consideration, while the HSOC and NRCC work in partnership to maintain situational awareness and solve operational and tactical level issues.

According to the NRP, the Secretary of Homeland Security may activate the IIMG based upon a recommendation from the HSOC Director, General Matthew Broderick, a colleague and fellow witness on this panel today. The Secretary's decision is generally based upon the nature, severity, magnitude, and complexity of the threat or incident situation. Once activated, the IIMG serves as a focal point for Federal strategic incident management planning and coordination. In addition, the IIMG develops strategies for implementing policy guidance.

As IIMG Director, I directed my staff in the early evening of Thursday, August 25, to alert all IIMG members regarding the approach of Hurricane Katrina and to request them to maintain readiness for possible IIMG activation within a 90-minute window as directed by the Secretary in accordance with standard IIMG recall protocols. At that

time, I also directed my staff to send regular HSOC situation and spot reports regarding Katrina to all IIMG members to help promote situational awareness and prepare them to assume their duties if recalled. As a result, this information was widely disseminated throughout the Executive Branch at a Senior Executive Service level, prior to landfall.

During the weekend period (August 27-28, 2005), I stayed in close contact with Director Broderick, receiving regular verbal and electronic updates on the Hurricane Katrina situation. Based upon the available information regarding the storm, it was decided not to activate the IIMG during that time, and that the fully activated HSOC and NRCC coordinating structures were robust enough to handle emergent incident management coordination and resource requirements. The IIMG membership remained on a 90-minute recall posture throughout the weekend to afford the Secretary an additive incident management capability if required. This approach is consistent with that followed in response to the onset of previous hurricanes.

As Hurricane Katrina approached the land borders of the United States, FEMA tactically pre-positioned significant assets, to include essential equipment, supplies, and specialty teams, in critical locations throughout the projected hurricane "footprint" and established initial NRP-related coordinating structures at the regional and state levels. Through these actions, the Department was "leaning forward" in preparation for a significant hurricane, informed by lessons learned from the previous hurricane season, the Hurricane Pam planning project, and emergent analysis from the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, as well as by specific requests from emergency management officials representing the states of Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Additional Federal assets were deployed into the region

following the issuance of the Presidential Emergency Declaration on August 27 (for Louisiana) and August 28 (for Mississippi and Alabama). The type and quantity of pre-positioned Federal assets were based upon previous hurricane experience as well as specific State and local-level requirements and requests. It should be noted that the NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex was not formally implemented, even though it was used as guidance, because it was designed and constructed for a “no-notice” incident scenario that would not allow time for a more tailored approach. Through the mechanism of the Presidential Emergency Declaration, the Federal government had sufficient authority and time to take action to determine and deploy a full measure of appropriate assets prior to landfall pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.

On Monday morning, August 29, 2005, the Deputy Secretary directed me to convene a meeting of IIMG members for the purposes of conducting a situational awareness update and pulsing the IIMG members regarding individual agency capabilities and operational activities in the hurricane impact area. At this point in the unfolding scenario, much of the information being reported from the field was understandably preliminary, incomplete, and unconfirmed. As the day progressed, I stayed in close contact with Director Broderick, but situational awareness remained incomplete with widely varying information. A comprehensive operational picture had not yet begun to emerge. Throughout this day, there were many inconsistent and uncertain reports regarding the extent of hurricane-related damage in New Orleans and the status of the levee system. This is fully consistent with the “Day 1” pattern established during previous hurricane situations.

On the following day, Tuesday, August 30, 2005, at approximately 11:30 a.m., I was first advised by my staff of confirmed reports of irreparable breaches to the levees in New Orleans, and that there was considerable flooding confirmed to be occurring in various parts of the city. As a result, IIMG members were recalled to DHS headquarters and the IIMG was officially activated at approximately 2:00 p.m. on that day. This decision was based on the fact that a potential long-term flooding of New Orleans represented a “catastrophic crisis within a crisis,” and that the Secretary would now require the additional layer of incident management capability provided by the IIMG. Secretary Chertoff also issued a formal memorandum designating Michael Brown, FEMA Director (already on the ground in Baton Rouge), as the Principal Federal Official (PFO) under the NRP.

As the events of that first week unfolded, three factors combined to negatively impact the speed and efficiency of the Federal response. The first was the sheer amount of physical devastation caused by Katrina in terms of both wind damage and flooding. Response teams had to cope with severely restricted geographic access to core parts of the impacted areas of New Orleans due to the extent of the flooding. Secondly, the tenuous initial security and law enforcement environment in New Orleans and the immediate surroundings significantly impacted rescue and response efforts until a degree of stability was achieved later in the first week of the response. Finally, as the week progressed after landfall, Federal officials did not fully implement key aspects of the NIMS and the NRP, which impeded the Federal response. As an example of this latter shortcoming, the PFO and core staff, following landfall, did not establish a robust Joint Field Office (JFO) and Emergency Support Function structure as called for in the NRP.

According to the NRP, the JFO serves as a key hub of Federal incident management coordination at the local level and enables integrated interaction with key State and local officials. Although the NRP envisions the JFO normally becoming operational within a 48- to 96-hour period after the initial occurrence of an event, the completely functional JFO in Baton Rouge, in fact, was not fully activated until much later.

Moreover, the PFO did not establish a robust Federal unified command structure in Baton Rouge or in New Orleans as called for in the NIMS. The concept of unified command provides for the coming together of senior representatives from each agency involved in incident response operations to enable informed, collective decision-making, resource allocation, and coordinated multi-agency operations. While many support agencies had liaisons co-located at the Louisiana and Mississippi Emergency Operations Centers, full unified command was not accomplished until after the first week (the sheer devastation brought about by the hurricane fully contributed to this situation). Finally, the PFO did not establish sufficient means for providing situational awareness back to DHS headquarters from Baton Rouge or, more importantly, from New Orleans itself—the main center of gravity from a catastrophic incident perspective. Lack of “eyes and ears” on the ground in New Orleans significantly hindered the ability of NRP entities at DHS headquarters to put together a common situational awareness and common operating picture for the Secretary and other senior decision-makers. This situation was dramatically turned around following the arrival of Vice Admiral Allen in theater and his assumption of overall PFO responsibilities, as well as improved communications.

The Department has moved aggressively to identify additional shortcomings associated with the Federal response to Katrina and to design and begin to implement

appropriate solutions. A key focus area is improving tactical-level situational awareness and command and control connectivity for catastrophic incidents. The Department leadership has also been working closely with FEMA headquarters and field components to restructure FEMA logistics and mission assignment processes for catastrophic incidents. More details will follow regarding this effort in the coming weeks. The Department is also committed to taking a close look at the NRP and its associated education and training process and making the adjustments necessary to ensure that we are fully prepared for the 2006 hurricane season. The Department looks forward to continuing its cooperative relationship with this Committee and other partners, as it continues to look back retrospectively in order to operate more effectively and efficiently during future incidents.

I would like to close by recognizing the extraordinary efforts of the men and women of FEMA who worked diligently—and continue to work diligently—to provide a wide variety of assistance to those whose lives were impacted by the hurricanes of 2005. The situation they faced at all levels was extremely complex, and in some cases, heretofore unprecedented. I hold these folks in the utmost regard; they deserve our continued respect and support in the road ahead.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.

**STATEMENT OF
BRIGADIER GENERAL MATTHEW BRODERICK
DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS COORDINATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

**Before the U.S. Senate, Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee
February 10, 2006**

Good morning, Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, and other distinguished members of this Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to address you today, and for your ongoing support to the Department of Homeland Security and its operations. I am honored and pleased to come before you to discuss the activities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) relating to the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

Currently, I am the Director for Operations at the Department of Homeland Security, but to be clear, at the time of Hurricane Katrina, I held the position of Director of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). By way of background, I am a retired Brigadier General in the U.S. Marine Corps after serving for 30 years. During this time, when not in command, I was in charge of operations centers at all levels of the Marine Corps, including battalion, regiment, brigade, division and later, as the Deputy Director of Operations at the Marine Corps Headquarters, I was in charge of the Marine Corps National Command Center in Washington DC.

Following my career with the Marine Corps, I served for three and one half years as a Regional Vice President of Operations for an international corporation and then as

an adjunct consultant for the Institute for Defense Analysis working on command and control and situational awareness systems and on projects aiming to standardize and modernize joint deployable operations centers for the Department of Defense.

Office of Operations Coordination and the Homeland Security Operations Center

In May 2003, I was asked by the Department of Homeland Security to help improve the then-fledgling Homeland Security Operations Center. At that time, the operations center consisted of five or six DHS headquarters employees and approximately 100+ detailees working in austere conditions with limited capabilities. Since that time, the center has grown into one of the largest 24/7 operations centers in the United States, with about 45 Federal, State and Local agencies represented, approximately 300 personnel. Last October, the Secretary, following his Second Stage Review (2SR) of the Department and in consultation with Congress, established the Office of Operations Coordination, of which the HSOC is a core part of that organization.

The Office of Operations Coordination is responsible for coordinating operations across all DHS organizational components, for coordinating activities related to incident management, for collection and dissemination of terrorist related threat information and for providing domestic situational awareness on a daily basis. Its major components are the HSOC, future operations, current operations and incident management operations. This was an important step within the Department because it consolidated the operational efforts of what were previously shared by other DHS components. It is also important to point out that the Headquarters focus of the Office of Operations Coordination, both during Hurricane Katrina and now, is at the strategic level and therefore acts in a supporting role to assist with additional national assets, as required.

The HSOC is the primary, national-level nerve center and conduit for information flowing into and out of these events. However, it does not become decisively engaged with any single event or incident so that it might monitor several different events at one time. In the case of an incident like Hurricane Katrina, the HSOC continues to provide situational awareness to the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), while the Incident Management Division (IMD), a component of the IIMG, assumes responsibility for coordinating Federal response specific to the incident.

Activities in Preparation for Hurricane Katrina

The HSOC began its involvement with Hurricane Katrina prior to the first landfall in Florida, on about August 24, 2005. About that time, the HSOC started issuing Daily Situation Reports, and we were closely monitoring the latest developments relating to the storm, especially the meteorological reports from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Over the course of Friday, August 26, the hurricane shifted its directional path and its intensity. There was a level of uncertainty as to where the storm's eye would make landfall, as well as its intensity, magnitude, and impact.

The Department knew that a significant hurricane could cause potentially grave damage to the Gulf Coast. Various reports forewarned of an impending disaster and suggested the possibility of a storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain and an overtopping of the levees.

As a result, we began to take appropriate actions. The Secretary had dispatched the FEMA Director to the area on Sunday, August 28. The President made Emergency Declarations for Louisiana (August 27), Mississippi (August 28), and Alabama (August 28), and the Interagency Incident Management Group was advised to maintain readiness

over the ensuing weekend. The HSOC was on high alert as well and was carefully monitoring the approaching storm. The Incident Management Division was also focused intently on the storm's development, in the event that the IIMG needed to be activated. The IMD's function is to coordinate the Federal response to a specific event, when an incident reaches national significance, and in that case, the IMD helps guide the efforts of the IIMG. In addition, DHS/FEMA had tactically pre-positioned significant assets in critical locations outside but near the intended areas of impact and it had initiated their National Response Coordinating Center (NRCC).

Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina

As the eye of the storm made landfall on Monday, August 29, 2005, information from the area was understandably sparse. At that time, it was difficult to ascertain accurate ground-truth as to the extent of the damage. Our standard operating procedure is not to disturb the operations of field commander in the middle of a crisis. Instead, we relied, in large part, on the good judgment of the information-providers in the field and the NRCC to "push" relevant, pertinent information to the HSOC as things become clear.

As the day wore on, the HSOC began to receive information from a number of sources, and began to gather, sort, and verify information and reports. There were many inconsistent and uncertain reports about the extent of flooding in New Orleans and the status of the levee system. We knew a certain amount of flooding can be expected in almost any hurricane situation. Nevertheless, the HSOC alerted others to these possibilities and potential occurrences, while we were making our best efforts to verify the accuracy. We were desperately pursuing all avenues in an effort to obtain confirmed reports from knowledgeable, objective sources. It is our job at the HSOC to distill and

confirm reports. Based upon my years of experience, we should not help spread rumors or innuendo, nor should we rely on speculation or hype, and we should not react to initial or unconfirmed reports which are almost invariably lacking or incomplete.

Activities Following Landfall of Hurricane Katrina

Prior experience had shown that as the storm cleared over the next day or two, the ground-truth would begin to crystallize, and a common operational picture and more frequent and accurate reporting would emerge. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

At about this time, it became clear that the Department needed to call upon significant additional Federal resources to respond to this event. As a result, the Department began to consider a greater role for the Department of Defense (DOD). Lieutenant General Russell Honore was already “leaning forward” pro-actively and moving assets and personnel into the region. The HSOC began receiving regular situation reports from the U.S. Northern Command (NorthCom) regarding DOD’s specific deployment activities responding to Hurricane Katrina.

While the military was providing this ongoing support, the two Departments were working to ascertain the precise language of what additional support could be requested and what could be provided. DOD needed to consider and balance these priority missions in light of their other military responsibilities and also needed a clearer understanding of exactly what was being requested. This effort was an example of excellent inter-agency coordination between two large agencies working collaboratively under significant pressure.

In addition, the Secretary deployed U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen as the Deputy Principal Federal Official in New Orleans. The situational awareness and reporting vastly improved, and the response efforts began to stabilize.

Areas for Improvement

The Secretary has stated on several occasions that one of his primary goals is to improve situational awareness for such incident response efforts, and the Office of Operations Coordination, established under 2SR, is one way to foster and promote this worthy goal. Since the early days following Hurricane Katrina, the Department continues to review the things that went well and the things that warrant improvement. I am proud to report that DHS has made great strides towards improving the information flow and situational awareness for incident management.

In particular, as the Secretary noted previously, DHS has established a 6-person national reconnaissance team that can be deployed in the immediate aftermath of an incident. In this way, the Department can receive real-time reporting of the facts on the ground, and the team can help us understand the priority concerns and allocate resources accordingly. A prototype of this concept was tested during the past Super Bowl with excellent results.

In addition, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has provided 26 two-person teams from offices throughout the country which can be deployed immediately to an incident anywhere within their region and use assets to report situational awareness directly back to the HSOC. They will begin their initial training next month.

Another step is the Secretary's designation of "Principal Federal Officials in waiting." The idea is that these Principal Federal Officials will have an opportunity to

work cooperatively with State and local officials on an ongoing basis to plan and train together. In this way, we can develop and build the kinds of relationships that one needs to rely upon when an emergency strikes.

These are just some initial changes to begin to address some of the lessons we learned from Hurricane Katrina. We continue to develop our comprehensive recommendations for the Secretary, and the Department looks forward to continuing its cooperative relationship with this Committee and other stakeholders.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I would be happy to answer any questions.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Michael D. Brown
From Senator Tom Coburn**

“Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership”

February 10, 2006

1. Like a field commander well away from the front, you had your operational headquarters in Baton Rouge. Baton Rouge is roughly an hour’s drive from New Orleans in normal circumstances. Would you have been better served, if able, had your operational headquarters been in the immediate vicinity like other officials involved in response efforts?

Interim Operating Facilities (IOF) are determined after considering several factors, including availability of transportation (such as air transport -- fixed wing or rotary), proximity to the epicenter of the disaster, safety of staff, communications, and, proximity of the affected state’s operations center.

Locating in Baton Rouge was the proper decision for the interim operating facility. We had air support for both helicopters and military jets. Because Baton Rouge was located outside the immediate danger zone, staff, which would number in the hundreds, would not be put in harm's way. Also, being in Baton Rouge allowed immediate interaction with Louisiana emergency management officials and with Governor Blanco.

Because I accurately anticipated the size of the disaster, locating my IOF in Baton Rouge gave me good access to affected areas in both Mississippi and Louisiana. Driving to and from New Orleans was never considered. Doing so would have wasted too much time. Considering the anticipated damage from Hurricane Katrina, we accurately assumed that most ground transportation would have been either impossible or, at best, slow or cumbersome.

A significant problem post-landfall was the inability of helicopters to land near the Superdome to evacuate victims. Locating our IOF in New Orleans would have exacerbated that problem.

Other officials did not locate in New Orleans. In fact, some teams of the Louisiana National Guard were stranded at their base because they did not evacuate. Because he was located at ground zero, Mayor Nagin was without communications for a significant period of time.

Initially I dispatched a Federal Coordinating Officer (Phil Parr), a Public Affairs Officer (Marty Bahamonde), and a National Disaster Medical Team to the Superdome. Only one individual, Marty Bahamonde, was able to make it to the

Superdome prior to landfall. Locating in New Orleans prior to landfall would have been a huge and costly mistake.

Although I considered moving to New Orleans post-landfall, I still had to consider that this disaster covered more than New Orleans. It covered a 90,000 square mile area, all of which required my attention. It covered three states, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, and eventually grew to cover many of the other states, when one considers the relocation of victims. Thus, as was my practice in all disasters prior to Katrina, I planned to cover the entire area of operations (AOR) in order to make certain that all FEMA teams, state teams and others, had what they needed and were able to respond as effectively as possible.

Despite the fact that my AOR covered 90,000 square miles, Secretary Chertoff instructed me not to leave Baton Rouge. That order drastically interfered with my ability to cut red tape, assist my teams, and gain first-hand knowledge of ground operations. It eventually led to a disjointed, confused response. This was the first time in my 4½ years at FEMA that I ever received such an order. Secretary Ridge never restricted or interfered in my operations as happened here. This ill-advised, naïve decision to restrict me to Baton Rouge assured FEMA's efforts could not succeed.

The contrast between my movements during the successful response to the four hurricanes that struck Florida in 2004, and my movements in Hurricane Katrina in 2005, is stark. During Katrina, I was prevented from assisting my teams, cutting through red tape, and making decisions which would have sped the response.

2. I recall a television interview during the disaster you gave on ABC's *Nightline* in which you claimed that you had not pre-positioned assets in New Orleans due to the fact that they would then be destroyed by the storm. Did you, in fact, not pre-position assets and, if not, do you stand by your rationale for not doing so?

We did preposition assets in New Orleans. The interview to which you refer concerned the convention center, which was not an evacuation center. The convention center was not part of the City of New Orleans evacuation plan or disaster plan, and therefore we did not preposition supplies there. Supplies were prepositioned in New Orleans' designated shelter of last resort, the Superdome.

However, I cannot respond to this question without pointing out the need for catastrophic disaster planning. We did, in fact, predeploy assets, food, water, and supplies to the Superdome, which was in New Orleans' emergency plan. The subsequent spontaneous opening of the convention center shows that the failure to order a mandatory evacuation resulted in unnecessary suffering. As soon as FEMA learned that the convention center had become a spontaneous shelter, I ordered that supplies be moved into the facility.

3. We heard in recent testimony from Mayor Nagin of New Orleans that upon arriving at Zephyr Field upon the request of Secretary Chertoff and yourself, he was shocked to find what he described as a "Ritz-Carlton" scene with many of the assets he had requested, and the people of New Orleans desperately needed, sitting idle. Would you explain to the committee why these assets were not being utilized at this time while New Orleans was caught in the throes of a disastrous crisis?

Such an assertion that these assets were not being utilized is incorrect. Traffic was constant in and out of Zephyr Field. It was our designated staging area where the supply chain ended prior to supplies being distributed to those areas based upon the State of Louisiana's requests to FEMA. That kind of statement is simply hyperbole. Zephyr Field was an active staging area for all of Louisiana.

Zephyr Field was an example of the incredible amount of supplies, equipment, manpower and other resources devoted to this disaster. When on the conference calls I was exhorting my teams to "jam the supply lines," that is exactly what I meant: get everything we have and keep it moving into the AOR.

The rescue workers, the logisticians, and the other men and women at Zephyr Field were doing everything and anything they could to move equipment and supplies into the disaster zone. I visited Zephyr Field personally, thanking those rescue workers who had just returned from rescue efforts.

4. Was there a breakdown that occurred between FEMA's preplanning and the actual recovery efforts that ensued in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina? Or, were there difficulties outside of your control and jurisdiction that hindered the execution of an effective and efficient emergency response?

Several years ago, FEMA requested and received appropriations to do a "table top exercise" for a catastrophic disaster in New Orleans. That table top exercise was completed, resulting in a report called "Hurricane Pam." However, funding was not forthcoming from the Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, or Congress, to then take the results of the Hurricane Pam exercise and translate those results into catastrophic, pre-disaster planning.

Emails produced to Congress show specifically that funding for the follow-up to the Hurricane Pam exercise was gutted by the Department of Homeland Security. The Department actually cut catastrophic disaster planning. As I have stated before, FEMA has been marginalized and its funding cut by DHS to the point of failure.

Additionally, there were factors outside my control that also limited the response and recovery during Hurricane Katrina:

(a) Lack of unified command structure between the federal and state government. A hotwash conducted by FEMA in December, 2005, asserts this unwillingness of the State of Louisiana to participate in a unified command as one of the factors inhibiting FEMA's response. James Lee Witt, former FEMA Director under President Clinton, who was hired by the State of Louisiana, told President Bush during a visit to Baton Rouge that a unified command could not be established, and that he would work closely with me to get one established.

(b) Lack of situational awareness on the ground. Other than reports from one FEMA employee, Marty Bahamonde, there was virtually no real-time information available concerning what was happening in New Orleans and surrounding parishes. FEMA must acquire the necessary communications equipment to provide future Directors and response teams with real-time information.

(c) The order from Secretary Chertoff to remain in Baton Rouge prevented me from commanding my response teams, acquiring real time information, and being able to break through the bureaucratic bottlenecks which slowed our response.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Michael D. Brown
From Senator Pete V. Domenici**

“Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership”

February 10, 2006

1. The Department of Homeland Security funds the National Infrastructure Simulation Analysis Center (NISAC) to evaluate disruptions to America’s infrastructure such as lives lost, property destroyed, and economic disruptions. A NISAC team evaluated the potential effects of Katrina and, on August 29, reported to the Administration that Katrina would cause severe flooding and possible levee breaches. When was FEMA provided with a copy of this report?

I am not aware that FEMA was ever provided this particular report. To my knowledge, the report was not provided to my staff or to me.

If an NISAC team evaluated the potential effects of Katrina and, on August 29, reported to the Administration that Katrina would cause “severe flooding and possible levee breaches” then there should be no doubt that the Administration was aware of the possibility of levee breaches. As I’ve stated elsewhere, I told both the White House and the Secretary that levee breaches were possible.

For officials now to claim that they were unaware of the potential levee breaches is disingenuous. The potential of levee breaches, coupled with widespread flooding, is the premise on which FEMA fought for funding to do catastrophic disaster planning. It is the premise on which the response and recovery teams operated prior to landfall. It is the premise on which the argument was made to Mayor Nagin and Governor Blanco to order a mandatory evacuation. It was the premise on which I telephoned President Bush and asked him to call the Mayor and Governor to demand a mandatory evacuation.

FEMA conducts infrastructure analysis through its HAZAS program. FEMA was well aware of the potential for levee breaches and severe flooding through our daily secure video teleconference calls (SVTS) where the National Hurricane Center and FEMA’s National Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) kept FEMA, the federal interagency, the Homeland Security Operations Center, the various states’ emergency operations centers, and the White House Situation Room, aware of the potentially devastating impact of Hurricane Katrina.

2. How did you and your team use the information in NISAC’s report as you responded to Katrina?

That information was not provided to me. I relied upon real-time, on-the-scene information, and the infrastructure analysis from FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center.

3. Do you believe FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security are using NISAC to its full capabilities?

I have no basis upon which to form an opinion as to either its capabilities or its usefulness.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Michael D. Brown
From Senator Daniel K. Akaka**

“Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership”

February 10, 2006

1. Based upon your testimony and the testimony of General Broderick, the Director of DHS's HSOC, there appears to be some dispute about whether FEMA is supposed to push information up to the HSOC or the HSOC is supposed to reach out to FEMA to pull the information it needs during a disaster.

Why do you believe the HSOC has the primary responsibility to pull the information instead of the other way around?

FEMA pushes information to the HSOC through various situation reports, spot reports and other on-scene reports. FEMA produces numerous daily reports which are automatically transmitted directly to DHS's HSOC. During operational periods in disasters, not only are daily reports transmitted to the HSOC, but the HSOC participates in the daily secure video teleconferences (SVTS). This enables the HSOC to have immediately all information which is shared among the various federal agencies, state governments, and volunteer organizations.

HSOC also has a responsibility to request information through FEMA's National Response Coordination Center (NRCC - the FEMA operations center) to ensure both that the requested information can be obtained from the appropriate source and that duplicate requests for the same information do not overwhelm the system. Unfortunately, DHS tends to slow the response in disasters either by going outside the NRCC to request information which is in the reports already provided by FEMA or by requesting information which is trivial or inconsequential to on-going operations.

Often, the DHS HSOC gives operational orders which it is not authorized to issue or which may conflict with operational decisions made on the ground. The HSOC is supposed to be a "situation room" for the DHS Secretary, not an operations center. Despite its name, the DHS HSOC is not an operations center, but an information center. It was clear during Hurricane Katrina that the DHS HSOC tended to make duplicate requests for information, gave operational orders, and confused the operational construct by which FEMA had successfully operated for twenty years.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Michael D. Brown
From Senator Mark Dayton**

“Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership”

February 10, 2006

1. I believe that we now need to look ahead. We need to understand why FEMA was unable to respond effectively, not just in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, but with the alleged bureaucratic delays that seem to be ongoing and at the crux of why more progress has not been made in clearing away and rebuilding New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. Do you have any suggestions for how Congress, legislatively, can empower FEMA to be more efficient in its response?

Congress should do what is difficult to do in Washington, DC: admit that it made a mistake in merging FEMA into the Department of Homeland Security, legislatively remove it from the Department, and re-establish it as an independent agency with Cabinet-level status.

Many tend to think that reorganization is a solution to many governmental ills. It isn't necessarily so. To the contrary, reorganization, along with the disruption reorganization causes, tends to diminish the expected gains from reorganization. Nevertheless, to save the organization, the withdrawal of FEMA from DHS is necessary.

During the tenure of previous FEMA Directors, the agency was able to make its case directly to the Administration, OMB and Congress for its budgetary needs and legislative requirements. Similarly, FEMA was directly accountable to the Administration and Congress for its successes and mistakes. Within DHS, by contrast, FEMA lacks a mechanism by which it can have its “day in court” for funding and policy issues. Many of those issues, critical to FEMA's success, never see the light of public discussion because they are buried within the bureaucracy of the Department of Homeland Security.

The primary examples of the effects of having FEMA as a part of DHS are on the record: the loss of more than \$80 million in operational funds, the existence of more than 500 unfilled personnel slots, the attrition of experienced career civil servants to other departments and agencies, and the failure to attract the first several choices for Director in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.

DHS has embarked upon the dismantling of emergency management in the United States. The proven science of emergency management – preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation – has been broken by the Department. Preparedness, whether for law enforcement activities, anti-terrorism activities, immigration issues, cyber terrorism, and natural or man-made disasters, has been consolidated within a preparedness directorate.

FEMA funding for “all-hazards” preparedness and response must now compete with all of those other competing interests. It is possible that terrorism may never happen again. By contrast, natural and man-made disasters will occur, and will do so frequently. FEMA will not be properly prepared for those incidents because it must now compete for funding and priorities within a department, the primary purpose of which is the prevention of terrorism.

Of the more than 185,000 persons employed by DHS, only 2,500 are focused on preparing for, responding to, recovering from, or mitigating against a natural or man-made disaster. The remaining approximate 182,000 employees are generally focused on law enforcement or “prevention” activities: border protection, customs inspections, transportation security, information analysis, and similar law enforcement activities. The FEMA Director now reports directly to the Secretary, not the President. Thus, the Secretary's priorities become FEMA's priorities. The FEMA Director is incapacitated, unable to publicly make his or her case for emergency management.

Congress must pull FEMA out of DHS, not only for the sake of emergency management in this nation, but also for the sake of federalism and the nation's governors. Governors are now forced to compete for homeland security funds, necessitating that emergency management take a back seat to terrorism-related funding. Governors, accustomed to dealing with one agency when it comes to disasters in their state, are now faced with doing training and exercises with one arm of the Department, only to be faced with dealing with another arm when it comes to actual response during a disaster.

FEMA succeeded over the years by establishing strong partnerships among state and local responders, Governors, and the federal government. FEMA has been seen as the “honest broker” between state and locals and the federal departments and agencies responding to disasters. By establishing a separate preparedness directorate which controls all funding to state and locals, DHS is now breaking those partnerships. Governors and their state and local emergency responders will now be required to deal with one arm of the department for funding, and then another arm, what remains of FEMA, when responding to disasters. This bifurcated approach breaks established partnerships, creates confusion among first responders, and adds another layer of bureaucracy between those responding directly to disasters and those who fund the training and exercises inherently crucial to effective responses.

Folding FEMA into DHS was a mistake. We should return FEMA to independent status, and restore emergency management to the preeminence it once enjoyed.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Matthew E. Broderick**

Questions from Senator Daniel Ken Akaka

In response to the question I asked you about testimony that you gave to committee staff regarding your efforts to secure buses for the evacuation of the Super Dome, you indicated that you were not involved in logistics for obtaining buses.

However, in your January 19, 2006, interview with committee staff, you stated that Secretary Chertoff asked you to fulfill operational functions related to the evacuation, such as ensuring “there were sufficient buses being applied to get those people out of the Superdome” because “Mike Brown wasn’t doing his job.”

- What specifically did you do to locate and secure buses for evacuation of the Super Dome?

Response (On behalf of Matt Broderick):

In support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) identified the bus requirement as a priority in the days following the storm’s landfall. However, state and local governments are responsible for planning and executing evacuation plans, including, but not limited to, those requiring busing large numbers of displaced persons, as was needed during Hurricane Katrina. Nevertheless, the Federal Government provided support when it was apparent that the state and local governments needed assistance. In the course of identifying the bus requirement as a priority, the HSOC worked with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its National Response Coordinating Center (NRCC), to arrange for the buses to evacuate the Super Dome. FEMA engaged the support of its Emergency Support Function 1/Transportation (ESF-1), which is led by the Department of Transportation (DOT). The HSOC continued to identify the bus requirement as a priority to the Department of Transportation until the bus evacuation mission was successfully accomplished.

- Was your ability to oversee the Homeland Security Operations Center hindered by your involvement in operations?

Response (On behalf of Matt Broderick):

During Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, the Homeland Security Operations Center’s (HSOC) leadership and staff, supported by the Incident Management Division (IMD), and unhindered by any involvement in operations, were able to successfully monitor operations and focus on their primary mission to provide accurate and timely situational awareness to the nationwide stakeholders. The Department’s IMD was an element of the DHS Integration Staff (I-Staff) and provided support to the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG). The IIMG was responsible for monitoring the activities regarding a particular incident from its inception to closure to include supporting the IIMG activation and senior government officials’ engagement. The IMD, which resided in the HSOC space, monitored the specific Hurricane Katrina related operational activities, while the HSOC continued to execute its mission to provide accurate and timely situational awareness to the nationwide stakeholders. In this way, the IMD maintained Hurricane Katrina related monitoring through the IIMG activation and deactivation.

Combined Catastrophic Plan for Southeast Louisiana and the New Madrid Seismic Zone

Scope of Work FY 2004

1. Purpose

The purpose of this scope of work (SOW) is to obtain enhanced disaster response planning and technical and project management support. It will assist FEMA, State, and local government to enhance response planning activities and operations by focusing on specific catastrophic disasters: those disasters that by definition will immediately overwhelm the existing disaster response capabilities of local, State, and Federal Governments.

The initial areas of focus will be New Orleans, Louisiana, and the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) in the Central United States. The goal of this project is to improve Federal, State, local government, and private-sector ability to respond to a catastrophic disaster in order to prevent loss of life; minimize the number of injuries; house, feed, and protect up to a million + survivors and evacuees; and begin transition to long-term recovery in the affected areas.

Contractor planning and technical expertise is needed to: 1) research and analyze scenarios, concepts, and issues relating to response operations; 2) help develop operational plans, strategies, and support mechanisms; and 3) ensure that response operations are flexible and comprehensive in meeting the mission of the Department of Homeland Security. The Contractor also may be required to produce deliverables associated with mitigation, preparedness, prevention, or recovery as they apply to response operation goals associated with the scope of work. In order to accomplish this:

- The Contractor must be prepared to develop a range of support documents or tools for decision making and operations that may include but not be limited to: issue and information papers; research and analytical reports; plans; decision trees; standby contracts; mutual aid agreements; standard operating procedures; guidelines; models; specifications; templates; geographic information systems (GIS) based documents; and documents associated with exercises, as required.
- The Contractor also must be prepared to function in subject matter areas that may include but not be limited to: essential elements of information; information management; emergency management; emergency support functions; law enforcement; political science; public and private sector law; economics; and construction, as required.
- The Contractor will employ in all work products the all risks and all hazards approach to emergency management including terrorism (e.g. weapons of mass destruction and cyber attack).

Work completed by the Contractor under this SOW should support the eventual development of an introductory general plan and a set of sub-plans that would constitute a comprehensive plan. The proposed plan will be designed so that parts of the plan can be revised, updated, and distributed periodically without requiring revision of the whole plan. Each part of the plan will clearly identify the organization or agency responsible for maintaining that part.

Development of the plan(s) will be in three stages.

- **Stage One** - The first stage will be a functional exercise involving: FEMA headquarters, FEMA Regions IV & VI, the State of Louisiana (LA), thirteen parishes in LA, the National Weather Service, Federal Departments and agencies staffing the Emergency Support Functions (ESF), EMAC representatives, and representatives from Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas. From the exercise results, a base catastrophic hurricane disaster plan will be developed. **(Reference Page 7 for further exercise requirements.)**
- **Stage Two** - The second stage will be development of the full catastrophic hurricane disaster plan to include Emergency Support Function Annexes and Support Annexes.
- **Stage Three** - The third stage will develop a catastrophic earthquake plan for the City of Memphis and Shelby County Tennessee.

While this Scope of work covers all three stages, only the Stage One will be funded under Task Order 001 of this Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA). Quotes should only be for the exercise and the development of a Catastrophic Base Plan for Louisiana.

The Contractor must develop and execute a functional exercise in Louisiana on or about July 16, 2004, (dependent upon response activities) for approximately 6-8 days and deliver a final Base Plan by September 30, 2004.

2. Special Considerations

Language used in this SOW references the Federal Response Plan and related organizational components (response teams, etc.) and program elements (program titles, etc.) that may remain in effect until the National Response Plan is completed, adopted, and implemented. The Contractor will be responsible for incorporating and reflecting these changes as instructed by the Project Manager. How and when to incorporate these changes will be determined by the Project Manager and conveyed to the Contractor.

The need for a complete catastrophic plan for New Orleans has urgency due to the risk that accompanies the advent of the annual hurricane season. The Contractor may be instructed to accelerate the development of the plan to meet this urgency. There may be a need to also prioritize and accelerate Contractor deliverables in the NMSZ site plan.

The Contractor will coordinate with FEMA and the State and local government what specific products and what process to follow in developing the plan. A general list of deliverables is contained in the sections "Tasks" (below) however, additional or more specific deliverables and/or guidance may be added from 1) planning sessions associated with this SOW; 2) after action reports from exercises and disasters; 3) presidential executive orders and other authoritative directives; 4) other catastrophic and emergency management documents and planning endeavors; and 5) other sources having substantive bearing on developing the plan.

The Contractor will develop a plan that has at its core: the priorities of an operational plan during the first two weeks of a catastrophic event; a vulnerability assessment with a time phased

response; an analysis of currently available resources and what resources will be needed; a gap analysis; and a resource utilization plan.

The Contractor will factor into the plan that a hurricane, earthquake, etc. large enough to constitute a catastrophe in one State will not confine its destruction to that State's borders and that disaster response activities in other States will have to be implemented concurrently, thereby making even more demands on resources and capabilities.

The Contractor will not attempt to develop a numerical definition of what constitutes a catastrophic disaster. Instead, the focus will be on developing numbers needed for planning against capability shortfalls in each individual emergency function. The plan will address at what point in each functional area resources and services will be exhausted in a "normal disaster", what numbers are to be used to plan for additional resources and services needed in a catastrophic disaster, and where these resources and services will be obtained.

The Contractor must remember and integrate into the plan that a catastrophic event will produce a chaotic and degraded environment and that the planned response must address the possible loss or malfunction of various layers and sections of all levels of government, the private sector, and voluntary organizations. The intent is to provide an optimum plan for a State to implement and a plan that encompasses the needs and capabilities of the entire country as it relates to a catastrophic event in a State. The Contractor will build redundancy into each segment of the plan to allow for the widespread destruction and failure of response capabilities inherent in a catastrophic disaster. An area of particular emphasis will be the possible need to reconstitute local and State government authorities, responsibilities, capabilities, missions, and resources. As part of this effort, the Contractor will work with the DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination, through the Response Division, to assist in developing these issues and the appropriate response strategies.

The Contractor will develop one but no more than three small tabletop exercises that may be administered during planning meetings of Federal, State, and local government officials and emergency managers. The exercise scenarios will present catastrophic level circumstances to the participants to assist them in better decision-making by helping them to anticipate the full range and nature of decisions that will need to be made.

3. Background

Federal Role in Disasters

FEMA is responsible for the coordination and implementation of programs within the full range of Federal emergency activities. These programs are implemented under various Federal mandates including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq.). The Stafford Act provides the authority for the Federal Government to respond to disasters and emergencies in order to provide assistance to save lives and protect public health, safety, and property. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) implements the Stafford Act and is designed to address the consequences of any disaster or emergency situation for which there is a need for Federal assistance and coordination. The FRP describes the basic mechanisms and structures by which the Federal Government will mobilize resources and conduct activities to augment State and local response efforts in major disasters and emergencies regardless of cause. The FRP with its associated processes and standard

operating procedures has proven to be an effective mechanism for delivering Federal assistance in most disaster scenarios. A copy of the FRP can be found at www.fema.gov.

However, the emergency management community has long feared the occurrence of a catastrophic disaster, an event having unprecedented levels of damage, casualties, dislocation, and disruption that would have nationwide consequences and jeopardize national security. The operational readiness, resources, and capabilities required to respond to the truly catastrophic event are yet to be tested or fully evaluated. There is concern throughout the emergency management community that the existing plans, policies, procedures and resources will not be adequate or appropriate to address the mega-disaster.

After September 11, 2001, knowledge that a catastrophic disaster could strike at any time in any number of ways has gained even more credence with the array of weapons terrorists could have in their arsenal and have voiced their willingness to use. To the "normal" risks causing a catastrophe can be added weapons of mass destruction (chemical, radiological, bacterial) and cyber attack. Catastrophe also could be the result of a convergence of any number or combination of any of these risks.

In conformance with current FEMA policy and priorities, it is now necessary to either broaden the scope and application of existing mechanisms or to create new, independent response planning mechanisms to ensure efficient, consistent, coordinated operations throughout all phases of a catastrophic disaster or emergency. FEMA will address the needs created by a catastrophic disaster or emergency by providing leadership in coordinating—with other departments and agencies, states, and localities—the full integration of Federal, State, local, and private sector interagency response activities. These considerations will be incorporated into the new National Response Plan (NRP) as required under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security Directive 5.

Over the years, various efforts have been undertaken to address catastrophic disaster readiness. This scope of work will develop site specific plans, use them to develop a template(s) for other site-specific planning, and address related issues as needed.

Annex A

Southeastern Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan

1. Catastrophic Planning in Louisiana

Louisiana is highly susceptible to hurricanes because the topography is generally low-lying river delta and some of the most densely populated areas are actually below sea level. Land subsidence and channels in the Mississippi River contribute to the loss of several square miles of wetlands and barrier islands each year, causing severe storm surges and flooding every hurricane season. One mile of wetlands can reduce storm surges by one foot, as well as reducing wind energy but at the current rate of loss, the wetlands buffer is estimated to be depleted within forty years.

Approximately 1,733,000 people live in the thirteen southeastern parishes of Louisiana that would be most threatened by a hurricane. This includes the City of New Orleans. The affected parishes and their populations are:

Ascension	77,000	St. Charles	48,000
Assumption	23,000	St. James	21,000
Jefferson	455,000	St. John	43,000
Lafourche	90,000	St. Tammany	191,000
Orleans	485,000	Tangipahoa	101,000
Plaquemines	27,000	Terrebonne	105,000
St. Bernard	67,000		

The most dangerous hurricane would be a slow-moving Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane that makes landfall at the mouth of the Mississippi River, moves northwest of and parallel to the river, and then crosses New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain. Various hurricane studies suggest that a slow-moving Category 3 or almost any Category 4 or 5 hurricane approaching Southeast Louisiana from the south could severely damage the heavily populated Southeast portion of the state creating a catastrophe with which the State would not be able to cope without massive help from neighboring states and the Federal Government.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) believe that the gravity of the situation calls for an extraordinary level of advance planning to improve government readiness to respond effectively to such an event. The few highways leading out of the New Orleans area would be blocked early by tides, wind, and surge in Lake Pontchartrain. Such a catastrophic hurricane could result in significant numbers of deaths and injuries, trap hundreds of thousands of people in flooded areas, and leave up to one million people homeless. The geographic situation of Southern Louisiana and the densely populated New Orleans area would complicate response problems and quickly overwhelm the State's resources. Some anticipated problems are listed below:

- Over one million people would evacuate from New Orleans. Evacuees would crowd shelters throughout Louisiana and adjacent states.

- Hurricane surge would block highways and trap 300,000 to 350,000 persons in flooded areas. Storm surge of over 18 feet would overflow flood-protection levees on the Lake Pontchartrain side of New Orleans. Storm surge combined with heavy rain could leave much of New Orleans under 14 to 17 feet of water. More than 200 square miles of urban areas would be flooded.
- It could take weeks to "de-water" (drain) New Orleans: Inundated pumping stations and damaged pump motors would be inoperable. Flood-protection levees would prevent drainage of floodwater. Breaching the levees would be a complicated and politically sensitive problem: The Corps of Engineers may have to use barges or helicopters to haul earthmoving equipment to open several hundred feet of levee. To further complicate the situation, the flood would probably disable the New Orleans District of the Corps of Engineers.
- Rescue operations would be difficult because much of the area would be reachable only by helicopters and boats.
- Hospitals would be overcrowded with special-needs patients. Backup generators would run out of fuel or fail before patients could be moved elsewhere.
- The New Orleans area would be without electric power, food, potable water, medicine, or transportation for an extended time period
- Damaged chemical plants and industries could spill hazardous materials.
- Standing water and disease could threaten public health.
- There would be severe economic repercussions for the state and region.
- Outside responders and resources, including the Federal response personnel and materials, would have difficulty entering and working in the affected area.

2. Tasks

Work Plan

The Contractor shall provide support for at least one but no more than three meetings in Louisiana for two to three days each to present and discuss the plan with Federal, regional, state, and local officials and emergency managers. The Contractor can expect to attend meetings in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area to discuss the Federal portions of the plan; these may be averaged to one a week.

The Contractor shall develop a catastrophic plan using the FRP/NRP as a guide and produce 1) a Basic Plan, 2) Emergency Support Function Annexes, and 3) Support Annexes. A Recovery Function Annex supplied by the FEMA Recovery Division will be included in the final plan. The plan shall integrate and not conflict with plans and structures developed by the State of Louisiana and individual cities and parishes.

The basis plan and all of the annexes shall be titled the "Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan", and shall be designed so that parts of the plan can be revised, updated, and distributed periodically without requiring revision or re-distribution of the entire plan. It shall be designed to serve as the framework for future catastrophic plans in the same jurisdictions for other catastrophic risks such as terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. Each part of the plan shall identify the organization or agency responsible for future maintenance of that part of the plan.

The Contractor will develop, execute, and evaluate a functional exercise with FEMA and the State of Louisiana. The scenario will feature a catastrophic hurricane striking southeastern Louisiana. Exercise participants will consist of management level personnel who will be presented with operational situations and required to make decisions on how to respond to the special circumstances of a catastrophic event including limiting factors and issues. The Plan will also identify critical trigger points for use in decision-making.

The participants will number between 100 to 150 personnel from FEMA HQ (10-12), Region VI (10-15), Federal ESFs (84), Louisiana (40), and representatives from EMC, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas.

To assist the Contractor in developing a responsible quote, please be advised that the FEMA Region VI exercise design team has collected existing plans, models, and studies and will have ICP Predictive Modeling and Damage Maps.

The Contractor will work with the existing exercise design team in developing the following standard documents for this emergency management exercise:

- Concept and Objectives
- Master Scenario Events List (with Implementers)
- Exercise Plan
- COSIN (Control and Simulation Document)
- Evaluation Plan
- Participant Orientation Material (Player Handbook, Controller Guide, Evaluator Guide, Communications Directory, & Training Slides)

The Contractor will have all draft documents relating to the exercise available for final review 15 days prior to the exercise. After review and comments by the exercise design team, the Contractor will have final exercise documents available two days prior to the exercise start date.

After the exercise, the exercise evaluation phase will differ from the traditional format; the Contractor will work with FEMA and the State to produce Incident Action Plans and associated Base Plan. **The Contractor is reminded that the second stage will be the development of the full catastrophic hurricane disaster plan to include Emergency Support Function Annexes and Support Annexes and should not be included in the response to the Request for Quote of April 2004.** The Second stage may also include development of the materials listed in the last bullet of each Annex as described below. ("Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required").

The catastrophic plan will contain the following annexes that will be developed as per the caveats noted in Section 2. Special Considerations. Individual tasks may be eliminated, added, exchanged, or emphasis increased or diminished as the specifics of catastrophic operational needs and planning are ascertained; this applies to the exercise development phase and the final Annexes due in the Second Stage. The bulleted items are concerns and objectives to be in the annexes and should be reflected in exercise play. They are presented alphabetically and not in order of priority.

A. Communications Annex

The communications portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall ensure the provision of communications support and capability to responders to achieve maximum communications before and during the event, any required temporary communications, and restoration of permanent communications.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Recommend measures for improving interoperability of communications between emergency-management agencies, including such topics as frequency allocation, cell-phone phone usage and controls, avoidance of frequency jams, and use of various radio bandwidths.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

B. De-Watering Annex

The US Army Corps of Engineers will have the responsibility of developing and implementing a plan for removing floodwater from the City of New Orleans ("de-watering") in conjunction with local levee districts and local political jurisdictions. The Contractor shall determine what consequences this will have vis-à-vis FEMA, State, and local governments response capabilities and responsibilities that will have to be integrated into the plan.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Develop a plan that details the coordination and decision process for implementing the USACE plan for removing floodwater from New Orleans metropolitan area.
- Make recommendation to the USACE on their plan to include temporary and long term repairs to the pumping stations, and removal of debris that prevents access or obstructs flood control and drainage structures.
- Plan for restoration of power grid necessary for operation of electrical pumps.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

C. Direction and Control Annex

This portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for collecting, analyzing, processing, and disseminating information about potential or actual disasters or emergencies to facilitate the planning, decision making and overall activities of governmental response.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Assess the survivability of the State, Parish, and Levee District emergency management offices, communication equipment, and alternate power supplies.
- Plan for coordination of FEMA, Louisiana OEP, and local-government response measures.

- Plan for assessment of damage and determination of urgent response requirements.
- Plan for use of a joint public information center and dissemination of emergency public information.
- Plan for time-phased deployment of resources.
- Outline the process for communicating and prioritizing requests for assistance
- Identify areas of conflicting interests (governmental, socio-economic, etc.).
- Identify potential legislative actions that might be necessary to implement effective response and recovery plans.
- Plan for continued plan maintenance and update.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

D. Health and Medical Services Annex

The Health and Medical Services portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for coordinating resources in response to public health and medical care needs following a major disaster or emergency, or during a developing potential medical situation.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Develop strategies to support local health and medical service providers.
- Assess the work that Louisiana State University (LSU) has done in this area under the Louisiana Board of Regents Millennium Health Excellence Fund.
- Assess the ability of each medical facility and special-needs shelter to operate after the storm hits.
- Determine immediate staffing needs while storm approaches and after the storm hits.
- Set priorities for staffing and supplying hospitals, and other medical facilities in the affected area.
- Identify transportation needs for staff and supplies.
- Plan support to local medical facilities for pre- and post-storm evacuation of patients and staff.
- Identify sources for specialized transportation equipment suitable for evacuation of critical patients.
- Plan for maintenance of public health in short and long-term shelters and in emergency housing facilities.
- Plan for managing mass casualties.
- Determine how the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) could be used.
- Plan for vector control activities.
- Plan for inoculation of emergency response workers.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

E. Infrastructure Annex

This portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for lifesaving and life-sustaining actions and damage mitigation through technical advice and evaluation; engineering services, construction management, and inspection; emergency repair of water and wastewater

treatment facilities; provision of potable water, ice, and emergency power; and real estate support. It will reflect that while New Orleans and other areas may remain underwater for a prolonged period of time, other areas in Louisiana may need the infrastructure response activities associated with "normal" disasters.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

Debris Removal

- Assess the current adequacy of Parish debris plans.
- Develop an overall debris strategy, consistent with FEMA debris policy, to include burn sites and other planning considerations that are needed.
- Estimate anticipated quantity of debris for disposal in order to develop a debris plan.
- Identify available capacities at existing landfills.
- Review existing statutory requirements (i.e., load limits, air quality) and determine if provisions for modifying the Debris Annex are needed following a disaster.
- Identify potential staging areas for debris for sorting and reduction.
- Identify and prioritize by Parish the major arteries that should be cleared of debris.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

Emergency Ice, Water, and Power Requirements and Distribution.

- Identify quantity of ice and water needed by parishes per day.
- Identify distribution points for water and ice within the parishes.
- Identify parish capability to receive and distribute the commodities.
- List critical facilities and power generation specification within each parish that should be prioritized for emergency generators.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

Infrastructure Restoration

- Develop strategy or plan to support local utility service providers.
- Plan to support levee district pumping operations.
- Plan for removal of debris from public and private property.
- Plan for restoration of critical transportation systems.
- Plan for restoration of utilities (power, water, sewer, gas).
- Plan for restoration of public facilities (schools, fire stations, government buildings).
- Plan for restoration of commerce and general economic recovery.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

F. Mass Care/Housing Annex

The mass care and housing portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall support the delivery of mass care services of shelter, feeding, and emergency first aid to disaster victims; the establishment of systems to provide bulk distribution of emergency relief supplies to disaster

victims and the collection of information for the purpose of reporting victim status and assisting family reunification.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Assess the current shelter plan for Southeast Louisiana.
- Estimate the number of people requiring short and long-term housing. Develop a strategy for short/long term housing of successive amounts of people.
- Identify availability and needs of short and long-term housing options in the area.
- Incorporate FEMA's catastrophic housing strategy.
- Plan for construction and installation of temporary housing facilities based on an acceptable percentage of the total population.
- Identify support services for shelters, and both short and long-term housing facilities and outline procedures to activate those resources.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

G. Prevention & Mitigation Annex

The Prevention & Mitigation portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for the protection of life and property and the prevention of future losses through a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of preparedness & preventive techniques.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Develop a plan to rapidly conduct hazardous material assessment and monitoring
- Recommend measures that could be taken to prevent or lessen the effects of hurricane storm surge and flooding (i.e. hardening fixed facilities, evacuating mobile facilities, implement techniques) to minimize hazardous material incidents.
- Develop a traffic control plan to facilitate controlled access in and out of the impacted area. Develop procedures to identify and consider mitigation opportunities throughout disaster operations.
- Develop criteria by which to allow for the phased reentry of the general population.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc., to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

H. Reentry Annex

The reentry portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for the safe, phased, and controlled return of private citizens and the private and public sectors into the disaster area for permanent residence. It will reflect that while New Orleans and other areas may remain underwater for a prolonged period of time and prohibit rapid reentry, other areas in Louisiana may be able to permit victims to return to their homes and or businesses within a timeframe associated with "normal" disasters.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Develop criteria to use in determining the sequence and rate of return for private citizens and the private and public sectors.
- Identify complications associated with controlling reentry (logistical, psychological, and social) and develop strategies to reduce the negative effects of those complications.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

I. Search, Rescue, and Medical Annex

The search and rescue portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for the location, rescue, on-site treatment, and re-location of stranded citizens, and for the rescue and relocation of hospital patients and other special populations.

The Contractor shall but not be limited to performing the following:

- Assess the current search-and-rescue capabilities in Louisiana and neighboring states.
- Devise a plan to include direction and control for the rescue of stranded people.
- Develop a strategy for estimating the number of citizens to be rescued, develop a priority cascade to use in deploying resources, and develop a strategy on rescuing successive amounts of people by air, land and sea.
- Identify and plan pick-up points for movement of rescued people. Develop a medical support strategy to rescue successive amounts of people.
- Identify hospitals and medical staff needed to support search and rescue operations.
- Identify responsibility for conducting preliminary damage assessments.
- Identify medical staff augmentation capabilities from unaffected areas in the state.
- Devise a plan/methodology to identify federal and EMAC resources needed.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc., to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

J. Security Annex

This portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall assess the overall need for and elements of a security annex.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Identify and arrange transportation for people who would be needed to provide security for hospitals and shelters.
- Identify and arrange transportation for public safety officers to secure urban areas.
- Develop a plan to allow emergency response personnel into the disaster area following a storm.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

K. Transportation Annex

The transportation portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall 1) assist all responders requiring transportation capacity to perform response missions and 2) serve as a coordination point between response operations and restoration of the transportation infrastructure.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Identify additional transportation and transportation support resources needed to move disaster victims, response personnel, and supplies in and out of the impacted areas in order to conduct cleanup and restoration activities.
- Identify airports suitable for use as staging areas for reception, storage, and distribution of relief supplies.
- Determine distribution of relief supplies based on priority of need.
- Develop a transportation plan for movement of general supplies into the affected area.
- Develop a transportation plan for movement of life-support supplies to short- and long-term shelters.
- Identify airfields, runways, hangars, and other transportation facilities that could be used for temporary emergency housing.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, data base protection, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

Annex B

New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Earthquake Plan

1. Catastrophic Planning in the NMSZ

The New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) extends more than 120 miles southward from Cairo, Illinois, at the junction of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, into Arkansas and parts of Kentucky and Tennessee. It roughly follows interstate 55 through Blytheville down to Marked Tree, Arkansas, crossing four state lines and the Mississippi River in three places as it progresses through some of the richest farmland in the country.

The greatest earthquake risk east of the Rocky Mountains is along the NMSZ. Damaging earthquakes are not as frequent as in California, but when they do occur, the destruction covers more than 15 times the area because of the underlying geology and soil conditions prevalent in the region. The zone is active, averaging about 200 earthquakes per year though most of them are too small to be felt. With modern seismic networks, the capacity to detect earthquakes has greatly increased, and many more very small earthquakes are being detected now than in the past. There is a common misconception that earthquake activity has increased over the years, but the increase is due to more sophisticated recording methods that can detect earthquakes that were previously unrecorded. The history of the region indicates, however, that the earthquake risk is the most serious potential disaster to be faced.

In the winter of 1811 – 1812, a series of very large earthquakes occurred along the fault system buried deep within the NMSZ. Using felt information reported in newspapers and from eyewitness accounts of effects, magnitudes have been estimated to be 7.8, 8.0, and 8.1. In addition to the main shocks in December, January, and February, there were more than a thousand aftershocks, some of which were almost as large as the main shocks. The earthquakes were felt throughout the eastern United States and into Canada, ringing church bells as far away as Richmond, Virginia, and Charleston, South Carolina. Closer to the epicenter, much of the area was flooded, making it unfit for farming for many years, and most of the building infrastructure in the epicenter region was destroyed. In some areas, land rose or subsided as much as 20 feet, and small waterfalls or rapids were observed on the Mississippi River, causing part of the river to flow backwards for a short time. Seismologists now believe the New Madrid earthquakes represent the greatest known release of seismic energy in the world. As a result of the earthquakes, Congress passed the nation's first disaster assistance bill, offering arable land to farmers in exchange for ruined cropland, the initiation of a federal disaster policy that continues today.

Since 1811 and 1812, two more large earthquakes have occurred in the NMSZ – an estimated magnitude 6.4 near Marked Tree, Arkansas, in 1843, and an estimated magnitude 6.8 near Charleston, Missouri, in 1895. While scientists believe magnitude 8.0 earthquakes are very rare in the area, they are concerned about those smaller in size to those in 1843 and 1895, which occur more frequently. With the older infrastructure in the region and the relatively unprepared population, even a magnitude 6.0 event could be devastating to people and communities in the epicentral region.

Scientists have also learned that the New Madrid fault system may not be the only fault system in the Central U.S. capable of producing damaging earthquakes. The Wabash Valley fault

system in Illinois and Indiana shows evidence of large earthquakes in its geologic history, and there may be other, as yet unidentified, faults that could produce strong earthquakes.

In 1977, the United States Congress enacted the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act and then created the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program. Subsequently, the Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium was established in 1983, with funding provided by FEMA. It is composed of the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee. CUSEC improves public earthquake awareness and education; coordinates multi-state planning for earthquake preparedness, response, and recovery; and encourages research in earthquake hazard reduction. It also has a network of partners in the non-government sector, including the insurance industry, professional associations, volunteer organizations, business and industry groups, and others. FEMA will coordinate catastrophic earthquake planning with CUSEC to maximize the input and products resulting from this program initiative.

2. Site Specific Plan for Tennessee

The City of Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee, will be the location of the site-specific catastrophic earthquake plan because it is the closest metropolitan area to the center of the NMSZ. It sits on bluffs above the Mississippi River and has sandy soil. This makes it highly vulnerable to the full range of earthquake after effects including liquefaction.

3. Earthquake History of Tennessee

The western part of Tennessee was shaken strongly by the New Madrid, Missouri, earthquake of 1811 - 1812 and by earthquakes in 1843 and 1895. The area has also experienced minor shocks. Additional activity has occurred in the eastern part of the State, near the North Carolina border.

The three great earthquakes that occurred in the Upper Mississippi region near New Madrid in 1811 - 1812 rank among the most significant events in U.S. history. Maximum intensity for each of the large shocks is estimated at XII*. Topographic changes were noted over an area of 75,000 to 130,000 square kilometers; the total area shaken was at least 5 million square kilometers. Damage was very small for such great earthquakes because of sparse population. Chimneys were knocked down in many places in Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri. Raised and sunken lands, fissures, sinks, sand blows, and large landslides characterized the most seriously affected area. The most typical sunken land is Reelfoot Lake in Tennessee. This lake is from 12 to 16 kilometers in length and from 3 to 5 kilometers in width. The submergence ranged from 1.5 to perhaps 6 meters, although greater depths were reported.

[Earthquake intensity is represented as a number (written as a Roman numeral) describing the severity of an earthquake in terms of its effects on the earth's surface and on humans and their structures. Several scales exist, but the ones most commonly used in the United States are the Modified Mercalli scale and the Rossi-Forel scale. There are many intensities for an earthquake, depending on where you are, unlike the magnitude, which is one number for each earthquake.]

On January 4, 1843, a severe earthquake (intensity VIII) affected Memphis and other places in western Tennessee. The shock was reported to have lasted 2 minutes, though this is probably exaggerated. Walls were cracked, chimneys fell, and windows were broken. The total felt area was about 1 million square kilometers. The shock was strongly felt in Knoxville and caused considerable alarm but did no damage. It was also sharply felt in Nashville. Another tremor on

November 28, 1844, caused some bricks to fall from chimneys in Knoxville (intensity VI). Windows and dishes rattled and sounds like distant thunder were heard. Memphis experienced additional damage from a July 19, 1895, earthquake. Walls and chimneys cracked, and people were in panic (intensity VI).

A strong shock centered at Knoxville on March 28, 1913, was felt over an area of 7,000 square kilometers in eastern Tennessee. Two shocks were felt in many places. Movable objects were overthrown, and bricks fell from chimneys (intensity VII). A number of false alarms were set off at fire stations. Buildings throughout the city shook violently. The Knox County Courthouse, a massive brick structure, trembled noticeably. People outdoors experienced a distinct rise and fall in the ground; there were some cases of nausea.

Another earthquake in the Mississippi Valley region caused damage in Tennessee and Arkansas on May 7, 1927. It was strongest at Jonesboro, Arkansas, where some chimneys fell (intensity VII). However, the felt area indicated that the epicenter was farther to the east, in Tennessee. Damage there was limited to the shattering of windowpanes and breaking of dishes in the Memphis area. Many people were awakened by the early morning (2:28 AM) rapid rocking motion; in addition, surface and subterranean sounds were heard. The shock was also felt in parts of Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Missouri, an area of about 337,000 square kilometers.

A fairly strong earthquake centered near Covington on November 16, 1941 affected a sizable area in western Tennessee. Cracks appeared in the courthouse at Covington, where everyone noticed the tremor (intensity V-VI). At Henning, many felt it, and an explosive noise preceded the trembling. The shock was also felt at Dyersburg, Frayser, Memphis, Millington, Pleasant Hill, and Ripley.

Dyersburg was the center of another disturbance on July 16, 1952. The press reported numerous cracks in a concrete-block structure. The earthquake was felt by nearly all, and many persons were frightened (intensity VI). It was also felt at Finley and Jenkinsville. A few people felt a weak aftershock.

An earthquake centered near the Arkansas - Tennessee border (near Finley) awakened many residents on January 25, 1955. The 1:24 AM shock broke windows and damaged plaster walls at Finley, where it was felt by all (intensity VI). The total felt area, including points in Illinois and Kentucky, covered about 75,000 square kilometers.

An early morning shock (3:02 AM) on March 29, 1955, was felt by everyone in Finley (intensity VI). Plaster was cracked in one home. A roaring noise and violent shaking were reported. Many at Caruthersville, Missouri felt the tremor.

Minor damage occurred at Covington from a January 28, 1956, earthquake. Chimneys and walls were cracked (intensity VI). Many were awakened at Covington, and the press reported some residents left their homes at Henning. The shock was also felt in Arkansas and Missouri. Two tremors about 13 minutes apart were felt over a broad area of eastern Tennessee and adjoining parts of Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia on September 7, 1956. At Knoxville, both shocks were felt by nearly all, many of whom were alarmed (intensity VI). Windowpanes shattered, dishes broke, objects were shaken from shelves, pictures fell, and some plaster was knocked from walls. The total felt area covered approximately 21,500 square kilometers.

An earthquake sequence consisting of one foreshock, a magnitude 4.6 main shock, and more than 30 aftershocks occurred south of Knoxville during the latter part of 1973. The foreshock, magnitude 3.4, on October 30, was felt over an area of 2,100 square kilometers, with a maximum intensity of V. The main shock caused minor damage (intensity VI) in several towns in eastern Tennessee, Georgia, Kentucky, and North Carolina. Minor cracks in walls at the University of Tennessee Hospital at Knoxville were reported. Minor damage to walls, windows, and chimneys occurred in the Maryville - Alcoa area. The shock disrupted relay contacts at the Alcoa switching station, causing a temporary loss of power. The total felt area, including parts of South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia, as well as the region mentioned above, covered about 65,000 square kilometers. A network of eight portable seismographs was installed in the main epicenter area. This network was operational from December 2 through December 12 and recorded 30 small magnitude aftershocks. Additional aftershocks were reported felt on December 13, 14, and 21, 1973.

4. Largest Earthquake in Tennessee

Near Memphis, Tennessee
1865 08 17 15:00 UTC
Magnitude 5.00
Intensity VII

At Memphis, chimneys were thrown down. At New Madrid, Missouri, chimneys were damaged and waves formed on the river, that were like those made by a passing steamboat. The earth appeared to undulate. It was felt from St. Louis, Missouri, to Jackson, Mississippi and in Illinois.

U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey
URL: http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/states/tennessee/tennessee_history.html

5. Live Seismic Data from WVT – Waverly, Tennessee

http://asllwww.cr.usgs.gov/Seismic_Data/telemetry_data/WVT_24hr.html

6. Tasks

Work Plan

The Contractor shall provide support for at least two but no more than four meetings in the NMSZ for two to three days each to present and discuss the plan with Federal, regional, state, and local officials and emergency managers. The Contractor can expect to attend meetings in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area to discuss the Federal portions of the plan; these may be averaged to one a week.

The Contractor shall develop a catastrophic plan using the FRP/NRP as a guide and produce 1) a Basic Plan, 2) Emergency Support Function Annexes, and 3) Support Annexes. A Recovery Function Annex supplied by the FEMA Recovery Division will be included in the final plan. The plan shall integrate and not conflict with plans and structures developed by the State of Louisiana and individual cities and parishes.

The basic plan and all of the annexes shall be titled the "New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Earthquake Plan for the City of Memphis and Shelby County Tennessee", and shall be designed so that parts of the plan can be revised, updated, and distributed periodically without

Requiring revision or re-distribution of the entire plan. It shall be designed to serve as the framework for future catastrophic plans in the same jurisdictions for other catastrophic risks such as terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. Each part of the plan shall identify the organization or agency responsible for future maintenance of that part of the plan.

In developing the work plan to accomplish the catastrophic plan, the Contractor will give the highest priority to planning tasks that are of the highest priority to the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA). Annexes not of highest priority should at least be framed with assumptions and an outline in order to provide basic guidance in response to a catastrophic earthquake if one occurs before the Plan's completion. The work plan shall outline proposed tasks, necessary participants, anticipated outcomes, suggested due dates, and rough expenditures to complete each segment of the final plan.

The catastrophic plan will contain the following annexes that will be developed as per the caveats noted in section "3. Special Considerations" at the beginning of the SOW. Individual tasks may be eliminated, added, exchanged, or emphasis increased or diminished as the specifics of catastrophic operational needs and planning are ascertained. They are presented alphabetically and not in order of priority.

A. Communications Annex

The communications portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall ensure the provision of communications support and capability to responders to achieve maximum communications before and during the event, any required temporary communications, and restoration of permanent communications.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Recommend measures for improving interoperability of communications between emergency-management agencies, including such topics as frequency allocation, cell-phone phone usage and controls, avoidance of frequency jams, and use of various radio bandwidths.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

B. Direction and Control Annex

This portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for collecting, analyzing, processing and disseminating information about potential or actual disasters or emergencies to facilitate the planning, decision making and overall activities of governmental response.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Assess the survivability of the State, County, and City emergency management offices, communication equipment, and alternate power supplies.
- Plan for coordination of FEMA, TEMA, and local-government response measures.
- Plan for assessment of damage and determination of urgent response requirements.
- Plan for use of a joint public information center and dissemination of emergency public information.

- Plan for time-phased deployment of resources.
- Outline the process for communicating and prioritizing requests for assistance
- Identify areas of conflicting interests (governmental, socio-economic, etc.).
- Identify potential legislative actions that might be necessary to implement effective response and recovery plans.
- Plan for continued plan maintenance and update.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

C. Health and Medical Services Annex

The Health and Medical Services portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for coordinating resources in response to public health and medical care needs following a major disaster or emergency, or during a developing potential medical situation.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Develop strategies to support local health and medical service providers.
- Assess the ability of each medical facility and special-needs shelter to operate after the storm hits.
- Determine immediate staffing needs while storm approaches and after the storm hits.
- Set priorities for staffing and supplying hospitals, and other medical facilities in the affected area.
- Identify transportation needs for staff and supplies.
- Plan support to local medical facilities for pre- and post-storm evacuation of patients and staff.
- Identify sources for specialized transportation equipment suitable for evacuation of critical patients.
- Plan for maintenance of public health in short and long-term shelters and in emergency housing facilities.
- Plan for managing mass casualties.
- Determine how the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) could be used.
- Plan for vector control activities.
- Plan for inoculation of emergency response workers.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

D. Infrastructure Annex

This portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for lifesaving and life-sustaining actions and damage mitigation through technical advice and evaluation; engineering services, construction management, and inspection; emergency repair of water and wastewater treatment facilities; provision of potable water, ice, and emergency power; and real estate support. It will reflect that while New Orleans and other areas may remain underwater for a prolonged period of time, other areas in Louisiana may need the infrastructure response activities associated with "normal" disasters.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

Debris Removal

- Assess the current adequacy of local government debris plans.
- Develop an overall debris strategy, consistent with FEMA debris policy, to include burn sites and other planning considerations that are needed.
- Estimate anticipated quantity of debris for disposal in order to develop a debris plan.
- Identify available capacities at existing landfills.
- Review existing statutory requirements (i.e., load limits, air quality) and determine if provisions for modifying the Debris Annex are needed following a disaster.
- Identify potential staging areas for debris for sorting and reduction.
- Identify and prioritize the major arteries that should be cleared of debris.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

Emergency Ice, Water, and Power Requirements and Distribution.

- Identify quantity of ice and water needed by local government per day.
- Identify distribution points for water and ice within the affected jurisdictions.
- Identify local government capability to receive and distribute the commodities.
- List local government critical facilities and power generation specifications that should be prioritized for emergency generators.

Infrastructure Restoration

- Develop strategy or plan to support local utility service providers.
- Plan for removal of debris from public and private property.
- Plan for restoration of critical transportation systems.
- Plan for restoration of utilities (power, water, sewer, gas).
- Plan for restoration of public facilities (schools, fire stations, government buildings).
- Plan for restoration of commerce and general economic recovery.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

E. Mass Care/Housing Annex

The mass care and housing portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall support the delivery of mass care services of shelter, feeding, and emergency first aid to disaster victims; the establishment of systems to provide bulk distribution of emergency relief supplies to disaster victims and the collection of information for the purpose of reporting victim status and assisting family reunification.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Assess the current shelter plan for the area.
- Estimate the number of people requiring short and long-term housing. Develop a strategy for short/long term housing of successive amounts of people.
- Identify availability and needs of short and long-term housing options in the area.
- Incorporate FEMA's catastrophic housing strategy.

- Plan for construction and installation of temporary housing facilities based on an acceptable percentage of the total population.
- Identify support services for shelters, and both short and long-term housing facilities and outline procedures to activate those resources.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

F. Prevention & Mitigation Annex

The Prevention & Mitigation portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for the protection of life and property and the prevention of future losses through a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of preparedness & preventive techniques.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Develop a plan to rapidly conduct hazardous material assessment and monitoring.
- Recommend measures that could be taken to prevent or lessen the effects of an earthquake (i.e. hardening fixed facilities, evacuating mobile facilities, implement techniques) to minimize hazardous material incidents.
- Develop a traffic control plan to facilitate controlled access in and out of the impacted area.
- Develop procedures to identify and consider mitigation opportunities throughout disaster operations.
- Develop criteria by which to allow for the phased reentry of the general population.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, etc., to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

G. Reentry Annex

The reentry portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for the safe, phased, and controlled return of private citizens and the private and public sectors into the disaster area for permanent residence.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Develop criteria to use in determining the sequence and rate of return for private citizens and the private and public sectors.
- Identify complications associated with controlling reentry (logistical, psychological, and social) and develop strategies to reduce the negative effects of those complications.
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H. Search, Rescue, and Medical Annex

The search and rescue portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall provide for the location, rescue, on-site treatment, and re-location of stranded citizens, and for the rescue and relocation of hospital patients and other special populations.

The Contractor shall but not be limited to performing the following:

- Assess the current search-and-rescue capabilities in Tennessee and neighboring states.
- Devise a plan to include direction and control for the rescue of stranded people.
- Develop a strategy for estimating the number of citizens to be rescued, develop a priority cascade to use in deploying resources, and develop a strategy on rescuing successive amounts of people by air, land and sea.
- Identify and plan pick-up points for movement of rescued people. Develop a medical support strategy to rescue successive amounts of people.
- Identify hospitals and medical staff needed to support search and rescue operations.
- Identify responsibility for conducting preliminary damage assessments.
- Identify medical staff augmentation capabilities from unaffected areas in the state.
- Devise a plan/methodology to identify federal and EMAC resources needed.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

I. Security Annex

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The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Identify and arrange transportation for people who would be needed to provide security for hospitals and shelters.
- Identify and arrange transportation for public safety officers to secure urban areas.
- Develop a plan to allow emergency response personnel into the disaster area following a storm.
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J. Transportation Annex

The transportation portion of the plan developed by the Contractor shall 1) assist all responders requiring transportation capacity to perform response missions and 2) serve as a coordination point between response operations and restoration of the transportation infrastructure.

The Contractor shall perform but not be limited to performing the following:

- Identify additional transportation and transportation support resources needed to move disaster victims, response personnel, and supplies in and out of the impacted areas in order to conduct cleanup and restoration activities.
- Identify airports suitable for use as staging areas for reception, storage, and distribution of relief supplies.
- Determine distribution of relief supplies based on priority of need.
- Develop a transportation plan for movement of general supplies into the affected area.
- Develop a transportation plan for movement of life-support supplies to short- and long-term shelters.
- Identify airfields, runways, hangars, and other transportation facilities that could be used for temporary emergency housing.
- Develop ready-to-be-implemented mutual aid agreements, contracts, staffing plans and specifications, supplier lists, equipment needs and specifications, etc. to facilitate rapid response capabilities at the catastrophic level, as required.

September 15, 2003

Secretary Tom Ridge
Department of Homeland Security
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for taking the time to meet with me Friday regarding grant consolidation and the overall preparedness strategy of the Department. My sole motivation regarding these topics is to ensure that you have the benefit of all perspectives during your decision making process. As I mentioned in our conversation, decisions regarding grants and preparedness will have a substantial impact upon the future mission of FEMA. Regardless of your final decision, I will have one reaction. I will support and apply all necessary assets and manpower to implement your decision.

I believe the following proposals present a unique opportunity to achieve a tremendous success for both the Department and the Administration. Undoubtedly, individuals within and outside the Department will raise concerns regardless of your ultimate decision. Through your leadership and a focused effort to answer these concerns, I am confident these proposed actions will not only placate the detractors, but will ultimately gain their praise when the advantages to the first responder and the preparedness of the nation are revealed.

The proponents of moving grant programs and FEMA's preparedness mission to the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination (OSLGC) describe the reorganization as an effective way to consolidate preparedness and grants responsibilities to achieve an effective, Department-wide, terrorism preparedness initiative or a "one-stop shop".

In reality, their proposed action does not consolidate grants or preparedness initiatives. The proposal would still result in a bifurcation of these functions within the Department. There will still be congressionally mandated all-hazards grant and preparedness programs within EP&R. Additionally, the proposed move would ignore the painful lesson FEMA learned years ago during the 1985 Pennsylvania tornadoes and Hurricane Andrew that the separation of the preparedness mission from the response mission inevitably leads to an ineffective and uncoordinated response. These realities shaped President Bush's proposal for EP&R and reinforce my continuing belief that the only way to truly consolidate these programs within the Department is to consolidate both the grant and preparedness programs within EP&R by moving ODP to FEMA.

This proposal is consistent with the National Strategy for Homeland Security. It directly tracks several of President Bush's priorities in his proposed legislation for the Department. The proposal is also consistent with the President's '04 Budget that calls for the transfer of a handful of FEMA grants to ODP. The goal of the President's budget is the consolidation of grant programs. You can achieve that consolidation and remain consistent with the budget by using the Secretary's administrative powers to move ODP into EP&R. It is this same logic that allows the move of ODP into OSLGC, as the budget does not address the move of ODP once the proposed grant programs are incorporated into it.

The goal of creating a grants and preparedness "one-stop shop" for the first responder and State and local governments is truly achieved only by moving ODP to EP&R. This move will eliminate potential political liabilities for the Secretary by distancing the Secretary's office from the operational and decision making role of the disbursement of billions of dollars of highly sought after and contested grant monies. The example of the Fire service's active lobbying with regards to grant funding and their tensions with other entities competing for limited grant dollars is a primary reason to remove these political liabilities from the direct office of the Secretary. Moving ODP and these functions into an operational directorate provides the Secretary's office with the appropriate oversight of these programs while removing the direct responsibility of addressing the tensions and criticisms that arise from the first responder community. Simply put, a denial letter comes from an Under Secretary rather than the Office of the Secretary.

President Bush clearly signaled that First Responder Grants belong in EP&R when he proposed the First Responder Initiative in his budget proposal of January 2002. The President later advocated moving ODP to EP&R in his proposed legislation for the Department. The recommendation to move ODP to FEMA received far greater scrutiny and policy review by the President's senior staff than has the current proposal to move ODP into the OSLGC. In fact, the move to OSLGC has never been formally vetted at the senior staff level within the Department. Additionally, both the President in his proposal and Congress in the Act, clearly indicated that the preparedness mission should reside within the EP&R directorate by including the word 'preparedness' in the Directorate's name and mission.

While the President's attempts to move ODP were unsuccessful, it is important to note that during the creation of the Department, the President's legislative strategy was centered on gaining several key and unprecedented management authorities for the Secretary of DHS. This calculated strategy was made knowing that later, these powers could be exercised to achieve many of the President's unfulfilled legislative priorities. Due to the President's successful efforts to gain these authorities, you are now in the position to move ODP to EP&R thereby delivering on a key element of the President's original proposal for the Department.

The precedent setting use of the Secretary's unique management authorities should be exercised for high-level initiatives so as not to dilute the baseline upon which these

authorities are utilized. Moving ODP and a handful of grants from FEMA to the OSLGC reduces the threshold of these powers. Instead of consolidating all aspects of grants and preparedness within one directorate of the department, it uses the authority to move limited aspects of programs from a division level office to a different support office. This will not result in the sought after Departmental consolidation of preparedness responsibilities. The move of ODP to OSLGC will not solve the fundamental problem of the separation of some preparedness activities (i.e. terrorism preparedness) from the all-hazards preparedness and grant functions of FEMA. The move of ODP to OSLGC will also dilute the future abilities of DHS Secretaries to exercise these unprecedented authorities at the appropriate level and indeed, could further limit your ability to exercise these authorities during your tenure.

FEMA has an existing infrastructure to handle the transfer of ODP that is far more robust in structure, experience, regional presence, and established historical relationships with State and local entities and first responders than that of the OSLGC. Since FEMA's inception in 1979, it has cultivated an extensive infrastructure enabling effective coordination of emergency preparedness and response through our long-standing relationships with State and local entities. This infrastructure is founded in common efforts among Federal and State entities to coordinate throughout the entire continuum of the emergency management cycle.

FEMA's relationships with its State and local partners have been formed, maintained, and improved over the course of 111 emergency declarations, 912 major disaster declarations and numerous response operations. Similarly, our decades of operations in these areas is buttressed by a developed financial management system that supports our expertise in grants administration by disbursing a massive amount of awards each year. In FY '03 alone, FEMA has distributed \$5.4 billion in 175,374 awards. This is compared to ODP's awards of approximately \$2.8 billion in 204 awards in FY '03.

Moving ODP to EP&R will create the full integration of all preparedness functions within one Directorate. ODP will enhance the terrorism delta on FEMA's solid all-hazards foundation. It will merge ODP's strong point of law enforcement prevention grants and training functions with FEMA's solid relationships with fire, EMS, public works, local officials, and emergency managers. Additionally, the move will match ODP's experience in the mandated state homeland security plans with the strong relationship FEMA has developed with the Governors, mayors, and State and local emergency managers that execute these state plans. The result will be a unified and balanced approach to all preparedness activities.

In my opinion, there is one hurdle that the proposal of moving ODP to EP&R must overcome. A traditional tension between the division of influence between the fire and police services must be addressed. Currently, the fire community opposes moving Fire grants to ODP due to its concern that fire issues will be given a lower priority in the historically law enforcement oriented approach of ODP. Vice versa, moving ODP to EP&R raises similar concerns with the law enforcement community. I believe a

politically viable and beneficial strategy exists for this issue and FEMA can lead its implementation immediately.

To address the concerns of the law enforcement community, I am proposing a reorganization of the Preparedness Division of FEMA. Currently, the U.S. Fire Administrator is the Director of Preparedness. This will raise concerns from the law enforcement community. To address this issue, EP&R will modify the structure of the Preparedness Division to incorporate a Presidentially appointed senior representative and advocate from both the fire and police services. These representatives will serve as the operational Deputy Directors of Preparedness under the newly confirmed Sue Mencer who would be the Director of Preparedness. This will facilitate a unified and balanced approach to the Department's preparedness activities.

The newly designated Deputy Director of Preparedness and U.S. Fire Administrator would represent the fire services. The newly created Deputy Director of Preparedness and U.S. Law Enforcement Representative would represent Law enforcement services. Both of these positions would be filled with proven, experienced, and respected senior officials from their respective service. The creation of these co-equal positions will provide each of the traditional services with an advocate who is recognized as one of their own.

The creation of the U.S. Law Enforcement Representative gives the police services something they have never had within the Federal government. Local police officials have associated their preparedness activities with the Department of Justice. Regardless of the existing perception of ODP representing law enforcement issues, there exists a reality that DOJ/ODP represents the *Federal* law enforcement views rather than *local* police interests. The police services have never had one of their 'own' representing their issues at the appropriate level of ODP or DOJ. This proposed reorganization of FEMA's Preparedness Division gives them their own representative. Cops identify with cops, not the FBI.

The USFA representative will focus more on preparedness issues for fire, EMS, and the traditional FEMA constituency. The Police Representative will focus more on preparedness issues relating to prevention and law enforcement. Each of these Deputy Directors should benefit from the expertise of liaisons from IAIP, S&T, USCG, USSS, and BTS in order to fully integrate all missions of the Department into a common delivery of a *unified, all-hazards* preparedness strategy.

If appropriately executed, this strategy will gain the support of first responders, the law enforcement community, and their representatives in Congress.

In light of your administrative powers and the President's initial proposal, the question is not why should ODP be in EP&R, but rather why should ODP *not* be in EP&R? In my opinion, no sufficient policy justifications exist to justify the proposition that ODP should not be in EP&R.

While detractors resort to the fact that the President twice unsuccessfully tried to move ODP, they fail to account for the reality that the dynamics behind the Congressional opposition to the move have changed due to committee realignments. Detractors also ignore the fact that you wield Congressionally granted reorganizational authorities that the Executive did not possess during its prior attempts to effectuate the move. Mark Twain once said, “We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it- and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove-lid again- and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one either.”

The transfer of ODP to FEMA will help facilitate the development of a true one-stop shop for first responders. The one-stop shop will consist of a web portal that will include training standards, equipment procurement, training coursework, grant resources, and applications combined into a viable portal that can be utilized by the smallest communities to our largest cities. FEMA’s development of the Compendium of Federal Terrorism Training is the preexisting foundation for the development of a comprehensive, interagency, terrorism training and preparedness portal. Having all preparedness and grant functions in EP&R will enable the Department to streamline its ability to determine training needs; determine responsibility for developing specific training among the Directorates and the federal government in order to fill gaps and avoid duplication; develop and maintain required training; and ensure quality, consistency, and conformity with existing standards.

The backbone of our one-stop shop concept is the development of a National Terrorism Mission-essential Task List (NTMETL). This element is the key to any system that focuses on the needs of the first responder. First responders consistently state that their single biggest need is to have a list of tasks that they can train against. NTMETL will enable the Department to target preparedness efforts by organizing available training and grants in a system that considers the discipline (i.e. public health, law enforcement), scenario (i.e. RDD, communicable bio agent), role (i.e. technician, operations), and tasks (i.e. condition, standard). Adding the delta to this system of the existing training compendium, a standardized equipment list for each task, available grants to help acquire the suggested training and equipment, and an online application will make the system a true “one-stop shop”.

The benefit to the first responder will be the ability for them to have a performance/training roadmap for their emergency personnel, determine training priorities, access course information, contact training providers to schedule training, plan exercises using standardized performance criteria, and apply for grants. The benefit to the Department will be an ability to use empirical data to guide federal training management, tie equipment and grants to key preparedness activities, control training gaps and duplication, and provide an empirical basis to determine the preparedness of the nation as well as determining necessary funds to adequately prepare. Ultimately, we will be able to truly compare a state’s plan to its level of preparedness.

This one-stop shop proposal could be achieved with a series of milestones announced along the way to a complete, operational one-stop shop. The stage of completing the Compendium of Federal Training portion is essentially complete today. The completion of cataloguing available Federal grants can also be achieved in short order. The final element of creating the NTMETL will take more time, but can be achieved in a reasonable period if it is given the right resources and appropriate interagency priority.

To facilitate this effort, I believe it would be extremely helpful if an Executive Order were issued to designate DHS (operational responsibility would be delegated to EP&R) as the lead for this interagency effort. Strong IT contracts supported by an interagency working group comprised of program experts operating under a stringent timeline for deliverables will enable this project to succeed. The inter-agency is already accustomed to EP&R/FEMA acting as the inter-agency coordinator on the Compendium, and will readily embrace this role, too.

The final issue I would like to address is the impact of removing the preparedness mission from FEMA will have on its response mission. Just as grants are so closely linked to preparedness, preparedness is integrally linked to response. It is for this reason that the backbone of FEMA's responsibilities given to it in the Stafford Act are reflected in the emergency management cycle of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. This cycle forms a chain that should not be broken. Because this cycle guides every action that FEMA takes, it is clear why the agency has organized its four divisions of Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation directly in line with the priorities set out by the cycle. The preparedness function represents an integral pillar of FEMA's ability to meet the requirements of this rigorous cycle.

The placement of the preparedness mission in the Department is a fundamental question for the future mission of FEMA. Preparedness defines EP&R's vision of "A Nation Prepared" and drives our mission to lead the Nation to *prepare for*, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from major domestic disasters, both natural and manmade, including incidents of terrorism.

Since FEMA's inception in 1979, it has cultivated an extensive infrastructure enabling the effective coordination of emergency preparedness and response through our long-standing relationships with state and local entities. This infrastructure is founded in common efforts among Federal and State entities to coordinate throughout the entire continuum of the emergency management cycle

An effective preparedness policy is validated through an increased ability to respond through training, planning, education, guidance, exercises and assessments. Preparedness is fundamentally linked to response, as it is the cornerstone of planning in advance for the response phase of the emergency management cycle. Therefore, we believe that all preparedness functions of the Department should be consolidated into FEMA where the response mission resides.

In the 1980's, FEMA learned the hard way that disjointed efforts between preparedness and response create significant problems in effectively managing disasters. As an example, the 1985 tornado outbreak that affected northwestern Pennsylvania highlighted significant planning and response problems. More recently, as Secretary Card can attest, the lack of a synchronized effort between the preparedness and response missions led to an ineffective response to Hurricane Andrew. It is interesting to note that then, as today, there were competing interests involved in the preparedness mission. Years ago this tension was caused by the separation of resources applied to the preparedness for nuclear war from all-hazards preparedness. Today, the tension is between preparedness for terrorism as opposed to all-hazards.

The Stafford Act, as we know it today, was strongly influenced by the Federal shortcomings in response to the 1985 tornado outbreaks in Pennsylvania. As a result, the Act focused on the need for an all-hazards approach to preparedness and response. The all-hazards approach operates upon the understanding that there is a cycle to emergencies that begins with preparedness and mitigation, flows into response, and ends with recovery. These primary areas or phases of disaster management are inextricably linked. The further preparedness efforts are distanced from the response, recovery, and mitigation duties, the greater the opportunity for disconnects that can result in an ineffective and uncoordinated response.

Moving the preparedness function out of FEMA and into OSLGC would fundamentally sever FEMA from its core functions of supporting first responders, State and local governments and the public. It would shatter agency morale and would completely disconnect the Department's response functions from the responders and governments they are supposed to support. It would break longstanding, effective and tested relationships with the states and first responder stakeholders. The move would also sever effective FEMA training delivery systems that directly train over 1,000,000 first responders each year. The appropriate pairing of the preparedness and response missions in the EP&R directorate compliments emergency management structures at the State and local level. In those structures, the same people responsible for responding to any emergency or disaster, no matter the cause, would be the same people responsible for preparing for it.

The preparedness mission should remain in FEMA. The agency has decades of experience in preparedness, an existing field structure in its regions, and is the Directorate tasked with providing the response to terrorist attacks and natural disasters. The Department does not need to start from scratch by shuffling and recreating preparedness responsibilities within other areas of the Department. FEMA has laid a solid preparedness foundation and the Department should build upon it.

I recognize that these proposals differ significantly from your original thinking. These proposals likewise represent a significant divergence from the original design for a one-stop shop and the role of preparedness within the Department. However, I sincerely

believe that the senior leadership of the Department would readily embrace such bold changes.

I am also convinced that you should exercise your reorganization authorities in such a way that establishes a higher baseline for the future exercise of those authorities, both for yourself and future secretaries. Whatever your decision, the dedicated employees of EP&R/FEMA will work diligently to implement them.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to outline both my concerns and these proposals.

Very truly yours,

Michael D. Brown

cc: .
DuncanCampbell

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March , 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: Michael Chertoff
FROM: Michael D. Brown
SUBJECT: Component Head Meeting

Overview of Component:

Mission:


To lead the Nation to prepare for, to mitigate the effects of, to respond to, and to recover from major domestic disasters, both natural and manmade, including incidents of terrorism.

Key Staff:

Chief of Staff,	Patrick Rhode
Deputy Chief of Staff,	Scott Morris
Acting Chief Operating Officer,	Ken Burris
Policy Director,	Brooks Altshuler
National Security Division Director,	Reynold Hoover
Acting Director NIMS Integration Center	Gil Jamieson
Acting Preparedness Division Director,	David Garratt
United States Fire Administrator,	David Paulison
Acting Response Division Director,	Ed Buikema
Recovery Division Director,	Dan Craig
Mitigation Division Director,	David Maurstad

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Emergency Preparedness & Response
Directorate
Federal Emergency Management Agency



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Summary Budget Information





FEMA

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FEMA Operating Budget

Fiscal Year 2005 (Dollars in Thousands)




Total FEMA FY 2005 Budget: \$ 14,070,114 (Dollars in Thousands)

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
FEMA Budget Homeland Security (HS) vs. Non-HS

Fiscal Year 2006 President's Budget
(Dollars in Thousands)



FEMA Activities Designated as "Homeland Security" by OMB:

- National Incident Management System (NIMS) Integration
- Catastrophic Planning
- Medical Surge
- Continuity of Operations (COOP)
- Continuity of Governments (COG)
- National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and NDMS Support
- Noble Training Center Support
- Reimbursement to DOE for Nuclear Incident Response Team Exercises



FEMA

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Reductions to FEMA Base, FY 2003-2005

Dollars in Thousands

FY 2003

30,600	* Transfers to DHS from FY 2002 un-obligated balances
12,000	* Transfers to DHS from FY 2003 Annual Accounts
10,598	* Transfer to BTS (ODP) from FY 2003 Annual Accounts
21,437	Transfer to IG for audits and investigations
5,500	Transfer to TSA from Liberty Shield Fund
<u>\$80,135</u>	Total FY 2003 Reductions

FY 2004

22,000	Transfer to IG for audits and investigations
6,779	Charges for DHS Working Capital Fund
28,000	National Preparedness Transfer to BTS-Office of Domestic Preparedness
21,000	Reduction to Base - Disaster Relief Fund
13,000	* Reduction to Base - Operating Expenses
<u>\$90,779</u>	Total FY 2004 Reductions

FY 2005

11,697	* DHS Mandated Efficiencies
18,501	Charges for Working Capital Fund
<u>\$30,198</u>	Total Estimated FY 2005 Reductions

* A total of \$77.9 million has been permanently lost from the base. These permanent reductions represent a 14.8 overall decrease in FEMA's already limited discretionary spending account since joining DHS.



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Pre-Decisional Over-Target Requests
 FY 2007-11
 Dollars in Millions

	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11
1. Rebuild of Base Operating Budget	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0
2. Federal Regional Centers - Improvements	5.0	5.0	5.0	-	-
3. NETC/Noble Training Center	7.8	5.9	5.8	5.5	5.5
4. National Response Plan (NRP) Maintenance	6.6	6.7	6.9	7.1	7.3
5. Catastrophic Planning	10.0	10.0	10.0	11.0	11.0
6. Convert National Security Terms to FTE	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.8	2.9
7. Facility Relocations	1.5	* 20.7	* 44.2	0.2	0.2
8. National Security Special Events	3.3	9.8	4.8	4.5	6.8
9. National Exercise Support	3.5	3.7	3.8	4.0	4.3
TOTAL:	85.1	109.3	128.1	80.1	83.0

* Spike in Facility Relocations in FY 2008 and 2009 is due to expected FEMA Headquarters relocation.

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Management of FEMA Base Budget FY 2005

- September 2004 - FEMA froze hiring for over 500 positions to assure availability of funding for all on-board staff.
- January 2005 - FEMA issued a staffing baseline with 3,771 full-time positions, including 565 vacancies.
- January 2005 - Guidelines issued requiring case-by-case approval to fill vacancies in *Preparedness, Mitigation, Response and Recovery* and *Administration and Regional Operations* appropriations.
- FEMA is now unable to fill 189 vacancies.

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Identification of Top Near-Term Management Issues

Most Important Goals

1. Operational Construct

Create and begin implementation of a revised FEMA operational construct that ensures the best utilization of the Nation's resources when responding to disasters and emergencies. The intent is to examine our conceptual approach to disaster management and develop new approaches that improve effectiveness through re-designed processes. Examples include re-design of our disaster work force, including operational readiness of full-time FEMA staff; tracking and visibility of operational assets; and examination of the proper balance of operational roles between headquarters and regional offices.

2. Logistics Capability and Asset Visibility

Develop and begin implementation of a supportable logistical strategy that effectively and efficiently supports the DHS and FEMA disaster response and recovery requirements, to include: acquisition, deployment, tracking, warehousing, and operation and maintenance of all assets.

3. Catastrophic Planning

Develop and begin implementation of a comprehensive and integrated multi-year catastrophic planning strategy that meets the requirements of FEMA and its partners, and supports implementation of the National Response Plan.

4. National Incident Management System Integration Center (NIC)

Establish a NIC to provide strategic direction for and oversight of the NIMS to ensure a consistent, nationwide approach to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents regardless of cause, size or complexity.

5. Disaster Work Force

Establish and begin implementation of a plan to recruit, train, credential, deploy and retain a disaster workforce with the appropriate skill mix and management structure to support the operational requirements of all disaster related functions.

6. Position Management

Establish and maintain a baseline of all positions in the Agency, and hold managers accountable for developing long-range workforce plans to assure appropriate numbers, skills, and grades of employees to support current and long-term mission needs.

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Most Serious Challenges:

1. Preparedness

The preparedness mission is scattered across the Emergency Preparedness & Response Directorate (EP&R), Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP), Public Affairs, and the Headquarters Integration Staff (I-Staff).

The President recommended moving ODP into EP&R in his legislative proposal for the Department. However, the Congress enacted legislation placing ODP within the BTS Directorate.

Recently, the Department missed an opportunity to consolidate the preparedness mission when DHS chose to use its own authorities to move ODP to the newly created OSLGCP. This reorganization has failed to produce tangible results due to the lack of a clearly defined chain of command. The absence of effective leadership in the preparedness mission has further spawned a complete lack of accountability for results. For example, in HSPD-8, the President called for the submission of the National Preparedness Goal with the DHS Fiscal Year 2006 budget submission. The deadline passed and OSLGCP did not submit the preparedness goal.

These recent organizational changes have divided what was intended to be one, all-hazards preparedness mission into two artificially separate preparedness categories of terrorism and natural disasters. DHS has institutionalized the split by dividing the primary responsibilities for each category between the separate organizations of FEMA and ODP. Having two organizations and several other ancillary organizations working on preparedness has bred internal and external confusion.

The DHS Preparedness mission should be centralized in the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate. This recommendation is consistent with The President's original intent and is consistent with the Act's direction that the first responsibility of the EP&R Under Secretary is "helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies".

Moving OSLGCP/ODP to EP&R will create the full integration of all preparedness functions within one directorate. ODP will enhance the terrorism delta on FEMA's solid all-hazards foundation. Most importantly, the move would reconnect the severed link between preparedness and response within the Department. The link ensures that capabilities and procedures trained will be identical to the capabilities and procedures actually applied during a real event.

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2. National Response Plan and other operational planning initiatives

Ambiguity regarding the organizational placement of the National Response Plan (NRP) and other operational planning initiatives needs to be resolved. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned EP&R in Section 502 with,

- (3) Providing the Federal Government's response to terrorist attacks and major disasters, including-*
- (A) managing such response;*
 - (B) directing the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the Strategic National Stockpile, the National Disaster Medical System, and...the Nuclear Incident Response Team;*
 - (C) overseeing the Metropolitan Medical Response System;*
 - (D) coordinating other Federal response resources in the event of a terrorist attack or major disaster;*
- (4) Aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters;*
- (5) building a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal, State, and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond to such attacks and disasters; and*
- (6) Consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan;*

Instead of assigning many of these responsibilities to EP&R, as described in the Act, the former Secretary made the decision to assign these responsibilities to varying departmental entities. For example, the development of the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System was initially assigned to TSA for development. Then after several months, the Secretary again shifted responsibility for NRP/NIMS development to the newly created I-Staff within the immediate office of the Secretary. This decision was consistent with past and subsequent decisions that removed key areas of operational responsibility from line directorates.

Since the completion of the NRP and NIMS, another operational planning function has been created and assigned, outside of EP&R, to the I-Staff. The Operational Planning Integrated Process Team (OPIPT) has been tasked with developing an operational planning approach to maximize DHS preparedness and response capabilities. This effort will center on the development of plans for 16 scenarios developed in conjunction with the HSC. It is still unclear how these plans will be reconciled with the existing Incident Annexes to the NRP, ongoing catastrophic planning at FEMA, and similar planning efforts at DOD and the NCTC. On its face, the assignment and implementation of these efforts outside of the NRP construct appears to contradict the Act's original intent when it assigned EP&R with "*Consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan.*"

In addition to the OPIPT's federal planning responsibilities, there is a proposal to also make OPIPT responsible for planning initiatives at the State and local level. These proposals ignore FEMA's decades long expertise, relationships, and understanding of the

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emergency management system and potentially ignore basic concepts of authority. The effect of these assignments has been a confused operational framework, and an implementation strategy that is vexing to staff as well as congressional authorizers and appropriators.

Since the inception of the Department, responsibilities that the Act delegated and that FEMA's mission encompasses, have been assigned to other areas of the Department. The result has led to confusion and the duplication of mission areas within the Department. Fundamentally, the continual redelegation of EP&R/ FEMA's responsibilities for preparedness, response, and emergency/incident management has called into question EP&R's future role and existence within the Department.

Proposals for long-term cross-cutting effectiveness

1. Organization

The management trend since the inception of the department has been to ignore the statutory roles of the Under Secretaries who are appointed by the President to serve as the Department's senior leadership team. The department has failed to enable a leadership team that works across the department. Instead, DHS created a top-heavy organization that is led by its staff rather than its leadership.

The department has focused on building org charts: the vertical and horizontal boundaries of the department; the assembling of tasks into jobs and jobs into departments, and divisions. However, the department has failed at an equally important element of organization by excluding any attention to the personal networks that link people throughout the department and across the department's boundaries. These networks are just as important, if not more important, for the execution of the department's mission.

The lack of these networks, coupled with a skewed allocation of missions and authorities, have encouraged unfocused empire building in duplicative mission areas rather than facilitating the development of cohesive strategies to fill the homeland security vacuum that DHS was created to address. To create personal networks, the leadership of the department must be part of an environment that facilitates integration. This can be done by having permanent office space available to the Under Secretaries and their staffs at the NAC. This will better enable the Under Secretaries to collaborate with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, all other Under Secretaries, and their respective staffs. The availability of collocated space will help create integration through the development of personal networks at the leadership level. These networks will, in turn, be driven throughout the respective organizations resulting in increased horizontal integration.

2. Decision Authority

The allocation of decision authority within the department- i.e. what decisions are made by which people at what levels, with what oversight or review, is dysfunctional. The formal delegations of authority by the Act have been ignored. Decision making authority

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often resides within positions that are outside the span of control of the Under Secretaries who are statutorily responsible for particular missions.

The expectation of Under Secretaries being responsible for the management of their statutory responsibilities has eroded to an operating construct that places much of these responsibilities within newly created and expanded staff organizations such as the I-Staff and the OSLGCP. The executive office staff's involvement in operational and management areas that are clearly within an Under Secretary's purview has created conflicts. These conflicts are compounded by the executive office's track record of continually bringing additional operational responsibilities into the Secretary's Office rather than pushing them down to the directorates.

The current rationale given for expanding staff organizations is to create integration within DHS. However, these moves create the opposite affect. In an attempt to 'integrate', the executive office has merely pulled representatives out of their existing directorates, cut all ties from their home organization's chain of command, and created yet another layer of bureaucracy. These staff functions are uncoordinated with the directorates and perform duplicative functions that create confusion and organizational tension.

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For Official Use Only
26 January 2004

DHS Headquarters Integrated Operations Staff Capability

**CONCEPT PAPER
FOR DEPARTMENT LEADERSHIP TEAM REVIEW**



January 26, 2004

Pre-decisional working paper

For Official Use Only

26 January 2004

Purpose:

This paper discusses the need for an overarching operations staff capability within the DHS headquarters to bridge the existing gap between integrated threat monitoring and assessment (an HSOC/Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis responsibility) and corresponding integrated operational response activities (fragmented across DHS components and staff offices), on a “steady-state” basis and during contingencies. This gap also includes a lack of an appropriate mechanism to coordinate operational response activities with the interagency, as well as with the HSC/NSC (CSG).

Issue:

DHS headquarters does not have an established mechanism for linking the threat monitoring and assessment functions (in an all-hazards context) with a corresponding integrated operational response function across DHS components and activities. Although DHS headquarters does have an established and validated mechanism for enabling executive decisionmaking during “post-incident” contingency situations (Homeland Security Operations Center/Interagency Incident Management Group/Initial National Response Plan), this mechanism is currently not functional in the “steady-state” or “heightened alert” mode outside the context of an actual incident. This deficiency denies the DHS leadership the ability to consider and direct operational actions in day-to-day or “pre-incident” scenarios based upon a coordinated and integrated set of course of action recommendations developed by an appropriate integrating staff function. This deficiency also complicates DHS operational coordination with other agencies and with the HSC/NSC (CSG) during steady-state and pre-incident periods. These problems will become more acute with the implementation of the DHS regional structure if not remedied.

Proposed Operations Staff Capability

Develop a DHS headquarters staff function to: facilitate seamless horizontal integration and coordination of headquarters-level operational activities by integrating cross-directorate operations and contingency planning; providing synchronized staff support to the Department Leadership Team for day-to-day operational response, heightened alert, and crisis decision making activities; managing the operational planning and execution of headquarters-level readiness exercises; and coordinating and integrating operational planning, contingency support, and exercise requirements with DHS Regional Directors and their staffs.

Proposed Operations Staff Roles and Functions

- Develop a headquarters-level operational planning system and coordinate the development of cross-directorate and regional operations and contingency plans;
- Develop a system to facilitate integrated, cross-component operational and contingency plan execution at the national and regional levels;
- Develop a national base line “campaign” plan detailing operational activities associated with changes in the Homeland Security Advisory System;

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26 January 2004

- Develop and administer a system to ensure the seamless integration and coordination of threat monitoring and corresponding cross-directorate operational response activities on a day-to-day basis (beyond the scope of IA and IP coordination with external stakeholders);
- Provide integrated, cross-directorate operational staff support, to include operational response course of action development, to the DHS leadership on a day-to-day basis;
- Provide day-to-day integrated DHS operational interface with the Counterterrorism Security Group and other EOP organizations;
- Enable senior executive decisionmaking and provide “battlestaff” support during periods of heightened alert and contingency situations;
- Provide overall administrative oversight of headquarters-level operational functions and programs assigned to DHS in the National Response Plan;
- Provide sustained management oversight for the Interagency Incident Management Group, Homeland Security Operations Center, and the nationwide Principal Federal Official (PFO) network;
- Coordinate and integrate cross-directorate headquarters and regional-level operational participation in the National Homeland Security Exercise Program (NHSEP) and other designated training activities;
- Develop and administer an after action reporting, “lessons learned,” and best-practices system based on NHSEP and other training event outcomes; and
- Develop a system to assess DHS regional-level preparedness for contingency operations.

Proposed Concept of Operations

- DHS functional components maintain operational control over all component resources/assets; Operations staff personnel perform a coordinating/integrating role and have no directive or command authority over DHS component resources/assets
- Operations staff personnel take the lead role in integrating and coordinating cross-directorate “steady-state” operational preparedness activities (HSAS operational “campaign plan” development, contingency plan development, “care and feeding” of the nationwide PFO network, administrative maintenance of the IIMG and INRP support functions, readiness exercises, etc.)
- Operations staff personnel attend daily threat SVTC sessions and HSOC briefings to gain and maintain “steady-state” situational awareness
- Operations staff personnel compile and consolidate cross-directorate input and lead DHS representation at the weekly Risk Management Group (RMG) SVTC session
- During normal periods, HSOC continues to monitor the overall threat picture and consolidate and report day-to-day situational awareness and component operational activities to the DHS leadership through the Secretary’s Morning Summary and operational SITREPs as required
 - HSOC handles routine operational activities not keyed to specific threats; oversees daily common operating picture and alerts DHS leadership of any anomalies

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- During periods of heightened alert based on a general threat picture, operations staff personnel will compile and provide an enhanced set of cross-directorate operational course of action recommendations to help inform the initial HSAS change decision, as well as continuously update and provide additional course of action recommendations to the DHS leadership as the threat-operational picture evolves
 - Operations staff personnel will convene and lead tailored DHS/IIMG meetings/planning sessions as required to coordinate the operational activities of appropriate DHS entities and other Federal departments and agencies within a common framework
 - Operations staff personnel will take the lead in daily coordination with the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) and help prepare the DHS leadership for Homeland Security DC/PC meetings associated with the evolving threat-operational picture
- During periods of heightened alert based upon specific, credible threats, operations staff personnel will convene and lead continuous internal DHS planning sessions and tailored IIMG meetings and provide continuously updated operational situational awareness briefings and operational course of action recommendations to the DHS leadership
 - Operations staff personnel will take the lead in daily coordination with the CSG and help prepare the DHS leadership for Homeland Security DC/PC meetings associated with the evolving threat/operational picture
- During a "post-incident" response, operations staff personnel will convene and lead a continuous session of the IIMG tailored to meet the demands of the scenario at hand as detailed in the Initial National Response Plan and IIMG Standard Operating Procedures document
 - Operations staff personnel will work in conjunction with HSOC, IA, DHS component staffs, and staff offices; representatives from other federal departments and agencies; and the deployed PFO network to provide continuous situational awareness, overall incident management oversight, and enable DHS executive crisis decisionmaking
 - Operations staff personnel will take the lead in continuous coordination with the CSG and help prepare the DHS leadership for Homeland Security DC/PC meetings associated with the evolving threat/operational picture

Recommendation:

- Recommend that a day-to-day operational support staff function be instituted within the recently activated Headquarters Operational Integration Staff (I-Staff)
 - The I-Staff charter approved by the Secretary currently reflects all the tasks and functions described above (to include cross-directorate planning, exercises, and incident management), with the exception of those related to the tying together of threat monitoring, analysis, and operational response activities on a day-to-day and pre-incident basis
 - This recommendation leverages the existing incident management systems, processes, and protocols that have been developed and validated during the past

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year in line with the INRP; minimizes change from a known and rehearsed set of protocols

- The I-Staff works directly for the DHS leadership Team and is at the appropriate level to interface with the CSG, HSC, and other EOP organizations on operational matters
- This recommendation ties together the headquarters-level operational planning and execution process horizontally across the directorates, as well as vertically down to the DHS regions

The Purpose and the Issue as defined in the working paper are based upon conflicting statements. The Purpose paragraph states that there is a “lack of an appropriate mechanism to coordinate operational response activities within the interagency,” while the Issue paragraph states, “this mechanism is currently not functional in the “steady-state” or “heightened alert.” There is a system for interagency coordination and it is called the Emergency Support Function (ESF) under the National Response Plan.

If this system, which is currently directed by FEMA through its role and responsibilities, does not meet the requirements of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) it would be more efficient to enhance FEMA’s responsibilities and concentrate on the integration of that role into the HSOC needs as opposed to recreating the wheel as this proposal proposes.

The first thought that comes to mind is empire building or a lack of understanding of the role and responsibilities of the EP&R directorate of DHS. The very use of the descriptor that there exists a “deficiency” that complicates the operational coordination of other agencies indicates a notional thought that something exists to serve this function. Therefore, an understanding of the role that FEMA plays in coordinating through the former Federal Response Plan and now through the Interim National Response Plan and through the National Response Plan in the future is critical in addressing this issue.

Virtually each example cited is a current capability that FEMA maintains. The very fact that one doesn’t know about it or doesn’t understand it does not necessitate the requirement to go forth and create it. Under Proposed Operations Staff Roles and Functions, Bullets 1, 2 and 3 are already being conducted through FEMA’s program directorates and regional planning functions. Bullets 11 and 12 again are being performed through the RAMP. How many of these programs does DHS need?

FEMA is already in the business of coordinating operations within the scope of most DHS activities. You have to look no further than the response to the shuttle disaster to see that the system does in fact work. If the desire is to make that capability more robust to address the issues and ideas discussed in the working paper, then the appropriate action would be to strengthen those responsibilities and not attempt to insert a staff level organizational element within the Secretary’s office into the chain of command between the Secretary and those organizational elements responsible for operations within the department. It would be a most positive and welcome occurrence to have DHS recognizes the capabilities and role that FEMA plays and build upon these capabilities.

We all strive to serve the Secretary to the best of our abilities; however the effectiveness and efficacy of that service need not be judged on the proximity to the Homeland Security Operations Center. The Proposed Concept of Operations completely ignores the day-to-day activity in which FEMA is involved. The whole tenor of the working paper ignores the very core of the response to events in this country and that is FEMA’s response to the garden-variety disaster. The paper does not begin to delve into the response and coordination efforts necessary to respond to that localized flood, or ice storm that consumes much of the monies of the disaster support account. You cannot have a system that is not interested in picking up the debris from an ice storm in South Carolina in January and turn around and want to have an operational role in an approaching hurricane in May. This type of approach does little more than confuse state and local officials. The current working paper serves as an outline of the problem that is created by structuring an operational concept for response to terrorism while ignoring the natural disaster component.

**FEMA**

Interoffice Memorandum

To: Admiral Jim Loy
Deputy Secretary

From: Michael D. Brown
Under Secretary
Emergency Preparedness and Response

Date: March 16, 2004

Re: FY 2004 Spending Plan

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss how FEMA is progressing and the challenges we are facing as we approach the mid-point of Fiscal Year 2004. While FEMA is a relatively small part of DHS, our mission—FEMA's mission—is a critical one, with extremely high public visibility. The President, State and local governments, other federal agencies, Congress, the media and the American people expect FEMA, and now DHS, to ensure the Nation's ability to respond to and recover from not only acts of terrorism, but all of the natural disasters, and other emergencies we face each year.

These expectations provide the lens through which we view our current budget situation and how we are positioned to maintain and exceed those expectations for the future. We are currently living within our FY 2004 appropriation and FTE levels, and we are adhering closely to budgetary intent in our spending.

However, we are struggling every single day to maintain operations and capabilities at *current* levels. I am increasingly concerned that, as a result of this struggle, important investments and preparations for the future are being mortgaged or deferred indefinitely.

FEMA's FY 2004 discretionary budget total is \$4.6 billion. This figure includes over \$2 billion for the Disaster Relief Fund, \$1.4 billion for BioDefense Countermeasures and Public Health Programs, and \$637 million for grant programs (for the modernization of flood maps, floodplain management activities, and disaster loans).

Only \$563 million of our FY 2004 budget represents our true operating expenses. This figure represents only 12% of our overall budget.

There are three issues regarding our operating accounts that I want to make certain you are aware of:

1. How our budget account structure limits our ability to manage our budget,

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2. The scope of reductions to our FY 2004 operating accounts, and
3. The challenges that are mounting as a result of our current situation.

1. Limited ability to manage our budget

We currently suffer from a lack of flexibility based on how Congress has structured our operating accounts. The President's Budget proposed a single "Operating Expenses" account for FEMA. But in the FY04 Appropriation, Congress broke out the line items in the single "Operating Expenses" account into a number of smaller, separate accounts, including separate accounts for "Administrative and Regional Operations" and "Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery."

This significantly reduced the flexibility we would otherwise have with a single account. Because of the way we are boxed in, we have been forced to charge some administrative costs to the administrative set-asides in other appropriations, such as the Flood Map Modernization and Pre-Disaster Mitigation funds, in order to make-up for funding lost to DHS taxes and other reductions we have been forced to take in operating expenses.

2. Scope of reductions to FY 2004 operating accounts (PMRR and ARO)

The FY 2004 FEMA operating budget (consisting primarily of our "Administrative and Regional Operations" and "Preparedness, Mitigation, Response and Recovery" accounts) has absorbed significant reductions.

In formulating the FY 2004 Budget, OMB transferred \$13 million from FEMA to "Departmental Management" (from Operating Expenses, Administrative and Regional Operations). OMB's rationalization was that consolidation of functions under DHS would generate savings, but no savings have been realized. FEMA continues to operate with essentially the same number of personnel, but has steadily taken on additional taskings and responsibilities.

Additionally, during the FY 2004 budget formulation phase: Approximately \$9 million was transferred from the "Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery" operating account base to the Office of Domestic Preparedness. However, since those funds included salaries for positions that did not transfer to ODP, we were forced to absorb those costs as well.

FEMA has also lost \$250 million to rescissions of appropriated funds in FY 2004 (including a supplemental for the Disaster Relief Fund). These rescissions included nearly \$2 million in reductions to the already hurting "Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery" and "Administrative and Regional Operations" accounts. We estimate DHS taxes for this year could ultimately reduce FEMA's funding between \$3 and \$10 million, funds that are currently allocated to FY 2004 program activities.

In addition to reduced funding levels in FY 04, we are losing 67 positions to ODP with activities that are transferring to ODP. The effect of this FTE transfer is made especially acute by the fact that many of these positions performed only collateral duty on the transferred activity (example: Citizen Corps). Nevertheless, FEMA is losing the full position. The work that these individuals will leave behind will have to be redistributed to an already over-burdened staff. With a full-time personnel count of about only 2,500 across the entire Directorate, the loss of 67 positions has a significant effect.

While FEMA is continuing to meet its obligations and carry out its fundamental responsibilities, it has been a difficult time. We expect the remainder of the year and FY 2005 to continue in the same deteriorating mode, and are preparing ourselves accordingly.

3. Mounting Challenges: Homeland Security (Terrorism) vs. Non-Homeland Security (All Hazards), Shortfalls, Un-Funded Requirements, and the Future

Within FEMA, approximately \$230 million in shortfalls and unfunded requirements, over and above our current operating expenses have been identified. These items include such things as: National Special Security Events, development of mutual-aid agreements, forced facilities moves, and increased security costs.

As I noted in my letter to Secretary Ridge transmitting FEMA's FY 2006-2010 Resource Allocation Plan, I have committed our Directorate to the difficult-but-necessary work of finding the funding for these within our current funding level. However, last week we received news from the CFO's office that OMB has designated two-thirds of our budget as being "Non-Homeland Security," and those "Non-Homeland Security" activities will be held to zero budget growth beginning in FY 2006. This paints a grim picture for FEMA's future.

Although solid targets have not yet been released by the CFO's shop, we have been told to expect to reprogram our FY 2006 budget plans to absorb a cut of *\$100 million*. Once we receive our revised target FY06 we will begin counting the cost. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that many if not most of our current un-funded requirements and shortfalls will have to be deferred in favor of more Homeland Security (terrorism) priorities.

I would like to thank you for the time and the attention to detail that you have given to the planning and budgeting process. I appreciate having a forum in which these issues can be raised and addressed within the department. FEMA has one of the most visible and critical missions in the Department. I look forward to working with you to ensure that we have the resources to carry out our all-hazards mission while working within the Departmental priorities

DRAFT; 6 April 2004; 11:58:11

**MEMORANDUM FOR JOE D. WHITLEY
THE GENERAL COUNSEL**

FROM: Baruch Weiss
Associate General Counsel

David Trissell
Associate General Counsel

Catherine Mitrano
Deputy Associate General Counsel

Jay N. Lerner
Ellen McClain
Michael Russell
Lou Brenner
Thomas Muther
Erica Bomsey
Diane Donley

SUBJECT: Legal Issues Regarding Regional Structure for the
Department of Homeland Security

This Memorandum examines the legal issues regarding the proposal to establish a regional field structure for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).¹

Based upon our legal research, we believe that the Secretary is authorized to:

- Establish a regional structure within the Department of Homeland Security and empower Regional Directors with appropriate authorities;
- Allocate responsibilities among Department officials (with appropriate Congressional notification); however, he may not abolish an organizational unit or function;
- Appoint Regional Directors without the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate; and
- Re-allocate authority from DHS Officers to the Regional Directors (even if the Regional Director is not Senate confirmed), where the Secretary

¹ This Memorandum is intended to address only the legal issues; it does not purport to take a position or pass judgment on policy matters.

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preservation of “functions,” “authorities,” and “capabilities” for TSA, as it did with the U.S. Coast Guard. With the Coast Guard (as discussed more fully below), Congress not only required that it be preserved as a “distinct entity,”⁶¹ but it also added that “Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, the authorities, functions, and capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform its missions shall be maintained intact and without significant reduction.”⁶²

TSA would still remain a “distinct entity,” for purposes of Section 424. TSA would still conduct its operations in the same manner, and TSA-Headquarters would conduct overall policy control and direction for transportation security issues.

Limitations With Respect to the U.S. Secret Service. Section 821 of the HSA (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 381) provides that:

In accordance with Title XV [dealing with the President’s Reorganization Plan, as discussed above], there shall be transferred to the Secretary [of Homeland Security] the functions, personnel, assets, and obligations of the United States Secret Service, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity within the Department, including the functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto.

Based upon similar reasoning and logic as discussed above, we conclude that even under the Secretary’s Regional Plan, the Secret Service would retain its status as a “distinct entity.” Under this Plan, the Secret Service would still retain its own unique identity in terms of its functions, personnel, assets, and obligations.

Limitations With Respect to Emergency Preparedness and Response and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. In addition to the role of the Regional Director, there are two other officials -- the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) -- who have certain legal authorities during contingency situations or “incidents of national significance.”⁶³ As noted above, the

consolidate functions or organizational units of the two bureaus with each other.” See also Section 476 of the HSA (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 296) which designates separate funding accounts for the legacy-INS Bureaus of Citizenship and Border Security [now ICE]. These sections do not seem to be at issue with respect to the Secretary’s proposed Regional Plan, as there is no consideration that the RDs would recombine the INS in any way, especially since it appears that the Citizenship and Immigration Services will not be included in the Regional Plan.

⁶¹ Section 888(b) of the HSA.

⁶² Section 888(c) of the HSA. See *Russello v. United States*, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another provision, rules of statutory construction dictate that Congress acted intentionally in the omission).

⁶³ The term, “incident of national significance,” is defined in the various drafts of the Interim National Response Plan. The most recent draft of the Interim National Response Plan lists virtually every situation that a Regional Director might face including incidents of regional significance. Therefore, for purposes of consistency, the drafters of the Secretary’s Regional Plan might wish to utilize the phrase, “Incidents of national Significance,” instead of “contingency situations.” Nevertheless, for purposes of this

Secretary's Regional Plan establishes the role of the Regional Director in contingency situations; whereas the Stafford Act and the Federal Response Plan designated the role of the FCO; the Homeland Security Act⁶⁴ required the consolidation of existing Federal emergency response plans into a single, coordinated National Response Plan (still in draft),⁶⁵ and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) established the role of the Principal Federal Official.⁶⁶

During contingency situations, there must be no confusion or uncertainty as to the various roles of Government officers. Therefore, we believe that the roles of the RD, the PFO, and the FCO must be more clearly defined with unambiguous lines of authority and to avoid duplication and conflict.

Although the role of the FCO has existed for many years, the roles of the PFO and RD are relatively new (within the last year or so). As a result, the precise parameters of these roles have not yet been clearly determined or defined. Nevertheless, it appears that depending upon how the roles and responsibilities of these officers are constructed, there might be some overlap in potentially significant ways. Therefore, we have expressed our concerns to the DHS Integration Staff, the operational architects currently drafting the roles and responsibilities for each of these Government officers.

To provide legal guidance to these drafters, we will discuss the currently prescribed roles for each of the three relevant Government officers and their parameters – the Regional Director, Federal Coordinating Officer, and the Principal Federal Official.

Regional Director. As discussed above (at page 18), the RD has been empowered with numerous authorities during times of contingency situations.⁶⁷

Federal Coordinating Officer. Pursuant to the Stafford Act,⁶⁸ the President shall designate a Federal Coordinating Officer in the case of a "major disaster"⁶⁹ or

Memorandum, the authors will use the terms of the document "Regional Directors Roles and Responsibilities," *i.e.*, terminology involving "contingency situations."

⁶⁴ Section 502(6) of the HSA (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 312(6)).

⁶⁵ The draft Interim National Response Plan is intended to replace the existing Federal Response Plan which has described the procedures for coordinating Federal departments and agencies.

⁶⁶ The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the PFO is intended to explain in detail the role of the PFO; the latest draft of the SOPs was issued in November 2003. In addition to these referenced source documents, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), recently published, describes the concept of managing using the Incident Command System in the event of a contingency situation.

⁶⁷ According to the Secretary's Regional Plan, during contingency situations, the Regional Director: (1) Serves as the lead DHS official; (2) Exercises directive authority over components; (3) May serve as the Principal Federal Official for domestic incident management under the National Response Plan; (4) Advocates for additional DHS resources; (5) May temporarily reallocate resources to meet contingency situation response requirements; and (5) Mobilize external stakeholders and coordinates interaction with DHS field activities.

⁶⁸ Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5121-5206 (Stafford Act).

“emergency.”⁷⁰ This authority has been delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the transfer of FEMA authorities to DHS,⁷¹ which has been re-delegated to the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response. Therefore, the Secretary or the Under Secretary may make such designation during a “major disaster” or “emergency.”

The FCO is responsible for coordinating the delivery of Federal assistance following a formal Presidential declaration of a “major disaster” or “emergency.”⁷² The FCO provides disaster assistance to affected state and local governments as well as to individual disaster/emergency victims.⁷³

These FCOs are highly skilled professionals trained to lead coordinated efforts of emergency management during times of crisis. Because FCOs may be authorizing funds that have been delegated to FEMA, FCOs must be employees of FEMA. All FCOs receive specialized training, and the funding for such emergency management efforts comes through the FEMA budget mechanisms.

For purposes of DHS organizing its emergency response efforts, it is important to note that the FCO is appointed only after the President makes a formal declaration of a “major disaster” or “emergency.” Prior to this declaration (or if no declaration is made), the role of the FCO does not exist, and there is no authority to provide direct federal assistance.⁷⁴ Therefore, there might be some contingency situations which deserve

⁶⁹ A “major disaster” is defined in the Stafford Act at 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) as any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.

⁷⁰ An “emergency” is defined in the Stafford Act at 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) as any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.

⁷¹ Section 503(1) of the HSA (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 313(1)).

⁷² In most instances, the FCO serves as a Disaster Recovery Manager to provide financial assistance under the Stafford Act (44 C.F.R. § 206.41(b)) to the state coordinating officer. Generally, a Governor will designate a state coordinating officer to oversee disaster operations for a state. This state coordinating officer is the Governor’s authorized representative to execute all necessary documents for disaster assistance. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.41(c) and (d).

⁷³ See 42 U.S.C. § 5143; 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.41 and 206.42.

⁷⁴ See 44 C.F.R. § 206.208. In certain limited circumstances, DHS may assist prior to a Presidential declaration, and in these cases, the Department may mobilize initial response resources (e.g., food, water, emergency generators) and emergency teams closer to potentially-affected areas. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5189b, 5192(a)(1) and (b), and 5195(a)(1). Also, DHS can activate essential command-and-control structures to lessen or avert the effects of a “major disaster” and to improve the timeliness of disaster operations. When an incident poses a threat to life and property that cannot be effectively addressed by the state or local governments, DHS may request the Department of Defense to use its resources prior to a declaration to perform any emergency work “essential for the preservation of life and property.” 42 U.S.C. § 5170(c)(1). See also 44 C.F.R. § 206.34.

Federal attention, but do not rise to the level of a major disaster or emergency (*i.e.*, where the President does not intend to issue a declaration, or before the President has determined that a declaration is warranted). In these instances, the Secretary may wish to look to some other official to lead the Federal response to the contingency situation.

Principal Federal Official. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) provides that:

The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.⁷⁵

The Secretary may delegate this responsibility as PFO.⁷⁶

As noted above, a contingency situation might occur which does not rise to the level of a Presidential declaration of a “major disaster” or “emergency,”⁷⁷ as defined by the Stafford Act, and thus, the President will not issue a formal declaration and no FCO will be designated. Nevertheless, it is possible that certain incidents might require an emergency response from the Federal Government; however, the President does not wish to issue a Stafford Act declaration. In such instances, a PFO may be designated to provide Federal assistance and attention to the incident site.

Nevertheless, these incidents might require an emergency response from the Federal Government. Therefore, a PFO may be designated to provide Federal assistance and attention to the incident site.

An early draft of the Standard Operating Procedures for the Principal Federal Official (November 2003) included the following roles and responsibilities:

- Representing the Secretary of Homeland Security as the senior Federal official on-scene to enable the Secretary to carry out his role as the principal Federal official for domestic incident management;
- Ensuring overall coordination of Federal domestic incident management activities and resource allocation on-scene, ensuring the seamless integration of Federal incident management activities in support of State, local, and tribal requirements;

⁷⁵ As of the date of this Memorandum, the details of the role of the Principal Federal Official have not yet been clearly determined or defined. Earlier drafts have indicated that the PFOs would operate as a central spokesperson at the incident site, a point-of-contact for media interviews, conflict manager among responding agencies, and/or a high-level representative to the Secretary and Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG).

⁷⁶ See section 102(b) of the HSA (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 112(b)).

⁷⁷ Most incidents (such as a transportation accident, power outage, or chemical release) could be designated by the President as an “emergency.”

- Providing strategic guidance to Federal entities and facilitating interagency conflict resolution as necessary to enable timely Federal assistance to State, local, and tribal authorities;
- Serving as a primary, although not exclusive, point for Federal interface with State, local, and tribal government officials, the media, and the private sector for incident management;
- Providing real-time incident information, through the support of the Federal incident management structure on-scene, as detailed in the Federal Response Plan and other Federal incident management and emergency plans, to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the HSOC and the IIMG, as required; and
- Coordinating the overall Federal public communications strategy at the state, local, and tribal levels and clearing Federal interagency communications to the public regarding the incident.

Potential Inconsistencies or Duplications Among Federal Officials. Reviewing the role and responsibilities of the FCO and comparing against the proposed roles, responsibilities, and duties of the RD and PFO during contingency situations, is illustrative of the significant potential for duplication, inconsistency, and confusion among these Federal officers. A few examples follow:

- *Need for One Leader.* As discussed above, the PFO “represents the Secretary of Homeland Security as the senior Federal official on-scene” and provides “strategic guidance to Federal entities.” This role is virtually the same as the RD’s designation as “lead DHS official.” Where a PFO and RD might disagree as to the proper emergency response procedure or strategy, there might be confusion as to whose judgment would/should prevail. In addition, where a President has declared a “major disaster” or “emergency,” the FCO might advocate a completely different (third) approach.
- *Necessary for Unified Authority to Direct Federal Resources and Assistance.* The FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of Federal assistance after a Stafford Act declaration. This role for the FCO might conflict or overlap with the RD’s role to “exercise directive authority” over DHS component agencies within the region and to “temporarily reallocate resources to meet the contingency situation.” Further, the PFO has been delegated the Secretary’s authority to “respond to . . . major disasters and other emergencies” and is to “ensure overall coordination of Federal domestic incident management activities and resource allocation on-scene.”
- *Requirement for Single Liaison to Media and External Stakeholders.* The PFO is designed to serve as the primary “point for Federal interface with State, local, and tribal government officials, the media, and the private sector for incident management.” However, the RD is authorized to “mobilize external stakeholders and coordinates interaction with DHS field activities.”

For purposes of evaluating the Secretary’s Regional Plan, there is significant potential for confusion and conflict during contingency situations. The RD’s roles with

respect to “lead DHS official,” exercising direct authority over components, reallocation of resources, mobilizing stakeholders, and coordinating interaction among DHS field components may infringe upon the roles of the FCO (under a Stafford Act declaration) and the PFO. It will be important for the Integration Staff to resolve any overlap, duplication, or inconsistencies in the inter-relationships between the RD, FCO, and PFO.

Limitations With Respect to the U.S. Coast Guard. Under Section 888(b) of the Homeland Security Act, the Coast Guard must remain as a “distinct entity” of the Department. In this regard, the protection provided to the Coast Guard is similar to that provided to the Secret Service and TSA.

Beyond the “distinct entity” provisions, the HSA provides additional protections for the Coast Guard, which presumably further preserve the Coast Guard. For instance, Section 888(c) provides that “the authorities, functions, and capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform its missions [78] shall be maintained intact and without significant reduction.” In addition, Section 888(d) provides that:

No mission, function, or asset (including for purposes of this subsection any ship, aircraft, or helicopter) of the Coast Guard may be diverted to the principal and continuing use of any other organization, unit, or entity of the Department, except for details or assignments that do not reduce the Coast Guard’s capability to perform its missions.

Therefore, the Coast Guard’s authorities, functions and capabilities must remain intact (without significant reduction) and may not be diverted to the “principal and continuing use” of another agency.

We conclude that even with these added protections, the Coast Guard can be fit, with some modifications, into the regional framework. Section 888(d) seems to ban only the “principal and continuing use,” but not, by implication, the short-term temporary use, so long as the transfer does not diminish, in any way, the agency’s ability to perform its statutory missions, as defined. During contingency situations, the need to utilize Coast Guard resources would be heightened and would be permissible.

In addition, the Secretary’s Regional Plan seems to encompass the notion of “details” or “assignments,” so that Coast Guard resources may be re-assigned in contingency (emergency) situations for a limited duration. In this way, the Coast Guard may still remain intact as a “distinct entity” without reducing its authorities, functions, or capabilities in any significant way for any significant length of time.


⁷⁸ Section 888(a) of the HSA defines the Coast Guard’s “Homeland Security” Missions as: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Drug Interdiction; Migrant Interdiction; Defense Readiness; and Other Law Enforcement. In addition, the Coast Guard’s “Non-Homeland Security” Missions are: Marine Safety; Search and Rescue; Aids to Navigation; Living Marine Resources; Marine Environmental Protection; and Ice Operations.

Office of Inspector General

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528Homeland
Security

January 18, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable C. Suzanne Mencer
Director
Office for Domestic Preparedness
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness

FROM: 
Robert L. Ashbaugh
Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Evaluations, and Specials
Reviews
Office of Inspector General

SUBJECT: TOP Officials 3 Observation Paper #1: Participation of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and Additional Exercise Issues

As you know, we are conducting a review of the Top Officials 3 (TOPOFF 3) exercise to determine whether Department of Homeland Security (DHS) preparation for and conduct of TOPOFF 3 effectively achieves overarching exercise objectives. At the outset, we want to express our appreciation for the cooperation and assistance that we have received from your office throughout our review thus far.

During preparations for the TOPOFF 3 exercise, several issues have come to our attention that offer an opportunity for us to assist your office before the actual exercise. Rather than wait until the conclusion of the exercise to issue a report assessing its outcome, the customary result of such reviews, we would like to share information that, in our opinion, would assist in further exercise preparation. In working with your staff, we agreed to provide our observations on topics that might warrant such treatment.

Our first observation paper discusses the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) participation in TOPOFF 3 and several additional issues relevant to the exercise as a whole. The issues presented were brought to our attention while attending numerous planning events, reviewing relevant documents, and interviewing DHS and interagency officials involved in the TOPOFF 3 exercise development process.

We may include this observation paper in an annex to our final report on TOPOFF 3. We welcome your comments on our observations and look forward to continuing our partnership with your office as we work towards improving the TOPOFF exercise process.

cc: The Honorable Michael D. Brown, Under Secretary, Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate
Mr. James Kish, Director, National Exercise Program
Mr. Robin (Butch) Colvin, Branch Chief, National Exercise Program

**TOP Officials 3 Observation Paper #1:
Participation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
Additional Exercise Issues**

Executive Summary

We focused on FEMA's participation in TOPOFF 3 because, as of early October 2004, it appeared the agency was not actively engaged in TOPOFF 3 planning meetings and exercise development. Other agencies' planners were questioning FEMA's level of involvement. Also, FEMA had not posted its agency objectives on the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Portal. In our opinion, this suggested an absence of active planning.

Communication challenges between ODP, its contract support, and FEMA in early exercise planning stages might have limited FEMA's engagement in the process. For example, one FEMA planner expressed concern that its mission was not adequately reflected in early versions of the Master Scenario Events List. However, by late October 2004, we observed an increase in available information and level of detail regarding FEMA's exercise participation. After reviewing material recently available on ODP's Portal and interviewing FEMA, DHS, and ODP exercise planners, it appears FEMA is making progress in planning for TOPOFF 3. Nevertheless, we have identified several issues and concerns that could inhibit the overall effectiveness of TOPOFF 3 if not actively addressed.

FEMA

FEMA planners said they are uncertain as to whether Emergency Support Function (ESF) agencies will fully participate in the Full Scale Exercise. ODP should coordinate with FEMA planners to address these concerns and assess the extent to which funding shortages may limit or inhibit ESF participation. At the federal, state, and local levels, officials are still unclear as to the difference in program support that FEMA provides when there is an emergency declaration versus a major disaster declaration. Coordination between FEMA and ODP should be enhanced prior to the TOPOFF 3 Full Scale Exercise to educate these officials on the differences.

Additional Exercise Issues

Federal planners have expressed concerns about funding availability for exercise participation. To understand more about the costs associated with participating in TOPOFF, we requested ODP's assistance in obtaining cost estimates from participating departments and agencies.

Federal department and agency planners said ODP and its contract support have sometimes not adequately considered their views about exercise planning and incident management. We encourage ODP and its contract support to enhance communication with DHS entities and interagency planners.

We have not observed National Incident Management System (NIMS) or National Response Plan (NRP) training. We suggest incorporating NIMS and NRP training as a part of the TOPOFF 3 exercise development process.

One of the main concerns of first responder organizations is the safety of response personnel. This issue was not discussed during planning meetings that we attended. If they have not already done so in other meetings, we encourage ODP and its contract support to include discussion among federal, state, and local officials regarding response personnel safety.

Issues Concerning FEMA's Participation

FEMA's Level of Participation

By early October 2004, it appeared the agency was not actively engaged in TOPOFF 3 planning meetings and exercise development. Other agencies' planners questioned FEMA's level of involvement. Also, FEMA had not posted its agency objectives on the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Portal. This suggested an absence of active planning. To better understand the agency's level of participation in TOPOFF 3, we met with FEMA and ODP planners, reviewed DHS, FEMA, and ODP exercise planning documents, and reviewed FEMA's role under the National Response Plan (NRP).¹ Since an interagency meeting that we attended in late October 2004 and the Mid Term Planning Conference in November 2004, FEMA has been more actively engaged in the exercise. FEMA's TOPOFF 3 lead planner helped to clarify its commitment by affirming that the agency would staff all levels under the NRP during the exercise.²

Specifically, FEMA has announced plans to activate Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) in the New Jersey and Connecticut venues and to deploy Advance Emergency Response Teams (ERT-A). The Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) and the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) also will participate at both venues. FEMA will also deploy Mobile Emergency Response Support teams to assist ERT-A field operations and the ERT-A will rely on an Initial Operating Facility until the Joint Field Office (JFO) is established.

In addition, FEMA will deploy a state liaison to the Connecticut and New Jersey Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) and participate in the JFO. There will be one or two FEMA liaisons in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-managed Joint Operations Center (JOC). FEMA and the FBI are considering sharing the costs of operating field offices during TOPOFF 3. The agency will mobilize the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). There will be a FEMA-operated Emergency Support Team (EST) around the clock for five days during TOPOFF 3 and agency officials would like to put all nationwide Regional Offices on "stand by" notice. FEMA said it will not activate the Urban Search and Rescue team for the exercise, based upon the costs involved, but its other commitments are strong signs that it intends to support the exercise. Nonetheless, our examination of FEMA's preparations identified additional areas of concern that warrant discussion.

Agencies with Emergency Support Function Roles

FEMA planners at headquarters and regional levels said they are uncertain as to whether Emergency Support Function (ESF) agencies will fully participate in the Full Scale Exercise. FEMA planners expressed concern that federal ESF agencies may not fully participate if funding for the exercise is not available in their budgets.

¹ See Appendix A for a background discussion regarding FEMA's incident management role and role under the NRP.

² See Appendix B for FEMA's TOPOFF 3 objectives.

ESF agencies are critical to the preparedness, response, and recovery activities under the NRP. In a potential or actual Incident of National Significance, the NRP designates primary and support federal agencies to coordinate fifteen ESF functions. Each role requires coordination among numerous federal agencies that have specific crisis and consequence management capabilities. For example, under ESF #5, FEMA is the lead agency in coordinating the emergency management functions of up to 24 federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross. FEMA is the primary agency for six ESFs. It is critical that departments and agencies with ESF roles participate in the exercise in order to maximize learning about actions required to implement ESFs.

We do not have enough information to assess whether a lack of funding is going to affect ESF support participation in the Full Scale Exercise; however, it appears to be an often-voiced concern by exercise participants. We suggest that ODP venue directors survey federal agencies to gauge ESF participation and determine the extent funding shortages may limit or inhibit participation.

FEMA's Program Support Remains Unclear

FEMA has not addressed a critical issue identified in the TOPOFF 2 After Action Report, i.e., state officials did not have a clear understanding as to the difference in program support FEMA provides when there is an emergency declaration versus a major disaster declaration. Specifically, the Governor of Illinois requested that the President declare a major disaster. When the President declared an emergency, officials had concerns about "whether some individual assistance programs, which are specifically authorized for a disaster but not for an emergency, would be authorized." Our understanding is that FEMA has not taken action to correct or address this issue and TOPOFF 3 participants continue to express uncertainty about FEMA program support. Coordination between FEMA and ODP should be enhanced prior to the TOPOFF 3 Full Scale Exercise to educate those officials on the differences.

Additional Exercise Issues

Funding Exercise Participation

The costs for federal agencies to participate in TOPOFF come from existing agency operating budgets. Because there is no line-item in agency budgets for TOPOFF participation, the concern with the current practice is that adequate funding is not guaranteed and the burden is placed upon each agency to demonstrate to their management that the benefits of participation outweigh the costs. For example, FEMA estimates participating in TOPOFF 3 will cost between \$500,000 and \$700,000. As an alternative to using operating budget funds, FEMA managers recently decided to deploy temporary Disaster Assistance Employees during TOPOFF 3 so that some of their exercise personnel costs would be financed through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). FEMA officials advised us that future use of the DRF as a mechanism to cover such costs is unlikely.

To understand more about the costs associated with participating in TOPOFF, we requested ODP's assistance in obtaining cost estimates from participating departments and agencies. When the exercise is completed, we plan to perform an analysis of estimated costs versus actual costs.

Open Lines of Communication

Federal department and agency planners who have attended TOPOFF 3 meetings said ODP and its contract support have sometimes not adequately considered their views about exercise planning and

incident management. On occasions when views or feedback were provided, some planners felt their input was not sufficiently reflected in either the TOPOFF 3 exercise scenario or Master Scenario Events List (MSEL). For example, during the Mid Term Planning Conference, one regional coordinator pointed out the absence of MSEL items addressing potential FEMA activities in New Jersey, an omission that we understand ODP has not adequately resolved. We suggest ODP coordinate with FEMA Region II planners and address their concerns about the MSEL.

We have learned that communication with ODP and its contract support was most difficult in early development stages, from the June 2004 Initial Planning Conference through the November 2004 Mid Term Planning Conference. Since the Mid Term Planning Conference, there has been a noticeable improvement in coordination. We encourage ODP and its contract support to address FEMA Region II's concerns about the MSEL and maintain open lines of communication with DHS entities and interagency planners. There is a wealth of institutional knowledge within DHS and other participating departments and agencies that, if solicited and applied, will help foster a more conducive learning environment that will enhance the TOPOFF 3 process.

Testing NIMS and NRP

One of the overarching objectives of TOPOFF 3 is to improve the nation's capacity to prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks according to protocols established in the NRP and NIMS. The Secretary of Homeland Security released the NIMS on March 1, 2004, for implementation at all levels of government. Under HSPD-5, federal departments and agencies, beginning in fiscal year 2005, are to require adoption of NIMS as a condition for providing federal preparedness assistance.

At this point in the planning process, we have not observed NIMS training conducted in coordination with TOPOFF 3 planning; however, we have recently learned that NRP and NIMS command and control issues will be discussed during the Advanced Distance Learning Exercise (ADLE) currently scheduled for the end of January 2005. We encourage NIMS instruction during the ADLE. In addition, NIMS training directed at venue and federal participants would assist with command and control issues during the Full Scale Exercise in April 2005.

The Secretary of Homeland Security released the Initial National Response Plan (INRP) on September 30, 2003. Since September 2003, DHS officials have coordinated with emergency managers at the federal, state, and local level to draft a final NRP. DHS publicly announced completion of the NRP and its associated annexes in January 2005. Although ODP made a June 30, 2004, draft version of the NRP available to TOPOFF 3 planners through their Portal, we find it challenging for federal, state, and local emergency managers to plan for TOPOFF 3 in accordance with the NRP when DHS only recently made the final version available to the public. We have also observed that the ESF Annexes, the Support Annexes, and the Incident Annexes have not been posted on ODP's Portal for interagency exercise planners to review. The NRP will be discussed during the ADLE; however, it would also be useful for federal, state, and local organizations involved in TOPOFF 3 to participate in NRP instruction prior to the Full Scale Exercise.

First Responder Deployment During a Biological Incident

One of the main concerns of first responder organizations is the safety of response personnel. During an actual biological terrorist attack, response organizations would take appropriate measures to protect the lives and safety of personnel. The pneumonic plague scenario in New Jersey presents

challenging issues concerning responder safety. We have not heard this issue discussed during the planning meetings that we attended and want to encourage ODP and its contract support to facilitate such discussions among federal, state, and local officials, if they have not already done so.

Appendix A:**FEMA Incident Management Role**

Under Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, United States Policy on Counterterrorism, and PDD-62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas, the President named FEMA the lead agency for "consequence management." In February 1997, a Terrorism Incident Annex was added to the Federal Response Plan (FRP) to implement PDD-39. FEMA's consequence management activities included measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the creation of the DHS, federal incident management responsibilities have changed. The President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) in February 2003. Under HSPD 5, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for domestic incident management. HSPD 5 ordered the creation of a single, comprehensive national approach to domestic incident management and integration of crisis and consequence management. It also directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management System (NIMS). Although the Homeland Security Act of 2002, HSPD 5, and HSPD 8 National Preparedness changed federal incident management, FEMA's mission remains to "lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from disasters."³

On May 8, 2001, at the President's direction, FEMA created the Office of National Preparedness (ONP) to provide leadership in the coordination and facilitation of all federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management. Following the creation of DHS, ONP's terrorism specific functions were reassigned to the Office for Domestic Preparedness, but FEMA still retains some preparedness functions. Under the reorganized Preparedness Division, FEMA's mission is to help the nation be ready to respond to disasters and incidents of all kinds. The Preparedness Division "develops and delivers emergency management and first responder training programs; coordinates and develops plans, resources and national standards for emergency response operations; and develops and coordinates assessments and exercises."⁴

National Response Plan

DHS publicly announced completion of the NRP and its associated annexes in January 2005; however, we reviewed the July 2004 version of the NRP and its annexes that ODP made available to TOPOFF 3 planners on its Portal.⁵ Below are some of the technical roles this version identifies for FEMA.

Roles Under the National Response Plan:

- The FEMA Regional Director deploys a liaison to the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to provide technical assistance.

³ FEMA Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2003-2008.

⁴ <http://www.fema.gov/preparedness>

⁵ The completed NRP is available at www.dhs.gov.

- The Regional Director will partially or fully activate the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC), which is operated by FEMA and coordinates regional efforts until a Joint Field Office (JFO) is established.
- The RRCC coordinates federal support until the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) or Federal Response Coordinator (FRC) assumes responsibility.
- The JFO coordinates federal assistance and incident management operations locally.
- The RRCC coordinates deployment of Advance Emergency Response Team (ERT-A). The ERT-A is deployed in the early stages of an event and is headed by a FEMA team leader.
- The Interim Operating Facility (IOF) is a temporary field facility the FEMA ERT uses in the early stages of an incident.
- The national ERT (ERT-N) can assist the ERT-A when its resources are overstretched.
- The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), within the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), is managed by FEMA. The JFO forwards support conflicts to the NRCC for resolution and the NRCC refers unresolved issues to the Inter-agency Incident Management Group (IIMG).
- FEMA provides staff for support functions not filled by Emergency Support Function (ESF) personnel.
- The FEMA Operations Center supports the NRCC and provides notification to other departments and agencies of potential ESF activation.
- The Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) augments medical response capabilities of the local medical community.
- The Disaster Mortuary Team (DMORT) provides backup for local morgues.

A federal agency designated as an ESF primary agency serves as a federal executive agent under the FCO (or FRC for non-Stafford Act incidents) to accomplish the ESF mission. FEMA is the primary agency for the following ESF roles:

- ESF# 3: Public Works and Engineering
- ESF# 5: Emergency Management
- ESF# 6: Mass Care Housing and Human Services
- ESF# 9: Urban Search and Rescue
- ESF# 14: Community Recovery, Mitigation, and Economic Stabilization
- ESF# 15: Emergency Public Information and External Communications

FEMA is an ESF supporting agency in the following roles:

- ESF# 2: Telecommunications and Information Technology
- ESF# 10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
- ESF# 13: Public Safety and Security

FEMA is the coordinator for the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex.

FEMA is the coordinating agency for the following NRP Support Annex functions:

- Financial Management Support Annex
- Logistics Management Support Annex
- Volunteer and Donations Management Support Annex

Appendix B:**FEMA's TOPOFF 3 exercise objectives:**

1. Test/evaluate FEMA's capability to implement the National Response Plan (NRP) at national and regional levels when directed or as necessary to respond to states' requests for assistance.
 - a. Test/evaluate FEMA's ability to activate, mobilize, station/deploy, sustain, redeploy, and reconstitute emergency teams in accordance with existing procedures.
 - b. Test/evaluate FEMA's capability to effectively and efficiently direct and control deployed individuals and teams.
 - c. Test/evaluate FEMA's capability to effectively communicate and coordinate internally with deployed individuals and teams at all facilities, and externally with DHS elements and states as necessary to accomplish its mission.
 - d. Test/evaluate the capability of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), Principal Federal Officer (PFO), and Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officer to interface efficiently and effectively during response operations resulting from terrorist actions.
2. Test/evaluate FEMA's capability to properly execute the disaster declaration process for Incidents of National Significance involving weapons of mass destruction.
3. Test/evaluate FEMA's capability to coordinate with federal partners to identify, assemble, account for, transport, deliver, and recover assets in support of states' requests for assistance.
4. Test/evaluate FEMA's capability to operate under provisions of the National Incident Management System (NIMS).
5. Test/evaluate FEMA's capability to plan and execute recovery operations in support of impacted states during and after response operations.
6. Test/evaluate FEMA's capability, in concert with response partners, to effectively coordinate the release of media/public information at multiple venues.

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 10:00 PM
To: '4941813@who.eop.gov'
Subject: Re: Checking in

Thanks for writing, Andy. This is a bad one. Housing, transportation and environment could be long term issues.

If you want any details (not too good on the blackberry) feel free to call anytime. 202 309 1603.

And, I appreciate your support and notes. MB

-----Original Message-----
From: 17324305 <4941813@who.eop.gov>
To: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov>
Sent: Mon Aug 29 21:51:07 2005
Subject: Checking in

Joe Hagin has kept me well-informed about your reports. Anything you want me to do??
 Andy Card

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 11:59 PM
To: 'Michael.Lowder@dhs.gov'
Subject: Re: Follow up

No, Mike, thank you.....

-----Original Message-----
From: Lowder, Michael <Michael.Lowder@dhs.gov>
To: 'Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov' <Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov>
Sent: Mon Aug 29 23:39:48 2005
Subject: Follow up

We had a call with Marty ltonight (after your call to me) to get a download of information on what he saw today. This was fed into the stae planing. Lokey was on the call too.

There is a significant search and rescue effort under way. The last report I've had was that they have rescued over 300 people in NO so far tonight. Most of this was by boat, with some by helo. There is a lot more to do! US&R is supporting that effort. NDMS is supporting the evacuation of special needs patients out of the Superdome, moving them to LSU in Baton Rouge.

We're putting medical plans in place to support the damaged hospitals in both NO and the MS coast.

At first light on Tuesday, the RNA teams are supposed to be airborne in both LA and MS. This will help us identify some of the most critical facilities, and help identify how we are going to be able to access those facilities. Debris and flooded roads are going to be blocking a good bit of the access.

I know that the media will be out in full force, on the ground, in boats, and in the air, but so will we.

I know there is a LOT os work that has to be done, and done very quickly, but everyone is focused on getting it done.

The worst part is not knowing what we don't know., but we are working hard to find that out, and deal with it.

Thanks!

ML

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 8:53 AM
To: Altshuler, Brooks; 'patrick.rhode@dhs.gov'
Subject: InterAgency

Hagin thinks its a great idea. Will tell POTUS and Andy we ought to proceed.

Also says that Haley is pushing POTUS visit Th or Fr and Joe wants Fr or Sa. "Seems" to agree that others are too early and certainly agreed POTUS should be first.

So, let's get the interagency going as soon as we get the green light.

Also, touched Chertoff today. FYI he and Leavitt are headed to CDC. Casually mentioned he was going to R4 to give a morale boost. Do they know that? Did we know that?

On an unrelated matter, I amready to blow up IT support at the mountain. In a MDRC and they can't seemto get me connected.....or even care about getting me connected.

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 4:55 PM
To: Kimbrell, Stanley
Subject: Re: White House request

I've spoken to him twice now. Thanks. MB

-----Original Message-----
From: Kimbrell, Stanley <Stanley.Kimbrell@fema.gov>
To: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@fema.gov>
Sent: Wed Aug 31 15:24:04 2005
Subject: White House request

Sir, we just got a call from the White House switchboard notifying us that Mr Haigen wanted to speak with you and that they couldn't reach you on cell phone, as all circuits are busy. I gave them the number to the EOC at Baton Rouge as a possible alternate (800-615-8775). If you call the FOC, we can patch you through to the White House.
Thanks. Stan

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
 Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 6:02 PM
 To: 'patrick.rhode@dhs.gov'; Altshuler, Brooks
 Subject: Fw: hurricane effort/cruise ships fup

Why? Why isn't this red tape being cut?

-----Original Message-----

From: Cooper, Ric <rcooper@cooperddb.com>
 To: Gair, Brad <Brad.Gair@dhs.gov>
 CC: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov>
 Sent: Thu Sep 01 17:44:39 2005
 Subject: RE: hurricane effort/cruise ships fup

Thanks for the response, recognized you had tried to get it done. I've since been told that FEMA had to hand-off to Military Sealift Command and some Captain there basically has said their "procurement procedures" doesn't allow for these quick decisions, questioned locations of ships (even though my understanding they were putting ships where FEMA wants them), and indicated he needed to look at other alternatives. He also asked about if and when ships might be available if a request came "in next few days." We all tried, as we know you did. Let me know if you have any other ideas.

RC

From: Gair, Brad [mailto:Brad.Gair@dhs.gov]
 Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 5:20 PM
 To: Cooper, Ric
 Cc: Brown, Michael D
 Subject: RE: hurricane effort/cruise ships fup

Ric,

I am well aware of this issue. I have done all that I can on this end and it is now in the hands of FEMA contracting.

From: Cooper, Ric [mailto:rcooper@cooperddb.com]
 Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 4:41 PM
 To: Gair, Brad
 Cc: Brown, Michael D
 Subject: FW: hurricane effort/cruise ships fup

Brad...

Carnival just brought me up to date on situation and their "drop-dead" timing for re-deploying ships to accommodate schedules for this weekend. They are standing by to cancel 8,000 plus cruises beginning at 6 tonight so that they can get ships to you as requested. However, they cannot do that without "letter of authorization" or whatever form of commitment letter they requested. Is there anything I can do to help out or facilitate in any way...including if they have something in their requirements that is causing delay, I will get straight and/or simplified.

Call if I can help...#305/529-4307 or cell at #305/606-5778.

Ric Cooper

From: Brown, Michael D [mailto:Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 8:54 PM
To: 'Jeb Bush'; Cooper, Ric
Subject: RE: hurricane effort/cruise ships fup

Ric, thanks for the note that Jeb sent. I personally think this is a great idea. One of my HQ folks working the housing issue is going to contact you directly. If you haven't heard from them by close of business tomorrow, please call me on my cell phone, 202.309.1603. Thanks. MDB

From: Jeb Bush [mailto:jeb@jeb.org]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 6:18 PM
To: Cooper, Ric
Cc: Brown, Michael D
Subject: RE: hurricane effort/cruise ships fup

thank you Ric. I will pass on to Mike Brown. I can't believe they haven't asked as of yet but Mike will respond quickly.

Jeb

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 9:31 PM
To: 'Altshuler, Brooks'
Subject: RE: Grape vine

OK.I did tell him privately that the phone calls were killing me, and he said he understood. He assures me he is not trying to interfere, but they are literally driving me crazy.

Is it that people think that through my interviews and what I'm saying, or is it something specific?

-----Original Message-----

From: Altshuler, Brooks [mailto:Brooks.Altshuler@dhs.gov]
 Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 7:59 PM
 To: 'Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov'
 Subject: Grape vine

Please talk up the Secretary during your press avails I.e. "Solid team with solid support from the secretary" etc. Unconfirmed, but people are noticing and they are reading into friction- and this is not people at ~~dhs~~. But people at WH.

Just tuck that away, nothing that has boiled to the surface, but it could if you don't dispel any perceived connotations.

Hang tough. You did a good job at the afternoon presser today.

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 11:05 PM
To: 'jordjb@bellsouth.net'
Subject: Re: MREs

Excellent. Except for the fact tomorrow's travel is POTUS, it would be good to have one of you along for future travel.

-----Original Message-----

From: jordjb@bellsouth.net <jordjb@bellsouth.net>
 To: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov>
 Sent: Thu Sep 01 22:50:22 2005
 Subject: MREs

Sir,

Checked with ESF folks and log folks have five trucks of MREs and 5 of water ready to go in to the Convention Center and the SuperDome. Each truck has about 21K MREs, so obviously enough to do what needs to be done. I am told they are ready to move whenever necessary, but as you heard from LTG Honore, he is working the security piece. Al Jones and I are standing by to assist you and your staff on any other issues as they arise. Just a note - if you desire, we can travel with you when you believe it is a good idea. Both of us have satellite comms capability we can bring along and can provide other immediate staff support when you are away from the DFO. Obviously believe we should keep at least one of us at the DFO. Just want to make sure you understand we have no problem with accompanying you and providing support as needed.

v/r

John Jordan
 COL, US Army

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
 Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 11:51 AM
 To: Rhode, Patrick
 Subject: Re: UPDATE FOR AF-1

I just told the boss privately I need the army NOW. Federalized is getting good reception.
 Karl wants to know if we could move my operating base to NO Intl Airport. Thoughts?

-----Original Message-----
 From: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@fema.gov>
 To: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@fema.gov>
 Sent: Fri Sep 02 11:22:54 2005
 Subject: Fw: UPDATE FOR AF-1

Where is our military security?

-----Original Message-----
 From: Heath, Michael <Michael.Heath@fema.gov>
 To: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@fema.gov>; Altshuler, Brooks
 <Brooks.Altshuler@fema.gov>; Burris, Ken <Ken.Burris@fema.gov>
 Sent: Fri Sep 02 10:33:23 2005
 Subject: UPDATE FOR AF-1

NDMS

- Teams were evacuated yesterday afternoon after receiving intel from the National Guard that the security situation was deteriorating. The National Guard evacuated as well. DMATS left all equipment behind. Last night, they attempted to go back in with FPS. FPS deemed the situation unsafe and they did not go back in. They again tried this morning and again FPS determined that the situation was unsafe.

- We have no NDMS assets at the convention center.

See below from Lowder:

From: EST-ESF05CH <EST-ESF05CH@fema.gov>
 To: Buikema, Edward <Edward.Buikema@fema.gov>; Craig, Daniel <Daniel.Craig@fema.gov>; Hepler, Megs <Megs.Hepler@fema.gov>; Gray, Richard <Richard.Gray@fema.gov>; Garratt, David <Dave.Garratt@fema.gov>; Pawlowski, Michel <Michel.Pawlowski@fema.gov>; Lowder, Michael <Michael.Lowder@fema.gov>
 Sent: Fri Sep 02 10:17:57 2005
 Subject: Re: Spot Rep

A cell phone call was received from a truck driver carrying supplies at exit 2 on Causeway Blvd that his truck was being hijacked by an armed mob. Contact was lost with the driver and attempts to re-contact him have been unsuccessful. ESF-13 is following up.

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
 Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 11:56 AM
 To: Rhode, Patrick
 Subject: Re: UPDATE FOR AF-1

Done. I had already told military liaisons to tell Honore.

-----Original Message-----
 From: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@fema.gov>
 To: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@fema.gov>
 Sent: Fri Sep 02 11:53:42 2005
 Subject: RE: UPDATE FOR AF-1

Why? Maybe eventually, but comms are horrible there -

Know that there is a mission assignment to the DOD right now - looks like this:

"FEMA request that DoD provide the support the planning and execution of the full logistical support to the Katrina disaster in all declared states in coordination with FEMA."

This needs to be turned on at your level now - Sec Chertoff is aware -

thanks

-----Original Message-----
 From: Brown, Michael D
 Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 11:51 AM
 To: Rhode, Patrick
 Subject: Re: UPDATE FOR AF-1

I just told the boss privately I need the army NOW. Federalized is getting good reception.

Karl wants to know if we could move my operating base to NO Intl Airport. Thoughts?

-----Original Message-----
 From: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@fema.gov>
 To: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@fema.gov>
 Sent: Fri Sep 02 11:22:54 2005
 Subject: Fw: UPDATE FOR AF-1

Where is our military security?

-----Original Message-----
 From: Heath, Michael <Michael.Heath@fema.gov>
 To: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@fema.gov>; Altshuler, Brooks
 <Brooks.Altshuler@fema.gov>; Burris, Ken <Ken.Burris@fema.gov>
 Sent: Fri Sep 02 10:33:23 2005
 Subject: UPDATE FOR AF-1

NDMS

- Teams were evacuated yesterday afternoon after receiving intel from the National Guard that the security situation was deteriorating. The National Guard evacuated as well. DMATS left all equipment behind. Last night, they attempted to go back in with FPS. FPS deemed the situation unsafe and they did not go back in. They again tried this

morning and again FPS determined that the situation was unsafe.

We have no NDMS assets at the convention center.

See below from Lowder:

From: EST-ESF05CH <EST-ESF05CH@fema.gov>

To: Buikema, Edward <Edward.Buikema@fema.gov>; Craig, Daniel <Daniel.Craig@fema.gov>;
Hepler, Megs <Megs.Hepler@fema.gov>; Gray, Richard <Richard.Gray@fema.gov>; Garratt, David
<Dave.Garratt@fema.gov>; Pawlowski, Michel <Michel.Pawlowski@fema.gov>; Lowder, Michael
<Michael.Lowder@fema.gov>

Sent: Fri Sep 02 10:17:57 2005

Subject: Re: Spot Rep

A cell phone call was received from a truck driver carrying supplies at exit 2 on Causeway
Blvd that his truck was being hijacked by an armed mob. Contact was lost with the driver
and attempts to re-contact him have been unsuccessful. ESF-13 is following up.

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 12:17 PM
To: 'michaelbrown@att.net'; 'brownt@fccps.k12.va.us'
Subject: FW: You and the President

-----Original Message-----

From: Johnson III, Clay [mailto:Clay_Johnson_III@omb.eop.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 8:56 AM
To: Brown, Michael D
Subject: RE: You and the President

I've not heard one person here disparage you work. I'll keep you informed.

-----Original Message-----

From: Brown, Michael D [mailto:Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 9:03 AM
To: Johnson III, Clay
Subject: Re: You and the President

Yes, and it hurts my family. I will do anything to protect them.

I saw POTUS get a tear in his eye yesterday which I don't think anyone else saw while talking to the LA delegation. My heart goes out to him, Clay.

And, if he doesn't have confidence in me - which is understandable considering the circumstances - let me know. I will readily step aside. Otherwise, I am going to continue my damndest to help these people.

Thanks for letting me rant.

MB

-----Original Message-----

From: Johnson III, Clay <Clay_Johnson_III@omb.eop.gov>
To: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@dhs.gov>
Sent: Tue Sep 06 08:32:48 2005
Subject: You and the President

What a great opportunity for every cheap-shot artist in the world to take a free swing at you and the President.

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Wednesday, September 07, 2005 5:06 PM
To: 'Gail.Kulich@dhs.gov'
Subject: St Bernard Parish

Gail, please pass to the Secretary.

I just rec'd a call from Josh saying the Secretary committed 6K trailers in St. Bernard Parish. That is a commitment that cannot be fulfilled at this time. Yesterday I agreed to provide them what they need to start reconstituting their parish government, including police, etc., and continue to ramp up to get them the temporary housing they need overall. But, those demands have to be considered in light of *all* demands on housing throughout the affected area. They are simply trying to play us off each other to get the most they can, which I fully understand.

9/30/2005

Ovall, Jeffery

From: Heath, Michael
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 5:35 PM
To: Brown, Michael D
Subject: Re: Conference Call

Boss is about to take the stage at an event. 5 minutes.

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@fema.gov>
To: Heath, Michael <Michael.Heath@fema.gov>
Sent: Mon Aug 29 17:35:04 2005
Subject: Re: Conference Call

Yes. Good time right now.

-----Original Message-----
From: Heath, Michael <Michael.Heath@fema.gov>
To: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@fema.gov>
Sent: Mon Aug 29 17:30:55 2005
Subject: FW: Conference Call

Can you do this? .

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: Atkiss, Steven A. <Steven_A._Atkiss@who.eop.gov>
To: Heath, Michael <Michael.Heath1@dhs.gov>
Sent: Mon Aug 29 17:31:55 2005
Subject: Re: Conference Call

So there is no update at all tonight? Can Mike be available to talk to Joe in about 10 mins?

-----Original Message-----
From: Heath, Michael <Michael.Heath1@dhs.gov>
To: Zemp, DeWitt <DeWitt_Zemp@who.eop.gov>; Atkiss, Steven A. <Steven_A._Atkiss@who.eop.gov>
Sent: Mon Aug 29 16:27:05 2005
Subject: Conference Call

Guys,

FEMA is not conducting a conference call tonight. Our next scheduled call is 12:00 PM tomorrow morning. We also advise against a call at that time since most emergency managers will be out doing damage assessments at that time.

Burris, Ken

From: English, Patricia
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2005 2:32 PM
To: Burris, Ken
Subject: FW: Funding for NRP Support

Ken, would like to discuss the below. Can we talk either before or after the 4 o'clock meeting. I am prepared to tell them NO but I am not sure of the politics involved with the NO.

Pat

-----Original Message-----

From: Jenkins, James [mailto:James.Jenkins@dhs.gov]
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2005 1:51 PM
To: English, Patricia
Cc: Jones, Rendell; Kapaldo, David; Woodson, Mary Ann; Schled, Eugene; Maner, Andrew; Charles, Rick
Subject: Funding for NRP Support

Pat,

The DHS Operational Integration Staff is the Department's team, comprised of detailees, working on cross departmental issues and projects to promote interoperability and component integration. The team currently does not have a source of funding. Because some of their work is time critical, while we strive to identify a solution for funding them this fiscal year, we have decided we have no choice but to push the costs for time critical projects currently assigned to them out to components.

Many of the Operational Integration Staff's unfunded items concern the National Response Plan and work to further preparedness and are items we have determined fall under FEMA mission areas. Specifically, we have \$518.5K of time critical requirements that we have associated with FEMA. Because of the need to fund these items immediately and the lack of other funding alternatives at this time, the CFO believes it is appropriate and necessary for FEMA to fund these items through direct obligation or a reimbursable agreement with the Operational Integration Staff.

The specific line items are as follow:

Contractor and other support of NRP rollout:	\$75,000
PFO support kits:	\$10,000
PFO workshop:	\$250,000
IIMG IT and security requirements:	\$33,500
Operational Integration Staff travel:	<u>\$150,000</u>
	\$518,500

I realize the additional funding requirements may cause challenges for FEMA. I am ready to discuss these with you in e-mail, by phone, or in person. Please let me know your questions and feedback regarding this CFO decision.

Because deadlines for the rollout of the NRP are fast approaching, we need to resolve this funding issue as soon as possible.

Thank you,

v/r,
Jim Jenkins
Desk Officer for FEMA, Budget Division
Department of Homeland Security
7th and D Street S.W.

3/29/2005

OE's CONTRIBUTION FOR HSDN

TOTAL CONTRIBUTION		CONTRIBUTION AMOUNT BY FISCAL YEAR				
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT / FUNDING ACTIVITY	AMOUNT	FY 04 DIRECT (ACTUAL)	QTR 1 FY 05 WCF (ACTUAL)	QTR 2-4 FY 05 (PROJECTED)		TOTAL FY 05 WCF
				WCF		
CBP	\$ 20,062,280	\$ 7,210,500	\$ 4,289,680	\$ 5,362,100	\$ 9,651,780	
ICE	\$ 27,031,581	\$ 3,000,001	\$ 5,658,480	\$ 7,073,100	\$ 12,731,580	
SECRET SERVICE	\$ 2,107,960	\$ 777,000	\$ 505,760	\$ 632,200	\$ 1,137,960	
DHS HQ-CIO	\$ 14,818,800	\$ 12,000,000	\$ 1,252,800	\$ 1,566,000	\$ 2,818,800	
HQ S&L	\$ 14,216,260	\$ -	\$ 540,560	\$ 675,700	\$ 1,216,260	
TSA	\$ 2,244,000	\$ 1,100,000	\$ 464,000	\$ 580,000	\$ 1,044,000	
FEMA	\$ 9,330,740	\$ 1,500,000	\$ 2,591,440	\$ 3,239,300	\$ 5,830,740	
IAIP	\$ 42,844,640	\$ 7,200,000	\$ 7,219,840	\$ 9,024,800	\$ 16,244,640	
S&T	\$ 2,424,240	\$ 600,000	\$ 677,440	\$ 846,800	\$ 1,524,240	
TOTAL	\$ 135,080,501	\$ 33,387,501	\$ 23,200,000	\$ 29,000,000	\$ 52,200,000	

* Under Review

FY06 (PROJECTED)	
\$ 3,200,000	
\$ 11,300,000	
\$ 193,000	
\$ -	
\$ 13,000,000 *	
\$ 100,000	
\$ 2,000,000	
\$ 19,400,000	
\$ 300,000	
\$ 49,493,000	

New DHS Tax Bill

[illegible]

Michael D Brown

From: Jadacki, Matt
Sent: Monday, January 05, 2004 5:26 PM
To: Altshuler, Brooks; English, Patricia; Burris, Ken; Tolbert, Eric; Lowder, Michael
Cc: Rhode, Patrick; Morris, Scott; Shea, Bob; Brown, Michael D
Subject: RE: Info needed ASAP: Info requested by HSC on funding for Catastrophic Planning

-----Original Message-----

From: Altshuler, Brooks
Sent: Friday, January 02, 2004 11:43 AM
To: English, Patricia; Jadacki, Matt; Burris, Ken; Tolbert, Eric; Lowder, Michael
Cc: Rhode, Patrick; Morris, Scott; Shea, Bob; Brown, Michael D
Subject: Info needed ASAP: Info requested by HSC on funding for Catastrophic Planning
Importance: High

From Tuesday's meeting, David Howe asked us to provide info on funding for our Catastrophic Planning efforts.

1. How much did we request?

The FY 05 budget request contained 2 over target initiatives that dealt with catastrophic planning -- \$20 million for a catastrophic housing initiative and \$4.5 million for catastrophic planning and exercises. The \$4.5 million was embedded in the \$80 million over target request for integration of the national emergency response teams and systems.

2. At what level was the request denied i.e. did it make it over to OMB- should include whether we protested at DHS level? Neither over target request was approved by DHS or submitted to OMB.

3. How much money do we have now to do the planning and where are we getting it? In FY 04, the Response Division budgeted \$1.752 million for catastrophic planning. Part of the funding (\$1.274 million) is from the Liberty Shield supplemental received in FY 03 and the remainder (\$477K) was reprogrammed from other activities, including logistics and the FEMA Operations Center.

4. How much money do we need to carry out the planning? For catastrophic planning and exercises- \$4.5 million -- the same amount requested in the over target request. An additional \$20 million is required for the catastrophic housing initiative.

I want to caution folks that the FY 05 budget is still being finalized. Normally, this information is embargoed until the President's budget is released. This has not been shared with DHS budget or OMB. Please use discretion when using this information.

Matt

Michael D Brown

From: Jadacki, Matt
Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2003 6:17 PM
To: Brown, Michael D; Rhode, Patrick; Castleman, Ron; Burris, Ken; English, Patricia
Subject: FW: FY '05 Settlement of Appeal (for the most part)
Attachments: fy-05.100M.Savings.12.18.pm.xls; Appeal Resolution Chart 12-18.xls

Attached are 2 charts. One deals with the results of the FY 05 passback appeal and the other lists the allocation of the DHS \$100 million cost savings initiative.

EPR has a net decrease of \$3 million from the original passback. Only a few EPR passback priorities were deemed worthy by DHS to include in the appeal. \$7 million is provided for USAR teams (no funding in the original passback, FEMA asked for \$32 million in the appeal, DHS changed to \$10 million), \$7 million for NIMS (no funding in the original passback, FEMA asked for \$32 million, DHS changed to \$20 million), \$10 million reduction for COOP activities (passback provided \$37 million, FEMA did not appeal), and a \$7 million reduction in the DRF (to offset increase in USAR funding).

The second chart indicates that FEMA will be expected to cough up \$12 million to support the DHS \$100 million "Savings Initiative." The original tax was about \$8 million, but was somehow increased by 50%. Barry West is trying to get more info on this.

Finally, I understand that the proposal to transfer the SNS back to HHS will not be included in the President's FY 05 budget. However, DHS and HHS have discussed this proposal with the Vice President. The thinking is that a budget amendment will be submitted to include this proposal subsequent to the release of the President's budget. It seems that that OMB does not want to deal with any authorization issues in the budget submission.

Happy Holidays

Matt

-----Original Message-----

From: Schied, Eugene [mailto:Eugene.Schied@dhs.gov]
Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2003 4:51 PM
To: David Deloof; David Kapaldo; Deborah DeVault; Delphine McClenton; Ernestine Delamar; Karen Shull; Kip Louttit; Lisa Duffy; Mary Wagner; Mike Sweat; Otis France; Rendell Jones; Rick Charles; Blore, Gary CAPT; Carol Dunham; David Nicholson; Donald L. Simcox; Eric Myers; Asseng, George CAPT; Hahn, Kurt G; Jacobik, Barbara; James Bittner; John.Eichelberger@customs.treas.gov; Jon Lemon; Katherine French; Kathy Singleton; Marc Hollander; Mark Kerski; Matt.Jadacki@fema.gov; Natchuras, Michael; Pat English; Rich Reilly; Richard Houck; Robert Gardner; Schlesinger, Paul L; Sharla Rausch; Titus, Alan; Wilson, Suzanne H
Cc: Hale, Janet; Kolb, Ingrid
Subject: FY '05 Settlement of Appeal (for the most part)

Budget Contacts-

Attached are two charts that adjust the funding levels provided by OMB in Passback. The Secretary appealed a number of items to OMB, and OMB was willing to fund a number of these items. One of the attached spreadsheets (Appeal Resolution Chart 12-18) show additions and subtractions to the Passback. This chart total \$265 million gross getting added to the Passback. Note at the bottom of this chart for any "Dept-Wide" items that impact your organization.

Partially offsetting this increase is \$100 M in savings. The breakout of the savings by organization is displayed in the attached savings spreadsheet.

Three significant items remain unresolved, although we expect to know more today or tomorrow. These three major items are 1) Overall ODP funding; 2) Overall

TSA funding; and 3) funding for Deepwater. These items were appealed to the Budget Review Board. The decisions of the BRB on these three items has the potential to adjust the increases and decreases as presented in the attached charts, but I don't think it will. Please work with your desk officers to finalize your FY '05 numbers.

-Eugene

2/1/2006

DHS FY-05 \$100M SAVINGS INITIATIVE
(dollars in '000s unless specified otherwise)

	Strategic Sourcing Savings (note 1)				Component Selected Savings (note 2)	Information Technology Savings (note 3)	Total Savings
	Office Supplies	Weapons & Ammo	Copiers	Fleet Motor Vehicles (note 2)			
TSA	\$2,524	\$94	\$700	\$110	\$726	\$20,830	\$24,984
CBP	\$1,972	\$333	\$80	\$1,500	\$912	\$18,870	\$23,667
USSS	\$302	\$78	\$150	\$375	\$180	\$770	\$1,855
FLETC	\$44	\$1,751	\$50	\$30	\$30	\$200	\$2,145
USCG	\$2,133	\$687	\$60	\$300	\$910	\$9,190	\$13,280
EP&R	\$228	\$0	\$10	\$3	\$695	\$10,760	\$11,697
ICE (note 4)	\$668	\$1,057	\$450	\$3,642	\$584	\$11,950	\$18,391
ODP	\$7	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$588	\$100	\$745
IAIP	\$35	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$133	\$1,220	\$1,388
S&T	\$11	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$145	\$20	\$166
Dept Ops	\$55	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$33	\$1,510	\$1,598
OIG	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$13	\$70	\$83
Totals	\$8,000	\$4,000	\$1,500	\$6,000	\$5,000	\$75,500	\$100,000
		\$19,500			\$5,000	\$75,500	\$100,000

Note 1 Strategic Sourcing Savings	Figures for this items obtained from the Chief Procurement Officer.
Note 2 Component Selected Savings	Components shall select a savings. Savings shares based on FY-04 total enacted dollars.
Note 3 Information Technology Savings	Savings based on proportional shares of FY-04 planned spending based on latest Exhibit 53 submission to OMB.
Note 4 ICE Weapons & Ammo	Includes \$3,97M for ICE and \$25K for FPS.

SAVINGS SUMMARY	
Amount (in millions)	Description
\$8.0	Office Supplies
\$4.0	Weapons and Ammo
\$1.5	Copiers
\$6.0	Fleet Motor Vehicles
\$5.0	Component Chosen
\$75.5	Information Technology
\$100.0	TOTAL

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
FY 2005 PASSBACK
(In Thousands of Dollars)

Items Sent to the BRB			
Bureau/ Component	Item	Notes	Settlement
ODP	Grants/Assistance	Match '04 enacted	
TSA	Operations	Funding for operations, systems, and LOI's Offset by \$2 fee	
USCG	Deepwater	Deepwater accelerated to 13 years	
		<i>BRB Subtotal</i>	0
	\$2 Fee Offset		
		<i>Net Discretionary BRB Appeal</i>	0

OMB Settlement			
Bureau/ Component	Item	Notes	Settlement
USCG	Military Pay	Match DoD	6,000
USCG	Base Reduction	Technical adjustment to restore base reduction	71,000
USCG	Great Lakes Ice Breaker	Completes Great Lakes Icebreaker pier-side renovations; passback provided \$6M	1,750
USCG	Shore Facilities	Provides minimal funding	5,000
USCG	Increase Maritime Domain Awareness	Funds coordination efforts for MDA with program office	2,200
USCG	Balance and Perform non-Homeland Security Missions	Provides motor life boat safety configuration requirements	600
		<i>USCG Subtotal</i>	86,550
CBP	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)	Pilot project of UAVs	10,000
CBP	Radiation Detection and Monitoring	Deployment of new technology under development	25,000
CBP	Sensor Technology	Offset for UAVs; may find other offset	(10,000)
		<i>CBP Subtotal</i>	25,000
Dep OPS	Office of Security	This is for 8 FTE to perform critical personnel and physical security functions	378
Dep OPS	Savings	Cut to Departmental Operating expenses	(6,000)
		<i>Dep OPS</i>	(5,622)
IAIP	Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC)	Funds for basic/ongoing operations in FY 2005	10,000
		<i>IAIP</i>	10,000
USSS	See Snow Security	Funding to transfer to Treasury, to be reimbursed back to USSS by Treasury	(2,400)
		<i>USSS</i>	(2,400)
BTS	U.S. VISIT	Prime Integrator funding	10,000
BTS	CAPPS II	More funding for data from commercial and government sources	5,000
		<i>BTS</i>	15,000
BICE	Detention Bed Space	Additional detention bed space sought because of increase in investigations	5,000
BICE	GTMO	Fund operational costs charged by DoD	6,216
		<i>BICE</i>	11,216
BICE	ICE International Affairs	\$10 M to cover some of cost in ICE for Visa Security Unit and for International Program. Need to realign with CBP. \$4 M to replace existing Exams funds.	14,000
BICE	Federal Air Marshals	Match '04 enacted level, post-resumption	18,800
		<i>BICE</i>	44,016
CTIS	Backlog Reduction Funding	Additional backlog funding. In addition to \$15 mil in passback, plus \$30 mil provided to ICE so that ICE won't get Exams enforcement dollars	25,000
		<i>CTIS</i>	25,000
FLETC	Harpers Ferry	Operations of new center. Reduced O&M funding in the first year	2,000
		<i>FLETC</i>	2,000
EP&R	Urban Search & Rescue	Recommend offset by DRF remain a separate program	7,000
EP&R	National Incident Management System (NIMS)	Funding needed to execute new program	7,000
EP&R	Interagency COOP	Reduced from passback	(10,000)
EP&R	Disaster Relief Fund	Offset for Urban Search and Rescue and NIMS	(7,000)
		<i>EPR</i>	(3,000)
Dept Wide	e-Merge	Provides additional funding. To be determined which budget(s) this will be presented in.	23,000
Dept Wide	Technical corrections	Fixes OMB adjustments to pay in the passback. Funding is for: \$6M CG; \$1.03M USSS; \$9.637 CBP; \$1.785 EPR; Dept Ops \$2.4 mil.	20,835
Dept Wide	Long Range Radar	Used by USSS, ICE and USCG. This funding will go in one of those budgets.	12,500
Dept Wide	Implementation	Funding for 1 component (USCG, \$10 M) and management (Dept Ops, \$2.5 M)	12,500
		<i>Dept Wide</i>	68,835
		Sub Total	265,779

Michael D Brown

From: Altshuler, Brooks
Sent: Monday, October 06, 2003 11:59 AM
To: Brown, Michael D
Cc: 'Patrick.Rhode@dhs.gov'
Subject: Fw: NRP / NIMS Strategic Issues

Patrick wanted you to have this.

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Hess, Charles <Charles.Hess@fema.gov>
To: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@fema.gov>; Altshuler, Brooks <Brooks.Altshuler@fema.gov>
Sent: Mon Oct 06 08:52:33 2003
Subject: NRP / NIMS Strategic Issues

Gents: Per Request -- CH

- * NIMS: Adopt National Intergency Incident Management System as base system. Keep standards and details to a minimum as to a llow maximum flexibility for state and local governments. (This appears to be current direction of workgroup --so this maybe OBE.)
- * NRP: Eliminate PFO position which adds more layers and unnecessary staff. This position is redundant and duplicative given the FCO's role and "status". If this is not viable, dual hat the FCO as the PFO. State and locals do not want to referee federal turf issues between PFO, FCO, and SAC.
- * NRP/NIMS: Consolidate /streamline oversight groups into one set of NRP/NIMS coordinating bodies. (Policy group plus working level group similar to CDRG and ESFLG) This would include: IIMG, PCC-DTRIM, CDRG, ESFLG, NRT, FRERP policy group, etc.
- * NRP: Retain ESF structure, modify to add needed new ESF's (Donations, volunteer management, perhaps law enforcement) . Avoid adding "boutique" ESF's. Categorically retain ESF structure --this is a clear message from state and local constiuent groups -- (writing team is also heading in this direction, but I would say this is not yet a "done deal".)
- * Siimplify /clarify coordination process and team structure at HSC. Too much redundancy and yet another resource support requirement for other D's & A's.
- * Need to come to closure with DOJ/AG on role and responsibility of SAC. Much language in Initial NRP preserves the SAC's privity of relationship with the FBI Director & AG.

Michael D Brown

From: Castleman, Ron
Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2003 11:07 AM
To: Rhode, Patrick; Brown, Michael D
Cc: Morris, Scott; Jadacki, Matt; Burris, Ken; Tolbert, Eric
Subject: FW: summary of Catastrophic planning request/funding -

Bottom line is DHS cut our '05 request for Catastrophic Housing and Catastrophic Planning. Eric plans to use other moneys for catastrophic planning but just has enough for one city; New Orleans. Details follow.....

These were our top 3 over target priorities for '05 which were presented on or about July 25th.

Recovery Program: \$10,000,000
 Redesign of Recovery Efforts for Catastrophic/Terrorist Events
 Builds DHS capability to provide recovery assistance following a catastrophic disaster/ terrorist event.

Response Program: \$80,000,000
 Integration of DHS National Emergency Response Teams and Systems
 Establishes the emergency response component of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as set forth in HSPD-5
 Management of Domestic Incidents. Its three elements are:
 1. National Incident Management Teams
 2. Catastrophic and WMD Response Planning (e.g. New Orleans, et al)
 3. Response Communications and Logistics Support

National Security Program: \$4,726,000
 Continuity of Government (COG) Support
 Creates testing, training and exercise program to assess Continuity of Government Program, as well as support for classified White House programs.

Matt says that DHS cut the above but did include the following in their Budget Decision document to OMB:

Financial System: \$3,000,000
 Funding for the Integrated Financial/Business Management System
 COG Support: \$4,726,000
 To create testing, training and exercise program to assess COG program.
 Emergency Response Teams: \$8,500,000
 \$6.2 M for logistics and upgrades to the Incident Response Teams.
 \$2.3 M for logistics and upgrades to the Mobile Emergency Response System.

Let me know if we can provide other info.

-----Original Message-----

From: Jadacki, Matt
Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2003 9:56 AM
To: Castleman, Ron
Subject: RE: summary of Catastrophic planning request/funding -

Ron

Even though we did not receive catastrophic planning funding in FY 04, Eric thought it was important enough that he set aside some of his budget to fund an exercise in New Orleans.

Matt

-----Original Message-----
 From: Castleman, Ron
 Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2003 9:44 AM
 To: Jadacki, Matt
 Cc: Morris, Scott; Burris, Ken; Brown, Michael D; Rhode, Patrick;
 Tolbert, Eric
 Subject: Re: summary of Catastrophic planning request/funding -

Didn't we also ask for money (separate from catastrophic housing) that was just for
 "Planning" e.g. New Orleans?

 Sent from my Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
 From: Jadacki, Matt <Matt.Jadacki@fema.gov>
 To: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@fema.gov>; Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@fema.gov>
 CC: Castleman, Ron <Ron.Castleman@fema.gov>; Morris, Scott <Scott.Morris@fema.gov>;
 Burris, Ken <Ken.Burris@fema.gov>
 Sent: Tue Dec 30 09:24:06 2003
 Subject: RE: summary of Catastrophic planning request/funding -

It was cut by DHS. We included catastrophic housing planning as DPR's number one over
 target request. The proposal was for \$20 million (50% DRF and 50% non-DRF). You may
 recall the budget hearing with DHS (Hale, et.al) when you provided a persuasive argument
 for this initiative. There was some discussion about whether FEMA should be in the mobile
 home business. After that meeting, we received budget decisions from DHS and this
 initiative did not make the cut and it never made it to OMB. I will provide the paper
 trail this morning.

Matt

-----Original Message-----
 From: Brown, Michael D
 Sent: Monday, December 29, 2003 7:50 PM
 To: Rhode, Patrick; Jadacki, Matt
 Cc: Castleman, Ron; Morris, Scott
 Subject: RE: summary of Catastrophic planning request/funding -

Matt, when we did the review of the directorate priorities for '05, we included
 catastrophic planning again, but it was cut. Was that cut from our proposal to DHS by DHS
 or by OMB. I need to be very specific about how it was taken out. MB

-----Original Message-----
 From: Rhode, Patrick
 To: Jadacki, Matt
 Cc: Castleman, Ron; Morris, Scott; Brown, Michael D
 Sent: 12/29/03 4:11 PM
 Subject: Re: summary of Catastrophic planning request/funding -

Did omb cut it or did dhs cut it? Thx

-----Original Message-----
 From: Jadacki, Matt <Matt.Jadacki@fema.gov>
 To: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@fema.gov>
 CC: Castleman, Ron <Ron.Castleman@fema.gov>; Morris, Scott
 <Scott.Morris@fema.gov>; Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@fema.gov>
 Sent: Mon Dec 29 13:45:11 2003
 Subject: RE: summary of Catastrophic planning request/funding -

FEMA's FY 04 budget request to OMB included \$100 million for
 catastrophic planning. The plan was to conduct major exercises in 5

cities across the US. OMB did not approve this request and it never made it to the President's FY 04 budget nor was it funded by Congress. The FY 05 budget does not contain separate funding for catastrophic planning. Eric Tolbert has set aside some funding in the Response Division's FY 04 budget to conduct at least one exercise (I believe in New Orleans).

Matt

-----Original Message-----

From: Rhode, Patrick
Sent: Monday, December 29, 2003 12:51 PM
To: Jadacki, Matt
Cc: Castleman, Ron; Morris, Scott; Brown, Michael D
Subject: summary of Catastrophic planning request/funding -

Matt,

Can you give us a quick rundown reminder of the request for this year vs. funding ahead of a two meeting?

thanks - Patrick

Michael D Brown

From: Altshuler, Brooks
Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2004 8:51 AM
To: Brown, Michael D; Morris, Scott; Rhode, Patrick
Subject: FW: comments on operations center

Attachments: Operation Center.doc

Amen on the attachment and yet we have to bite our tongues.

-----Original Message-----

From: Burris, Ken
Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2004 8:41 AM
To: Shea, Bob; Altshuler, Brooks
Subject: comments on operations center

Attached are my comments on working paper from the operations center.



Operation
Center.doc

Ken

The Purpose and the Issue as defined in the working paper are based upon conflicting statements. The Purpose paragraph states that there is a “lack of an appropriate mechanism to coordinate operational response activities within the interagency,” while the Issue paragraph states, “this mechanism is currently not functional in the “steady-state” or “heightened alert.” There is a system for interagency coordination and it is called the Emergency Support Function (ESF) under the National Response Plan.

If this system, which is currently directed by FEMA through its role and responsibilities, does not meet the requirements of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) it would be more efficient to enhance FEMA’s responsibilities and concentrate on the integration of that role into the HSOC needs as opposed to recreating the wheel as this proposal proposes.

The first thought that comes to mind is empire building or a lack of understanding of the role and responsibilities of the EP&R directorate of DHS. The very use of the descriptor that there exists a “deficiency” that complicates the operational coordination of other agencies indicates a notional thought that something exists to serve this function. Therefore, an understanding of the role that FEMA plays in coordinating through the former Federal Response Plan and now through the Interim National Response Plan and through the National Response Plan in the future is critical in addressing this issue.

Virtually each example cited is a current capability that FEMA maintains. The very fact that one doesn’t know about it or doesn’t understand it does not necessitate the requirement to go forth and create it. Under Proposed Operations Staff Roles and Functions, Bullets 1, 2 and 3 are already being conducted through FEMA’s program directorates and regional planning functions. Bullets 11 and 12 again are being performed through the RAMP. How many of these programs does DHS need?

FEMA is already in the business of coordinating operations within the scope of most DHS activities. You have to look no further than the response to the shuttle disaster to see that the system does in fact work. If the desire is to make that capability more robust to address the issues and ideas discussed in the working paper, then the appropriate action would be to strengthen those responsibilities and not attempt to insert a staff level organizational element within the Secretary’s office into the chain of command between the Secretary and those organizational elements responsible for operations within the department. It would be a most positive and welcome occurrence to have DHS recognize the capabilities and role that FEMA plays and build upon these capabilities.

We all strive to serve the Secretary to the best of our abilities; however the effectiveness and efficacy of that service need not be judged on the proximity to the Homeland Security Operations Center. The Proposed Concept of Operations completely ignores the day-to-day activity in which FEMA is involved. The whole tenor of the working paper ignores the very core of the response to events in this country and that is FEMA’s response to the garden-variety disaster. The paper does not begin to delve into the response and coordination efforts necessary to respond to that localized flood, or ice storm that consumes much of the monies of the disaster support account. You cannot have a system that is not interested in picking up the debris from an ice storm in South Carolina in January and turn around and want to have an operational role in an approaching hurricane in May. This type of approach does little more than confuse state and local officials. The current working paper serves as an outline of the problem that is created by structuring an operational concept for response to terrorism while ignoring the natural disaster component.

**Situational Awareness:
The Day of Landfall**

8:30 AM ET:



"about a twenty-foot tidal surge... The tidal surge came up and breached the levee system in the canal, so we're faced with major flooding both in the east, East New Orleans, and then out on the lakefront."

(statements made by Col. Terry Ebbert, New Orleans Director of Homeland Security, during a conference call with the American Red Cross, Louisiana Emergency Operations Center, FEMA Region VI, and the National Weather Service (NWS))

9:08 AM ET:



TSA

"The National Weather Service has reported that a levee broke on the Industrial Canal near the St. Bernard-Orleans parish line, and 3 to 8 feet of flooding was possible . . . In the uptown area of New Orleans on the south shore of Lake Ponchartrain, floodwaters by have [sic] already intruded on the first stories of some houses and some roads are impassable . . . There is heavy street flooding throughout Orleans, St. Bernard, and Jefferson parishes."

(9:00 AM Transportation Security Administration "Katrina Brief" distributed; later received by Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) Senior Watch Officer at 11:41 AM ET)

9:14 AM ET:



"A levee breach occurred along the industrial canal at Tennessee St. 3-8 feet of water is expected due to the breach."

(NWS Flash Flood Warning)

9:25 AM ET:



"At a 7:30 a.m. [CT] news conference, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin said that water was coming over the levee system in the Lower 9th Ward, especially in the Florida Avenue area. Nagin said that the Florida Avenue pumping station was not working, and there were unconfirmed reports of people standing on their roofs."

(HSOC Spot Report #5, sourced to the Louisiana Office of Emergency Management and a news conference conducted by Mayor Nagin)

9:36 AM ET:



"Report that levee in Arabi has failed. next to the industrial canal."

(E-mail from FEMA Hurricane Liaison Team Coordinator Matthew Green, who was stationed in the National Hurricane Center, to FEMA's Deputy Director of Response Michael Lowder)

10:00 AM ET:



"Levees overtopped in Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes . . . Extensive and life threatening storm surge flooding occurring along the Louisiana and Mississippi coast at this time . . . Significant and life threatening storm surge 18 to 22 feet above normal is occurring."

(NWS Hurricane Katrina Local Statement)

Committee on Governmental Affairs

EXHIBIT Q

Individual items listed herein may or may not have been provided directly to the HSOC

10:00 AM ET:



"It is getting bad. Major flooding in some parts of the city. People are calling in for rescue saying they are trapped in attics, etc. That means water is 10 feet high there already. Trees are blowing down. Flooding is worsening every minute . . . The bad part has not hit here yet."

(E-mail from DHS Protective Security Advisor Louis Dabdoub, stationed in New Orleans, to HSOC and DHS officials)

10:12 AM ET:



FEMA

"Severe flooding in the St. Bernard/Orleans parish line. Police report water level up to second floor of two story houses. People are trapped in attics. Pumps starting to fail. The city has now confirmed four pumps are off line"

(E-mail from Michael Heath to, among others, FEMA Chief of Staff Patrick Rhode and FEMA Acting Director of Operations Ken Burris summarizing a report from FEMA's Marty Bahamonde, who was located in the New Orleans Emergency Operations Center)

10:36 AM ET:



"The lower parishes of La, Plaq and St Bernard parish's [sic] are under water."

(E-mail from DHS Protective Security Advisor Louis Dabdoub, stationed in New Orleans, to HSOC and DHS officials)

11:13 AM ET:



"Flooding is significant throughout the region and a levee in New Orleans has reportedly been breached sending 6-8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward area of the city. Per the Governor, water is rising at 1 foot per hour and the New Orleans Mayor reports problems with a pumping station, causing flooding. HSOC repots [sic] that due to rising water in the 9th Ward, residents are in their attics and on their roofs."

(White House Homeland Security Council Katrina Spot Report)

11:32 AM ET:



"After a morning conference call with state and parish officials, Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau said emergency personnel stationed at Jackson Barracks have confirmed that the waters are rising, although he could not say whether the cause was a levee breach or overtopping. Extensive flooding has been reported along St. Claude and Claiborne avenues . . . The 911 call centers in St. Bernard and Orleans parishes have been shut down and evacuated, Landreneau said."

(HSOC Senior Watch Officer e-mail to senior DHS officials)

11:51 AM ET:



FEMA

"New Orleans FD is reporting a 20 foot wide breach on the lake ponchartrain side levee. The area is lakeshore Blvd and 17th street."

(E-mail from FEMA's Michael Heath to FEMA's Deputy Director of Response Michael Lowder summarizing a report from FEMA's Marty Bahamonde, who was located in the New Orleans Emergency Operations Center)

11:52 AM ET:



"Katrina batters New Orleans . . . Some levees topped . . . Extensive damage is occurring . . . A significant and life threatening storm surge estimated around 20 feet has occurred with Katrina . . . Causing levees to be overtopped in Orleans and St Bernard parishes."

(NWS Hurricane Katrina Local Statement)

12:00 PM ET:



"Captain Mark Willow, NOPD Homeland Security has reported a 20 foot Levee Break at 17th Street Canal. Fire Department is reporting authority. Levee Board notified."

(Louisiana State Police Emergency Operations Center, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report)

12:40 PM ET:



"Widespread flooding will continue across the parishes along the south shore of Lake Ponchartrain in the greater New Orleans area . . . This continues to be an extremely life threatening situation . . . Those seeking refuge in attics and roof-tops are strongly urged to take the necessary tools for survival. For example. . . those going into attics should try to take an axe or hatchet with them so they can cut their way onto the roof to avoid drowning should rising flood waters continue to rise into the attic."

(NWS Flash Flood Warning)

2:54 PM ET:



"A small breach reported at 17 Street Canal by local firemen. Report that Duncan Pumping Station and Bonnebelle Pumping Station suffered roof damage, inundation of pumps, and are not operating at this time. Reported overtoppings of levee near Arabi and Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. Some level of widespread flooding has occurred. Report there has been a breach of the levee in the east of Harvey Canal, west bank area."

(USACE e-mail to, among others, Commanding Officer of the Mississippi Valley Division, later forwarded at 4:14 PM ET to USACE headquarters)

5:00 PM ET:



"St. Bernard & 9th Ward Levee breach (reported by Sewage & Water Board) . . . Haynes Blvd Pump Station Levee Breach (reported by Jackson Barracks) . . . 17th Street Canal levee breach, flooding Lakeview area."

(Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Situation Report)

8/29 6:00 pm ET - DHS HSOC Situation Report #7:

"Preliminary reports indicate the levees in New Orleans have not been breached; however, an assessment is still pending."

6:08 PM ET:



"Reports of flooding vary based on region with some levees in new Orleans reportedly breached [sic]. Extensive flooding in the Lower 9th Board [sic] and St. Bernard Parish may be a result of water going over the tops of the levees."
(American Red Cross Situation Report, e-mailed to HSOC, IIMG, DHS officials, and White House Officials)

Early Evening:

"[Y]ou could also hear chatter on the radios that there was thousands of people on the rooftops that needed to be saved."



* * *

"I called up our Incident Command Post in Alexandria, relayed information that there was intense flooding in the area and that we needed to marshal as many resources, both aircraft and small boats, as many as possible because this would be an extended, protracted search and rescue effort."
(Testimony of Coast Guard Captain Frank Paskewich before this Committee regarding late afternoon overflight of New Orleans)

7:35 PM ET:



DHS HSOC issues Spot Report containing reports of breaches from USACE 2:54 e-mail.
(HSOC Spot Report 7, sourced to USACE New Orleans District Emergency Ops)

8:34 PM ET:



"There is reported flooding in Kenner with water 4-5 ft. on Williams Blvd. There is flooding in St. Bernard Parish with reports of water up to the roofs of homes. It has been reported that Causeway Blvd. has about 4 ft. of standing water. It has been reported that Arabi, in St. Bernard Parish, is under 10 ft. of water . . . All Jefferson and Orleans Parish Pumping Stations are inoperable as of 29 Aug."
(USACE Hurricane Katrina Situation Report)

9:00 PM ET:



"This is a catastrophic disaster. I've just started getting reconnaissance reports in from my folks in the field and I'm anticipating now that I'm going to have to prepare for housing at least tens of thousands of victims that are going to be without homes for literally months on end . . . We've got some storm surges that have come across the levees. We have some, I'm not going to call them breaches but we have some areas where the lake and the rivers are continuing to spill over. The flood waters are still spilling into those neighborhoods, so it's frankly unfortunately going to get worse before it gets better . . . FEMA folks who have been with the agency for, you know, 15 or 20 years to call in and talk about how this is the worst flooding they've ever seen in their entire lives and talking about just neighborhoods after neighborhoods gone."
(Statement of Michael Brown on CNN's Larry King Live)

9:29 PM ET:



"[T]he first (unconfirmed) reports they are getting from aerial surveys in New Orleans are far more serious than media reports are currently reflecting. Finding extensive flooding and more stranded people than they had originally thought – also a number of fires. FYI, in case tomorrow's sit reps seem more 'severe.'"

(E-mail to John Wood, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of DHS)

10:05 PM ET:



"Significant flooding reporting [sic] in St. Bernard Parish. Levee on West bank of Industrial Canal was possibly overtopped or breached. Over 10' of water reported standing. Levee at East Jefferson was not overtopped, however localized flooding reported. Due to this flooding, 4 East Jefferson pumping stations are not working."

(USACE Hurricane Katrina Situation Report)

10:30 PM ET:



"There is a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Ponchartrain allowing water to flow into the City . . . Only one of the main pumps is reported to still be working but cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful . . . an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water . . . Hundreds of people were observed on the balconies and roofs of a major apartment complex in the city . . . A few bodies were seen floating in the water and Coast Guard pilots also reported seeing bodies but there are no details on locations or numbers."

(HSOC Spot Report #13, sourced to a FEMA teleconference with Marty Bahamonde)

11:05 PM ET:



Summary of Bahamonde's overflight sent to DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson.

(E-mail from Patrick Rhode)

11:47 PM ET:



"According to Remote Sensing Imagery and available Census data, approximately 136,000 housing units in New Orleans have been impacted by flooding."

(HSOC Spot Report #12, sourced to the FEMA Mapping and Analysis Center)

3:15 AM ET:



"Extensive flooding throughout various parts of metro New Orleans area. Several levee breaches reported and flooding continues from Lake Ponchartrain into parts of New Orleans and Metairie . . . This storm has impacted a wide area and caused catastrophic damage to New Orleans and the surrounding region, including areas north of Lake Ponchartrain and western Mississippi.

(U.S. Coast Guard Situation Report 6 – Hurricane Katrina)

6:00 AM ET:



"Industrial Canal at Tennessee St.: levee has breached, with water to depth of 5 feet at Jackson Barracks; 17th St. at Canal Blvd.: levee has been breached – breach extends several 100 meters in length; Much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater, depth unknown at this time . . . Widespread and significant flooding has occurred throughout the city of New Orleans, extending eastward across the Mississippi gulf coast into Alabama."

(DHS HSOC Situation Report #8)

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UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

KATRINA CONFERENCE CALL

Number 10

Monday, August 29, 2005

7:30 a.m.

Q-1

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[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM AN AUDIO RECORDING.]

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. : --if you look at our radar imagery, you can see that it's kind of over the lower Plaquemines, lower St. Bernard area. It's moving northward at 15 miles an hour. The central pressure has risen to 918 millibars and it was about 70 miles--well, at the time of the advisory, it was 70 miles southeast of New Orleans. I think it's a little closer now.

There's no changes really in the watches and warnings that we had earlier. The maximum sustained winds, as I said before, are 145 miles an hour. Now, Katrina is undergoing a weakening process, and we have seen that occurring over the last several hours. Its size has continued to increase in aerial extent. There's been no real changes in the steering currents other than Katrina weakening a little, weakening slightly. It's becoming larger and it's increasing--because of its increasing size, it's going to spread more storm surge problems over a wider area.

As far as the areas of greatest impact, I think you already know who you are. It's really, of course,

Plaquemines, St. Bernard, Orleans, St. Tammany, our friends along the Mississippi coast, Washington Parish. Those are all the areas of greatest impact. I'm not saying that the parishes to the west of the impact area are not feeling effect, but I'm really going to concentrate on this briefing for the ones that are going to get the worst of it, and that includes St. Tammany.

Hurricane force winds, and for those of us in the know, are already occurring in our areas and we're starting to also see some--getting some damage reports about tornadoes in the bands along the Mississippi coast. We had a tornado reported in the Gulfport area with some injuries.

Storm surge flooding is now beginning in earnest. We have storm surge at 14 feet along the Mississippi coast and climbing. There's four feet of water on U.S. 90. That report is very recent.

So we just basically are going to have to continue to use a Category 4 [inaudible] high tide option. The maximum surge, we think it's going to be focused, 18 to 25 feet, mostly along and to the east of the eyewall, and that's mainly Mississippi, but, however, in southeast

Louisiana, mainly our areas along and east of the Mississippi River, Orleans, St. Tammany, Lake Pontchartrain, we're still going to be dealing with storm surge issues in that area. The highest surges are going to be, of course, in basically the eastern part of Lake Pontchartrain and east of the Mississippi River. We're looking at 16 to 18 feet, mainly, mainly east of the Mississippi River in the Canarden [ph] are and the Bayou Dam [ph] area and probably a little bit less as you go away from those areas. The western part of Lake Pontchartrain, I think we were looking at surges somewhat less than I think we were saying earlier, nine to 11 feet.

We know about the rainfall, five to ten inches. Really, it's going to continue for the most part for most of the day. There might be a brief let-up, but that's going to be an ongoing issue for us.

We already discussed the tornado potential and everyone knows that there is along and mainly east of where the eyewall is. Let's say, if you want to use a marker, probably anything east of I-55, you draw a line I-55 southward, you run a potential tornado threat, particularly

Washington, St. Tammany, St. Bernard, Orleans, those parishes, Jefferson, I couldn't let you off the hook right now. So you seem to be the ones that have the greatest tornado threat right now.

And you know about the rivers. Many river flood warnings have been issued, mainly right now because of the storm surge threat that we're facing. Later on, we'll be continuing some of these warnings because of the runoff of the heavy rain.

Let's see. I think that's about all I have for the weather briefing at this time.

MR. : Thank you, Mike. We really appreciate it.

At this point in time, we will take a look with road closures and conditions and any evacuation issues that may still be remaining. We'll start with State Police. State Police?

MR. : This is [inaudible]. I'm sure we do have some road closures. We are unable to get out right now and really assess those roads due to the weather conditions. As soon as we can get the information to you,

we'll be reporting them. At the present time, we're anticipating our needs for recovery and reentry. We are anticipating all the local [inaudible] for communications support, declaring our response to those local requests and assessing our emergency supplies, preparing to get assessments, around an air assessment [inaudible] the helicopters out, we will. We have also put our [inaudible] counselors on stand-by for [inaudible] just in case. And we're also doing assessments for transportation mode for hazardous materials and secured [inaudible] areas. We do know that we have the report of a train bridge being struck by a barge in St. Mary's Parish and we have folks responding as well as St. Mary's Parish [inaudible] help with that, and that's my report.

COLONEL SMITH: DOTD?

DOTD: We closed the [inaudible] city connection bridge last night at 11:30 p.m. The causeway and I-10 elevated structures in the New Orleans area are closed. U.S. 61 in Canner is closed, where we sandbagged. The [inaudible] tunnels are closed. All movable bridges are closed to navigation. All the pontoon bridges in the

intercoastal waterway are closed to navigation. No ferries are operating on the Mississippi. DOTD stands ready to mobilize as ready as the storm passes. We've got our people sheltered in right now and we'll be ready to move with State Police right after the storm moves by. That concludes my report.

COLONEL SMITH: We'll now go to our parish reports. Please give us your status. Something else that we would request, we know that you're very, very busy, but if you could periodically, every couple hours, give us a situation report either through [inaudible] either by phone or by fax, we'll assess it any way we can get it. It will help us better prepare in our planning for what you may need when we're able to get out.

With that, we will start with our roll call.

Ascension?

MR. : Ascension is sheltering 695 people in two shelters, east bank and west bank. Approximately 10,000 residents are affected by power outages at this time.

COLONEL SMITH: Assumption?

MR. : Assumption has about 300

sheltered. As everyone else, we have [inaudible] down a lot of our arteries and a lot of our streets right now are [inaudible] won't be able to do that until probably lunchtime.

COLONEL SMITH: Jefferson?

MR. : Jefferson is experiencing now a pretty constant 70- to 80-mile per hour wind, gusts over 100. We have unconfirmed reports of building collapses on the west bank. We have unconfirmed reports of significant flooding on the east bank around the hospital. The entire metro area is out of power right now. We have completely lost electric power, but that's basically to be expected. We're unable to confirm any of these reports because with 70-plus-mile per hour constant winds, sustained, we cannot get to the streets.

COLONEL SMITH: Lafourche?

MR. : We have about 1,500 people in shelters right now. At last report at 5:30, we had [inaudible] 86 miles an hour [inaudible]. We haven't received any reports from that yet. We have some reports of structure damage, but it is not confirmed. The wind is too

high for us to go out and check. As soon as it goes out, we'll go inspect it and give you a status.

COLONEL SMITH: Orleans?

MR. : Power down in the city.

Nine-one-one down. City hall is up on emergency power. Our phone systems, our IT phone systems are all down so we're talking on cell. We, in fact, are fearing major surge, 20-feet-plus on [inaudible] and the east. We've lost contact with four pumping stations. We did regain, try and get out, but we turned around because of the amount of water. We know that one crew at least is talking to us, so we've got four pumping stations that we've lost contact with. There's extensive flooding in the east. We're okay in the Superdome. We're on backup power. Things are quiet over there. The police station, police headquarters is down on power but on backup power. We've got basic communication, radio communications that we're operating on.

COLONEL SMITH: St. Bernard?

MR. : We're hearing a lot of power is down, all communication is down [inaudible] all our towers are down, communication towers are down. Our 911 center has

been evacuated. We have structural damage on the major buildings that we were using as temporary shelters. We have about 300 to 400 people in some shelters and we move them from one hallway to another as the roofs come off. We can't rescue these people because the winds are about 80 to 90 miles an hour. And the good news is, I have Jesse on the 800 megahertz. He can't get in touch with you.

COLONEL SMITH: Would you repeat that, please?

MR. : What, that Jesse can't get in touch with you?

COLONEL SMITH: No, the damage, and please include [inaudible] in your report.

MR. : We don't know [inaudible]. We can't get there yet.

COLONEL SMITH: Okay.

MR. : [Inaudible] our office has sections that are coming off. Our glasses are breaking. The radio tower has been knocked down. Our 911 center is evacuated [inaudible] all deputies to the [inaudible] courthouse. We're not putting anybody out on the street right now. The shelter we were using at [inaudible] high

school, the gym roof has been blown off. The windows on the side of the school are being ruptured as we talk. They're moving the evacuees to the second floor right now in the hallway. The same with our high schools [inaudible] the roof and several sections of the roof have been blown off [inaudible] trying to get in as fast as possible. The windows are being blown out. We're having major structural damage at that school and we can't get [inaudible]. As soon as the wind calms down, we're going to transport them to a safe location [inaudible].

We have three-foot of flooding in [inaudible] because the water has topped the levee in [inaudible]. It looks like we're going to have more flooding in the other sections of [inaudible].

MR. : Three feet of water in [inaudible].

MR. : [Inaudible] verify the water in the Ninth Ward, the Industrial Canal?

COLONEL SMITH: Carl Ebert [ph], did you hear that question?

MR. EBERT: I've got it. We do have reports from

our pumping stations, before they went offline, they were being [inaudible] with about a 20-foot tidal surge before we lost contact with them. We've regained contact with one of them, one of the stations, but we've got major tidal surge coming up that intercoastal waterway and East New Orleans. We're also getting some push-back coming up the canal and on the lakefront that knocked another one of our major pumping stations out. The tidal surge came up and breached the levee system in the canal, so we're faced with major flooding both in the east, East New Orleans, and then out on the lakefront.

MR. : Thank you, [inaudible]. Also, I have Jesse on the 800 megahertz. Do you all want to go to the 800 megahertz to be able to talk to him, or you want me to transfer [inaudible]?

COLONEL SMITH: Basically, we've asked Jesse to give us a report. He has, but if you've got him right there with you online, you can ask him if he has anything else further to report or any information he needs to share, Larry. I would appreciate it. By the way, there is three to four feet of water on St. Claude [ph] near Jackson

Parish, for your information.

MR. : Excuse me?

COLONEL SMITH: I said there is three to four feet of water on St. Claude near Jackson Parish. That's for your information.

MR. : Okay. Thank you. I'm going to get Jesse back again.

[Inaudible conversation.]

MR. : Okay, Jess. I have Baton Rouge on the line. Is there anything you want to tell us?

MR. : Give them a heads up. We're going to probably request search and rescue in the Johnson Bayou area when the weather [inaudible] and we can [inaudible] communications. That's about it.

MR. : Ten-four, Jesse. St. Bernard out. Did you get that?

COLONEL SMITH: We got that. Ask him about flooding conditions. Ask Jesse if he can give us any report at all on flooding, Larry.

MR. : Jesse, can you give them any [inaudible] is there any flooding in Jackson?

MR. : Say it again.

MR. : [Inaudible] asked if you had
flooding in Jackson Parish at this time.

MR. : Roger that. We certainly do.

MR. : Can you give us some [inaudible]
of what you've got?

MR. : [Inaudible] came out in the street
in front of the building that we're in [inaudible].

MR. : Okay. Ten-four, Jess. You got
that?

COLONEL SMITH: Yes, we got that, Larry. Thank
you for your help there. You got anything else there for
St. Bernard?

MR. : I'd like to put a request in right
now to give me some more trucks [inaudible].

COLONEL SMITH: We've got that request and we're
going to be ready to respond to you just as soon as the
conditions allow us to do it, Larry.

MR. : All right. I also need that water
and MREs as soon as possible.

COLONEL SMITH: We've got those requests, as well,

and as soon as we can work them, we'll be getting them to you.

MR. : Thank you very much. I'm going to have to get off right now because I've got other things I have to do.

COLONEL SMITH: We understand, Larry. Before you get off, we were going to try and do another conference call at noon, if possible. We'll try and make these quick because we know everybody's responding and you're very busy, but we'll try and do this again at noon.

MR. : Okay.

COLONEL SMITH: Take care of what you need to do and we're here for you.

MR. : Okay. Thank you, Colonel.

COLONEL SMITH: St. Charles?

MR. : We've got widespread power outages. [Inaudible] the heaviest winds at this time. We think that we're going to probably have significant storm surge flooding at this time in our east bank. We should have many homes that we think will go under with the storm surge and/or rainfall, so we do think that we're going to be

in pretty bad shape over on the east bank. [Inaudible] will certainly be underwater and impassible. That'll be something everybody needs to know for recovery.

One other thing is that we believe that our water distribution system on the east bank is out of water. We think that system [inaudible] may be out of municipal water for the time [inaudible].

COLONEL SMITH: St. James?

MR. : Trees down, some power outage. Our emergency operations center is operating on generator. The Gravesty Forest Station [ph], which is about a year and a half old, we lost that completely. Sustained winds right now are at about 45 miles an hour and we're getting gusts presently at about 75 miles an hour.

COLONEL SMITH: St. John?

MR. : St. John, parish-wide power outages. Maximum sustained winds, 50 to 65 miles per hour. Too much wind and rain to go out. Right now, we've haven't done any [inaudible] yet and the 911 center and the EOC is operational on generator power [inaudible]. I'm sorry, and low water supply parish-wide.

COLONEL SMITH: St. Tammany?

MR. : Yes, sir. We have about 1,500 sheltered. We have some streets flooded throughout the parish, but we don't know the exact locations yet. We do have road blockages due to utility poles and trees. We have power outages throughout the parish and we've got an 8:30 official meeting, but we're going to do a teleconference call with all our municipality leaders so we can get a better assessment since we're not physically out there.

COLONEL SMITH: Tangipahoa?

MR. : Yes. We have widespread power outages also, trees down. We have about 1,500 people sheltered. We're getting those 50- to 60-mile-an-hour winds sustained with higher gusts. I feel fortunate right now compared to everyone else, but we're maintaining. We're on emergency power here at our operations center. End of report.

COLONEL SMITH: Terrebonne?

MR. : Our 911 center is evacuated. We've got 35,000 people without power. There are over 3,000 in shelters. We have winds about 50 to 65. We have

unconfirmed reports of buildings with major roof loss. Also, we have at least one fatality that we know of, a heart attack and possibly a second.

COLONEL SMITH: Mike, what about flooding?

MR. : No reports of flooding, and we can't get out right now.

COLONEL SMITH: Mike, the winds that you were reporting, what part of Terrebonne were you picking those winds up in?

MR. : [Inaudible.]

COLONEL SMITH: Thanks, Mike. Washington?

MR. : Yes, sir. Washington has some power outages, some structural damage. We have very strong winds at this time and I'd estimate about 60 miles an hour winds, lots of [inaudible] across the parish. We have no flooding at this time and we have 1,560 people in shelters.

COLONEL SMITH: Thank you. Mayor Camardelle, do you have any information at all that you'd like to share with us?

MAYOR CAMARDELLE: Yes. The command center [inaudible] Grand Isle to speak to you this morning. I had

five people [inaudible] connection I made with one of the gentlemen at city hall was five foot of water underneath city hall and I've lost contact ever since. That's the report I have [inaudible] spread out and check on these individuals [inaudible].

COLONEL SMITH: We'll be ready to go.

We'll go to our troop reports at this time. Troop

A?

MR. : I have very little to add to what the Colonel said. Power outages throughout the area, trees and power lines down, and we will attempt to take care of it as soon as the winds let up.

COLONEL SMITH: Troop B?

MR. : Waiting for the winds to die down so we can get outside.

COLONEL SMITH: C?

MR. : No report at this time.

COLONEL SMITH: L?

MR. : We have reports of trees down, [inaudible] confirmed. Our [inaudible] are in [inaudible] surface facilities [inaudible] and we are [inaudible] on

generator backup. That's it.

COLONEL SMITH: Shelter and DHH, special needs?

MR. : We were in [inaudible] campus with special needs shelter there last night, as late as one o'clock p.m. They're running people at triage. They come in buses from Orleans, that area. The Baton Rouge area has notified us that they'll take 40 [inaudible] patients in their hospitals, and so the hospitals there will accept as many patients as they can from hospitals that are [inaudible] evacuated areas for patient care, so we request that a [inaudible] help us with [inaudible] getting patients out of the affected areas out there so we can get people where [inaudible]. We have an EMAT team here that we're going to [inaudible] as soon as the weather allows so they can help them out there at the Superdome, and at the hospitals are trying to take care of patients [inaudible] in the hospitals in the affected areas to see if they have power outages and what their needs will be, so as soon as we can get in there, we can get there to take care of their patients as best they can, give them backup. So at this point, we feel like we're [inaudible] the weather permits.

COLONEL SMITH: Shelter Task Force?

MR. : Yes. Red Cross [inaudible] Glen Meres. Shelters are not reporting any problems. We've got 53 open. The numbers shortly before seven, 10,166 and they're scattered from [inaudible], Shreveport, [inaudible], and out that way. Also, Orange and Jefferson County, Texas, have 520 of our residents over that way.

Tell St. Bernard if he's on the line, and he can relay this, that the buses did make it and they've been set up in [inaudible] parish over there and they should be safe [inaudible]. If there are problems occurring in the sheltering efforts, we need to be made aware of it because we think they're working as well as we had hoped for. End of report.

COLONEL SMITH: DSS?

MS. : DSS [inaudible] shelters. In addition to those by the Shelter Task Force, we had a total of 113 shelters, roughly 28,000 people sheltered in general population shelters. We have our seven special needs shelters open with roughly 850 people being sheltered in special needs shelters.

I would like clarification from Arlene if they have any idea of the number of people in the Superdome in the general population shelter.

COLONEL SMITH: Arlene, did you get that? Arlene, are you still on the line?

MR. : Yes, Colonel. We have over 10,000. We don't have accurate counts on that number yet. As soon as we get it, we will let you know.

COLONEL SMITH: Thank you, Jo. Appreciate it. American Red Cross?

MR. : Continuing to operate shelters and work with DSS in cooperation with those things and continue to stage resources to be ready to move in [inaudible].

COLONEL SMITH: Mississippi EOC? Mississippi EOC, are you still on the line?

FEMA Region 6?

MR. : [Inaudible] we're continuing to monitor the situation. No report at this time.

COLONEL SMITH: Okay. Arlene, one of the things that we're concerned about, do you have any information as to the status of water and so forth around the big Charity?

MR. : Yes. We've got major problems at Charity. We've got five floors with the windows blown out on them and flooding on the bottom floor. We've knocked down that pedestrian bridge across, between the hospitals, so we've got the VA with first floor flooding. University seems to be pretty good in the conflict, but we're going to have major problems, and we've already got them at Charity. We know we've got a number of people that we've responded. We've got about 25 calls for service obviously with people who are trying to survive on their roofs. They're up top-side that didn't evacuate. But we're prioritizing those and basically we'll deal with those when we can get out and about.

So we will have to update the concerns and we need to look at the medical assistance, especially from the folks that came over from Houston because Charity is going to have major problems.

COLONEL SMITH: Thank you. Before we get off this thing, we want to give everybody an opportunity to see if you've got any questions. I know that you've got a lot of things to do, but let's run down it real quick.

Ascension, anything?

MR. : Nothing at this time.

COLONEL SMITH: Assumption?

MR. : No questions.

COLONEL SMITH: Jefferson?

MR. : Jefferson has a couple of issues.

Number one, we're going to need to make some requests for commodities and/or fuel and so forth. Do we want to handle that through E Team, Colonel?

COLONEL SMITH: Absolutely.

MR. : Okay. Secondly, we have a number of our staff sheltered in Washington Parish. The Red Cross there seems to have problems with feeding. Can we get some food resources?

COLONEL SMITH: Absolutely.

MR. : Okay.

COLONEL SMITH: We just need to do about it. All they need to do is let us know and we'll coordinate that.

MR. : We'll send that through E Team and coordinate with Washington Parish.

Medical resources and requests of FEMA assistance

from the FEMA stockpile, again through E Team?

COLONEL SMITH: Absolutely, same source, and we've got the FEMA sitting shoulder-to-shoulder with us and we'll turn and we'll act on it just as soon as we get the request.

MR. : Very good. Everything coming through E Team.

Last thing for the National Weather Service.

Question: When can we expect the winds to begin to die down so that we can do a formal assessment or something similar to it?

COLONEL SMITH: Mike?

MR. DEARA: Hurricane force winds should abate sometime between noon and two p.m. today.

MR. : Okay. Tropical storm force winds?

MR. DEARA: That's going to take a lot longer, Walter, because of the large size of the hurricane. Give me a second. I'm going to get you--

MR. : That's fine. You can call me offline.

MR. DEARA: Walter?

MR. : Yes?

MR. DEARA: I've got it for you.

MR. : Good.

MR. DEARA: This evening.

MR. : All right. Thank you.

MR. DEARA: No problem.

MR. : That's it, Colonel.

MR. : For our planning purposes, what does "this evening" mean, and I'm not trying to pin you to something--

MR. DEARA: No problem. For the south shore, six, seven p.m. For the north shore areas, eight, nine p.m.--eight to nine p.m.

COLONEL SMITH: Thank you. I appreciate it.

Lafourche, you got anything [inaudible]?

MR. : Storm surge information for the [inaudible] and Grand Isle area. Is there anything available?

COLONEL SMITH: Mike?

MR. DEARA: For [inaudible] Grand Isle? Stand by. We'll get back to you on that one. Can we call you back offline?

MR. : Yes, sir.

MR. DEARA: Okay. We'll do that. This is the Mayor of Grand Isle, right?

MR. : This is [inaudible].

COLONEL SMITH: That's Lafourche Parish, Mike.

MR. DEARA: Lafourche Parish, okay. I've got you. We'll give you a call offline about that.

COLONEL SMITH: Arlene?

MR. : I think we can [inaudible] putting our request together, but we know that we've got a shortage of meals, so I'll just say shoot at a couple hundred thousand to start with because we're going to have problems at the Dome and then we've got all the people in the various places that we're going to have to collect up this evening. But we'll be putting our request together [inaudible] for food and water, fuel, and as we roll out, we're going to try and consolidate our communications requirements because we're going to have some problems in communications, working with all the agencies and are struggling to get our 911 back up.

COLONEL SMITH: Thank you. St. Bernard?

MR. : [Inaudible.]

COLONEL SMITH: St. Charles?

MR. : National Weather Service, what's
the expected storm surge on the east bank [inaudible]
something definitive on that.

[End of recording.]



From: Mahoney, Darryl
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 11:41 AM
To: HSOC.HSIN; HSOC.SWO
Cc: HSOC.COMMON
Subject: FW: TIMG Hurricane Katrina Update--0900
Importance: High

From: CDO.TSA [mailto:CDO.Tsa@dhs.gov]
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 11:29 AM
To: HSOC.TSA; CMC-01@dot.gov
Subject: FW: TIMG Hurricane Katrina Update--0900

Hurricane Katrina has come on land at approx. 0750 in Grand Isle, LA. She is still at a Category 4 stage and has sustained speeds of 110 mph. The medical facilities in Mobile Outpatient Clinic and the Gulfport VA Hospital have reported flooding. Changes to Rail, Aviation Operations, and surface operations are being updated and will be included in the 0900 operations update..

-----Original Message-----

From: Keene, Christopher
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:08 AM
To: CDO.TSA; ACDO.TSA
Subject: 0900-Katrina Brief

Q-2

9/17/2005

DHS-HSOC-0002-0000186

F

Hurricane

Katrina

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0900 29 AUG 05

0900 - 29 Aug 2005

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Hurricane Katrina

- Hurricane Katrina has now been downgraded to a Category 3 storm with top winds of 125 mph.
- The center of hurricane Katrina was located near the mouth of the Pearl River, about 35 miles east-northeast of New Orleans. Katrina is moving N at approx 15 mph
- The National Hurricane Center is downgrading its predictions for a massive storm surge. The center now reports that New Orleans could see a 15-foot storm surge -- down from a feared 28-foot swell.
- A 15-foot swell would still be enough to cause extensive flooding.

Hurricane Katrina

- The eye of Hurricane Katrina is making its second northern gulf coast landfall near the Louisiana-Mississippi border. Radar data shows that the northern eyewall is very intense and doppler velocities are near 120 knots at an altitude of about 5000 ft over extreme southern Mississippi.
- The National Hurricane Center estimates that the hurricane will weaken as the center moves over land. However, Katrina has such a large and powerful circulation that it will probably retain hurricane intensity for about 12 hours, bringing damaging winds well inland. The potential loss of life due to falling trees and freshwater flooding are major concerns.
- The track forecast reasoning is basically unchanged. Katrina should accelerate north-northeastward. Katrina is expected to lose tropical characteristics over the next few days.

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DHS-HSOC-0002-0000189

0900 - 29 Aug 2005

3

Hurricane Katrina

- In the uptown area of New Orleans on the south shore of Lake Ponchartrain, floodwaters by have already intruded on the first stories of some houses and some roads are impassable.
- The National Weather Service has reported that a levee broke on the Industrial Canal near the St. Bernard-Orleans parish line, and 3 to 8 feet of flooding was possible. The Industrial Canal is a 5.5-mile waterway that connects the Mississippi River to the Intracoastal Waterway.
- There is heavy street flooding throughout Orleans, St. Bernard and Jefferson parishes. Also, earlier reports of an apartment collapse in Jefferson Parish are false. It was actually a house that collapsed.
- Terry Ebbert, New Orleans director of homeland security, said more than 4,000 National Guardsmen were mobilizing in Memphis and would help police New Orleans streets.

0900 - 29 Aug 2005

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WGUS54 KLIX 291316
FFWLIX
LAC071-087-291915-

BULLETIN - EAS ACTIVATION REQUESTED
FLASH FLOOD WARNING
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NEW ORLEANS LA
814 AM CDT MON AUG 29 2005

THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE IN NEW ORLEANS HAS ISSUED A

* FLASH FLOOD WARNING FOR...
ORLEANS PARISH IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA
THIS INCLUDES THE CITIES OF...NEW ORLEANS
ST. BERNARD PARISH IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA
THIS INCLUDES THE CITY OF CHALMETTE

* UNTIL 215 PM CDT

* A LEVEE BREACH OCCURRED ALONG THE INDUSTRIAL CANAL AT TENNESSE
STREET. 3 TO 8 FEET OF WATER IS EXPECTED DUE TO THE BREACH.

* LOCATIONS IN THE WARNING INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO ARABI AND
9TH WARD OF NEW ORLEANS.

DO NOT DRIVE YOUR VEHICLE INTO AREAS WHERE THE WATER COVERS THE
ROADWAY. THE WATER DEPTH MAY BE TOO GREAT TO ALLOW YOUR CAR TO CROSS
SAFELY. VEHICLES CAUGHT IN RISING WATER SHOULD BE ABANDONED QUICKLY.
MOVE TO HIGHER GROUND.

A FLASH FLOOD WARNING MEANS THAT FLOODING IS IMMINENT OR OCCURRING.
IF YOU ARE IN THE WARNING AREA MOVE TO HIGHER GROUND IMMEDIATELY.
RESIDENTS LIVING ALONG STREAMS AND CREEKS SHOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE
PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND PROPERTY. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO CROSS
SWIFTLY FLOWING WATERS OR WATERS OF UNKNOWN DEPTH BY FOOT OR BY
AUTOMOBILE.

LAT...LON 2992 9012 2994 9003 2987 8987 3001 8985
3004 8982 3008 8993 3002 9012

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

HSOC SPOT REP

SPOT REP #:	05
Date/Time (EDT):	08/29/09:25
Reference:	
Source of Information:	News Media and LA OEM
Type of Incident:	Hurricane Katrina

Update	
	<p>At a 7:30 a.m. news conference, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin said that water was coming over the levee system in the Lower 9th Ward, especially in the Florida Avenue area. Nagin said that the Florida Avenue pumping station was not working, and there were unconfirmed reports of people standing on their roofs.</p> <p>"There is a significant amount of water in the 9th Ward," Nagin said.</p> <p>Nagin said that city officials had reports of at least five fires in the city and one collapsed building. The locations of the fires and the building were not specified.</p> <p>Meanwhile, a 9th Ward resident reported that houses were taking in water on Reynes Street at the Claiborne Avenue bridge.</p>
Storm Impacts	
Victims/Injuries	
Significant Damage	
Approved By	Peter Jensen, Planning Section NRCC

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Page 1 of 1

DHS-FEMA-0055-0007573

FL Q-4

From: Rhode, Patrick
 Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 10:19 AM
 To: Heath, Michael
 Subject: RE: superdome

Send to Brown as well if you can - takns

-----Original Message-----

From: Heath, Michael
 Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 10:12 AM
 To: Rhode, Patrick; Altshuler, Brooks; Burris, Ken
 Subject: RE: superdome

From Marty Bahamonde in the New Orleans EOC (next to the superdome)

-Severe flooding on the St. Bernard/Orleans parish line. Police report water level up to second floor of two story houses. People are trapped in attics.

-Pumps starting to fail. The city has now confirmed four pumps are off line.

-Windows and parts of the east side of the Amaco building blown out.

-New Orleans shopping center (next to superdome) destroyed.

-Windows and parts of the East side of the Hyatt Hotel have been blown out. Furniture is blowing out of the hotel.

-Top floors of the Entergy building have been blown out -Area around the Superdome is beginning to flood.

We should have pictures shortly.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lowder, Michael
 Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:39 AM
 To: Brown, Michael D; Rhode, Patrick; Heath, Michael; Buikema, Edward; Craig, Daniel; Lokey, William; Jones, Gary
 Subject: FW: superdome

F Y I

-----Original Message-----

From: Green, Matthew
 Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:36 AM
 To: Lowder, Michael
 Subject: RE: superdome

Report that the levee in Arabi has failed.. next to the industrial canal

 Matthew Green
 FEMA Hurricane Liaison Team Coordinator
 National Hurricane Center
 11691 SW 17th Street
 Miami, Florida, 33165-2149 USA
 [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: Lowder, Michael
 Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:21 AM
 To: Green, Matthew
 Subject: RE: superdome

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DHS 0005684

Q-5

Yes, we have reports that two pieces have blown off.

No word on impact to the structural integrity

-----Original Message-----

From: Green, Matthew

Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:09 AM

To: Lowder, Michael; Gray, Richard

Subject: superdome

Ham radio here reports that a piece of the superdome roof has peeled off... but I can not confirm.. just thought you would want to know... I am sure your sources know more.

Matthew Green

FEMA Hurricane Liaison Team Coordinator

National Hurricane Center

11691 SW 17th Street

Miami, Florida, 33165-2149 USA
[REDACTED]

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 WTUS84 KLIX 291359
 HSLIX
 LAZ038-040-050-056>070-MSZ080>082-291600-

HURRICANE KATRINA LOCAL STATEMENT
 NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NEW ORLEANS LA
 900 AM CDT MON AUG 29 2005

...HURRICANE KATRINA DIRECT HIT FOR NEW ORLEANS AND MISSISSIPPI
 COAST...

...LEVEES OVERTOPPED IN ORLEANS AND ST BERNARD PARISHES...

...EXTREMELY DANGEROUS HURRICANE MOVING ACROSS NEW ORLEANS AND
 MISSISSIPPI COAST...

...HURRICANE WARNING IN EFFECT FOR SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA AND COASTAL
 MISSISSIPPI FROM MORGAN CITY EAST TO THE ALABAMA FLORIDA BORDER...

...EXTENSIVE AND LIFE THREATENING STORM SURGE FLOODING
 OCCURRING ALONG THE LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI COAST AT THIS TIME.

...AREAS AFFECTED...
 IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA...THE FOLLOWING PARISHES

ASSUMPTION...ST JAMES...ST JOHN THE BAPTIST...ST CHARLES...
 ST BERNARD...TERREBONNE...ORLEANS...JEFFERSON...PLAQUEMINE...
 LAFOURCHE...ST TAMMANY...TANGIPAHOA...LIVINGSTON.

IN COASTAL MISSISSIPPI...THE FOLLOWING COUNTIES
 HANCOCK...HARRISON...JACKSON

...WATCHES AND WARNINGS...
 A HURRICANE WARNING IS IN EFFECT FROM EAST OF MORGAN CITY EAST TO THE
 ALABAMA-FLORIDA BORDER AREA. THIS INCLUDES THE METRO NEW ORLEANS
 AREA...AND THE MISSISSIPPI COAST.

AN INLAND HURRICANE WARNING IS ALSO IN EFFECT FOR AREAS AWAY FROM THE
 COAST.

A FLOOD WATCH IS IN EFFECT FOR MOST OF SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA AND
 EXTREME SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI TONIGHT.

A TORNADO WATCH IS IN EFFECT THROUGH 12 PM CDT.

...STORM INFORMATION...
 AT 800 AM CDT...THE CENTER OF HURRICANE KATRINA WAS LOCATED NEAR
 LATITUDE 29.7 NORTH...LONGITUDE 89.6 WEST. THIS LOCATION WAS ABOUT
 EASTERN ST BERNARD AND ORLEANS PARISHES.

MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 135 MPH...WITH HIGHER GUSTS.
 HURRICANE KATRINA IS A CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR
 SIMPSON SCALE. SOME FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY.

...PRECAUTIONARY/PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS...
 WITH THE ONSET OF HURRICANE FORCE WINDS AND HEAVY SQUALLS...PEOPLE

SHOULD REMAIN IN LAST RESORT REFUGES IN STRONG...WELL CONSTRUCTED BUILDINGS. IF LIFE THREATENING STORM SURGE FLOODING DEVELOPS...MOVE TO HIGHER FLOORS OR HOUSE ATTICS. BRING TOOLS TO MAKE AN EMERGENCY EXIT SHOULD THESE HIGHER FLOORS OR ATTICS BECOME INUNDATED.

...STORM SURGE FLOOD AND STORM TIDE IMPACTS...
KATRINA MAKING LANDFALL IN EASTERN NEW ORLEANS AND MISSISSIPPI COAST AREA THIS MORNING. EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND LIFE THREATENING HURRICANE...SIGNIFICANT AND LIFE THREATENING STORM SURGE 18 TO 22 FEET ABOVE NORMAL IS OCCURRING. LEVEES HAVE BEEN OVERTOPPED IN ORLEANS AND ST BERNARD PARISHES. IN ADDITION DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES ARE OCCURRING ON TOP OF THE STORM SURGE NEAR THE COAST. SEVERE TIDAL FLOODING WILL CONTINUE IN THESE AREAS. IN ADDITION... SEVERE STORM SURGE FLOODING IS PROBABLY OCCURRING IN SOUTHEAST ST TAMMANY PARISH AND IN HANCOCK...HARRISON AND JACKSON COUNTIES IN COASTAL MISSISSIPPI.

IN ADDITION...A STORM SURGE OF 10 TO 12 FEET WILL BE OCCURRING IN THE SOUTHWEST PART OF LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AFFECTING THE EAST BANKS OF JEFFERSON...ST CHARLES...ST JOHN THE BAPTIST AND LIVINGSTON PARISHES.

TIDES ARE RAPIDLY INCREASING ALONG THE SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA COAST. SEVERE STORM SURGE FLOODING IS EXPECTED DEVELOP THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THE MORNING...WITH HIGHEST VALUES ALONG THE LOUISIANA COAST EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER...MISSISSIPPI COAST...AND ALONG THE SHORE LINE OF LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AND MAUREPAS.

...WIND IMPACTS...
KATRINA HAS EVOLVED INTO A LARGE HURRICANE WITH HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTENDING AROUND 100 MILES FROM THE CENTER. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS ARE OCCURRING OVER SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA AND SPREADING INTO COASTAL MISSISSIPPI. POWER OUTAGES WILL BECOME MORE WIDESPREAD DURING THE MORNING HOURS. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS WILL PERSIST OVER MUCH OF THE REGION THROUGH EARLY MONDAY AFTERNOON. WIND GUST OF 100 MPH WAS REPORTED BY THE GULFPORT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER. BELLE CHASSE NAVAL AIR STATION HAD A WIND GUST OF 105 EARLIER THIS MORNING.

WINDS ASSOCIATED WITH STRONG CATEGORY 3 HURRICANES CAN TOTALLY DESTROY MOBILE HOMES AND POORLY CONSTRUCTED DWELLINGS...AND CAUSE MAJOR DAMAGE TO EVEN WELL CONSTRUCTED BUILDINGS. HIGHER WIND SPEEDS WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY STRONGER ON UPPER FLOORS OF TALL BUILDINGS CAUSING DAMAGE.

...TORNADOES...
A TORNADO WATCH HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR MUCH OF SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA AND COASTAL MISSISSIPPI DUE TO THE THREAT OF TORNADOES.

...RAINFALL...
RAINFALL TOTALS OF 8 TO 10 INCHES...WITH ISOLATED MAXIMUM AMOUNTS OF 15 INCHES...ARE POSSIBLE.

...NEXT UPDATE...
THE NEXT LOCAL STATEMENT WILL BE ISSUED AROUND 1030 AM CDT.
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From: Dabdoub, Louis S
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:36 AM
To: Waters, Michael; Milicich, Mark; MacLaren, Jon; Stanton, Lawrence; Stern, Ira; Smith, Susan; Porell, Susan; Neale, Donald
Cc: Toth, Kirk; Wallace, Ben; Robinson, Donald; HSOC.PSA; PSADutyDesk; 'David.Hunter1@dhs.gov'; Jackson, Liz <CTR>
Subject: Re: Jackson, MS PSA contact info

It is now being reported that most of the storm surge should hit eastern N.O. Over to the Miss Gulf coast region, perhaps as far as Gulf Port.

The lower parishes of La, Pla and St Bernard parish's are under water.

The eye wall is about 45 min to 1 hour away from hitting the major metropolitan area.

There are several reports of roofs being blown off of houses and businesses in the metro area already.

Where I am is in complete darkness now with even the generator power gone.

I will keep posting as long as I can.

Louie

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Dabdoub, Louis S <Louis.S.Dabdoub@HQ.DHS.GOV>
To: Waters, Michael <Michael.Waters@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Milicich, Mark <mark.milicich@HQ.DHS.GOV>; MacLaren, Jon <Jon.M.MacLaren@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Stanton, Lawrence <Lawrence.Stanton@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Stern, Ira <Ira.Stern@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Smith, Susan <susan.smith@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Porell, Susan <susan.porell@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Neale, Donald <Donald.Neale@HQ.DHS.GOV>
CC: Toth, Kirk <kirk.toth@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Wallace, Ben <BenWallace@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Robinson, Donald <Donald.Robinson@HQ.DHS.GOV>; HSOC.PSA <HSOC.PSA@HQ.DHS.GOV>; PSADutyDesk <PSADutyDesk@HQ.DHS.GOV>; 'David.Hunter1@dhs.gov' <David.Hunter1@dhs.gov>; Jackson, Liz <CTR> <Liz.Jackson@associates.HQ.DHS.GOV>
Sent: Mon Aug 29 09:00:49 2005
Subject: Re: Jackson, MS PSA contact info

It is getting bad. Major flooding in some parts of the City. People are calling in for rescue saying they are trapped in attics, etc. That means water is 10 feet high there already. Trees are blowing down. Flooding is worsening every minute and infrastrucuter issues are rapidly being taxed. Most of the area has lost electricity. The bad part has not hit here yet.

Just an fyi, I am working totally off my blackberry now. The hardline I had is down. I will keep posting as long as I can on this, until it goes down.

Louie

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Dabdoub, Louis S <Louis.S.Dabdoub@HQ.DHS.GOV>
To: Waters, Michael <Michael.Waters@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Milicich, Mark <mark.milicich@HQ.DHS.GOV>; MacLaren, Jon <Jon.M.MacLaren@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Stanton, Lawrence

<Lawrence.Stanton@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Stern, Ira <Ira.Stern@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Smith, Susan
 <susan.smith@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Porell, Susan <susan.porell@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Neale, Donald
 <Donald.Neale@HQ.DHS.GOV>
 CC: Toth, Kirk <kirk.toth@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Wallace, Ben <BenWallace@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Robinson,
 Donald <Donald.Robinson@HQ.DHS.GOV>; HSOC.PSA <HSOC.PSA@HQ.DHS.GOV>; PSADutyDesk
 <PSADutyDesk@HQ.DHS.GOV>; 'David.Hunter1@dhs.gov' <David.Hunter1@dhs.gov>; Jackson, Liz
 <CTR> <Liz.Jackson@associates.HQ.DHS.GOV>
 Sent: Mon Aug 29 07:52:03 2005
 Subject: Re: Jackson, MS PSA contact info

1

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Waters, Michael <Michael.Waters@HQ.DHS.GOV>
 To: Milicich, Mark <mark.milicich@HQ.DHS.GOV>; MacLaren, Jon <Jon.M.MacLaren@HQ.DHS.GOV>;
 Stanton, Lawrence <Lawrence.Stanton@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Stern, Ira <Ira.Stern@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Smith,
 Susan <susan.smith@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Porell, Susan <susan.porell@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Neale, Donald
 <Donald.Neale@HQ.DHS.GOV>
 CC: Toth, Kirk <kirk.toth@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Dabdoub, Louis S <Louis.S.Dabdoub@HQ.DHS.GOV>;
 Wallace, Ben <BenWallace@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Robinson, Donald <Donald.Robinson@HQ.DHS.GOV>;
 HSOC.PSA <HSOC.PSA@HQ.DHS.GOV>; PSADutyDesk <PSADutyDesk@HQ.DHS.GOV>; 'David.Hunter1
 @dhs.gov' <David.Hunter1@dhs.gov>; Jackson, Liz <CTR> <Liz.Jackson@associates.HQ.DHS.GOV>
 Sent: Sun Aug 28 16:55:35 2005
 Subject: Re: Jackson, MS PSA contact info

The contact number given for me in the original message is not correct. My Blackberry
 number is 334-201-1988.

Thanks,

Mike Waters

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Milicich, Mark <mark.milicich@HQ.DHS.GOV>
 To: MacLaren, Jon <Jon.M.MacLaren@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Stanton, Lawrence
 <Lawrence.Stanton@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Stern, Ira <Ira.Stern@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Smith, Susan
 <susan.smith@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Porell, Susan <susan.porell@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Neale, Donald
 <Donald.Neale@HQ.DHS.GOV>
 CC: Toth, Kirk <kirk.toth@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Waters, Michael <Michael.Waters@HQ.DHS.GOV>;
 Dabdoub, Louis S <Louis.S.Dabdoub@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Wallace, Ben <BenWallace@HQ.DHS.GOV>;
 Robinson, Donald <Donald.Robinson@HQ.DHS.GOV>; HSOC.PSA <HSOC.PSA@HQ.DHS.GOV>; PSADutyDesk
 <PSADutyDesk@HQ.DHS.GOV>; David.Hunter1@dhs.gov <David.Hunter1@dhs.gov>; Jackson, Liz
 <CTR> <Liz.Jackson@associates.HQ.DHS.GOV>
 Sent: Sun Aug 28 15:59:12 2005
 Subject: Jackson, MS PSA contact info

See Ben's email below. Kirk Toth (Mobile, AL PSA) and Mike Waters (Birmingham, AL PSA)
 will provide their hurricane plan of action and contact information this evening. Kirk's
 # is 850 621-3264 and Mike's # is 202 680-3498.

Thanks,

Mark Milicich
 Protective Security Advisor- Norfolk, VA U.S. Department of Homeland Security
 IAIP- Protective Security Division
 Work: 757 314-1819
 Cell: 757 262-6600
 mark.milicich@dhs.gov

From: Wallace, Ben
Sent: Sun 8/28/2005 3:20 PM
To: Milicich, Mark
Subject: Re: Contact Information

Mark
Plan on being in MEOC in Jackson. Phone cell 662 699 9407. Home 601 664 0718 Waiting to hear from Dep Dir MS Homeland Security. Haven't sent SITREP because nothing to report except MS in stste of emergency. We expect hurricane force winds in Jackson at this time. More to follow when something to say different from other PSAs.

VR
Ben

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

Addington, David S.

From: Kaniewski, Daniel J.
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 11:13 AM
To: Bartlett, Dan; Beyer, Todd W.; Burck, Bill; Duffy, Trent D.; Hagin, Joseph W; Hook, Brian H.; Kavanaugh, Brett M.; Kropp, Emily L.; McGurn, William J.; McMillin, Stephen S.; Miers, Harriet; Miller, Bruce E.; Ralston, Susan B.; Rapuano, Kenneth; Sforza, Scott N.; Silverberg, Kristen; Smith, Heidi M.; Townsend, Frances F.
Cc: Atkiss, Steven A.; Bennett, Jessica C.; Black, Stephen P.; Brown, Jamie E.; Burke, John G.; Burkhardt, Shannon B.; Currin, John; DeSeri, Robert; DL-HSC-BTS; DL-HSC-CHEM-BIO; DL-HSC-EXECSEC; DL-HSC-Front; DL-HSC-PPR; DL-NSC-WHSR; Drouin, Lindsey E.; Fiddelke, Debbie S.; Healy, Erin E.; Hughes, Taylor A.; Kane, M. Lauren; Kendall, Karyn Richman; Kirk, Matthew; Kyle, Ross M.; Mamo, Jeanie S.; Michel, Christopher G.; Mistri, Alexander M.; Mitnick, John M.; Morgan, Derrick D.; Nagle, Erin C.; Patel, Neil S.; Perino, Dana M.; Pitkin, Douglas; Roebke, Heather M.; Wilmot, Daniel K.; Wysocki, Candace M.; Zemp, DeWitt
Subject: HSC PPR Katrina Spot report 11am

Currently Katrina has 127 mph sustained winds, making it a **Category 3** storm. Katrina is moving northward, located 22 miles to the east of New Orleans. Flooding is significant throughout the region and a levee in New Orleans has reportedly been breached sending 6 to 8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward area of the city. Per the Governor, water is rising at 1 foot per hour and the New Orleans mayor reports problems with a pumping station, causing flooding. HSOC reports that due to the rising water in the 9th Ward, residents are in their attics and on their roofs.

Significant structural damage has been reported in New Orleans due to Katrina. The roof of the Superdome has sustained some damage (rain is coming in through holes in the roof, though Governor states that building is structurally sound). The HSOC reports at least one building collapse in New Orleans and the media reports an apartment building in Harvey, Louisiana has collapsed and an oil rig has been separated from its mooring.

The eyewall of the hurricane has remained just east of New Orleans. The eyewall is where the strongest winds, largest surge and waves are, so areas east of New Orleans are being hit harder. A 15-20 foot storm surge is expected for Biloxi, Mississippi

We are watching this developing this situation and will provide updates following our noon conference call with FEMA.

--
Daniel J. Kaniewski
 Director of Response and Recovery
 Homeland Security Council
 The White House
 202-456-5415

004795

1/4/2006

Q-8

Drummond, Michael

From: Lee, Insung [Insung.Lee1@dhs.gov] on behalf of HSOC.SWO [HSOC.Swo@dhs.gov]
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 11:32 AM
To: HSOC.SWO; DL-NSC-WHSR; Nichols, Bethany A.; Langer, Elliott M.; Nielsen, Kirstjen M.; Bagnat, Joel B.; Farrell, J. Elizabeth; Bentz, Julie A.; Kaniewski, Daniel J.; Davis, Richard D.; Barton, Michael; Broderick, Matthew; DiFalco, Frank; Stephan, Bob; Chase, John; Dinanno, Tom; McDonald, Edward; Kulisch, Gail; Paar, Tom; Jackson, Michael (DepSec); Wood, John (COS); NICC; Secretary Briefing Staff; HSOC.HSIN
Subject: HSOC#4317-05: HC Katrina Update - 1130 hrs

FYI

Vlr,

InSung Oaks Lee
 Senior Watch Officer
 Department of Homeland Security
 Homeland Security Operations Center
 (W) 202-282-8101
 (P) 877-600-5657

After a morning conference call with state and parish officials, Maj. Gen. Bennett C. Landreneau said emergency personnel stationed at Jackson Barracks have confirmed that the waters are rising, although he could not say whether the cause was a levee breach or overtopping. Extensive flooding has been reported along St. Claude and Claiborne avenues.

Landreneau confirmed reports that a leak has developed at the Superdome, where thousands of people who could not leave the city are waiting out the storm. But he said the building is still structurally sound and that people had been moved from the spot that is leaking.

Five floors of windows at Charity Hospital have blown out, with flooding reported on the first floor of the hospital, which has remained open, officials said.

Local officials are also reporting that floodwaters are encroaching on roads in the lower-lying parishes of St. Bernard and Plaquemines. The 911 call centers in St. Bernard and Orleans parishes have been shut down and evacuated, Landreneau said.

12/2/2005

WHK-05001

Q-9

From: Heath, Michael
 Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 11:51 AM
 To: Lowder, Michael
 Subject: Re: Information

FYI...

From Marty. He has been trying to reach Lokey.

New Orleans FD is reporting a 20 foot wide breach on the lake ponchatrain side levy. The area is lakeshore Blvd and 17th street.

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Lowder, Michael <Michael.Lowder@fema.gov>
 To: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@fema.gov>; Lokey, William <William.Lokey@fema.gov>; Jones, Gary <Gary.Jones@fema.gov>; Robinson, Tony <Tony.Robinson@fema.gov>; Heath, Michael <Michael.Heath@fema.gov>; Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@fema.gov>; EST-ESF03-A <EST-ESF03-A@fema.gov>; EST-ESF03-B <EST-ESF03-B@fema.gov>; EST-ESF03C <EST-ESF03C@fema.gov>
 Sent: Mon Aug 29 09:52:34 2005
 Subject: FW: Information

F Y I

ML

From: Green, Matthew
 Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:50 AM
 To: Buikema, Edward
 Cc: Lowder, Michael
 Subject: RE: Information

From WWL TV

.. A LEVEE BREACH OCCURRED ALONG THE INDUSTRIAL CANAL AT TENNESSE STREET. 3 TO 8 FEET OF WATER IS EXPECTED DUE TO THE BREACH...LOCATIONS IN THE WARNING INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO ARABI AND 9TH WARD OF NEW ORLEANS.

Matthew Green
 FEMA Hurricane Liaison Team Coordinator
 National Hurricane Center
 11691 SW 17th Street
 Miami, Florida, 33165-2149 USA
 305-225-4217

257

From: Buikema, Edward
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:40 AM
To: Green, Matthew
Cc: Lowder, Michael
Subject: Information

Matthew,

Please copy me on the spot report emails you send to Mike Lowder. That information is very helpful.

Thanks. Ed

000
 WTUS84 KLIH 291556
 HSLIX
 LAZ038-040-050-056>070-MSZ080>082-291600-

HURRICANE KATRINA LOCAL STATEMENT
 NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NEW ORLEANS LA
 1052 AM CDT MON AUG 29 2005

...KATRINA BATTERS NEW ORLEANS...SOME LEVEES TOPPED...EXTENSIVE
 DAMAGE IS OCCURRING...

...KATRINA MAKING SECOND LANDFALL ON MISSISSIPPI COAST...PRODUCING
 EXTREME DAMAGE...

...HURRICANE WARNING IN EFFECT FOR SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA AND COASTAL
 MISSISSIPPI FROM MORGAN CITY EAST TO THE ALABAMA FLORIDA BORDER....

...EXTENSIVE AND LIFE THREATENING STORM SURGE FLOODING OCCURRING
 ALONG THE LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI COASTS AT THIS TIME...INCLUDING
 THE NEW ORLEANS AREA...

...AREAS AFFECTED...
 IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA...THE FOLLOWING PARISHES

ASSUMPTION...ST JAMES...ST JOHN THE BAPTIST...ST CHARLES...
 ST BERNARD...TERREBONNE...ORLEANS...JEFFERSON...PLAQUEMINE...
 LAFOURCHE...ST TAMMANY...TANGIPAHOA...LIVINGSTON.

IN COASTAL MISSISSIPPI...THE FOLLOWING COUNTIES
 HANCOCK...HARRISON...JACKSON

...WATCHES AND WARNINGS...
 A HURRICANE WARNING IS IN EFFECT FROM EAST OF MORGAN CITY EAST TO THE
 ALABAMA-FLORIDA BORDER AREA. THIS INCLUDES THE METRO NEW ORLEANS
 AREA...AND THE MISSISSIPPI COAST.

AN INLAND HURRICANE WARNING IS ALSO IN EFFECT FOR AREAS AWAY FROM THE
 COAST.

A FLOOD WATCH IS IN EFFECT FOR MOST OF SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA AN
 EXTREME SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI TONIGHT.

TORNADO WATCHES IN EFFECT FOR COASTAL LOUISIANA AND SOUTH
 MISSISSIPPI.

...STORM INFORMATION...
 AROUND 1030 AM CDT...THE EYE OF HURRICANE KATRINA WAS CENTERED OVER
 HANCOCK COUNTY MISSISSIPPI AND ST. TAMMANY PARISH LOUISIANA...AND
 WAS MOVING TOWARD THE NORTH AROUND 17 MPH. THIS MOTION WILL
 CONTINUE THIS AFTERNOON.

MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 125 MPH...WITH HIGHER GUSTS.
 HURRICANE KATRINA IS NOW A CATEGORY THREE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR
 SIMPSON SCALE...AFTER STRIKING THE SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA COAST NEAR
 GRAND ISLE AS A CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE EARLIER THIS MORNING.

PRECAUTIONARY/PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS...
WITH THE ONSET OF HURRICANE FORCE WINDS AND HEAVY SQUALLS...PEOPLE SHOULD REMAIN IN LAST RESORT REFUGES IN STRONG...WELL CONSTRUCTED BUILDINGS. IF LIFE THREATENING STORM SURGE FLOODING DEVELOPS...MOVE TO HIGHER FLOORS OR HOUSE ATTICS. BRING TOOLS TO MAKE AN EMERGENCY EXIT SHOULD THESE HIGHER FLOORS OR ATTICS BECOME INUNDATED.

...STORM SURGE FLOOD AND STORM TIDE IMPACTS...
KATRINA IS MAKING A SECOND LANDFALL ALONG THE MISSISSIPPI-LOUISIANA BORDER NORTHEAST OF NEW ORLEANS...GENERALLY OVER HANCOCK COUNTY MISSISSIPPI AND ST. TAMMANY PARISH LOUISIANA.

A SIGNIFICANT AND LIFE THREATENING STORM SURGE ESTIMATED AROUND 20 FEET HAS OCCURRED WITH KATRINA...CAUSING LEVEES TO BE OVERTOPPED IN ORLEANS AND ST BERNARD PARISHES. IN ADDITION DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES ARE OCCURRING ON TOP OF THE STORM SURGE NEAR THE COAST. SEVERE TIDAL FLOODING WILL CONTINUE IN THESE AREAS FOR SEVERAL MORE HOURS. SIGNIFICANT FLOODING IS ALSO OCCURRING ALONG THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST OVER HANCOCK...HARRISON AND JACKSON COUNTIES. EXTENSIVE DAMAGE DUE TO THE WIND AND STORM SURGE IS OCCURRING ALONG THE MISSISSIPPI COAST.

IN ADDITION...A STORM SURGE OF 10 TO 12 FEET HAS OCCURRED IN THE SOUTHWEST PART OF LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AFFECTING THE EAST BANKS OF JEFFERSON...ST CHARLES...ST JOHN THE BAPTIST AND LIVINGSTON PARISHES.

...WIND IMPACTS...
HURRICANE FORCE WINDS ARE OCCURRING OVER SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA AND COASTAL MISSISSIPPI...WITH WINDS OVER 100 MPH STILL OCCURRING NEAR THE COAST. POWER OUTAGES ARE OCCURRING...AND WILL BECOME MORE WIDESPREAD DURING THE REST OF THE MORNING. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS WILL PERSIST OVER MUCH OF THE REGION THROUGH EARLY MONDAY AFTERNOON.

WINDS ASSOCIATED WITH STRONG CATEGORY 3 HURRICANES CAN TOTALLY DESTROY MOBILE HOMES AND POORLY CONSTRUCTED DWELLINGS...AND CAUSE MAJOR DAMAGE TO EVEN WELL CONSTRUCTED BUILDINGS. HIGHER WIND SPEEDS WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY STRONGER ON UPPER FLOORS OF TALL BUILDINGS CAUSING DAMAGE.

...TORNADOES...
A TORNADO WATCH HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR MUCH OF SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA AND COASTAL MISSISSIPPI DUE TO THE THREAT OF TORNADOES.

...RAINFALL...
RAINFALL TOTALS OF 8 TO 10 INCHES...WITH ISOLATED MAXIMUM AMOUNTS OF 15 INCHES...ARE POSSIBLE.

...NEXT UPDATE...
THE NEXT LOCAL STATEMENT WILL BE ISSUED AROUND 130 PM CDT.

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260


LOUISIANA STATE POLICE



EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

MONDAY, AUGUST 29, 2005

1100 HOURS



000001

Q-12

INFORMATION INPUT:TEXT PRESENTED IN BLACK WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AND CURRENTTEXT PRESENTED IN RED IS NEW INFORMATION

WEATHER

HURRICANE KATRINA ADVISORY NUMBER 27
 NWS TPC/NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER MIAMI FL
 10 AM CDT MON AUG 29 2005

...CENTER OF POWERFUL HURRICANE KATRINA AGAIN MOVING ASHORE...NEAR
 THE LOUISIANA-MISSISSIPPI BORDER...CONTINUES POUNDING SOUTHEASTERN
 LOUISIANA AND SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI...

A HURRICANE WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST
 FROM MORGAN CITY LOUISIANA EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA
 BORDER...INCLUDING THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN.

AT 10 AM CDT...1500Z...ALL HURRICANE WATCHES ARE DISCONTINUED.
 A TROPICAL STORM WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT FROM EAST OF THE
 ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER TO INDIAN PASS FLORIDA...AND FROM WEST OF
 MORGAN CITY TO CAMERON LOUISIANA.

FOR STORM INFORMATION SPECIFIC TO YOUR AREA...INCLUDING POSSIBLE
 INLAND WATCHES AND WARNINGS...PLEASE MONITOR PRODUCTS ISSUED
 BY YOUR LOCAL WEATHER OFFICE.

AT 10 AM CDT...1500Z...THE CENTER OF HURRICANE KATRINA WAS LOCATED
 NEAR LATITUDE 30.2 NORTH... LONGITUDE 89.6 WEST. THIS POSITION IS
 NEAR THE MOUTH OF THE PEARL RIVER...ABOUT 35 MILES EAST-NORTHEAST
 OF NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA AND ABOUT 45 MILES WEST-SOUTHWEST OF
 BILOXI MISSISSIPPI.

KATRINA IS MOVING TOWARD THE NORTH NEAR 16 MPH...AND THIS GENERAL
 MOTION IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TODAY AND TONIGHT. ON THIS TRACK
 THE CENTER WILL MOVE OVER SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI TODAY AND INTO
 CENTRAL MISSISSIPPI THIS EVENING.

MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 125 MPH...WITH HIGHER GUSTS.
 KATRINA IS NOW A CATEGORY THREE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON
 SCALE. WINDS AFFECTING THE UPPER FLOORS OF HIGH RISE BUILDINGS
 WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY STRONGER THAN THOSE NEAR GROUND LEVEL.
 WEAKENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS AS THE CENTER MOVES
 OVER LAND. HOWEVER...HURRICANE FORCE WINDS ARE EXPECTED TO SPREAD
 AS FAR AS 150 MILES INLAND ALONG THE PATH OF KATRINA. SEE INLAND
 HURRICANE AND TROPICAL STORM WARNINGS FROM NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE
 FORECAST OFFICES.

HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 125 MILES FROM THE
 CENTER...AND TROPICAL STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP
 TO 230 MILES.

000002

THE MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE ESTIMATED FROM AIR FORCE HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT IS 927 MB...27.37 INCHES.


COASTAL STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 15 TO 20 FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS...ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES...CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF THE CENTER. STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 10 TO 15 FEET...NEAR THE TOPS OF THE LEVEES...IS STILL POSSIBLE IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS AREA. SIGNIFICANT STORM SURGE FLOODING IS OCCURRING ELSEWHERE ALONG THE CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF OF MEXICO COAST.

RAINFALL TOTALS OF 5 TO 10 INCHES...WITH ISOLATED MAXIMUM AMOUNTS OF 15 INCHES...ARE POSSIBLE ALONG THE PATH OF KATRINA ACROSS THE GULF COAST AND THE TENNESSEE VALLEY. RAINFALL TOTALS OF 4 TO 8 INCHES ARE POSSIBLE ACROSS THE OHIO VALLEY INTO THE EASTERN GREAT LAKES REGION TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY.

A FEW TORNADES ARE POSSIBLE OVER PORTIONS OF SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MISSISSIPPI...SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL ALABAMA...AND THE WESTERN FLORIDA PANHANDLE TODAY.

REPEATING THE 10 AM CDT POSITION...30.2 N... 89.6 W. MOVEMENT TOWARD...NORTH NEAR 16 MPH. MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS...125 MPH. MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE... 927 MB.

INTERMEDIATE ADVISORIES WILL BE ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER AT NOON CDT AND 2 PM CDT FOLLOWED BY THE NEXT COMPLETE ADVISORY AT 4 PM CDT.



000003

Significant Events

Representatives from the Metropolitan New Orleans and the North Shore area continue to report significant structural damage, heavy flooding and deteriorating weather.

*Captain Mark Willow, NOPD Homeland Security has reported a 20' foot Levee Break at 17th Street Canal. Fire Department is reporting authority. Levee Board notified.

Troop L has relocated to 12th District Fire Department. Phone number is 985-809-8007. Troop L has lost all capabilities. Water has overtaken the generator.

Jefferson Parish has lost all water pressure. They are also closing ALL roadways.

DPS Police Capital Complex has regular power but has experienced generator problems. Reliability concerns in the event of another power loss.

LSP Academy fire alarm is activated. There is no emergency. LSP-A Staff has attempted to contact company with no success.

We are continuing to receive emergency 911-like calls which are now being entered into a Database for tracking.

DOTD reports that water is beginning to rise over US 11 at I-10. Troop L notified.

Contraflow

It is estimated that 500,000 vehicles were evacuated under Contraflow.

Road Closures

LA 1 south of the Leeville Bridge is closed.

I-10 eastbound into Mississippi is closed.

US 61 at the St. Charles / Kenner Line is closed.

Causeway Bridge is closed.

Crescent City Connection is closed.

LA 632 in St. Charles parish is not passable.

US 61 in St. Charles Parish is closed due to the weather.

The Belle Chase Tunnel is closed due to flooding.

I-12 at Albany is closed due to down power lines across the Interstate.

000004

000
 WGUS54 KLIH 291650
 FFWLIX
 LAC071-075-087-292245-

BULLETIN - EAS ACTIVATION REQUESTED
 FLASH FLOOD WARNING
 NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NEW ORLEANS-BATON ROUGE LA
 ISSUED BY NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MOBILE AL
 1140 AM CDT MON AUG 29 2005

THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE HAS ISSUED A

* FLASH FLOOD WARNING FOR...

ORLEANS PARISH IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA
 ST. BERNARD PARISH IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA
 PLAQUEMINES PARISH IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA

* UNTIL 545 PM CDT

* AT 1137 AM CDT...WIDESPREAD FLOODING WILL CONTINUE ACROSS THE
 PARISHES ALONG THE SOUTH SHORE OF LAKE PONCHARTRAIN IN THE GREATER
 NEW ORLEANS AREA...AS WELL AS IN PORTIONS OF PLAQUEMINES PARISH.
 THIS CONTINUES TO BE AN EXTREMELY LIFE THREATENING SITUATION. THOSE
 SEEKING REFUGE IN ATTICS AND ROOF-TOPS ARE STRONGLY URGED TO TAKE
 THE NECESSARY TOOLS FOR SURVIVAL. FOR EXAMPLE...THOSE GOING INTO
 ATTICS SHOULD TRY TO TAKE AN AXE OR HATCHET WITH THEM SO THEY CAN
 CUT THEIR WAY ONTO THE ROOF TO AVOID DROWNING SHOULD RISING FLOOD
 WATERS CONTINUE TO RISE INTO THE ATTIC.

RESCUE MAY NOT COME UNTIL THE STRONG WINDS ABATE AS DANGEROUS
 HURRICANE KATRINA MOVES NORTHEAST OF THE AREA.

LAT...LON 2986 9001 3002 8964 3016 8971 3003 9013

\$\$

From: Sills, David W MVD
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 3:14 PM
To: Irwin, William E HQ02; Hecker, Edward J HQ02
Cc: CE-UOC HQ02
Subject: FW: From Chuck Shadie on New Orleans Flooding

From: Montague, Joyce MVD
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 1:54 PM
To: Crear, Robert MVD; Rickey, John S MVD
Cc: Banks, Larry E MVD; Shadie, Charles E MVD; Sills, David W MVD
Subject: From Chuck Shadie on New Orleans Flooding

Status Report (1400 hr central time 29 Aug) on New Orleans Inundations Received from New Orleans District Emergency Ops.

Orleans Parish

A small breach reported at 17 Street Canal by local firemen. The 17 Street Canal is located along the Orleans Parish-Jefferson Parish boundary line on the east bank. Some leakage possibly still occurring into Orleans Parish near Lakefront.

Jefferson Parish

Report that Duncan Pumping Station and Bonnebelle Pumping Station suffered roof damage, inundation of pumps, and are not operating at this time.

St. Bernard Parish

Reported overtoppings of levee near Arabi and Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. Some level of widespread flooding has occurred.

West Bank

Report there has been a breach of the levee in the east of Harvey Canal, west bank area.

Other Parishes

To date, District has not received damage reports from surrounding parishes.

New Orleans Headquarters Building

Some roof damage has occurred to north end of building and to the shops buildings.

Chuck Shadie

Phone: 601-634-5917

**LOUISIANA OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
SITREP
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Hurricane Katrina**

As of: 1600 hrs 29 Aug 2005

WEATHER CONDITIONS

SITUATION: KATRINA CONTINUES WEAKENING OVER MISSISSIPPI BUT STRONG WINDS AND HEAVY RAINS STILL A THREAT

AT 4 PM LOCAL TIME, THE HURRICANE WARNING FOR LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AND FROM THE MOUTH OF THE PEARL RIVER EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER IS CHANGED TO A TROPICAL STORM WARNING. ALL OTHER WARNINGS ARE DISCONTINUED.

A TROPICAL STORM WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT FOR LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AND FROM THE MOUTH OF THE PEARL RIVER EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER. THIS WARNING WILL LIKELY BE DISCONTINUED THIS EVENING.

AT 4 PM LOCAL TIME, THE CENTER OF HURRICANE KATRINA WAS LOCATED NEAR LATITUDE 31.9 NORTH LONGITUDE 89.6 WEST OR ABOUT 30 MILES NORTHWEST OF LAUREL MISSISSIPPI.

KATRINA IS MOVING TOWARD THE NORTH NEAR 18 MPH AND A GRADUAL TURN TO THE NORTH-NORTHEAST WITH AN ADDITIONAL INCREASE IN FORWARD SPEED IS EXPECTED DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS. ON THIS TRACK THE CENTER WILL BE MOVING OVER CENTRAL AND NORTHERN MISSISSIPPI TONIGHT AND INTO WESTERN TENNESSEE ON TUESDAY.

MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 75 MPH WITH HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS A CATEGORY ONE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. CONTINUED WEAKENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS.

HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 60 MILES FROM THE CENTER...AND TROPICAL STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 205 MILES...MAINLY TO THE SOUTHEAST.

- a) **STATE DECLARATION STATUS:** Declared State of Emergency.
- b) **EOC MANNING:** Level I
- c) **INJURIES/FATALITIES:** (3) fatalities (Patients during transport)
- d) **SHELTERS:** (9) Special Needs open) (113) General Population Shelter
- e) **ROAD CLOSURES:** Causeway Bridge; LA 23 Belle Chase Tunnel

DHS-FEMA-0028-0001109


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Q-15

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
HURRICANE KATRINA

Date/Time (EST):			Tuesday, August 30, 2005 0600 hrs
Incident Type:			Natural Disaster: Hurricane Katrina
Location of Incident:			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gulf Coast States (Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas)
Time of Incident (EST):			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Katrina made its second landfall at approximately 0710 hrs EDT, Monday, August 29, 2005 over Southeast Louisiana as a strong category (4) Hurricane. Katrina made its first landfall at 1830 hrs on Thursday, August 25, 2005 near the Florida Broward/Dade County line as a category one (1) hurricane.
Incident Site Weather Conditions:	Current	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The center of Tropical Storm Katrina is located about 35 miles NE of Tupelo, MS Katrina is moving NNE near 18 mph Maximum sustained winds have decreased to near 50 mph, with gusts of 60 mph 	
	Next 24-48 hrs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A turn toward the NE and a faster forward speed, up to 30 mph. Further weakening is expected. Katrina should weaken to a depression later today Tropical storm force winds extend outward up to 105 miles Tornadoes are possible over western SC, NC, and VA Coastal storm surge flooding along the northern and northeastern Gulf of Mexico will slowly subside 	
	Next 48-72 hrs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Additional rainfall accumulations of 2-4", with isolated maximum amounts of 6" through the TN and Ohio Valleys, the lower Great Lakes, and into New England 	

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HURRICANE KATRINA



On-Scene Update			
Official Casualties		Extent of Damage	
Fatalities	<p>Florida: 11 in the state of Florida (first land fall).</p> <p>Mississippi: 7</p> <p>Louisiana: No official reporting at the time of this report.</p> <p>Alabama: No official reporting at the time of this report.</p>	Destroyed	Assessment Pending
Hospitalized	No official reporting at the time of this report.	Major Damage	Assessment Pending
Injured	No official reporting at the time of this report.	Minor Damage	Assessment Pending
Other	N/A	Power Outage	See ESF 12 Section

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HURRICANE KATRINA

Projections of Cascading Effects / HAZMAT Footprint

Widespread and significant flooding has occurred throughout the city of New Orleans, extending eastward across the Mississippi gulf coast into coastal Alabama. The following flood reports have been received for the city of New Orleans:

- Industrial Canal at Tennessee St.: levee has been breached, with water to a depth of 5 feet at Jackson Barracks
- 17th St. at Canal Blvd.: levee has been breached - breach extends several 100 meters in length
- Much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater, depth unknown at this time.
- Numerous homes flooded in Metairie and Harvey in Jefferson Parish
- East Jefferson Hospital in Metairie flooded
- Flooding to a depth of 8 to 10 feet in Metairie
- Flooding to a depth of 6 feet in 9th Ward in New Orleans
- I-10 Mounds Pump Station is out of service due to overheating
- Tulane University Medical Center experiencing a one inch rise in water per hour. Helicopter evacuations being considered.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates are in progress and project that it could take months to dewater the City of New Orleans. This will delay damage assessments and restoration. It is possible that New Orleans may face an extended period of water shortage. The Louisiana Emergency Operations Center reports Lake Ponchartrain levee is breached. Aerial damage assessments are under way. DHS has requested additional infrastructure impacts and flood models based on the potential breach. A complete assessment of the damage is pending.

Widespread flooding has also been reported across coastal Mississippi and Alabama. Flood waters have been reported in downtown Mobile, to a depth of 10 to 12 feet (up to streetlights).

Reports of major damage are now being received from central Mississippi. Local emergency management officials indicate that damage is too extensive to even begin to calculate or summarize at this point. Preliminary reports indicate that the damage has been heaviest in Lamar, Forrest, and Jones counties, but extensive, major damage appears to have occurred in all counties along and south and east of Interstates 55 and 20.

The water treatment plant at Jackson, Miss. was shut down at 5:00 pm due to power outage.

The Gulfport, Miss. fire chief estimates 75% of Gulfport homes have sustained major roof damage.

Chemical Plants:

- Awaiting initial assessment.

Water/Sewer Systems:

- There are widespread power outages in Louisiana and Mississippi. This will affect small to medium size facilities that have remote wells. It is expected that many areas will be without water. This is particularly true in the New Orleans area where heavy flooding is expected to inundate water treatment plants. Assessments are pending.
- Power outages will also affect many sewage lift stations. This will result in many raw sewage overflows, which will trigger boil water notices. This will be a particular problem in New Orleans and surrounding flooded cities and towns. Assessments are pending.

Drummond, Michael

From: JonesEr@usa.redcross.org
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 6:08 PM
To: JonesEr@usa.redcross.org; YolandaL.Gaston@dhs.gov; amiller@nvoad.org; Nationalvoad@aol.com; Art.Storey@dhs.gov; Nichols, Bethany A.; Ben.Curran@dhs.gov; Berl.Jones@dhs.gov; Bernadette.Frerker@dhs.gov; Peter.Bishop@uwamail.unitedway.org; robert.blitzer@hhs.gov; bruce.gentile@mail.va.gov; Bruce.Pfaff@dhs.gov; Peace, Cheryl D.; mcarliner@nahb.com; Carolyn.Coleman@dhs.gov; eocreport@cdc.gov; cpartain@cdc.gov; Claude.Cressy@northcom.mil; iimg3.iimg@hq.dhs.gov; Dick.Bainicky@dhs.gov; est-donat@dhs.gov; est-donat-a@dhs.gov; est-humser@dhs.gov; Harry.Noftsker@dhs.gov; thenderson@namb.net; Hhs.scc@hhs.gov; hscenter@dhs.gov; Farrell, J. Elizabeth; larry.jackson@dhs.gov; Jason.Jackson@wal-mart.com; Jennifer.Yunker@dhs.gov; Jon.Wallace@dhs.gov; Josue.Diaz@dhs.gov; Nielsen, Kirstjen M.; Brian.Kamoie@hhs.gov; jeff.karonis@dhs.gov; Ken.Curtin@dhs.gov; Laura.Hokenstad@dhs.gov; laura.manning@dhs.gov; Liz.Gibson@dhs.gov; Jack.R.Malgeri@irsounsel.treas.gov; NICC@dhs.gov; nieskes@comcast.net; David.Roybal@northcom.mil; Nc.icg.omb@northcom.mil; jan_c_oopper@hud.gov; ppowell@namb.net; Richard.Gray@dhs.gov; Natalie.Rule@dhs.gov; John_berglund@usn.salvationarmy.org; CGibneyCarey@safehorizon.org; flo_knox@usn.salvationarmy.org; Samuel.neglis@dhs.gov; tamara.schomber@uwamail.unitedway.org; Sheryl.maddux@usda.gov; marilyn.shigetani@dhs.gov; Ken.Skalitzky@dhs.gov; Stewart.Smith@northcom.mil; joseph.sredl@hq.dhs.gov; Bob.stephan@dhs.gov; Susan.Jensen@dhs.gov; suzanne.calvert@dhs.gov; swo.hsoo@hq.dhs.gov; micki@211tampabay.org; Vaco.roc@va.gov; Jaretha.Wallther@associates.dhs.gov; Nielsen, Kirstjen M.
Cc: GunlockJ@usa.redcross.org
Subject: American Red Cross Disaster Operations Report for the Hurricane Katrina 08 29 05 PM
Attachments: American Red Cross Hur Katrina Ops Report 08 29 05 #9.doc

The American Red Cross Disaster Operations Report for the Hurricane Katrina response is attached for your convenience.

This report has general Red Cross response and preparedness activities for the Southeastern US. This report will be generated twice daily. This report will continue to be generated twice daily until operations and preparations slow.

Should you want to be removed from this distribution list, or should you know anyone who might want to be added, please send a request to me at JonesEr@usa.redcross.org.

Information provided in this report is obtained from American Red Cross service areas, state lead chapters, affected chapters, and news media reports.

Thank you for supporting your American Red Cross!

Eric W. Jones
American Red Cross National Sector
 Government/ Emergency Management Liaison Activity Lead with Response Partner Services
 Office: 202/303-5670
 Mobile: 703/296-6132
 NHQ Disaster Operations Center FAX: 202/303-0233

12/2/2005

Q-17

WHK-06494



**American
Red Cross**

Disaster Operations Summary Report
Disaster Operations Center

Hurricane Katrina Post- and Pre-Landfall Report #9
Update as of 3:00 PM 08/29/2005

Landfall Report for Katrina 2 Shelter Counts as of 3:00 pm August 29, 2005						
State DR number	AL 871	MS 007	LA 865	TX 009	NFL 871	Totals
# Chapters Reporting	14	15	6	9	4	48
# EOCs in Jurisdiction Activated	6	14	16	1	5	42
# EOCs with Red Cross Liaisons	5	9	13	0	5	32
# Red Cross Shelters/Evacuation Centers on Standby*	33	11	24	17	7	92
# Red Cross Shelters/Evacuation Centers Currently Open*	47	93	76	13	10	239
Current Population*	2,999	12,697	18,194	1,576	1,625	37,091
# Meals Served to Date	1,337	895	23,267	1,620	742	27,861

*Shelter numbers fluctuate based on the location of the storm and the time of day. As a storm leaves an area, shelters close except for a few that remain open to house those people who cannot return home.

Impact of the Second Landfall of Katrina

As of 5:00 pm on Monday, August 29th, Hurricane Katrina was listed as a category one hurricane with maximum sustained winds at 95 mph and higher gusts. Weakening is forecast during the next 24 hours as the center continues moving over land. However, hurricane force winds are expected to spread as far as 150 miles inland along the path of Katrina. Hurricane force winds extend outward up to 125 miles from the center, and tropical storm force winds extend outward up to 230 miles.

New Orleans was spared direct hit. However, an estimated 770,000 utility customers in Louisiana are reported without power; Entergy Corp. alone reporting 700,000 and Cleco Corp reporting 70,000 outages. Reports of flooding vary based on region with some levees in New Orleans reportedly breached. Extensive flooding in the Lower 9th Board and St. Bernard Parish may be a result of water going over the tops of the levees. Boil water alerts have been issued.

A curfew is effective in New Orleans from Monday afternoon until dawn Tuesday, and dusk until dawn each day thereafter.

In Mississippi, local media reported 10,000 power outages, but no updates have been reported. Local media also reported a storm surge of more than 20 feet, with waves as high as 33 feet.

Hurricane Katrina is expected move north along the Mississippi River, resulting in showers and thunderstorms for the four state area, especially in northcentral Louisiana and southcentral Arkansas. These storms are not expected to become severe, although localized flooding will be possible across portions of Louisiana and Arkansas.

Alabama-Gulf Coast reports that blood drives have been cancelled for today resulting in a loss of 200 units in collections. AL-GC estimates that there will be a loss of 500 units collected over the next several days due to cancelled drives. The Mobile facility remains open with Mobile minimal staff present. All hospitals supported by Mobile received extra blood units prior to the storm. Mobile facility received superficial damage and is operating on auxiliary power.
(SOURCES: The Weather Channel/National Weather Service/CNN/The Times-Picayune)

WHK-06495

Red Cross Response and Activation for Second Landfall of Katrina

Community Services

Feeding

- Identified, with the Southern Baptists, sites for 25 kitchens, which are on stand-by, each with 20,000 daily capacity (for a total of 500,000), to be moved to sites post landfall.
- Requested an additional ten kitchens (with a daily capacity of 200,000). Spirit of America and Henry's Kitchen are being moved to Montgomery, AL for staging. (The Sysco Kitchen will move to the area post-landfall.)

Material Support Services

SAS:

- A Safe Area has been identified in the HQ facility for DRO staff
- A Weather Alert Radio has been set up, tested and is working
- An Evacuation Plan for the HQ facility has been completed

Logistics

- A Client Assistance Card (CAC) activation unit is operational at the Response Maintenance Center in Austin, TX
- Follow on orders for Sysco to support Baptist and Red Cross kitchens
- The Time Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) for kitchen has been received and is in stage one of implementation.
- Working with federal response for support of operations
- Henry's Kitchen and Spirit of America have arrived in Montgomery, AL
- 166 ERVs from the 48 continental United States have been deployed to the impacted region
- Approximately 288,000 heater meals are staged in Baton Rouge, with another 150,000 in Montgomery
- Obtaining FEMA cambros for Montgomery, AL
- Working with FEMA for equipment requests (fuel, dry boxes, generators, dumpsters, grey water containers, ice, water, forklifts, pallet jacks, shower units, port).
- Open SAM's accounts in Mississippi and Florida
- 2500 clean-up kits staged in Mississippi
- 5000 comfort kits in Mississippi

RTT

- ECRVs are staged in Alabama and Houston, with others supporting or in route to Louisiana.
- Received 25 check-ins from Red Cross communication-net.
- Creating 40 To-Go packs for the Kitchens
- Setting up coordinated communication networks for the affected areas to communicate with the Service Areas and National Headquarters

IKD

- Received offers from or placed requests by donors for support of relief operations

Partner Services**Government/Emergency Management Liaison**

- **Alabama:** Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is fully activated with a Red Cross Liaison present.
- **Louisiana:** Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is fully activated and a Red Cross Liaison is present.
- **Florida:** Florida's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) remains fully activated with a Red Cross Liaisons present.
- **Mississippi:** Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is fully activated with Red Cross Liaisons present.
- **Georgia:** Emergency Operations Center (EOC) continues operating at Level I (monitoring). No Red Cross Liaisons requested at this time.
- **South Carolina:** Emergency Operations Center (EOC) continues operating at Level I (monitoring). No Red Cross Liaisons requested at this time.
- **Tennessee:** Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) activated the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at noon on Monday, August 29th until further notice. This is a 24-hour partial activation to include a Red Cross liaison.

Federal

- An ESF#6 multi-partner coordination center has been established at Red Cross national headquarters in Washington, DC, and will be operational effective Tuesday, August 30th. The center will ensure better interagency coordination between the Red Cross, Federal agencies, other NGOs active in disaster, and public/private sector partners as we support community response actions.
- FEMA Region IV and Region VI Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) are staffed 24/7 by Red Cross. Red Crossers support the Emergency Response Team – Advanced (ERT-A) teams in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. Rapid Needs Assessment Teams (RNAT) ESF#6 are staffed in Florida and Mississippi.
- FEMA's National Response Coordination Center remains staffed 24/7 with ESF#6.
- ESF#6 partners are anticipating requests post-landfall.

External Affairs Liaison (EAL)

- EAL public members are present at the Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida State EOCs.
- Alabama, Louisiana, Florida and Mississippi Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) are fully activated today with Red Cross Liaisons present.

Non-government

- An ESF#6 Mass Care Coordination group was officially formed today. NGO representatives will convene at the new ESF#6 Mass Care Coordination Center at ARC NHQ. Initial NGO members include:
 - Adventist Community Services
 - America's Second Harvest (invited)
 - The Salvation Army
 - Southern Baptist Convention/North American Mission Board
 - American Humane Society
 - Church World Service (invited to coordinate faith-based organizations)
 - Labor representation
- VOAD partners are preparing for post landfall support in LA, MS and AL.
- Beginning calls with emotional and spiritual care national NGO partners.
- ESF #6 NGO committee members are being identified to deploy to DOC.

Individual Client Services

- Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) staff are at NHQ assisting Red Cross in developing protocols for recruitment and deployment of their personnel and will have a representative in the DOC for the duration.
- Initiated contact with Mental Health Partners to mobilize their resources to augment operational staffing.
- Will train staff, via OJT, on the procedures and tools for the new Welfare Information system.

Organizational Support Services**Public Affairs**

- Satellite equipment has been set up so interviews can be conducted from the Disaster Operations Center.
- Public Affairs is receiving a number of international media calls.
- Rapid Response Team coverage continues in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi.
- Rapid Response Teams are conducting media interviews and supporting the Southeast Louisiana Chapter in their public affairs efforts.

Fundraising

- Call 1-800-Help Now to make a contribution

Staff Services

- Moving staff to forward deployment centers in Houston, TX and Montgomery, AL
- A 1 time \$50.00 allowance will be added to the Disaster Staff Cards for personal preparedness for staff assigned to all Hurricane Katrina related disaster relief operations. These funds are to be used for the following personal preparedness items to ensure Red Cross staff members are prepared to maintain themselves in the Red Cross and partner staff shelters:
 - Flash light and extra batteries
 - Personal FA Kit and other personal choices for over the counter remedies
 - Bedding-sheets/sleeping bag, etc
 - Towels and wash cloths
 - Insect repellent
 - Sun screen
 - Hand sanitizer (Purell, packets, etc.)
 - Lip balm
 - Tissues
- Recruiting 1,900 DSHR members in the next three days
- 885 staff have been assigned and have arrived at all Hurricane Katrina operations; 39% of that number (342) were assigned to southern Florida

Preparedness

- Providing a list of appropriate brochures to Community Services (Mass Care) for public distribution to enhance awareness on safety information.
- Adjusting our preparedness content for this event to focus on people using bottled water and less on water treatment due to the significant amount of flood water, chemicals, or other hazards that can compromise water sources.

Response Center

Post-Landfall Report for Katrina 1, DR 863-06	
Operational Facts in Southern FL as of 9:00 PM August 28, 2005	
# of Shelters Currently Open	3
Current Shelter Population	110
Service Centers	1
Verified Hospitalized	1
Verified Ill/Injured	16
Health Service Contacts	38
Mental Health Contacts	45
Local Disaster Volunteers to Date	638
T&M Volunteers to Date	125
Mobile Feeding Units to Date	13
Comfort Kits Distributed	100

Impact and Assessment for the First Landfall of Katrina

Early damage assessment reports in southern Florida (Miami-Dade) indicate 795 homes with major damage and 457 with minor damage. Damage assessment teams in Miami-Dade are heading south to the upper Keys and three teams in Key West are headed north. Damage assessment for Broward County is almost complete.

As of Sunday at 2:00 PM, power was restored to all but 162,800 customers in Broward County and 332,400 customers in Miami-Dade (total of 736,800). *Source: Florida Power and Light*

Client Services

Service delivery will be by outreach in Broward and Miami-Dade and a combination of outreach and service centers in the Keys. It is anticipated that there will be 3000 cases opened in Miami-Dade and the Keys and 250 in Broward.

Web-Based Resources

- Louisiana State Police Emergency web site: <http://www.lsp.org/emergency.html>
- Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness web site: <http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/>
- Emergency Evacuation Guide for the State of Louisiana (lists Red Cross shelters and other information): <http://www.lsp.org/evacguide.html>
- Mississippi Emergency Management Administration: <http://www.msma.org/index.htm>

In The Matter Of:

*Always Ready: The Coast Guard's
Response to Hurricane Katrina*

*Senate Committee on Homeland Security
November 9, 2005*

*Miller Reporting Company, Inc.
735 Eighth Street, SE
Washington, DC 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666*

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Always Ready: The Coast Guard's
Response to Hurricane Katrina

Senate Committee on Homeland Security
November 9, 2005

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<p>(1) getting there. The meeting was over. Others were leaving (2) the trailer he was in and we were unable to really meet to (3) pursue that. His chief of staff said that my concerns had (4) been heard and that they were going to act on those in some (5) way. But I was unable to meet with Mr. Brown at that time. (6) He had moved on to other things. (7) Chairman Collins. Did anything change, from your (8) perspective on the ground, after you brought those concerns? (9) Admiral Duncan. That was Thursday evening. It appears (10) that Friday, things did change. We did get recognition that (11) water and food was necessary. We did see the JTF move (12) resources into place that provided some relief that was (13) needed up until that point. (14) Chairman Collins. Were alternative shelters (15) established as a result of that conversation? (16) Admiral Duncan. I can't say that anything came as a (17) direct result of that conversation. For all I know, some of (18) these things were planned before I had a conversation with (19) Mr. Brown. But the movement out of congested areas began, (20) medical triaging at the International Airport, alternatively (21) referred to as Moisant or Louis Armstrong, began. Water and (22) food distribution was better supported. And it did appear (23) at that point that we were starting to see a turn. (24) Chairman Collins. Thank you. (25) Senator Lieberman. Thanks. I want to go back to the</p>	<p>(1) wanted to go up on an overflight, do an assessment of the (2) area just like I did. It was our first opportunity to get a (3) nice, good, detailed survey or good look of the area. (4) We flew up to the north. We were on an H-60. We went (5) up towards where my station was, and you could see houses (6) burning. You could see my station was intact and I could (7) see intense flooding in the Lakeview neighborhood area, up (8) to the rooftops. At that point, you could also hear chatter (9) on the radios that there was thousands of people on the (10) rooftops that needed to be saved. (11) Senator Lieberman. Where was that coming from? (12) Captain Paskewich. That was coming from—to the 60 (13) helicopter. I think that was general, other helicopters— (14) Senator Lieberman. Other helicopters were flying, (15) right. (16) Captain Paskewich. Correct. There were multiple (17) helicopters in the area. (18) Senator Lieberman. Right. (19) Captain Paskewich. I counted four Coast Guard (20) helicopters within my own visual, and then the H-60 pilot (21) asked permission if he could bring us back, because they are (22) a big asset. They can rescue a lot of people. So our first (23) flight was about ten minutes. (24) Then we went back to the Superdome and told him we (25) would get him back up again—</p>
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<p>(1) questions of communications, which are very important, (2) obviously critically important in disaster response. Some (3) of the most pathetic moments in watching what happened and (4) reading afterward in New Orleans was the inability, for (5) instance, of the Mayor to communicate with his personnel, et (6) cetera. (7) Captain Paskewich, you were on both Coast Guard flights (8) with Mr. Bahamonde and have indicated that you, too, were (9) clearly able to see significant flooding in New Orleans at (10) the time. Admiral Duncan, you have indicated that you were (11) aware of significant flooding from a damage assessment (12) flight that you took about 5:00 p.m. on that same Monday, (13) the day of landfall, August 29. (14) I wanted to ask you both how and when did you (15) communicate that information to your superior offices in the (16) Coast Guard, to the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center, (17) or to any other Federal agencies or operations centers? (18) Admiral Duncan. Do you want to take it? (19) Captain Paskewich. Yes, sir. (20) Senator Lieberman. Captain, why don't you start. (21) Captain Paskewich. I was certainly on both flights (22) with Mr. Bahamonde, and when I came in from Baton Rouge, or (23) from Alexandria via Baton Rouge and went down the river to (24) survey, do a quick scan, and then headed across the city to (25) the airport, at the Superdome to pick up Mr. Bahamonde, he</p>	<p>(1) Senator Lieberman. You are talking about Bahamonde? (2) Captain Paskewich. Yes, sir. (3) Senator Lieberman. On that first flight, could you see (4) that the levees had broken? (5) Captain Paskewich. We went right over the area where (6) the levees are broken and I am pretty positive Mr. Bahamonde (7) saw the levee breach. I was focused on the flooding in the (8) neighborhoods— (9) Senator Lieberman. Sure. (10) Captain Paskewich. —and I was trying to get a visual (11) as to how many assets we needed. (12) Senator Lieberman. Right. (13) Captain Paskewich. The second flight we took with one (14) of Captain Jones' 65 crews. We went east, New Orleans East (15) and Slidell. I believe we were the first ones to see the (16) twin span drop, and then Slidell was underwater. New (17) Orleans East was very much underwater, as well. Shalmet, you (18) could see the Ninth Ward off in the distance. Intense (19) flooding. So north of I-10, intense flooding, and then (20) Shalmet, Ninth Ward south, intense flooding. (21) Senator Lieberman. So did you report what you saw to (22) any superiors? (23) Captain Paskewich. Yes, sir. When we landed at the (24) Dome, we made—we called back three separate times— (25) Senator Lieberman. Who did you call?</p>

Senate Committee on Homeland Security
November 9, 2005

Always Ready: The Coast Guard's
Response to Hurricane Katrina

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 61</p> <p>(1) Captain Paskewich. I called up our Incident Command</p> <p>(2) Post in Alexandria, relayed information that there was</p> <p>(3) intense flooding in the area and that we needed to marshal</p> <p>(4) as many resources, both aircraft and small boats, as many as</p> <p>(5) possible because this would be an extended, protracted</p> <p>(6) search and rescue effort.</p> <p>(7) Senator Lieberman. Admiral Duncan, I am interested in—</p> <p>(8) I presume you were a recipient of some of that information</p> <p>(9) that Captain Paskewich reported—</p> <p>(10) Admiral Duncan. Yes, sir.</p> <p>(11) Senator Lieberman. —and then I am curious, I know you</p> <p>(12) did speak to Deputy Secretary Jackson and apparently you</p> <p>(13) were in conversations with, I am sorry, the Commandant and</p> <p>(14) Secretary Jackson.</p> <p>(15) Admiral Duncan. Yes, sir, that is correct.</p> <p>(16) Senator Lieberman. You were in conversations with the</p> <p>(17) Commandant and senior Coast Guard officials, so just help me</p> <p>(18) with that chain of command—</p> <p>(19) Admiral Duncan. Yes, sir.</p> <p>(20) Senator Lieberman. —to the best of your recollection,</p> <p>(21) as to communication.</p> <p>(22) Admiral Duncan. Yes, sir. I moved on Sunday to</p> <p>(23) Houston to be in a position to come in immediately behind</p> <p>(24) the storm.</p> <p>(25) Senator Lieberman. Right.</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 63</p> <p>(1) Mississippi River, over the City of New Orleans, and then to</p> <p>(2) the east along the coast until we got to Bayou La Batre,</p> <p>(3) Alabama, turned around and came back and landed.</p> <p>(4) At that point, I had personally seen very substantial</p> <p>(5) flooding, not really able to attribute, I think in my mind,</p> <p>(6) what caused that flooding at this point—</p> <p>(7) Senator Lieberman. Right, but you saw the effect—</p> <p>(8) Admiral Duncan. Yes, sir. Absolutely. Absolutely.</p> <p>(9) Chairman Collins. And you reported that to the Coast</p> <p>(10) Guard Commandant?</p> <p>(11) Admiral Duncan. That is correct. I contacted the—in</p> <p>(12) fact, the time I have is—I took a brief from the sectors at</p> <p>(13) nine o'clock, when I landed. Then I called the Commandant</p> <p>(14) and the area commander, and the notes I have say it was at</p> <p>(15) ten o'clock, 2200, and I discussed with Admiral Crea and the</p> <p>(16) Commandant my observations, supplemented by what I was able</p> <p>(17) to gather from others who were doing other detailed</p> <p>(18) assessments on the ground.</p> <p>(19) Senator Lieberman. Yourself, you did not speak to</p> <p>(20) Secretary Jackson in DHS—</p> <p>(21) Admiral Duncan. I did no, no, sir.</p> <p>(22) Senator Lieberman. But do you have any idea what the</p> <p>(23) Commandant report to Secretary Jackson?</p> <p>(24) Admiral Duncan. No, sir, I would—</p> <p>(25) Senator Lieberman. We will have to talk to him</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 62</p> <p>(1) Admiral Duncan. When the storm conditions were</p> <p>(2) abating, I flew to Alexandria, took a brief from—this is</p> <p>(3) the tie-in with Captain Paskewich. His information goes to</p> <p>(4) this IMT in Alexandria. I went to see what was known across</p> <p>(5) the entire theater. So I tried to find out what was</p> <p>(6) happened in Sector Mobile, which covered the Mississippi</p> <p>(7) Coast, and also what was happening in Louisiana—</p> <p>(8) Senator Lieberman. So this is Monday evening?</p> <p>(9) Admiral Duncan. Monday afternoon, sir.</p> <p>(10) Senator Lieberman. Monday afternoon, okay.</p> <p>(11) Admiral Duncan. Two o'clock in the afternoon, I took</p> <p>(12) off from Houston, arrived probably about, I think it says</p> <p>(13) about three o'clock or so—three o'clock. I am sorry, 2:30.</p> <p>(14) I received initial reports from whatever was known by our</p> <p>(15) folks or any source that we could—news, anything we could</p> <p>(16) find—</p> <p>(17) Senator Lieberman. Right.</p> <p>(18) Admiral Duncan. —preparatory to my flight going into</p> <p>(19) the area. My notes indicate that at that time, there was</p> <p>(20) some reports of overtopping. I believe the Industrial Canal</p> <p>(21) was mentioned. We were prepared for flooding. Myself and</p> <p>(22) my chief of operations got on a flight with a petty officer</p> <p>(23) and we took a 60, a Falcon jet out down over Grand Isle,</p> <p>(24) which is on the coast, out over Loop, which is a substantial</p> <p>(25) oil production facility out in the Gulf, and then up the</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 64</p> <p>(1) directly.</p> <p>(2) Admiral Duncan. If I could also add—</p> <p>(3) Senator Lieberman. Please.</p> <p>(4) Admiral Duncan. —because there is another element to</p> <p>(5) your question, if I might, sir—</p> <p>(6) Senator Lieberman. Go ahead.</p> <p>(7) Admiral Duncan. —how do we pass that information to</p> <p>(8) others.</p> <p>(9) Senator Lieberman. Yes.</p> <p>(10) Admiral Duncan. That information, the normal tie-in at</p> <p>(11) the State Emergency Operations center to all the players,</p> <p>(12) including the State, who has primacy in responding to</p> <p>(13) incidents in the State, of course, is to pass that</p> <p>(14) information up through the OEP, or the Emergency Operations</p> <p>(15) Center in Baton Rouge. That information was passed through</p> <p>(16) to them, and our sit-reps, our situation reports, which lag,</p> <p>(17) of course, by an hour or two in typing it up and sending it</p> <p>(18) along, try to capture the detail of these observations and</p> <p>(19) any other source of information that might be available to</p> <p>(20) us and send that up to others, as well, and those would have</p> <p>(21) been developed and sent to the OEP, which is the Louisiana</p> <p>(22) Emergency Operations Center.</p> <p>(23) Senator Lieberman. Okay, I appreciate that. I want to</p> <p>(24) just quickly ask one more question and go to you, captain</p> <p>(25) Jones, Captain Paskewich, if you want to add. How were you</p>

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HSOC SPOT REP

SPOT REP #:	#7
Date/Time (EDT):	08/29/05 @ 1935
Reference:	Hurricane Katrina
Source of Information:	USACE New Orleans District Emergency Ops
Type of Incident:	New Orleans Inundations

Update	
Summary	<p>Initial USACE report of flooding in New Orleans – as of 1400, August 29, 2005</p> <p>Orleans Parish: A small breach reported at 17 Street Canal by local firemen. The 17 Street Canal is located along the Orleans Parish-Jefferson Parish boundary line on the east bank. Some leakage possibly still occurring into Orleans Parish near Lakefront.</p> <p>Jefferson Parish: Report that Duncan Pumping Station and Bonnebelle Pumping Station suffered roof damage, inundation of pumps, and are not operating at this time.</p> <p>St. Bernard Parish: Reported overtoppings of levee near Arabi and Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. Some level of widespread flooding has occurred.</p> <p>West Bank: Report there has been a breach of the levee in the east of Harvey Canal, west bank area.</p> <p>Other Parishes: To date, District has not received damage reports from surrounding parishes.</p> <p>New Orleans Headquarters Building: Some roof damage has occurred to north end of building and to the shops buildings.</p>
Significance	
Actions Follow-up	N/A
Miscellaneous	
Prepared By	Mathew Thompson NRCC Planning Section Analyst

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DHS-FEMA-0055-0007575

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CNN

SHOW: CNN LARRY KING LIVE 9:00 PM EST

August 29, 2005 Monday

TRANSCRIPT: 082901CN.V22

SECTION: NEWS; Domestic

LENGTH: 7393 words

HEADLINE: Tracking Hurricane Katrina

BYLINE: Larry King, Anderson Cooper, Kathleen Koch, Rob Marciano, Gary
Tuchman, David Mattingly

GUESTS: J. Marshall Shepherd, Michael Brown, Sam Champion, Marty Evans,
Kathleen Blanco

HIGHLIGHT:

The impact of Hurricane Katrina.

BODY:

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

LARRY KING, CNN HOST (voice-over): Tonight, Hurricane Katrina
batters New Orleans with whipping winds and massive floods.

And, in Mississippi the monster storm is blamed for three deaths so
far after turning some streets into rivers 12 feet deep.

With insurance estimates starting at \$9 billion, Katrina could be
the costliest storm in U.S. history.

But amidst all the destruction you'll hear from the paramedics who
helped an evacuating woman give birth to a baby in a Mississippi
traffic jam, their remarkable story plus all the latest with reports
throughout the zone next on LARRY KING LIVE.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

KING: We'll be checking in with Anderson Cooper who is on deck in
Meridian, Mississippi; Rob Marciano in Biloxi, Mississippi; at the WABC
Weather Center in New York is Sam Champion, the WABC TV meteorologist.

We'll be checking in a moment in the Baton Rouge FEMA studio with **Michael Brown**, the Undersecretary for Homeland Security; at the NASA Goddard Space Center, Dr. Marshall Shepherd; and, at the D.C. Bureau, Marty Evans, the president and CEO of the American Red Cross.

Let's start with Dr. Marshall Shepherd, the Research Meteorologist Laboratory for Atmospherics at NASA Goddard Space Center. Dr. Shepherd, putting it bluntly, is this the worst natural storm in American history?

DR. J. MARSHALL SHEPHERD, NASA HURRICANE RESEARCHER: Well, it's a bit too early to say that Larry but what we can say when this storm was a category five storm it got down to about 902 millibars and that is the fourth lowest pressure on record in the Atlantic basin, so it certainly ranks up there in the top five in terms of lowest pressure and that really translates into strength of the storm.

KING: Anderson Cooper, what's the situation in Meridian, Mississippi?

ANDERSON COOPER, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Well, the storm, as you know, has been downgraded to a tropical storm. It was a category one hurricane when I arrived here in Meridian about two and a half hours or so ago.

There are a lot of people in shelters. There are a lot of people staying with friends and there's expected to be a lot of flooding. The rain here has been just torrential over the last couple of hours. It's still raining but much lighter. The winds have really died down.

People have yet to really assess the damage in this area though, Larry. Darkness has fallen and people kind of staying where they are. Tomorrow morning when they get up when the sun is up they're going to start looking around and seeing how bad things are.

KING: Thanks, we'll be checking back again with Anderson. As you understand, pictures can cut in and out in devastation like this.

Michael Brown is Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness. He's director of FEMA and he's at our Baton Rouge -- at the FEMA studios in Baton Rouge, how bad **Michael**?

MICHAEL BROWN, FEMA DIRECTOR: Well, Larry, let me put it this way. This is a catastrophic disaster. I've just started getting reconnaissance reports from my folks in the field and I'm anticipating now that I'm going to have to prepare for housing at least tens of thousands of victims that are going to be without homes for literally months on end.

The visuals that you see, not of downtown New Orleans, because downtown New Orleans while there was some damage there, windows blown out that sort of thing, in the neighborhoods we are seeing water extensively everywhere up to rooftops.

The I-10 bridge is probably compromised. Even if we wanted to bring people back into New Orleans we probably cannot do that. And the same

thing is going on in Mississippi right now, so this is truly a catastrophic disaster.

BROWN: In a sense that little move to the right saved in a sense downtown New Orleans, Michael?

BROWN: It saved downtown New Orleans but it decimated everything east of downtown and then, of course, decimated everything up through Mississippi, so there's always good news and bad news and it here is it means we don't have the flooding in downtown New Orleans but we've got the flooding everywhere.

We've got some storm surges that have come across the levees. We have some, I'm not going to call them breaches but we have some areas where the lake and the rivers are continuing to spill over. The flood waters are still spilling into those neighborhoods, so it's frankly unfortunately going to get worse before it gets better.

KING: Since your job is now in the Department of Homeland Security does that affect anything with regard to this?

BROWN: Well, it makes it a lot better because I mean first of all I've talked to the president two or three times just in the past day. I've talked to all the cabinet secretaries that we're going to need help from and the Coast Guard and Immigration, Customs folks that help us with transportation are all right there at the table with me.

So, it brings together a unified front to do whatever it takes and that's what the president is saying. We're going to have to do whatever it takes to help Mississippi and Louisiana recover from this truly catastrophic event.

KING: Sam Champion, from your view in New York as a meteorologist not having it hit you, what's your assessment?

SAM CHAMPION, WABC-TV, NEW YORK METEOROLOGIST: Well, Larry, we're certainly watching the storm. We were covering it all night and this morning at landfall because it is going to affect our area in the northeast.

We have the path of this storm moving kind of through Western Pennsylvania, Western New York State with heavy rain and even some possibility of flooding all the way through during the day tomorrow and the following day.

This thing pulls into Canada or what's left of Katrina pulls into Canada by the time we get into Thursday and kind of hooks around northern New England. But right now just to kind of go over it, it's tropical storm Katrina, 30 miles northwest of Meridian, Mississippi is the center of circulation.

The heavy rain right now is in Mississippi and Alabama and the though of thunderstorms and even the possibility of tornadoes extends through into Georgia and all the way through the Florida panhandle.

I mean this is going to be a rough night and even a rough day tomorrow because what's left of this storm on its path to the north and northeast will be in Tennessee waiting tomorrow morning.

So, folks who aren't anywhere near tropical waters in Tennessee, in central Kentucky, in eastern Ohio and in Western Pennsylvania and even in West Virginia will feel the effects of this system, so we're certainly watching it.

It was a big one and it got everyone's attention when that central pressure got to 902 millibars and dropped it below Camille, which made it worse than Camille when it was out in the Atlantic.

KING: Yes.

Our CNN Correspondent Kathleen Koch is in Mobile, Alabama on the bay there. What's the story there Kathleen?

KATHLEEN KOCH, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Well, I'll tell you, Larry, everyone here...

KING: We lost Kathleen. Let's try Rob Marciano in Biloxi, Mississippi, what's the story in Biloxi Rob?

ROB MARCIANO, CNN METEOROLOGIST: Well, Larry, Biloxi along the coastline, the pictures that we're getting in and from what we've seen driving around is not good. The combination of winds in excess of 130 miles an hour and a storm surge in excess of 20 feet has led to in some cases homes being hollowed out, in other cases well structured brick homes being completely wiped off their foundation, cars piled up.

We've got video of cars, maybe 20 or 25 cars piled up on top of each other, reports of one of the casinos actually breaking apart and sinking into the Gulf of Mexico so bad news out of Biloxi.

We are stationed about six miles north of the shore. We did that to get away from that storm surge, which may very well have took some lives but we couldn't escape the wind. I mean the devastation behind me at this hotel we easily saw winds over 100 miles an hour.

At times the roof tiles were being pulled off, the plywood from the roof pulled off, rooms in which we were staying in and shooting from the ceilings collapsing letting in the elements from the outside and stucco, two of the four sides of this hotel the stucco completely ripped off.

So, Biloxi got the worst of it because, and Gulfport, because we were in that right front quadrant, the most feared part of the storm. You get the most intense winds, the most intense storm surge and unfortunately we got it here.

KING: Michael Brown has to be leaving us, so we'll check with Marty Evans after the break, the president of the American Red Cross.

Michael, how long before we're going to get a real assessment here? Is it going to take a week, damage, deaths and the whole story?

BROWN: Yes, I mean it really will. We started doing that this afternoon where we could, you know, finally at least here in Louisiana the storm moved out enough that we could start putting some helicopters and air assets out there to find out.

The teams are moving in. I mean tomorrow we'll be full force. Everybody will get in there. Now, everybody is going to have to go in by air probably or boats to find out but we'll start that real serious assessment tomorrow.

It's just amazing to see the pictures and to hear the firsthand reports of these FEMA folks who have been with the agency for, you know, 15 or 20 years to call in and talk about how this is the worst flooding they've ever seen in their entire lives and talking about just neighborhoods after neighborhoods gone.

And then you see the Coast Guard guys who are going out. I can't say enough about the Coast Guard. They go out and they're trying to do reconnaissance and the next thing you know there's a guy on the roof that needs rescuing, so they rescue that guy and try to get him back to safety. That's the kind of stuff we're going to find in the near future.

KING: Thanks for spending some time with us, Michael. We'll see you again tomorrow we hope.

BROWN: Thank you, Larry, OK.

KING: Michael Brown of FEMA.

And, when we come back we'll check in with Marty Evans, the president and CEO of the Red Cross. We'll be hearing from others, including the governor in a little while.

Don't go away.

KING: Before we check in with Marty Evans of the Red Cross, Jeanne Meserve is CNN's Homeland Security Correspondent. She's somewhere on the east side of New Orleans and we'll hear from here in a moment.

Marty Evans, can you be prepared for this?

MARTY EVANS, RED CROSS PRESIDENT AND CEO: Well, Larry, we certainly had a run-up last year the four hurricanes back to back. We sheltered well over 400,000 people, served 16 million meals. That was in retrospect kind of a practice session. This disaster is going to exceed the combination of the last four hurricanes.

KING: Dr. Shepherd, did NASA know it was going to be like this?

SHEPHERD: Well, I tell you this year the storms are running on 90 octane fuel. I believe we actually have a graphic, Larry, showing you some data from one of our satellites and, if you look closely at this graphic, if we can get it up for you, you'll see this is the beginning of the hurricane season and you can see this is from our Aqua Satellite.

Event: Hurricane Katrina		Organization: MVN	
Situation Report			
Start Date: 290617zAug2005		Valid as of: 300034zAug2005	
Report Number: 003		SITREP Date: 290617zAug2005	
Situation			

1. Situation

Hurricane Katrina went over the city of New Orleans on Monday.

Winds were 145-mph winds.

River Reading: 10.1 ft

River Crest (Carrollton Gage): 15.5 ft at 0900 hrs

A. General

CEMVN's CMT and CAT are coordinating the execution plan with the Unwatering Planning Response Team. District employees are calling in to the Alternate Headquarters Site to inform their supervisors of their status. CEMVN's CMT continues to brief CEMVS's CMT on CEMVN's AOR. The Commander's Reevaluation team inspected the District Headquarters Building and found minor damages to northeast corner of the third floor. COL Wagenaar reconstituted the EOC in the Distinct Headquarters building.

B. Weather

Rain and Windy

81 degrees F

Feels Like 85 degrees F

Wind: From WSW at 28 mph

C. Damage Assessment

No damages to report at this time.

D. Secondary Impacts

There is reported flooding in Kenner with water 4-5 ft. on Williams Blvd.

There is flooding in St. Bernard Parish with reports of water up to the roofs of homes.

It has been reported that Causeway Blvd. has about 4 ft. of standing water.

It has been reported that Arabi, in St. Bernard Parish, is under 10 ft. of water.

E. Other

PARISH EVACUATIONS:

SHELTERS:

Special Needs open: 9

General Population Shelter: 113

ROAD CLOSURES: Causeway Bridge; LA 23 Belle Chase Tunnel

Operations

A.1. MVN Project Operations

CDR has coordinated with Jefferson Parish and has the following information as of 1300 29Aug05:

3 pump stations in East Jefferson Parish are inoperable - no pump stations have operators on site - therefore no water is exiting the drainage canals and they are overtopping with rainwater and flooding the local streets. We observed 4 feet of water standing in Williams Blvd.

East Jefferson Parish Levee District personnel have driven the length of the Lake Ponchartrain Levee and report that the levee is in good condition, with no evidence of overtopping or erosion, only minor waves may have lapped over the levee.

We observed most houses with major damage to their roofs - roofing will be a huge mission for FEMA.

We have been unable to contact St. Tammany, Plaquemines, Orleans, St. Charles, or St. Bernard Parishes.

From: Besanceney, Brian [Brian.Besanceney@dhs.gov]
 Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:27 PM
 To: Wood, John E. Bergman, Cynthia; Karonis, Jeff; Knoke, William R; Boudreaux, Chad; Cannatti, Ashley
 Subject: FYI from FEMA

Natalie Rule, head of PA for FEMA called. Said the first (unconfirmed) reports they are getting from aerial surveys in New Orleans are far more serious than media reports are currently reflecting. Finding extensive flooding and more stranded people than they had originally thought - also a number of fires.

FYI in case tomorrow's sit reps seem more "severe"

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

Event: HURRICANE KATRINA		Organization: MVM	
Situation Report			
Start Date: 291833zAug2005		Valid as of: 300205zAug2005	
Report Number: 003		SITREP Date: 291833zAug2005	
Situation			

1. Situation

A. General

MVM EOC was activated at 1600 26 Aug 2005.

Hurricane Katrina made landfall at approximately 0610 29 Aug 2005 as a strong CAT 4 hurricane with winds measured at around 140 mph. Landfall was near the town of Buras, LA.

Post declaration missions from FEMA Reg. VI were received today. MVM EOC is currently transitioning into functioning as MVN. Post-Dec missions are being resourced in MVN Project 129809 and funds are being accepted in MVN CEFMS data base. This will be the last sitrep released as MVM. We will create a new event, Hurricane Katrina FEMA Missions, as MVN.

B. Weather

QPF prediction is 7" of precipitation from coast up through Ohio Valley throughout storm path. 16" of rain measured in New Orleans in past 24 hours.

C. Damage Assessment

Significant flooding reporting in St. Bernard Parish. Levee on West bank of Industrial Canal was possibly overtopped or breached. Over 10' of water reported standing. Levee at East Jefferson was not overtopped, however localized flooding reported. Due to this flooding, 4 East Jefferson pumping stations are not working.

D. Secondary Impacts

None at this time.

E. Other

None at this time.

Operations

A. Project Operations

Planning to release quarterboats from near Commerce, MS for deployment to New Orleans. This will suspend some bank grading and mat sinking operations.

B. USACE Authorities

No flood fight or damages to FCW within the District's AOR related to the event at this time.

RRV deploying from St. Louis to Memphis 29 Aug 2005.

MVM has received additional \$ 750,000 in Class 210 funding to support USACE activities through end of FY. This brings total up to \$ 800,000 for Hurricane Katrina.

B.1. FCCE Activities

8 Personnel from MVN arrived in Memphis on 28 Aug 2005 to assist MVM EOC in scoping possible Unwatering Mission.

Unwatering Planning Activities:

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HSOC SPOT REP

SPOT REP #:	#013
Date/Time (EDT):	08/29/05 @ 2230
Reference:	New Orleans Helicopter Overflight
Source of Information:	FEMA Teleconference -- observations from Marty Bahamonte, FEMA Public Affairs. Participants included Patrick Rhode, Mike Lowder, Bill Locke, Mike Pawlowski and Mary Anne Lyle
Type of Incident:	Hurricane Katrina

Update	
Summary:	<p>Marty Bahamonte of FEMA Public Affairs made two aerial over flights of the New Orleans area the afternoon of Monday, August 29, 2005. As additional information becomes available it will be reported.</p> <p>He concluded the two immediate major problems would be:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Access to the city because roads are flooded to the north and east. 2. Housing <p>His observations include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The I-10 Twin Span bridges to the east of the City to Slidell are compromised in both directions for a stretch of five to seven miles. On the east side bridge sections are gone; on the west side bridge sections are buckled and askew. • There is no way to enter New Orleans from the east. Highway 11 appears generally in tact but is under water where it enters the City and will require some repair but appears to be a quick fix. • The western I10/I610 junction connecting Jefferson and Orleans Parish is under water. • Entrance from the north is not possible because as roads get into the city, they are under water. • I10 to the west appears to have several underwater sections. • The Airline Highway by the airport is above water. • There is a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to flow into the City. • The levee in Metairie is in tact. • Only one of the main pumps is reported to still be working but cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful. • In the neighborhoods there are many small fires where natural gas lines have broken. • Flooding is greatest in the north and east in New Orleans, Metairie

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	<p>and north towards Slidell – an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The flights did not go all the way north to Slidell so conditions there are not reported. • Some homes were seen with water to the first floor and others completely underwater. • Hundreds of people were observed on the balconies and roofs of a major apartment complex in the city. The location has been provided to City officials. • Downtown there is less flooding. Most buildings have windows blown out but otherwise appear structurally sound. • West and South of the City appear dry. • Lake Front Airport by Lake Pontchartrain is under water. • There is an oil tanker grounded in the Industrial Canal – two tugs were observed working with the ship. • The Coast Guard reported two other tankers aground but they were not observed. • The Coast Guard is flying rescue missions for people stuck on roofs. They reported seeing about 150 people but also said that as they lifted people out, they saw others breaking through the roofs of adjacent homes. • The Coast Guard will use night vision devices and continue rescue missions into the night. • Search and Rescue will need boats, in some locations high wheeled trucks may be usable. FEMA USR Teams are coordinating boat use with Louisiana Fish and Game officials. • The City reports about 300 people have been rescued by boat so far. These rescue operations will continue through the night. • Boat traffic is not restricted and movement of supplies by boat and barge is feasible. • The Inter Harbor Canal is not visible. • A few bodies were seen floating in the water and Coast Guard pilots also reported seeing bodies but there are no details on locations or numbers.
Significance:	
Actions/Follow-Up:	N/A
Miscellaneous:	
Prepared By:	Mathew Thompson NRCC Planning Section Analyst

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DHS-HSOC-0004-0005522

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From: Rhode, Patrick [Patrick.Rhode@dhs.gov]
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 11:05 PM
To: mjackson
Subject: Update

Michael,

Just a quick update since our phone conversation this evening.

We just spoke with our first rep on the ground in New Orleans who did a helo tour and describes a 200 yard collapse of the levy on the south side of the lake which is accounting for much of the additional flooding. While significant, this was the only apparent collapse viewed.

He reiterates significant logistical challenges to the movement of teams and commodities by ground via east side of New Orleans. Says north is compromised as well, essentially leaving western as one of few potential options.

Describes approximately 60 percent of the city as under water to some degree.

Says a seven mile stretch of the twin span along I10 to Slidel is 100 percent compromised with many sections in need of repair.

Saw 1 oil tanker run aground and understands from coast guard that two more may have as well.

We understand that a robust search and rescue is underway in new orleans and through the evening using night vision equipment. Reports of many successful rescues by air from tops of homes. Fish and wildlife boats are also contributing successfully to this effort. Approx 150 were estimated to be stranded as I write this.

Waterways are open via boat or barge for commodity planners to consider as alternate routes.

Our Oklahoma DMAT team is moving the special needs population out of the superdome for better care now in baton rouge - this may range close to 1,000.

Our rapid needs assessment teams are scheduled to be on the ground by first light in the morning and will have immediate reach back to dmats and usr.

Only a few unconfirmed random body sightings at this time. Accuracy not reliable at this time.

Debris removal teams are engaged at this time and overnight in la and ms.

Less visibility on MS as storm remnants kept assessments to a minimum this evening, although there are significant search and rescue assets engaged there as well. More visibility on entire scope of situation in am.

Thanks,

Patrick

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HSOC SPOT REP

SPOT REP #:	# 12
Date/Time (EDT):	08/29/2005 @ 2347
Reference:	Hurricane Katrina
Source of Information:	FEMA Mapping and Analysis Center
Type of Incident:	Status of conditions in New Orleans, LA

Summary:	According to Remote Sensing Imagery and available Census data, approximately 136,000 housing units in New Orleans have been impacted by flooding.
Significance:	
Actions Followed:	
Miscellaneous:	
Prepared by:	NRCC Planning Section

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 FM CCGDEIGHT NEW ORLEANS LA//IMT//
 TO COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA//ACC//
 INFO COMCOGARD MLC LANT NORFOLK VA//MD/P/F/ML/S/V//
 ALLD8UNITS
 CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL//CC//
 COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OCC/G-OPF//
 COGARD CEU MIAMI FL
 COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA//AO/AM//
 BT
 UNCLAS //N03100//
 SUBJ: SITREP SIX - HURRICANE KATRINA
 A. MY R 291541Z AUG 05 - SITREP FIVE
 1. SITUATION: KATRINA HAS DOWNGRADED TO A TROPICAL STORM. AS OF 300300Z
 KATRINA IS LOCATED AT 33.5N, 088.5W WITH WINDS AT 60 MPH, MOVING NNE AT
 19 KTS. THE SKIES FROM THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER TO MOBILE WERE ORANGE WITH
 COAST GUARD AERIAL OVERFLIGHTS CONDUCTING SAR.
 1.A. CONTACT INFORMATION: AS PER REF A
 1.B. 292230Z AUG 05 SET POST HURRICANE CONDITION
 2. CG UNIT STATUS, CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS:
 2.A. COMMAND AND CONTROL:
 2.A.1 DISTRICT EIGHT: POST HURCON
 2.A.2 ATC MOBILE: HURCON 1
 2.A.3 SECTOR MOBILE: HURCON 1
 2.A.4 SECTOR NEW ORLEANS: HURCON 1
 2.A.5 AIRSTA NEW ORLEANS: HURCON 1
 2.A.6 GST MOBILE: HURCON 2
 2.A.7 MSST 91112 NEW ORLEANS: HURCON 1
 2.A.8 PRO LOCKPORT: HURCON 2
 2.A.9 COMMSTA NEW ORLEANS: HURCON 2
 2.B PERSONNEL:
 2.B.1. EVACUATION STATUS:
 2.B.1.A SECTOR NOLA: ICP IN ALEXANDRIA, LA AT FULL COMPLEMENT.
 2.B.1.B. ISC NOLA DUTY SECTION EVACED TO LORSTA GRANGEVILLE WITH 14
 PERSONNEL.
 2.C. EQUIPMENT:
 2.C.1. AIRCRAFT: ALL CONDUCTING SAR, DAMAGE OVERFLIGHT ASSESSMENTS AND
 LOGISTICS SUPPORT. ONE C-130 DESIGNATED FOR TRANSFERRING THE REMAINING
 DART TO ALEXANDRIA, LA AM 30AUG05. ONE HU-25 DESIGNATED FOR PARTS
 DELIVERY FLIGHT IN SUPPORT OF GROUNDED C-130.
 2.C.1.A. AIRCRAFT ASSESSMENTS
 2.C.1.A.1. HU-25 FLIGHT WITH CGD8, CGD8(C) AND PA REPS OVERFLEW LOOP,
 VENICE, RIVER AND COASTAL AREAS.
 2.C.1.A.2. HH-60 FLIGHT WITH SECTOR NOLA COMMANDER AND FEMA REP
 MR. MARTY BAHANAMY CONDUCTED SAR AND AREA ASSESSMENT.
 2.C.1.A.3. . HU-25 FLIGHT WITH FOSCR FOR POLLUTION. FLIGHT TO CAPTURE
 FOOTAGE OF AOR DAMAGE AND IMPACT.
 2.C.2. CUTTERS:
 2.C.2.A DISTRICT:
 CGC CYPRESS: U/W TO NOLA AREA.
 CGC BARBARA MABRITY: CORPUS CHRISTI, TX LOADING BUOYS FOR RETURN TO NEW

ORLEANS AOR

CGC HARRY CLAIBORNE: GALVESTON, TX LOADING BUOYS TO ASSIST IN POST-HURRICANE

RESPONSE EFFORTS

CGC CLAMP: BATON ROUGE, LA

CGC SHAMAL: U/W ENROUTE MOBILE AOR

CGC DECISIVE: U/W ENR VIC NOLA FOR SAR/COMMS/FLT DECK SUPPORT OPS

CGC DAUNTLESS: U/W ANTICIPATE ARRIVAL IN GALVESTON, TX AT 291830Z.

2.C.2.B SECTOR MOBILE:

CGC BONITO: PENSACOLA, FL - TOMBIGBEE RIVER, AL

CGC COBIA: BAYOU LA BATRE, AL (DRY DOCK)

CGC COHO: PANAMA CITY, FL

CGC SAGINAW: TOMBIGBEE RIVER, AL

CGC SEAHAWK: PANAMA CITY, FL

CGC STINGRAY: U/W ENR STA PANAMA CITY

CGC WEDGE: DEMOPOLIS, AL

2.C.2.C SECTOR NEW ORLEANS:

CGC AXE: BALTIMORE, MD

CGC BRANT: LOCKPORT, LA

CGC POMPAHO: U/W ENR SABINE, TX

CGC PAMLICO: BATON ROUGE, LA

CGC PELICAN: ABBEVILLE, LA

CGC RAZORBILL: SABINE, TX

CGC STURGEON: ABBEVILLE, LA

2.C.2.D VISITING CUTTERS:

CGC KODIAK ISLAND: BAYOU LA BATRE, AL

CGC VASHON: BAYOU LA BATRE, AL - REPORT RECEIVED OF VASHON BEING ADRIPT, SECTOR MOBILE UNABLE TO VERIFY. FIRST LIGHT FLIGHT COORDINATED TO LOCATE.

2.C.3. BOATS:

2.C.3.A STATION NEW ORLEANS: EVACUATED ALL ASSETS AND PERSONNEL.

2.C.3.B STATION GULFPORT: EVACUATED ALL ASSETS AND PERSONNEL.

2.C.3.C STATION VENICE: EVACUATED ALL ASSETS AND PERSONNEL.

2.C.3.D STATION GRAND ISLE: EVACUATED ALL ASSETS AND PERSONNEL.

2.C.3.E. STATION PASCAGOULA: STATION EVACUATED. NO SAR RESPONSE.

2.C.3.F. STATION DAUPHIN IS: STATION EVACUATED.

2.C.3.G. STATION PENSACOLA: STATION EVACUATED.

2.C.3.H. STATION DESTIN: MOORED AT STATION PANAMA CITY.

2.C.3.I. STATION PANAMA CITY: NO SAR RESPONSE. ANTICIPATE LAUNCHING 29 AUG 05.

2.C.3.J ANT DULAC: ENR WITH ASSET TO BATON ROUGE.

2.C.3.K ANT VENICE: EVACED TO BATON ROUGE, LA.

2.C.3.L ANT MORGAN CITY: ENR WITH ASSET TO BATON ROUGE.

2.C.3.M ANT NEW ORLEANS: EVAC TO BATON ROUGE.

2.C.3.N ANT GULFPORT: EVACED TO BATON ROUGE, LA

2.C.3.O ANT MOBILE: CG55118 AND CG49426 U/W WITH CGC SAGINAW.

2.C.3.P ANT PENSACOLA: TRAILORED AT H/P

2.C.3.Q ANT PANAMA CITY: TWO HAULED OUT IN PANAMA CITY, FL AND TWO TRAILORED IN MONTGOMERY, AL.

2.C.3.R ANT EUFALA: LOCATED AT H/P.

2.D. STRUCTURES: NSTR

3. PORT STATUS:

3.A. SECTOR MOBILE: PORT CONDITION ZULU. NO OCEAN GOING VESSELS ARE ALLOWED INTO PORT AT THIS TIME. INLAND BARGE TRAFFIC WITHIN THE PORT AND ALONG GICW REMAINS CLOSED B/W MM 60 (LONG BEACH) TO MM 350 (AUCILLA RIVER) UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. PHONE LINES ARE CURRENTLY DOWN, COMMS VIA CELL AND EMA RADIOS.

3.A.1. WATERWAY STATUS

3.A.1.A. PORT OF GULFPORT - CLOSED, PORT CONDITION ZULU.

3.A.1.B. PORT OF PASCAGOULA - CLOSED, PORT CONDITION ZULU.

3.A.1.C. PORT OF MOBILE - CLOSED, PORT CONDITION ZULU.

3.A.1.D. PORT OF PENSACOLA - CLOSED, PORT CONDITION ZULU.

3.A.1.E. PORT OF DESTIN/PANAMA CITY - CLOSED, PORT CONDITION ZULU.

3.A.2. SURVEY STATUS: NSTR

3.A.3. ATON STATUS: INITIAL ATON SURVEYS WILL BE PRIORITIZED TO MEET INDUSTRY

NEEDS AND ENSURE FUEL SUPPLIES ALONG THE GULF COAST.

3.A.4. BLOCKAGE / NAVIGATION HAZARDS: BILOXI SHRIMP FLEET HEAVILY DAMAGED.

3.A.5. QUEUE W/ PRIORITIZATION: NSTR

3.A.6. FLOODING: BASE MOBILE SUFFERED EXTENSIVE FLOODING AND POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE TO PIER STRUCTURES. EXTENSIVE FLOODING THROUGHOUT DOWNTOWN AREA.

3.B. SECTOR NEW ORLEANS: COTP NEW ORLEANS AND MORGAN CITY AT PORT CONDITION ZULU. THE LOOP IS SHUT DOWN. THE MS RIVER BAR AND LOWER MS RIVER CONDITION ZULU. THE LOOP IS SHUT DOWN. THE MS RIVER BAR AND LOWER MS RIVER FROM THE SEA BUOY TO MM 507 (NATCHEZ, MS) IS CLOSED. GICW IS OPEN FROM MM 177 (WHL) TO BAYOU BOEUF/BAYOU CHENE. RED RIVER IS CLOSED FROM MM 0 (CARR POINT) TO MM 99 (ALEXANDRIA). THE ATHCHAPALYA RIVER IS OPEN FROM MM 45 (KROTZ SPRINGS) TO EUGENE ISLAND BUOY. PORT ALLEN ROUTE IS OPEN FROM MM 0 (BATON ROUGE) TO MM 64 (PORT ALLEN LOCK). THE OUACHITA/BLACK RIVER IS CLOSED FROM MM 0 (JONESVILLE) TO MM 221 (SHREVEPORT). ANTICIPATE WATERWAY OPENINGS ONLY AFTER OVER FLIGHTS AND INITIAL PORT SURVEYS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED.

3.B.1.A. PORT OF NEW ORLEANS

3.B.1.A.1. NO CRUISE SHIPS REMAIN IN PORT.

3.B.1.A.2. FERRY VESSELS ARE NOT OPERATIONAL.

3.B.1.A.3. ALL BRIDGES, FLOODGATES, AND LOCKS ARE CLOSED IVO PORT OF NEW ORLEANS.

3.B.1.B. PORT OF SOUTH LOUISIANA - CLOSED

3.B.1.C. PORT OF ST BERNARD - CLOSED

3.B.1.D. PORT PLAQUEMINES - CLOSED

3.B.1.E. PORT OF GREATER BATON ROUGE - CLOSED

3.B.1.F. GULF ICW FOR NEW ORLEANS AND MORGAN CITY COTP ZONES ARE CLOSED.

3.B.2. SURVEY STATUS: NSTR

3.B.3. ATON STATUS: : INITIAL ATON SURVEYS WILL BE PRIORITIZED TO MEET INDUSTRY NEEDS AND ENSURE FUEL SUPPLIES ALONG THE GULF COAST.

3.B.4. BLOCKAGE / NAVIGATION HAZARDS: NUMEROUS BARGES ON LEVEE ON MISS RIVER. NUMEROUS JUMBLED BOATS AT BAYOU LA BATRE.

3.B.5. QUEUE W/ PRIORITIZATION: NSTR

3.B.6. FLOODING ASSESSMENTS: EXTENSIVE FLOODING THROUGHOUT VARIOUS PARTS OF METRO NEW ORLEANS AREA. SEVERAL LEVEE BREACHES REPORTED AND FLOODING CONTINUES FROM LAKE PONCHARTRAIN INTO PARTS OF NEW ORLEANS AND METAIRIE.

3.B.7. SEVERAL TANKSHIPS ARE GROUNDED ON THE LMR, TUGS ARE ASSISTING MOST AND THERE IS NO SIGN OF MAJOR POLLUTION FROM THESE VESSELS

3.C. OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS FACILITIES:

3.C.1. SEVEN SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE OFFSHORE DRILLING RIGS REPORTED ADRIPT. LOCATIONS OF TWO OF SEVEN UNKNOWN. SITUATION IS BEING MONITORED. TWO SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE PARTIALLY ADRIPT WITH SOME BROKEN ANCHOR LINES, STATUS PENDING.

3.C.2. INPORT SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE (NAME UNKNOWN) WAS PUSHED INTO COCHRANE-AFRICATOWN BRIDGE ON US HWY 98 OVER MOBILE RIVER. BRIDGE IS CURRENTLY CLOSED AND STATUS IS PENDING.

3.C.3. PARKER 21 RIG IS WEDGED AGAINST THE NE SIDE OF THE BAYOU BOEUF RR BRIDGE. MSU MORGAN CITY RESPONDED, VESSEL DAMAGE MINIMAL AND BRIDGE IS MISALIGNED AND INOPERABLE. TWO TUGS STANDING BY TO RESPOND ONCE WEATHER PERMITS. RAILROAD HAS BEEN NOTIFIED.

3.C.4. GSF ARTIC 1 IS MISSING, GSF CELTIC IS 8000 FT OFF LOCATION AND GLOBAL SANTA FE SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE HAS A 10-15 DEGREE LIST.

3.D. PILOT STATUS:

3.D.1. THE BAR PILOTS HAVE CEASED OPERATION.

3.D.2. NOBRA PILOTS CEASED OPERATIONS 281200R AUG 05.

3.D.3. CRESCENT CITY PILOTS HAVE SKELETON STAFF FOR EMERGENCIES ONLY AT CG VTC NOLA.

4. COMMUNICATIONS:

4.A. D8 EXCHANGE SERVER LOCATED AT BSU NEW ORLEANS IS DOWN. RESPONSE EFFORTS ONCE WEATHER PERMITS AND WATER RECREDS.

4.B. COMMSTA T1 IS DOWN, NO LONGER TRANSMITTING AND IS ON EMERGENCY POWER.

4.C. CAMSLANT TMMAC ENR TO ALEXANDRIA, LA ETA 300200Z AUG 2005.

4.D. TWICC IS ON SCENE IN MOBILE AND ESTABLISHING COMMS.

4.E. DESTIN AND FORT WALTON BEACH HIGH SITES OPERATIONAL. ALL OTHER HIGH SITES FROM PENSACOLA WESTWARD ARE INOP. ESD MOBILE ON SCENE AND RESPONDING.

4.F. SECTOR MOBILE LANDLINES RESTORED.

5. SAR/MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION: OVER 350 REQUESTS FOR ROOFTOP RESCUE, ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE DETERMINED VIA OVERFLIGHTS, RESPONDING AS POSSIBLE.

5.A. BRIDGE ALLISION AS PER REF A, STATUS PENDING.

5.B. OVER 18 406 EPIRB HITS IVO OF VENICE, SUSPECT THESE BELONG TO THE DAMAGED FISHING FLEET.

6. SPILL INFORMATION: MINIMAL POLLUTION ON THE LMR IVO NEW ORLEANS. OIL SLICK PRESENT ON MISS RIVER FROM NAS BELLE CHASSE TO VENICE

7. PUBLIC AFFAIRS: MASSIVE SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS IN IMPACTED AREAS ALONG THE LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI AND ALABAMA COASTS DRAWING SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL MEDIA INTEREST. PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONTACT NUMBERS ARE: D8 IMT 314-539-3900 X2264; SECTOR NOLA PAO 318-443-2565 OR 504-319-2229; SECTOR MOBILE PAO 757-636-2431 OR 252-267-3662.

8. RADM DUNCAN IS IN COMMUNICATION WITH GOV BLANCO FOR DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE EFFORTS.

9. INDUSTRY OUTREACH:

9.A. SECTOR NOLA - ISSUED MARINE SAFETY BULLETINS REGARDING CURRENT PORT CONDITIONS. COORDINATED WITH EPA, USACOE, ALL PORT PILOT ASSOCS, STEAMSHIP ASSOC OF LA AND MISS PRIVER MARITIME ASSOC. MORGAN CITY IS IN

CONTACT WITH PARISH LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEES, LOCKS AND BRIDGE OPERATORS.

9.A.1. SECTOR NOLA CONTACTED AMERICAN SALVAGE ASSOC WHO VOLUNTEERED TO SEND A REP TO THE ICP TO ASSIST IN THE COORDINATION OF SALVAGE RESOURCES AND PROVIDE SALVAGE EXPERTISE. REP IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE AT ICP 29AUG05.

9.B. SECTOR MOBILE ISSUED MARINE SAFETY BULLETINS REGARDING CURRENT PORT CONDITIONS.

10. AGENCY COORDINATION: ANTICIPATE COORDINATION WITH NOAA, PILOTS, AND ACOE TO COMPLETE BOTTOM SURVEYS OF AFFECTED WATERWAYS AFTER LANDFALL.

10.A. NOAA: PENDING

10.B. FEMA REGION IV RRCC ATLANTA, GA - (770)220-5577 OR (352)870-2625. CG DESK

(770)220-5590/FAX 5265.

10.C. FEMA REGION VI RRCC DENTON, TX - (940)898-5245/5399/5433. COORDINATING LIAISON ASSISTANCE.

10.D. ACOE: PENDING

10.E. STATE EOCs:

10.E.1. FL: SECTOR MOBILE REPS - (850)921-0223

10.E.2. LA: 4 SECTOR NOLA REPS - (225)925-4138

10.E.3. MS: 2 D8 REPS - (601)360-0054/FAX 0862

10.E.4. AL: 1 SECTOR MOBILE REP - (251) 690-3140

11. NEEDS:

11.A. PEOPLE: THIS STORM HAS IMPACTED A WIDE AREA AND CAUSED CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE TO NEW ORLEANS AND THE SURROUNDING REGION, INCLUDING AREAS NORTH OF LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AND WESTERN MISSISSIPPI. CG PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO D8 UNITS WILL LIKELY FACE DAMAGED, FLOODED, OR DESTROYED RESIDENCES, LACK OF UTILITY SERVICES, AND HIGH DEMANDS FOR FOOD, WATER, ICE AND FUEL. REQUESTS FOR CG MUTUAL ASSISTANCE ARE ANTICIPATED TO BE HIGH.

11.B. RECONSTITUTION OF STRUCTURES AND COMMUNICATIONS: CURRENT PLAN IS FOR D8 IMT TEAM ONE TO RETURN TO NOLA AREA AS SOON AS OPERATIONALLY FEASIBLE. IN THE INTERIM, THE TEAM WILL STAGE FROM THE LOUISIANA HOTEL AND CONVENTION CENTER, ALEXANDRIA, LA. SECTOR NOLA ICP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH 153 PERSONNEL.

11.C. LOGISTICS: THE D8 IMT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN ST. LOUIS.

11.D. SURVEY RESOURCES AND WATERWAYS: NSTR

11.E. ATON ASSETS: NSTR

11.F. DEPENDENT HOUSING OR OTHER NEEDS:

11.F.1. SECTOR NOLA REQUESTED HOUSING BARGE FOR PILOTTOWN STATION AND STA VENICE FOR APPROX 100 PERSONNEL.

11.F.2. SECTOR NOLA REQUESTED 20 FAMILY HOME ASSESSMENT TEAMS TO ALEXANDRIA, LA, CISM SUPPORT, STAGING AREA MANAGERS, SAFETY AND MEDICAL OFFICERS, 20 FOSCRS, 20 PIS, 2 EPA ON SCENE COORDINATORS, 2 MINERAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE REPS AND 2 SALVAGE PERSONNEL.

12.B. D8 IMT RESOURCE UNIT HAS PREVIOUSLY, IN SEPCOR, REQUESTED LANTARBA TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT:

12.B.1. REQUESTED ADDITIONAL C-130 AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF HURRICANE RECOVERY EFFORTS.

12.B.2. REQUESTED SUPPORT TO INVOLUNTARY RECALL 50 OFFICERS AND 500 ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA.

12.B.3. REQUESTED 2 CORPUS CHRISTI HU-25 A/C TO FORWARD STAGE AT AIRSTA HOUSTON IN PREP FOR STORM RECOVERY EFFORTS.

12.B.4. REQUEST THREE ADDITIONAL HH-60 TO DEPLOY TO ATC MOBILE TO SUPPORT POST

HURRICANE RECOVERY EFFORTS.

12.B.5. REQUESTED TACON OF MSST 91112

12.B.6. SECTOR NOLA REQUESTING ALL AVAILABLE TRAILERABLE ATON BOATS TO ASSIST IN SAR AND RECOVERY EFFORTS. ALSO, REQUESTING 4 ADDITIONAL ATON BOATS, CREWS, AND SPARE ENGINES. ALL CREWS SHOULD BE SELF SUFFICIENT AND EXPECT DEPLOYMENT FOR 30 DAYS, MOBILIZATION OF ALL AVAILABLE DART, C-130 TO BE PLACED ON STBY TO ASSIST WITH SAR, ONE FALCON AND ONE HH-60, 3 HH60'S STAGED AT CAMP BEAUREGARD, ONE AIR-OPS OFFICER TO REPORT TO ICP IN ALEXANDRIA, LA, COMMS EQUIPMENT, 2 BOAT FORCE QUALIFIED OFFICERS TO REPORT TO ICP IN ALEXANDRIA, LA, AND GENERATORS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES NEEDED FOR BASE ADVANCE.

12.B.7. SECTOR MOBILE REQUESTING ALL AVAILABLE BOAT CREWS, ALL AVAILABLE WATCHSTANDERS (SAR/IMT), AND IMAT BACKFILLS.

13. ASSISTANCE:

13. A. FROM NON-EFFECTED D8 UNITS:

13.A.1. DATS, CEU MIAMI AND ERTS WILL DEPLOY TO ASSIST WITH ASSESSMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION AM 20AUG05.

13.A.2. MSO PORT ARTHUR TO PROVIDE 5 UTL-TS WITH TWO CREWS PER BOAT.

13.A.3. THREE SECTOR RESPONSE TEAMS ARE PRE-STAGED IN BATON ROUGE, LA FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT ONCE SAFE. EACH TEAM IS COMPRISED OF AN INVESTIGATOR, MARINE INSPECTOR, AND POLLUTION INVESTIGATOR.

13.B. NON-CG UNITS:

13.B.1. URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE (USAR) INDICATED 3 USAR TASK FORCES CAPABLE OF RECON & LIGHT STRUCTURAL RECOVERY IS ENR, CONSISTING OF 28 PERSONSONNEL. 1 TEAM FROM MO IS ENR BATON ROUGE. 1 TEAM FROM FL ENR TO BATON, ETA UNKNOWN. TWO TEAMS ARE ENR CONSISTING OF 70 PERSONSONNEL CAPABLE OF USAR FOR HEAVY STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE. 1 TEAM FROM TX ENR BATON ROUGE, 1 TEAM FROM FL IS ENR BATON ROUGE, ETA UNKNOWN.

13.B.2. SOME MARITIME INDUSTRY SURVEY BOATS ON SCENE AND ADDITIONAL ASSETS ENR TO ASSIST IVO MOBILE BAY.

13.B.3. LA F&W HAS 12 SMALL BOATS IN BATON ROUGE AND 12 IN UPSTATE LA, 12 AIR BOATS, 1 26FT CABIN BOAT, AND 2 FIXED WING FLOAT PLANES. LA DOTD HAS 6 FERRY BOATS, ALL STANDING BY TO ASSIST.

13.B.4. 7 EPA OSCS AND 7 CONTRACTORS ENR TO MOBILE TO ASSIST RESPONSE EFFORTS.

14. DAMAGE:

14.A. CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE: SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE THROUGHOUT THE EFFECTED AREA. SIGNIFICANT FLOODING EASTERN PARTS OF NEW ORLEANS AND COASTAL MS. MAJOR DAMAGE 10 MILES SOUTH OF NAS BELLE CHASSE. CHALMETTE, IMMEDIATELY EAST OF NEW ORLEANS, SEVERELY HIT, PARTS OF I-10 IN NEW ORLEANS UNDER WATER. I-10 TWIN SPAN BRIDGE CONNECTING NEW ORLEANS AND SLIDELL SERIOUSLY DAMAGED WITH MAJOR PORTIONS KNOCKED DOWN. ROUTE 11 AND RAIL BRIDGES BETWEEN NEW ORLEANS AND SLIDELL SERIOUSLY DAMAGED, RT 90 BRIDGE IN GULFPORT, MS SERIOUSLY DAMAGED. QUICK, INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF LOOP INDICATES FACILITY INTACT. GRAND ISLE HEAVILY DAMAGED AND LOTS OF DEBRIS, NO ROOFS BUT CG HOUSES ARE STANDING.

14.B. OFFSHORE: PENDING ASSESSMENT REPORTS

14.C. MILITARY FACILITIES:

14.C.1. STA GULFPORT DESTROYED, ONLY ROOF AND FRAME REMAIN. STA VENICE FLOODED BUT STANDING. GRAND ISLE HEAVILY DAMAGED AND LOTS OF DEBRIS, NO ROOFS BUT CG HOUSES ARE STANDING.

14.C.2. VTS BERWICK BAY RADAR INOP

14.C.3. NAS MERIDIAN WITHOUT POWER BUT CG PERSONNEL DEPENDANTS OK.

14.C.4. CG PB DOCKS IVO BASE MOBILE DESTROYED

14.C.5. ATC MOBILE WITH SOME DAMAGE AND ON EMERGENCY POWER- NEARLY LOST HANGAR ROOF, COMMS SPACES DAMAGED BUT SHOPS OPERABLE. 92% FUEL AVAILABLE AND ADDITIONAL FUEL PROVIDED BY MILLIONAIRE FUEL.

14.C.6. BASE MOBILE SUFFERED EXTENSIVE FLOODING, COVERED IN DEBRIS OVER APPROX 75 PERCENT OF BASE.

14.C.7. ANTICIPATE EXTENSIVE DAMAGE AT STA DAUPHIN ISLAND AND PASCAGOULA, ASSESSMENTS PENDING.

14.

C.8. STA DESTIN SUFFERED MINIMAL DAMAGE, UNDER EMERGENCY POWER.

14.C.9. NO DAMAGE REPORTED AT STA PANAMA CITY.

14.C.10. LORSTA MALLONE AND STA PENSACOLA.

14.D. LIVES: NSTR

15. FUTURE PLANS:

15.A. COTP NEW ORLEANS PLANS TO EXTEND SAFETY ZONE TO COVER LMR BETWEEN MM 365 (NATCHEZ) TO MM 507 (ISSAQUENA COUNTY), THE OUACHITA/BLACK RIVERS MM 40 (JONESVILLE) TO MM 221 (MOREHOUSE PARISH), AND IF THE STORM PUSHES FURTHER WEST, THE RED RIVER MM 88 (ALEXANDRIA) TO MM 225 (SHREVEPORT).

15.B. TWO RESCUE SWIMMERS ENR TO AIRSTA HOUSTON IN PREP FOR POST-HURRICANE SAR.

15.C. TWO DARTS DEPLOYED TO ALEXANDRIA, LA WITH 36 PERSONNEL. PART OF DART ONE UNABLE TO DEPLOY DUE TO ENGINE PROBLEMS. ANTICIPATE DEPLOYMENT OF PART ONE AM 30AUG05. DART TWO ETA ALEXANDRIA AM 30AUG05.

15.D. DEPLOYMENT OF C-130 AIRCRAFT CASPER EQUIPPED TO SURVEIL THE AREA FOR OFF SHORE RIGS, POLLUTION, AND HURRICANE SURVIVORS.

15.E D8 IMT WILL DEVELOP AIR OPS PLAN FOR POST HURRICANE OPERATIONS.

15.F SECTOR COMMANDS WILL ESTABLISH SURFACE ACTION GROUPS TO RESPOND TO POST HURRICANE SAR, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, POLLUTION RESPONSE, AND ACT AS COMMS PLATFORM.

15.G. D8 IMT ANTICIPATES REQUESTING CISM ASSISTANCE TO BE AVAILABLE TO MEMBERS AND DEPENDANTS IN EFFECTED AREAS.

15.H. CGC SPENCER ENR D8 VIA YUCATAN STRAIGHT TO ACT AS COMMAND AND CONTROL/SAFE FLIGHT DECK.

15.I. CGC DECISIVE IVO LOOP ETA PM 30AUG05 TO CONDUCT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, THEN ENR IVO SECTOR NEW ORLEANS.

15.J. CGC CONFIDENCE WILL PROCEED TO D8 UPON RELIEF TO ASSIST WITH POST-HURRICANE RESPONSE EFFORTS.

15.K. CGC SHAMAL ENR IVO SECTOR MOBILE FOR POST-HURRICANE RESPONSE EFFORTS.

15.L. RECONSTITUTION OF DISTRICT MISSION PRIORITIZATION WILL BE DEVELOPED. D8 WILL PROVIDE GRANULARITY OF DISTRICT PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO BACKFILL D8 PERSONNEL/CREW MEMBERS/WATCHSTANDERS/TO ASSIST WITH MISSION WHILE PROVIDING RELIEF FOR D8 PERSONNEL.

15.M. PST ENR ALEXANDRIA, LA ETA 30AUG05 WITH 14 PERSONNEL FOR POST-HURRICANE RESPONSE EFFORTS. POC: ENS BLANCHARD, 415.720.4160.

16. ACTION REQUIRED:

16.A. POTENTIAL CIVILIAN PAY PROBLEMS, REQ LANTAREA TAKE FORAC. BELIEVE THAT UNDER NEW CIVILIAN PAY SYSTEM, COAST GUARD CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES WILL NOT BE PAID WITHOUT SUPERVISOR CERTIFICATION OF CIVILIAN TIME SHEETS BY 6 SEP. ANTICIPATE NUMEROUS CIVILIAN SUPERVISORS BEING DISPLACED FROM D8 AREA OVER NEXT TWO TO THREE WEEKS, UNABLE TO CERTIFY TIME SHEETS. REQ LANTAREA TO INVESTIGATE AND ADVISE OF WORKAROUNDS TO AVOID CIVILIAN PAY BEING DISRUPTED DURING TIME OF CRITICAL NEED.

BT

NNNN



Lester, Loving & Davies

February 6, 2006

Ms. Harriet Miers
Counsel to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

FAX: (202) 456-6279
(original will follow by mail)

Re: Testimony of Michael D. Brown

Dear Ms. Miers:

As you know, Michael D. Brown, former Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness and Response, is scheduled to testify before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on Friday, February 10, 2006. I represent Mr. Brown with respect to his appearance at the hearing.

Mr. Brown, of course, testified on September 27, 2005, before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. In preparation for this Friday's testimony, Mr. Brown was interviewed by Senate Committee staff on January 23, 2006. During both his testimony before the House and his interview by Senate Committee staff, Mr. Brown was asked several questions concerning his conversations with the President, the Vice President, and several top aides to the President, including Chief of Staff Andy Card, Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove, Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, Domestic Policy Advisor Claude Allen, and National Security Advisor Steve Hadley.

During the Senate interview, whenever Mr. Brown was asked such questions, David Trissell, General Counsel for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, raised an objection. Although Mr. Trissell was careful not to make a specific claim of, or use the words, "executive privilege," Mr. Trissell objected to testimony about what he called "executive level communications." By this, Mr. Trissell indicated he meant to cover in his objection any testimony concerning communications between Mr. Brown and the President or the Vice

**Lester, Loving &
Davies, P.C.**
1701 South Kelly Avenue
Edmond, OK 73013-3623
Phone: (405) 844-9900
Fax: (405) 844-9958
web: www.llldlaw.com

President, and the substance of any communications between Mr. Brown and the other mentioned individuals.

After Mr. Trissell made his objections, Mr. Brown generally tried to accommodate what he understood to be the desires of the White House as expressed by Mr. Trissell. Mr. Brown's questioners did not attempt to force him to disclose the material to which the Administration's objections were made.

It is my understanding that the Administration has made similar objections during the testimony and interviews of numerous FEMA and DHS officials over the last year. I understand that such objections were made not merely in connection with Congressional investigations into the response to Hurricane Katrina, but in connection with previous matters, as well.

Given the numerous questions on such points to Mr. Brown during his Committee staff interview, and given the widely publicized comments by both the Committee Chairman and the Ranking Member immediately after Mr. Brown's interview, I fully expect similar questions to arise during Friday's testimony.

As has been the situation since the outset of the various Congressional hearings regarding the response to Hurricane Katrina, Mr. Brown has been and is prepared to answer any and all questions. He intends to answer all questions fully, completely, and accurately. Specifically, unless there is specific direction otherwise by the President, including an assurance the President will provide a legal defense to Mr. Brown if he refuses to testify as to these matters, Mr. Brown will testify, if asked, about particular communications he had with the individuals named earlier in this letter. His desire is that all facts be made public.

During his press conference on Thursday, January 26, 2006, the President was asked the following question:

Why is it that this administration is not allowing the senior -- your senior staff that you conversated [*sic*] with prior to Hurricane Katrina, during and after, to testify, to interview or talk with congressional leaders? And why not push Michael Brown, who is now a private citizen, to go before them, as he is what many are calling a linchpin to the whole issue?

As the President indicated, the question was based on a mistaken premise. Mr. Brown has gone before Congress and has talked with, testified to, and been interviewed at length by Congress. However, in his response, President Bush stated:

And so we're fully cooperative with the members of the House in -
- of the Senate, and we'll do so without giving away my ability to get sound advice from people on my staff. You see, April, here's --

and this is an issue that comes up all the time, and you might -- we've had several discussions like this since I've been the President. If people give me advice and they're forced to disclose that advice, it means the next time an issue comes up I might not be able to get unvarnished advice from my advisors. And that's just the way it works.

When asked if "that include[s] Michael Brown," the President stated:

People who give me advice, it will have a chilling effect on future advisors if the precedent is such that when they give me advice that it's going to be subject to scrutiny.

See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060126.html>.

Given these statements, Mr. Brown is rightly concerned about how he should proceed this Friday when he appears before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. On the one hand, he desires to answer fully any and all questions the Committee may have. On the other hand, the President's statements indicate concern that the President be able to "get unvarnished advice from [his] advisors."

Mr. Brown greatly respects President Bush personally and the office of the President. He understands the centrality of the separation of powers in the Constitutional design of our government and the securing of liberty. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "special considerations control when the Executive Branch's interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications are implicated." The Court has also noted that "the public interest requires that a coequal branch of Government 'afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice.'" Of course, "[i]t is well established that 'a President's communications and activities encompass a vastly wider range of sensitive material than would be true of any ordinary individual.'"

The right of claiming such a privilege belongs to the President, not Mr. Brown. It is, as the Supreme Court has stated, "the Executive's Article II prerogative[]." Because he is no longer a member of the Executive Branch, however, Mr. Brown is not in a position to assert such a prerogative. As Mr. Trissell noted on at least one occasion during the January 23, 2006, interview, Mr. Brown is a private citizen; he does not and cannot presume either to assert or to waive the President's rights.

Therefore, as counsel to Michael Brown, I am requesting that the President make clear to him whether the President will assert Executive or some other Privilege that would prevent Mr. Brown from testifying as to any of his communications with Executive Branch officials. If the President desires to claim

some sort of privilege, please provide specific direction as to which communications with which individuals will be covered. Also, please let me know who will be present at the hearing to claim the privilege on behalf of the President. Because of the timing of the hearing, the need to obtain a clear, direct answer in a timely manner, and the length of time it will take me to travel from Oklahoma to Washington to represent Mr. Brown at the February 10, 2006, hearing, it is imperative I receive an answer no later than 5:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on Wednesday, February 8, 2005.

I appreciate your consideration of this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'A. W. Lester', written in a cursive style.

Andrew W. Lester

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 2006

Dear Mr. Lester:

Thank you for your letter of February 6, 2006 addressing the forthcoming testimony of your client, Michael Brown, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Administration appreciates your client's assistance thus far with the processes that have been undertaken by the Administration and by Congressional committees designed to discover the lessons to be learned from the response to Hurricane Katrina and to ensure that responses to future catastrophes meet the high standards that the American people demand and deserve. We know that your client's continued cooperation with assisting those processes will be of value.

As I know you appreciate, your client's service to the President as a senior official imposes a responsibility to maintain the confidentiality of certain communications. The President has emphasized the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of communications to him and his senior advisors in the course of assisting the President's decision-making. Asked about communications concerning the federal government's response to Hurricane Katrina, and specifically about whether your client should disclose confidential communications, the President stated on January 26, 2006 that "[i]f people give me advice and they're forced to disclose that advice, it means the next time an issue comes up I might not be able to get unvarnished advice from my advisors" and that "[p]eople who give me advice, it will have a chilling effect on future advisors if the precedent is such that when they give me advice that it's going to be subject to scrutiny."


The President's views regarding these Executive Branch interests have not changed. I appreciate that your client is sensitive to the interests implicated by potential disclosure of confidential communications to which he was a party as a senior official in the Administration, as reflected in his recent responses to Congressional committees and their staffs, and request that he observe his past practices with respect to those communications.

Sincerely,

Harriet Miers
Counsel to the President

Mr. Andrew W. Lester
Lester, Loving & Davies, P.C.
1701 South Kelly Avenue
Edmond, Oklahoma 73013-3623
Fax: (405) 844-9958

**EP&R/FEMA Study
Meeting Notes V1
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Meeting held at EP&R/FEMA
Monday, March 7, 2005, from 9:30 am to 11:00 am

Attendees:

From EP&R: Michael Brown, Scott Morris, Ken Burris,
From MITRE: Bob Shepherd, Rick Sciambi,
Larry Jurica, Joanne DeVincent

Bob Shepherd presented a briefing titled "Initial Assessment of EP&R" that summarized MITRE's findings from interviews and research.

Highlights from Mr. Brown's questions and comments:

1. How would you differentiate between an event of national significance and a **tornado** event over six counties?
2. Everything you've said, I believe. There are **no surprises**.
3. I'm not surprised that **response and recovery** comes up but don't allow it to drive the solution. Its just one of many factors.
4. This is our downtime each year. When nothing's going on, the **brain drain** gets worse
5. Is **Florida** the kind of disaster that should have been done from Headquarters?
6. I find that fascinating (referring to the statement that EP&R can't sustain **10 regions**).
7. I think you've articulated it very well; you've articulated what we all know (referring to accountability).
8. The whole problem.... This is true from my point downward and upward. (referring to the need to train to **build trust** both within EP&R and within DHS)
9. When I can't sleep at night... (I think about) another 9/11 and what do they do for **command and control**?
10. How do I get on the track to **put DHS on track**? Coast Guard, ICE, TSA, and ODP aren't going to respond. I'm having a difficult time separating this from the above (internal EP&R concerns).
11. That is precisely my concern in **Florida**. People are puppets on a string in one event and left hanging in another.
12. It would be interesting to diagram all the **teams** and functions coming into play. **I want to do that before making a decision**.
13. Interesting concept, **lead regions**. Also a good management tool. Gives people a mission, focus. I could accomplish a lot with enters of excellence. We've had a Region IV regional director open but I don't need one. I wouldn't

**EP&R/FEMA Study
Meeting Notes V1
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have to go to the Hill on realigning regions. I could do it by management and I don't care what DHS does.


14. I read that **training** and it's a joke (referring to a recent training publication).
15. I need to get a dedicated team on **communications**. Where do I find that goddess?
16. So everyone's response was based on their own role (referring to the lack of a clear opinion on **response and recovery** at headquarters)
17. I don't care how they are aligned (referring to the number **of regions**). I do care about how people are used. The upside; whatever DHS decides, as long as I have the people and places out there.
18. I'd like to see the data beneath it (referring to COTS programs to improve **situational awareness**).
19. Does it (**Homeland Security Act**) fit in with our mission? Look at the Act and see about substituting FEMA into EPR. Our role was expanded by the Act and diminished by the Secretary
20. Where are we going to find these people (referring to the teams recommended to carry out the priority actions)?

Highlights from Mr. Burris's questions and comments:


1. We spend \$300K per month to keep **ice** frozen
2. Breadth and depth? (referring to inability to sustain 10 **regions**)
3. **Board of governors**? Never heard of it. (Notes record "board of visitors" from interview with Eric Tolbert)
4. **FCO** doesn't answer to anybody. The problem is that the FCO has no authority unless the regional director delegates authority to sign checks...There's no FCO until a disaster is declared.
5. I find "limited **training funds**" interesting. We have millions of training dollars but they're not focused.... We don't have funds to do the training they want."
6. Our (HR) managers don't understand the flexibility we have... they don't use the tools we do have (referring to **hiring**).
7. We have the talent to have a fewer number of very capable **teams**... comes back to centers of excellence. If one group is in charge, everyone gets interested and gets ownership

ACTION ITEMS:

1. MITRE will provide and annotated briefing by Monday, March 14, 2005



000144



Task Description

- **To increase effectiveness, EP&R is reviewing its policies, plans, organization, and systems**
- **MITRE's initial task**
 - Interview EP&R executives to identify organizational strengths, pain points, opportunities, and challenges
 - Provide report on opinions expressed by executives
 - Derive preliminary recommendations from solutions proposed by executives

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During our initial discussions about this project, you told us you were resolved on improving the effectiveness of EP&R and wanted MITRE to provide the objective evaluation that wasn't coming from your RAMP reports. This is what we will be presenting to you today: a report on the current state of EP&R as seen through the eyes of your executives.


We will also be presenting preliminary options derived from solutions proposed by the executives.

Background

Mr. Brown's original direction to MITRE was to identify problems, issues, and barriers

- What's preventing FEMA from responding and recovering as quickly as possible?
- What are the things preventing FEMA from effective management?
- What are my options?
- What are the barriers and how we can overcome them?
- How should we support our organizations for response, recovery and mitigation?

000145



These themes seemed to underlie many of the concerns you and your executives expressed during the interviews.

Issues concerning EP&R organizational roles and responsibilities:

- Unclear or inconsistent role of Headquarters versus the regions during the response phase
 - EP&R will be called on to respond to any major disaster, natural or man-made
 - There needs to be enterprise-level command and control. Not only does Headquarters need to be able to respond to the White House and Congress, but it will also need to be able to define priorities in case operations are needed concurrently in multiple locations
- Unclear lines of responsibility lead to inconsistent accountability
- Lack of trust; personal relationships and experience trump organizational roles.

EP&R plans and procedures are non-existent, outdated, or inconsistent

- Standard Operating Procedures outdated or inconsistent between field and HQ: Regions often define their own operating procedures without coordinating them with HQ
- Lack of repeatable processes

Lack of adequate and consistent situational awareness across the enterprise. And there is the need to effectively use resources.

- This leads naturally to questions like: is 15,000 trailers too many to have in stock? How many should there be? Where are they and who has gotten them in the field? Who needs to know where they are? Clearly an asset management system is needed.


Inadequate work force management.

- There is a significant "brain drain" going on in EP&R.
- There is an inability to staff openings and there are not enough senior emergency management experts, or subject matter experts with enough technical experience.
- There is no deputy to you with operational experience and there are too many political appointees, too many temporary employees, too many "actings."
- There is not enough recruiting, and not enough training.
- Furthermore, the reduction in EP&R funding affects personnel most acutely because it's the only place EP&R can cut. Since services and equipment can't be cut, people end up going.

Staff feel marginalized because of FEMA's move to DHS.

- The assignment of EP&R to DHS, the loss of cabinet representation, the split in responsibility with ODP, and the loss of grants administration to ODP has meant that EP&R's authority has been lessened and it has become vulnerable to taxation by DHS.
- Roadblocks have been created and there has been a loss of morale.

000146




Large cadre of highly motivated and dedicated personnel. We were told that this is a culture in which people work very hard. They do whatever it takes to get the job done.

One person said: "We won't let it fail."

EP&R has also proven its ability to:

- Assert control from Headquarters for response efforts to major natural disasters when necessary. EP&R needs flexibility to assume this role when necessary
- Accommodate tailored responses according to the types and severity of a disaster and that includes
 - Procuring the assets necessary to support response operations and
 - Managing recovery operations from the Regional level
- EP&R can deploy skilled, knowledgeable personnel and they provide timely, initial assessments and ongoing coordination
- And some EP&R Regional centers have built highly productive relationships with states and localities.



In the course of analyzing data, we have found a number of items that contribute to performance. Here they are in the form of quotes from your executives. These quotes will indicate to you the candor with which your executives expressed themselves. They also illustrate the operational aspects of the Five Themes.

Organization

- "No one's in charge. Everybody's in charge."
- "People work their hearts out. They're burned out."
- "I didn't trust him, so I refused to work with him."
- "The Regional Directors have not been told what is expected of them"
- "We cannot sustain 10 Regions." This refers to operations and the breadth and depth of expertise which is now spread too thin.
- "We should have a limited number of operational centers that are state of the art with highly trained people"
- Additional quote: "No one's ever told me what my job is."

Operations

- "What is the vision? What are our goals? No one can tell you."
- "We always do each disaster differently."
- "We need plans to do surge assistance quickly in a disaster."
- "We've had 3 or 4 people ordering water for the same people."
- "We haven't published field operations guides in three years."

Support services


- "If the White House asks, 'Where are the water trucks? I can't tell them."
- "The current HQ/field arrangement requires hours of video conferencing."
- "We lost visibility of everything."
- Additional quote: "NEMIS is a hodgepodge."

Additional Quotes

Organization

- The political appointees don't understand business, can't make policy decisions, and are driven by politics and the latest news clips.
- People want to be led and told what they should pursue. Is the vision to prevent disasters, build partnerships? It's fuzzy. It's important for the Under Secretary to articulate the vision and say "I want you to come along with me."
- There's no on-going advice from our external communities. We had a board of visitors but it is now defunct.
- Leadership is key to success with states. Senior management has to lead, provide guidance, give orders, follow through and hold people accountable. This would allow the Regions to do what they think is the right thing to do.

000148



Plans and Processes

- EP&R mission diffused
- Roles and responsibilities of HQ and the Regions unclear or redundant
- Standard Operating Procedures missing or ignored
- Planning is low in priority


People and Structure

- Roles and responsibilities of staff unclear or redundant
- Reliance on personal relationships rather than procedures
- Culture rewards heroic behavior rather than adherence to procedures
- Inadequate staffing and skill sets

Technology

- No capability to support situational awareness throughout EP&R
- Inadequate ability to control inventory and track assets

000149



This Framework for Action includes possible solutions that are highly interdependent and must be integrated to be successful. For example: the Concept of Operations will drive the policies, plans and procedures necessary to implement situational awareness.

Plans and Processes

- Clearly define a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for executing the mission
- Produce and maintain integrated policies, plans, and procedures
 - Establish a full-time planning function
 - Train to the plans and procedures


People and Structure


- Review organizational roles and responsibilities with respect to:
 - Relationship of Response to Recovery at Headquarters
 - Regional structure and operational role
- Clarify roles, responsibilities, and reporting relationships for each employee
- Manage the workforce for mission results

Technology

- Develop a situational awareness capability for the entire organization
- Create an asset management system

000150





Action Plan

Clearly define a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for executing the mission

Plans & Processes **People**
Technology

• Actions

- Clarify the mission/vision of EP&R
 - Is EP&R "America's 9-1-1"? What about terrorist events?
 - Should the mission be bounded: "No dough for snow?"
 - Re-establish leadership for EM at the State & local level (no EM grants)?
- Develop a CONOPS and governance strategy emphasizing
 - Operational command
 - Logistics coordination
 - Staffing coordination
 - Response teams
 - Lines of communication
 - Contingency plan for responding to a second simultaneous or near-simultaneous major disaster

• Inhibitors

- Limited number of people who "understand the business"
- Complexity of external collaboration
 - Up to DHS
 - Other government agencies (OGAs)

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A Concept of Operations (CONOPS) needs to be clearly defined for the entire EP&R organization, including the Regions and all key external stakeholders.

When the next terrorist events happen, EP&R will be called on operationally. The CONOPS would be designed for this reality and put the elements in place for EP&R to be better positioned to carry the day. Modeling and simulation could indicate unnecessary overlaps and gaps in coordination with the rest of DHS, DoD, DoT etc.

Actions

- Clarify the mission/vision of EP&R
 - Is EP&R "America's 9-1-1"? What about terrorist events?
 - Should the mission be bounded: "No dough for snow?"
 - Re-establish leadership for emergency management at the State & local level (no emergency management grants)?
- Develop a CONOPS and governance strategy emphasizing
 - Operational command
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
Inhibitors

- Limited number of people who "understand the business"
- Complexity of external collaboration
 - Up to DHS
 - Other government agencies (OGAs)

Additional quotes

- "Our biggest impediment is lack of command and control, not fully defining our standard operating procedures so everyone understands and adheres to them."
- "HQ decided to play the role of the Region in Florida, out of desperately wanting visibility on the ground. This led to confusion of the people in the field as to who they were reporting to. That never should have been HQ's role when all we really wanted was operational visibility. We weren't intentionally trying to take tactical control. We only did it out of necessity."

000152



This slide refers to the relationship between FEMA Headquarters and regions with respect to responding to major disasters of national interest only. These are disasters so large in scope that they are followed by national media. Everyone interviewed felt that the regions do an excellent job with recovery operations, management of the recovery phase of a disaster and with the normal day to day or "run of the mill" response operations. This is not the case with major disasters of national interest.

We heard three prevailing concepts for response to incidents of national interest and they are illustrated here. A key question is the role HQ should play. Should HQ have a command role?


Option 1 is the basic way that response is handled today. The regions play the primary role in coordinating national assets, procurement and people to meet requirements emanating from the disaster area. The regions are experienced in doing this and have established relationships with the state and local emergency management organizations so they have an understanding of each state's capabilities to respond to this type of disaster and an established working relationship. Since the regions have been intimately involved with the response phase, they are better prepared to transition and handle the recovery phase. There is concern that the regions are not prepared to respond to a major disaster that has national coverage or that the information flow from the regions will be sufficient to give Headquarters the situation awareness they need.

Option 2 would have Headquarters play the primary role in coordinating logistic assets, procurement and people. Since Headquarters is directly involved with the day-to-day response operations, they should have better situation awareness and a greater ability to influence the outcome of the response operation. Since the field is dealing directly with Headquarters to obtain national assets, response times in meeting logistics requirements should be quicker and more efficient since the middleman (the regional office) has been removed. The concern here is that Headquarters may become overwhelmed. They also need to ensure they find a way to capitalize on the relationships that the regions have established with the state and local EM organizations and ensure the region is familiar with the response operation and there is a smooth transition to the recovery phase for management by the region.

Option 3 is a hybrid of the two previous options and one that is generally supported in this or a variant form by a majority of the people interviewed. Under this option a specified set of criteria would be used to determine whether Headquarters or a region would have the primary coordination support for the disaster area. Response efforts for major disasters of national interest would be handled by Headquarters while the more routine disaster responses would be run by the region. This would help provide Headquarters personnel with the situation awareness they need, as well as allow them to bring national assets to bear as required in a more expedient manner. At a certain point during the response phase, again based upon a specified set of criteria, the primary responsibility for response efforts to the disaster would pass to the region. The region would then manage the disaster through the remainder of the response phase and transition it into the recovery phase. This option capitalizes on the strength of both organizational levels—Headquarters and the region. This option was even more appealing when the national emergency response team was sent in as a precursor to establishing the Disaster Field Office to assess the situation, report back to Headquarters and if necessary begin coordinating with the state EM organization. Selection of this option would require new doctrine be developed and extensive training should be done to assure the smooth transition of operations from Headquarters to the regions. Also important is adequate training of the members of the national emergency response teams to ensure they truly function as a team and coordinate well with the states.

000153

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**Option 1****Advantages**

- Regions with experience
- Continuity of operations
- Established relationships with state and local EM organizations

Disadvantages

- Regions may become overwhelmed
- Poor situational awareness
- Duplication of effort

Option 2**Advantages**

- Better situational awareness
- Greater ability to influence
- More responsive coordination and assignment of national assets

Disadvantages

- Headquarters may become overwhelmed
- Continuity of operations
- Lack of relationships with state and local EM organizations

Option 3**Advantages**

- Better situational awareness
- Greater ability to influence
- More responsive coordination and assignment of national assets
- Continuity of operations

Disadvantages

- New doctrine must be developed
- Additional training

000154

11

Center for Emergency Management

- **Produce and maintain an integrated set of policies, plans, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)**

• Actions

- Establish a full-time planning function at HQ
- Conduct a phased review of existing policies, plans, and procedures
 - ♦ Ensure compliance with external directives (e.g., NRP) and consistency across Regions and agencies
 - ♦ Identify gaps and inconsistencies
- Identify specific individuals to own and successfully drive getting the job done
- Designate lead Region for different types of disasters (e.g., R-IV -> hurricanes)
- Produce the plans and procedures
- Exercise the plans: conduct training exercises to validate and reinforce the plans

• Inhibitors

- Resistance to adopting standardized procedures
- Requires clear articulation of tasks
- Limited training funds
- Uncertainty around EP&R's role in preparedness in DHS
- Limited number of people who "understand the business"
- Requires a dedicated team to carefully and forcefully execute the communication and implementation plans

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An integrated set of policies, plans, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) should be produced and maintained.

Actions

- Establish a full-time planning function at HQ
- Conduct a phased review of existing policies, plans, and procedures
 - Ensure compliance with external directives (e.g., NRP) and consistency across Regions and agencies
 - Identify gaps and inconsistencies
- Identify specific individuals to own and successfully drive getting the job done
- Designate lead Region for different types of disasters (e.g., R-IV -> hurricanes). This could bring a mission focus to the Regions based on the types of disasters they normally experience. Evolving the Regions into centers of excellence would open up a more precise allocation of resources and could offer opportunities to streamline management.
- Produce the plans and procedures
- Exercise the plans: conduct training exercises to validate and reinforce the plans

Inhibitors


- Resistance to adopting standardized procedures
 - Tendency to revert to 'heroic' operational model
 - Data standards differ among agency partners
- Requires clear articulation of tasks
- Limited training funds
- Uncertainty around EP&R's role in preparedness in DHS
- Limited number of people who "understand the business" and competing priorities
- Requires a dedicated team to carefully and forcefully execute the communication and implementation plans

Additional quotes


- "I don't think we drive our people to truly plan. We need to take a step to the side and ask, 'What if this happens again?' We don't take advantage of the slow times. A full-time planning unit would help; that's a 'wonderful idea.' I assumed we had answers and we didn't."
- "Doctrine and SOPs aren't coordinated between HQ and Regions. Plans are maintained Regionally and funneled up. We haven't published doctrine or field operational guides (FOGs) in over years. Our plans must be updated due to National Response Plan and we need to do reviews of our programs and regulations, e.g. flood insurance."

Key dependencies: Re-affirmed Mission and Vision, CONOPS

000155




009156



Center for Enterprise Modernization

Accelerating the Transformation of the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry

- **Clarify the roles, responsibilities, and reporting relationships for each employee**
- **Actions**
 - Perform job function analysis based on roles and responsibilities defined in CONOPS
 - Develop organizational reporting structure
 - Identify key skill sets
 - Create job descriptions and performance plans
 - Educate workforce through communication and implementation plans
- **Inhibitors**
 - Challenge of managing across stovepipes in divisions at Headquarters and Regions
 - Tension between Headquarters and the Regions
 - Distrust between different elements
 - Requires a dedicated team to carefully and forcefully execute the communication and implementation plans



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14

Clarify the roles, responsibilities, and reporting relationships for each employee.

Actions


- Perform job function analysis based on roles and responsibilities defined in CONOPS. What the personnel requirements and coordinating relationships necessary to carry out the CONOPS?
- Develop organizational reporting structure; publish org charts. Place these in channels that are easily accessible so that everyone can refer to them at any time.
- Identify key skill sets
- Create job descriptions and performance plans. Each employee should understand what is expected of him or her.
- Educate workforce through communication and implementation plans
 - Meet with employees individually to communicate the org charts and job descriptions

Inhibitors

- Challenge of managing across stovepipes in divisions at Headquarters and Regions. As a national endeavor, it is difficult to for EP&R to keep reinforcing collaboration, information sharing and uniformity in processes, but it still needs to be done.
- Tension between Headquarters and the Regions and distrust between different elements can be lessened when everyone understands their roles
- Requires a dedicated team to carefully and forcefully execute the communication and implementation plans

Key dependencies: CONOPS

000157



There was no clear agreement as to whether or not recovery and response should be combined at the Headquarters level. Those who supported it felt that it would alleviate the ambiguity in the field about who to contact and provide a more integrated approach to managing disasters. The biggest concern for those who didn't support combining the two revolved around the size of the resulting organization. They felt that it would create a huge, unwieldy, dominating organization. During the interviews three possible options surfaced for combining recovery and response.


Option 1 leaves the existing response and recovery organizations intact but adds an Executive Director that both the Director for Response and Recover would report to.

A variant of this option that is not displayed would move Logistics to the division level since it supports both response and recovery.

Option 2 creates a new division with four equal branches, Response, Recovery, Logistics and Resource Support. This option provides a tighter coupling between response and recovery which should facilitate more efficient coordination between the two branches, and improved the continuity of operations as FEMA moves from the response to the recovery phase for a particular disaster. The two existing Resource Support Branches would be consolidated to form one that, like logistics, would support both response and recovery. This would preclude the two branches from competing for the same resources as well as simplify coordination with their organizational counterparts at the FEMA level.

Option 3 creates a new division that is organized along the lines of the Incident Command System (ICS). In this option, response and recovery would be co-located in the Operations Branch providing the tightest coupling of the two. This should facilitate coordination and help ensure the continuity of operations as FEMA moves from the response phase to the recovery phase for a specific disaster. This option also provides the organizational structure most closely aligned with the regions. This should help clarify who the Headquarters' counterparts are in the regions and facilitate communication and coordination between the two levels. Opinions differed relative to organizing around ICS. There was general agreement that the ICS construct could be used effectively for the initial stage of disaster operations, both for response and recovery, but that it would become unwieldy for sustained operations. In much the same way, consensus was that it would be too unwieldy to use in normal day-to-day routine at Headquarters.

000158




A number of people voiced their concern over the current number of regions and EP&R's continued ability to support them. It was generally felt that the number of regions should be reduced, or that the region concept be abandoned entirely in favor of a territorial concept. Although there was no agreement on the exact number of territories EP&R should divide the field into, most felt that it should be between three and five.

The primary concern about having 10 Regions was the ability to adequately staff them with people having the right skill sets and experience, and maintaining them in sufficient numbers. Reducing the number of field organizations would allow EP&R to redistribute and concentrate the existing resources.

Factors influencing the number of regions or operational centers of excellence include the roles and responsibilities they will have relative to disasters, expected resources available (people and budget), span of control, etc. One method of grouping the states could be by the type of disasters that most often occur within a cluster of states. These actions may result in identifying an alternate solution such as 10 Regional offices that predominantly serve as liaison offices to the state and local emergency management organizations and three to four territorial Operational Centers of Excellence. Performing a job function analysis will assist in determining the types and number of billets required within each region or field organization. A strategy should be developed to overcome the inhibitors.

A major inhibitor will be political pressure not to close FEMA offices. This pressure will probably emanate from both the state and federal level. Lease agreements may preclude the closure of certain facilities/offices for an extended period of time, and union agreements may influence what can and can't be done with regard to changing the regional construct. There is the possibility that EP&R could lose some of its most experience people if realignment of the regions requires them to move to another area of the country or even state. Finally, it may not make sense to make a decision until DHS resolves how it will organize its field organizations (regions, territories, etc.)



Manage the Workforce for Mission Results

Plans & Processes **People & Structure**
Technology

- Actions**
 - Determine critical competencies
 - Capture the knowledge of departing Subject Matter Experts
 - Link performance standards to mission objectives
 - ◆ Hold people accountable for performance
 - ◆ Provide meaningful incentives for high performance
 - Establish and reinforce trust through training exercises—HQ and Regions
 - Invest in training, professional development, recruitment
- Inhibitors**
 - Requires full and continuous commitment of leaders
 - Limited training budgets
 - Ineffective Human Resources organization
 - Difficulty in recruiting subject matter experts
 - Resistance to reporting against performance measures

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Manage the workforce to achieve mission results

Actions

- Determine critical competencies
- Capture the knowledge of departing Subject Matter Experts
 - Prepare for more than 50% retirement over the next 5 years
 - Determine critical competencies
 - Recruit from the states' emergency management experts
 - Promote the EP&R brand to attract and retain employees
 - Define requirements for positions for political appointees
- Link performance standards to mission objectives
 - Hold people accountable for performance
 - Provide meaningful incentives for high performance
- Establish and reinforce trust through training exercises—HQ and Regions
- Invest in training, professional development, recruitment, and career planning

Inhibitors

- Requires full and continuous commitment of leaders
- Limited training budgets
- Ineffective Human Resources organization
- Difficulty in recruiting subject matter experts
 - Historic resistance to collaborative planning between HQ and the Regions
 - De-centralized staffing in Regions
 - DHS is a competing brand for recruiting emergency management
- Time and resources diverted from field activities to knowledge management
- Resistance to reporting against performance measures


Additional Quotes


- "Our strategic plan indicated that almost 60% of our people would be eligible for retirement in a five-year period. That's a lot of institutional knowledge. There needs to be new blood but we'll be losing all that knowledge."
- "Political appointees in the Regions are well meaning but clueless. They've never dealt with state and local people, a county commissioner or supervisors."

Background Information

- U.S. Comptroller General David Walker said recently that with strategic human management, DHS "can help it marshal, manage and maintain the people and skills needed to meet its critical mission." FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK 021005
- Ronald James, chief human capital officer at DHS, recently told the Senate Homeland Security Committee that the new personnel rules are an important step to keep the homeland secure. "We need the ability to move swiftly in response to threats," James said. "The current system is too rigid to do this." FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK 021005

000160





EP&R needs to develop a situational awareness capability as an overarching effort: this will provide end-to-end visibility of operational status. This capability will allow EP&R to acquire, analyze, and disseminate information required to understand and communicate an accurate portrayal of the situation (location, status, intent) in order to support decision-making.

Actions

- Determine information needs of decision-makers
- Reinforce collaboration and sharing of information. This needs to include mission partners representing the regions and states
 - A common set of data standards is critical for developing a situation awareness capability—and the standards must be enforced.
- Establish policies, plans and procedures to ensure maximum effectiveness of continuous collection, monitoring and dissemination of data

Inhibitors

- Lack of technical infrastructure to facilitate information sharing
- Resistance to policies, plans and procedures
- Requires clear articulation of roles and tasks to be performed

There are a number of commercial applications that can assist with pulling together the data and information; it can be displayed in different formats to enhance HQ's ops center with screens providing near-real time situation updates. Other considerations may include compressing the decision time to meet operational needs. This will enable a faster op-tempo and would improve speed of command.


Key dependencies: CONOPS, Processes and Procedures, Asset Management

000162

Center for Enterprise Modernization

Asset Management System

• Create an asset management system which can feed the situational awareness capability

Plans & Processes **People & Structure**

Technology

• Actions

- Define requirements
- Perform independent assessment of bar code pilot
- Identify alternatives and conduct analysis
- Develop plan
- Substantiate in policies and procedures

• Inhibitors

- Implementation cost
- Integration with DHS, state and commercial systems
- Lack of infrastructure in disaster areas
- Need simple, reliable system and procedures, especially for part-time staff

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Create an asset management system which can feed the situational awareness capability

Actions

- Define requirements
- Perform independent assessment of bar code pilot
- Identify alternatives and conduct analysis
- Develop plan
- Substantiate in policies and procedures

Inhibitors

- Implementation cost
- Integration with DHS, state and commercial systems
 - EP&R will want to be able to leverage existing capabilities and to extend the capability of sharing
 - This is where the use of data standards and agreement on information sharing really pay off
- Lack of infrastructure in disaster areas
- Need simple, reliable system and procedures, especially for part-time staff

Additional quote:

"We could leverage the expertise of the major logistics companies."


Background

Asset management systems are now commonly available as full function COTS solutions, tightly integrated with both bar code and radio frequency (RF) tracking technologies. Many also integrate with GPS (or other) major item or distribution platform tracking technologies. This allows shelving and point-of-issue capture, visibility of inventory in motion, real time tracking of issue quantities and, if desired, post-issue tracking of major items or issues to specific end-users. The cost of these types of systems is falling rapidly, due to heavy leverage of Internet, wireless, and satellite services. These approaches typically reduce their dependence on work force training by automating the tracking process.


Asset and logistics management brings the potential for extremely efficient and effective real time control of logistics functions. Demand can be tracked in real time, and future demand dynamically forecasted. External information can be integrated into these forecasts to account for what will be needed, and where, rather than what was needed earlier. It also supports agile redistribution of assets to keep up with changing critical needs. Finally, these technologies integrate into existing commercial supply chains and distribution management networks, which would allow EP&R to leverage external, as well as internal, stockages in response to disasters.

Key dependencies: CONOPS

000163



000164



Center for Enterprise Modernization

1. Decide on operational concept for disaster response

- Primary coordination is between DFO and Region
- Primary coordination is between DFO and Headquarters
- Major disasters of national interest only
 - ♦ Initially primary coordination is between DFO and Headquarters
 - ♦ Primary coordination responsibility moves to Region at specified time

2. Decide on organizational relationship at Headquarters between Response and Recovery


- Maintain current relationship – equal but separate
- Maintain current relationship but insert executive director
- Combine Response and Recovery into one division
- Combine Response and Recovery under ICS structure

3. Decide on field organization structure

- Maintain current structure – 10 Regions
- Reduce number of Regions
- Introduce new structure
 - ♦ Regional Liaison Offices
 - ♦ Smaller number of Territorial Centers of excellence

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This slide summarizes the key decisions that, once made, will clarify the command structure. Dependent on these decisions are the roles and responsibilities, standard operating procedures and the information flows that can provide situational awareness.



- **Baseline Concept of Operations and Standard Operating Procedures**
- **Address the situational awareness problem**
- **Clearly outline roles, responsibilities, accountabilities**
 - Investigate alternative models for command and control during response phase
 - If "Every disaster has a public affairs component that is vital to its success," then this should be part of the roles & SOPs
 - Clarify Regional (DRM) relationship with FCO, HQ with DFO
 - Clarify reporting relationship of FCO during response—who is really in charge during response phase?
 - Evaluate EP&R Regional structure
- **Clearly articulate the mission of EP&R within the context of DHS**
- ***Strongly recommend dedicated teams to address these actions***

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
A Concept of Operations (CONOPS) needs to be clearly defined for the entire EP&R organization, including the Regions and all key external stakeholders. The CONOPS will form the basis for evaluating the current standard operating procedures and creating new ones as needed. It will also allow for higher levels of efficiency, confidence and trust.

The situational awareness problem is closely aligned to the CONOPS. Once the command structure is determined then the information needs of all those within it can be defined. The right processes can be set in place to capture and deliver the needed information in a timely manner.

Roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities, should be made clear to everyone. This is especially true regarding the rationale for changes in command and control during the response phase, the need to attend to external audiences during major incidents, and the operating relationships of HQ, the regions, and the FCO.

Steps could be taken to educate the other DHS agencies to the critical responsibility carried by EP&R.

000166



● Develop strategic business case to take to OMB and Congress to reinforce need for a robust Emergency Management budget

● Evaluate

- Outsourcing
- Support services
- Dependence on Disaster Assistance Employees

● Take stewardship of the National Response Plan

● Create an advisory council of EM professionals to strengthen the availability of EM expertise

● Pursue critical strategic updates to the Stafford Act

● Communicate EP&R's role and value throughout DHS


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This slide focuses on what EP&R could do near-term to improve EP&R's effectiveness in the larger arena of DHS and the states, no matter what options from the other slides are adopted.


The overall theme is "Get People Talking To Each Other" because "It's all about relationships."

- Develop strategic business case to take to OMB and Congress to reinforce need for a robust Emergency Management budget
- Evaluate
 - Outsourcing
 - "A lot can be privatized."
 - Upgrading support services
 - "HR can't fill positions, can't track people or account for FTEs."
 - "Acquisitions is broke. They can't replenish the equipment of our medical teams."
 - "We have people who've gone months on getting their travel reimbursed."
 - "General counsel's office produces differing opinions that aren't resolved. This stalls decisions."
 - EP&R's dependency on Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs)
 - "Many of our people are not true responders. We don't know if they are going to show up. We provide nothing to make them show up."
 - "We should give them benefits and a certain number of hours, a minimum of 3 months pay, so if not employed, they are being trained. If they don't show up, they are gone."
- Take stewardship of the National Response Plan
 - Reach out directly to the states
 - "We can't afford to wait for them (the states) to be on their knees"
 - "Leadership is key to success with states. Senior management has to lead, provide guidance, give orders, follow through and hold people accountable. This would allow the Regions to do what they think is the right thing to do."
 - "Brainstorm with them. Don't leave it to DHS."
 - Initiate dialog with ODP on setting standards for all-hazards preparedness
 - "We've wasted too much time in conflict with ODP."
 - "My greatest fear is that we're not prepared for no-notice events."
 - Sponsor multi-agency coordination sessions in Washington
 - Jointly sponsor honest discussions with states
 - Ensure EP&R-recommended requirements for response and recovery are included in ODP's grants to states
 - Initiate dialog with Coast Guard on regions
- Create an advisory council of EM professionals to strengthen the availability of EM expertise
 - "If FEMA is changing the way it does business, then other agencies have to also."
- Pursue critical strategic updates to the Stafford Act
- Communicate EP&R's role and value throughout DHS
 - "After the hurricanes, there was a time for DHS to tout its capability. But it didn't. Maybe it was lack of confidence."

000167

 EP&R	
CENTER FOR ENTERPRISE MODERNIZATION	
Initial Interviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • January 25, 2005 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gary Moore, Logistics Branch Chief - Patrick Rhode, Chief of Staff - Dan Craig, Director of Recovery - Ken Burris, Director of Operations • January 26, 2005 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Michael D. Brown, Under Secretary - Eric Tolbert, Director of Response - Brooks Altshuler, Director of Policy - Mike Lowder, Supervisory Program Specialist • January 27, 2005 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bill Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer - Ed Bulkema, Regional Director - Scott Morris, Deputy Chief of Staff 	Follow-on Interviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • February 4, 2005 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Eric Tolbert, Director of Response • February 8, 2005 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bill Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer • February 10, 2005 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ken Burris, Director of Operations - Dan Craig, Director of Recovery • February 17, 2005 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ed Bulkema, Acting Director of Response • February 18, 2005 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dan Craig, Director of Recovery
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090168



• A Nation Prepared - Federal Emergency Management Agency Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2003 - 2008
 • Disaster Workforce Assessment, January-February 2002
 • ERT-41 Operations Plan, November 2002
 • FEMA Logistics Branch, November 5, 2004
 • FEMA Management Study, undated
 • GAO-04-180 Report: Continuity of Operations: Improved Planning Needed to Ensure Delivery of Essential Government Services
 • GAO-04-091 Report: Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally Chartered Commissions and GAO
 • GAO-04-0188 Report: FEMA Accountability Over Property
 • GAO-04-088R Report: Status of Key Recommendations GAO Has Made to DHS and Its Legacy Agencies
 • Homeland Security Act of 2002
 • Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: Management of Domestic Incidents
 • Incident Command System - www.fhisd.gov
 • Logistics Vision for FEMA, January 26, 2006
 • National Incident Management System fact sheet - www.dhs.gov
 • National Response Plan, December 2004
 • NFPA 1800 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs 2004 Edition
 • Office of Domestic Preparedness - www.odp.usdoj.gov
 • OPM Review of FEMA Disaster Temporary Employees, June 2004
 • Pre-Positioned Disaster Supply Business Case, November 5, 2004
 • Proposed Contingency Plan for Federal Disaster Operations - DRAFT, September 2001
 • Quarterly Performance Review FY 2002 - Q1 Briefing Response Program, January 26, 2003
 • Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
 • Special RAMP Report: Remedial Action Issues, Lessons Learned and Smart Practices Arising from the Federal Response to the 2004 Atlantic Hurricanes, November 26, 2004
 • Special RAMP Report: Remedial Action Issues, Lessons Learned and Smart Practices Arising from the Federal Response to Hurricanes Isabel - FINAL REPORT, December 19, 2003
 • Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for FEMA Region IV Region Operation Center (ROC), April 2003
 • Testimony and statement by Michael D. Brown, Under Secretary, Emergency Preparedness and Response and before House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security, March 24, 2004
 • Total Asset Viability Business Case, November 5, 2004

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Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs
EXHIBIT #6

From: Heath, Michael
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 10:20 AM
To: Brown, Michael D
Subject: FW: superdome

From Marty. He is at the New Orleans EOC and is watching this as it unfolds. Mike Beeman is in Gulfport. However, we have not been able to establish communications with him.

Marty is going to try to send us photos shortly.

-----Original Message-----

From: Heath, Michael
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 10:12 AM
To: Rhode, Patrick; Altshuler, Brooks; Burris, Ken
Subject: RE: superdome

From Marty Bahamonde in the New Orleans EOC (next to the superdome)

-Severe flooding on the St. Bernard/Orleans parish line. Police report water level up to second floor of two story houses. People are trapped in attics.

-Pumps starting to fail. The city has now confirmed four pumps are off line.

-Windows and parts of the east side of the Amaco building blown out.

-New Orleans shopping center (next to superdome) destroyed.

-Windows and parts of the East side of the Hyatt Hotel have been blown out. Furniture is blowing out of the hotel.

-Top floors of the Entergy building have been blown out -Area around the Superdome is beginning to flood.

We should have pictures shortly.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lowder, Michael
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:39 AM
To: Brown, Michael D; Rhode, Patrick; Heath, Michael; Buikema, Edward; Craig, Daniel; Lokey, William; Jones, Gary
Subject: FW: superdome

F Y I

-----Original Message-----

From: Green, Matthew
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:36 AM
To: Lowder, Michael
Subject: RE: superdome

Report that the levee in Arabi has failed.. next to the industrial canal

Matthew Green
FEMA Hurricane Liaison Team Coordinator
National Hurricane Center
11691 SW 17th Street
Miami, Florida, 33165-2149 USA
305-225-4217

-----Original Message-----



333

From: Lowder, Michael
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:21 AM
To: Green, Matthew
Subject: RE: superdome

Yes, we have reports that two pieces have blown off.

No word on impact to the structural integrity

-----Original Message-----

From: Green, Matthew
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:09 AM
To: Lowder, Michael; Gray, Richard
Subject: superdome

Ham radio here reports that a piece of the superdome roof has peeled off... but I can not confirm.. just thought you would want to know... I am sure your sources know more.

Matthew Green
FEMA Hurricane Liaison Team Coordinator
National Hurricane Center
11691 SW 17th Street
Miami, Florida, 33165-2149 USA
305-225-4217

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 2006

Dear Mr. Lester:

Thank you for your letter of February 6, 2006 addressing the forthcoming testimony of your client, Michael Brown, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Administration appreciates your client's assistance thus far with the processes that have been undertaken by the Administration and by Congressional committees designed to discover the lessons to be learned from the response to Hurricane Katrina and to ensure that responses to future catastrophes meet the high standards that the American people demand and deserve. We know that your client's continued cooperation with assisting those processes will be of value.

As I know you appreciate, your client's service to the President as a senior official imposes a responsibility to maintain the confidentiality of certain communications. The President has emphasized the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of communications to him and his senior advisors in the course of assisting the President's decision-making. Asked about communications concerning the federal government's response to Hurricane Katrina, and specifically about whether your client should disclose confidential communications, the President stated on January 26, 2006 that "[i]f people give me advice and they're forced to disclose that advice, it means the next time an issue comes up I might not be able to get unvarnished advice from my advisors" and that "[p]eople who give me advice, it will have a chilling effect on future advisors if the precedent is such that when they give me advice that it's going to be subject to scrutiny."

The President's views regarding these Executive Branch interests have not changed. I appreciate that your client is sensitive to the interests implicated by potential disclosure of confidential communications to which he was a party as a senior official in the Administration, as reflected in his recent responses to Congressional committees and their staffs, and request that he observe his past practices with respect to those communications.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Harriet Miers", with a stylized, flowing script.

Harriet Miers
Counsel to the President

Mr. Andrew W. Lester
Lester, Loving & Davies, P.C.
1701 South Kelly Avenue
Edmond, Oklahoma 73013-3623
Fax: (405) 844-9958

Committee on Governmental Affairs
EXHIBIT S

Photographs taken by FEMA Official Marty Bahamonde
from a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter above New Orleans

Monday, 8/29/05, estimated time: 5:30 - 6:00 pm.









